To understand the Court's decision in Miller, one must first comprehend how the Miller Court interpreted the Second Amendment:
SCOTUS:
"The Constitution, as originally adopted, granted to the Congress power--
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces, the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which they [p179] were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia -- civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And further, that ordinarily, when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.
Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 2, Ch. 13, p. 409 points out "that king Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom," and traces the subsequent development and use of such forces." ~ United States v. Miller (No. 696) 26 F.Supp. 1002, reversed. [Decided: May 15, 1939]
If that's how the Court interpreted the Second Amendment, then why did it deny the defendant's claim that the Federal laws regulating firearms at the time were Unconstitutional?
The reason was clearly not, as has often been falsely claimed, that the Miller Court concluded that the Second Amendment did not grant an individual right to keep and bear arms.
Instead, the Court explained its reason this way:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154, 158."
In other words, no evidence had been entered into the official record of the case proving that the weapon possessed by the defendant (a shotgun with a a barrel length of less than 18") was "any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense."
The Court interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to keep and bear military grade firearms, and as far as it knew based on the evidence presented, a short-barreled shotgun was not "ordinary military equipment," nor was it useful for the common defense of the nation.
So the defendant lost the case solely because his firearm wasn't--in the opinion of the Court in the absence of any evidence on the subject in the official record of the case--a military grade weapon useful for "the common defense."
Therefore, per current binding Supreme Court precedent, any outright prohibitions of firearms that qualify as "ordinary military equipment" or that would be useful "for the common defense" are Unconstitutional.
Very good - thanks.
Addressing these constitutional questions on the Senate floor, Senator William H. King, a Utah Democrat, stated to Senator Copeland, the chief sponsor, that "we have a constitutional provision that right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed ... [and that he] was wondering if this bill was not in contravention of the constitutional provision." Denying that the FFA was in contravention of the Second Amendment, Senator Copeland argued that the provisions of the Second Amendment must be read together, and that "[t]he part relating to militia is important ... [as (p.615)that part is], of course, in the first part of the constitutional provision." Senator McKellar responded that, "while [the Second Amendment] refers to the militia, the provision is all-inclusive and provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall remain inviolate."
The constitutional issue was not pursued further, however, apparently because the bill was designed as a regulation of interstate commerce. Moreover, the bill did not operate upon individual firearms owners, other than felons who received firearms in interstate commerce. A Senate committee explained the bill as follows:
The bill under consideration ... is designed to regulate the manufacture of and the shipment through interstate commerce of all firearms.
... It is believed that the bill above referred to will go far in the direction we are seeking and will eliminate the gun from the crooks' hands, while interfering as little as possible with the law-abiding citizen from whom protests have been received against any attempt to take from him his means of protection from the outlaws who have rendered living conditions unbearable in the past decade.
Meanwhile, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court rendered an equivocal opinion concerning the status of the NFA under the Second Amendment. Miller reached the Supreme Court after a district court had ruled that the NFA was unconstitutional on its face as violative of the Second Amendment. After ruling the NFA unconstitutional, the district court then dismissed an indictment for transporting in interstate commerce a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches without the required tax stamp. The Supreme Court reversed, offering the following reasoning:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Upon reversing, the Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. These proceedings would have required hearing evidence about the nature of the shotgun. In the absence of a factual record indicating that a "sawed-off" shotgun could have military uses, the Court did not consider whether the tax and related registration requirements of the NFA violated the Second Amendment. The Court apparently assumed that if the shotgun was a protected firearm under the Second Amendment, the tax and registration requirements may have been unconstitutional. Otherwise the Court could have disposed of the issue without remanding the case.
Furthermore, the Court apparently assumed that the Second Amendment protects all individuals, not just members of an organized force such as the National Guard. The test was not whether the person in possession of the arm was a member of a formal militia unit, but whether the arm "at this time" is "ordinary military equipment" or whether its use could potentially "contribute to the common defense." Consequently, had the Court assumed that the Second Amendment did not protect ordinary persons, it logically would not have remanded the case to determine the factual status of the firearm.
The Court also discussed the meaning of the Second Amendment. Referring to the militia clause of the Constitution, the Court stated that "to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made." The Court then surveyed colonial and state militia laws to demonstrate that "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense" and that "these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."
The Court in Miller also cited with approval to the commentaries of Justice Joseph Story and Judge Thomas M. Cooley, which articulate the philosophy behind the Second Amendment. In his commentary, Justice Story stated:)
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.
Judge Cooley's commentaries, also cited by the Court in Miller, state that:
Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the right of the people to keep and bear arms.... The alternative to a standing army is "a well-regulated militia"; but this cannot exist unless the people are trained to bearing arms. The Federal and State constitutions therefore provide that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed ....
Thus, although Miller was somewhat equivocal, it provided little comfort to supporters of registration, for its apparent holding was that registration of military-type arms might be inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Indeed, Miller represents the end of an era, for Congress would soon react to the rise of European police states by reaffirming the Second Amendment and rejecting registration.
In the 1941 legislative effort, shortly before Pearl Harbor, Congress authorized the President to requisition property from the private sector on payment of fair compensation. The Property Requisition Act included the following:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed-- (1) to authorize the requisitioning or require the registration of any firearms possessed by any individual for his personal protection or sport (and the possession of which is not prohibited or the registration of which is not required by existing law), ... [or] (2) to impair or infringe in any manner the right of any individual to keep and bear arms ....[12]
Explaining the Property Requisition Act, the House Committee on Military Affairs provided the following statement:
In view of the fact that certain totalitarian and dictatorial nations are now engaged in the willful and wholesale destruction of personal rights and liberties, our committee deems it appropriate for the Congress to expressly state that the proposed legislation shall not be construed to impair or infringe the constitutional right of the people to bear arms.... There is no disposition on the part of this Government to depart from the concepts and principles of personal rights and liberties expressed in our Constitution.
"
***The Court interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to keep and bear military grade firearms,***
And in 1970, the anti-gunners discovered MILLER all over again and wrote many TV scripts using MILLER to “prove” that RIFLES WERE OK, HANDGUNS WERE NOT!
The show I remember about this was ALL IN THE FAMILY in which Archie goes on TV to defend handguns just before he is robbed. Meathead brings up the Miller decision as proof rifles good, handguns bad.
BARNY MILLER also had such an anti-handgun segment along with many other shows of the 1970s.