Posted on 12/23/2014 4:53:44 AM PST by thackney
Republican victories in the US midterm elections in early November and the Saudi Arabia-imposed decision by Opec on Nov. 27 to maintain production at 30 million barrels of oil a day may seem too disconnected and tangential to merit deep consideration of any linkage. But the two political events actually illustrate the slowly diverging paths between the US and Saudi Arabia that could become too entrenched to redirect, and may ultimately destroy or at least permanently alter one of the most important remaining strategic constants in the world since 1945 — America's security guarantee of Saudi Arabia and its energy production.
If one wishes to look into the recent domestic drivers of US foreign policy animus toward Saudi Arabia, a place to begin is in the late summer of 2008, when the rhetoric between the presidential campaigns of Barack Obama and John McCain on energy and climate developed a fever. This was the period when the chant "Drill, baby, drill" first rang out at Republican rallies, and when Obama started talking about "rising oceans" due to climate change.
US political talk about energy independence has been common since the Nixon administration, but in July 2008, the same month that oil prices reached $147 a barrel, Obama held a retreat with his most senior campaign and policy staff to craft a strategy that that was both revolutionary and very different from past attempts. With such high prices, non-hydrocarbon alternatives like wind and solar were perceived as potentially profitable, and no one outside a tiny fraternity of petroleum engineers and geologists could anticipate the tight oil revolution that was about to break out.
Obama's speeches on energy have not aged well, showing the high degree to which his advisors were in the thrall of now debunked "peak oil" theory, but his explicit rejection of the Middle East's role in the world economic system stands out as an ahistorical position from past US presidents.
"As Americans, we know the answers to these questions," Obama said in a Lansing, Michigan, speech in early August 2008, weeks before his nomination in Denver. "We know that we cannot sustain a future powered by a fuel that is rapidly disappearing. Not when we purchase $700 million worth of oil every single day from some the world's most unstable and hostile nations — Middle Eastern regimes that will control nearly all of the world's oil by 2030. We simply cannot pretend, as Senator McCain does, that we can drill our way out of this problem."
Obama was incorrect in his assessment of future oil supplies, as was nearly everyone else. What his statement shows clearly is how his campaign artfully combined two separate domestic and foreign policy goals into a singular political vision: cutting foreign oil dependence. The populist, anti-corporate, post-carbon environmental mission that spoke to his political base, combined with a diminishing of the Middle East's — and Saudi Arabia's — centrality to the modern world's economic system, remains one of the most powerful maxims in American politics to this day.
This view — that Saudi Arabia is not a stabilizing force in the world — largely explains why Obama has a poor relationship with the Saudi leadership. This view is what caused him to try and cajole and entice Iran away from its revolutionary mien toward a status quo role in the region. It is also very much in keeping with the US electorate's view of the Saudi state since the Sep. 11, 2001, attacks.
Just Saying No
Polling by Gallup on how favorably US citizens view Saudi Arabia plunged from 47% to 27% between 2001 and 2002; no surprise given the preponderance of Saudi nationals involved in the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Positive sentiment recovered into the mid-30s by 2005, and has stayed at that level ever since — a level lower than any other major US ally except Pakistan.
By comparison, US popular sentiment toward Russia fell 16% between 2013 and 2014 as quasi-Cold War tensions returned, leaving only 34% of Americans with a positive opinion of the Russian state — about the same as for Saudi Arabia. Roughly two-thirds of the US populous holds negative views toward the Saudi Kingdom, a nation the US has promised to defend from all adversaries, both foreign and domestic.
Other polling shops, such as the Pew Research Center, show US positive sentiment toward Saudi Arabia even lower, in the mid-20s according to 2013 polling. A surprisingly low partisan difference exists among polling participants compared to other nations such as Israel or France, where the former is more heavily favored by Republicans, and the latter by Democrats. One way to interpret this is to argue that an unusual political consensus exists among US voters toward the strategic relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia — they no longer value it much.
How this electoral sentiment toward Riyadh translates into US politics isn't easily divined. At its most basic level, US voters voted "no" in 2014 for the fourth time in five national elections dating back to 2006. The behavior of the US electoral system may seem eclectic for those more familiar with parliamentary systems, but the rule applied here holds that whatever party a sitting president belongs to is the party in power. Every two years the US electorate makes a binary choice regarding that political leadership.
The theory is best encapsulated by mid-20th century political scientist E.E. Schattschneider who argued that: "The people are a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to 'yes' or 'no,' and it can only speak when spoken to." Using this measure, the four-out-of-five "no" votes, with Democrats taking big wins in 2006-08 against George W. Bush and losing large midterm votes in 2010 and 2014 with Obama in office, is the largest trend of "no" votes since the 1974-82 post-Watergate time period.
To be sure, attributing the general unhappiness of the US electorate to its Middle East foreign policy — with the Saudi security guarantee as the center of gravity — may be a couple of steps too far, given how many domestic concerns jump to the front of voters' minds, but as an indicator of mood and attitude it holds some value.
The concurrent arrival of lower Saudi favorability, a negative trend of US elections against the party in power, and the arrival of a president who viewed his election as an opportunity to change the status quo in the Middle East all play into the question of whether the decision by Saudi Arabia and Opec in November to push for market share and openly combat US tight oil production could come back to haunt Riyadh in the form of a further deterioration in the US-Saudi alliance.
The Next Commodity Super-Cycle
In Saudi Arabia's defense, the need to maintain market share in the face of high-cost non-Opec production means its production means that its policy is not exclusively aimed at the US, and the lower oil price is, on balance, good news for the US economy. The attempted US rapprochement with Iran, however, is a major red flag that has King Abdullah and others surrounding him in a quiet uproar.
Adding to Riyadh's anxiety with the US, the sense of regional strategic containment that the Saudi state feels has taken place since the US-led Iraq War, with Shia-led or heavily influenced governments in control of the capital cities of Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and now Yemen's Sanaa, leaving the Saudi crown with the sense that it is forced to act alone to defend its self-interest, and thus saying "no" to the US national security establishment in ways it would not have in the past.
This new-found independence in foreign policy by Riyadh can be seen with its isolation of Qatar and its behavior as a patron of a bankrupt Egypt, replacing previous US aid and more, since the coup against the Moslem Brotherhood-led civilian government there. This security independence could grow even more overt if the US comes to a nuclear agreement with Iran and starts to end Tehran's economic isolation. And although the Saudi statements on the drop in oil prices are careful to characterize it as strictly an economic and market issue with no political dimensions, it's willingness to exert its power as the dominant force in the oil market in November does appear to be another manifestation of its new-found autonomy.
While few in the US yet see the Saudi-inspired retreat of Opec from managing the global oil market and subsequent price drop as a severe threat to US dreams of energy independence, that view may change in a few months. There is no question that a low oil price policy that endures for a period of a year or more and seeks to drive out high-cost producers will severely set back US oil production growth and sow havoc in the US oil patch. While the US oil industry is no fan of Obama, their support of future Republican presidential candidates could hinge on attitudes toward protecting US oil producers and attempting to punish the source of damagingly low oil prices, thus driving another wedge between Riyadh and Washington. Although that is purely conjecture at this point, it does fit with popular US attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and the general desire of Americans for distance from the Mideast.
On the other hand, if oil prices recover soon and spur renewed growth in US production, the US may be exporting more energy than it imports in a decade, a condition that again would put it into direct competition with Saudi Arabia on world oil markets. Likewise, if Saudi Arabia's increasingly ambitious foreign policy continues, it may find itself at the head of a NATO-like military alliance with other Sunni monarch-led Gulf States that views US relations with Tehran with deep suspicion.
All of these scenarios seem to point to a further deterioration of the historic US-Saudi alliance and raise the question: Can it survive the next commodity super-cycle? Perhaps not, if the decisions made last month in both countries represent a continuation of new paradigms for each of them, rather than transient political events.
Without oil, Iran is going to backslide enormously
In my opinion, if Iran was lifted of the oppressive burden it lives under, it would flourish again, not unlike the economic miracle the Israelis created, in a barren land.
Thank you for considering an alternative point of view.
Note that I said “backslide” not collapse.
Iran has more capability than oil, and yes Iranians are capable, but for the last 50 years their standard of living has been greatly underwritten by oil.
25% of their GDP is oil, so I’d say about a 25% backslide.
I guess that depends on timing, that is to say, when the oil stops flowing, vs. when Iran may be able to throw off it’s shackles. You are correct, I failed to realize the importance of your use of the term ‘backslide’.
Thanks for your reply.
"As Americans, we know the answers to these questions," Obama said in a Lansing, Michigan, speech in early August 2008, weeks before his nomination in Denver. "We know that we cannot sustain a future powered by a fuel that is rapidly disappearing. Not when we purchase $700 million worth of oil every single day from some the world's most unstable and hostile nations -- Middle Eastern regimes that will control nearly all of the world's oil by 2030. We simply cannot pretend, as Senator McCain does, that we can drill our way out of this problem."Instead, we're now paying Iran $700 million a month for doing absolutely nothing but work on its nuclear weapons program.
Yep, we'll be back to paying $4 and more for a gallon of gasoline in a repressed economy.
No thank you, stay out the Bushes!
Every mosque and madrassa built around the world is done so with Saudi money. The Wall Street Journal documented that fact in June/July 2003. (I used to have a digital copy of the article, unfortunately I don't have it anymore....)
Yes. Islam is an integrated system. Its buildings are outposts for infiltration, intimidation, and domination.
No great secrets there. But western governments refuse to deal with it.
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