You are correct that the issue is not as simple as Bad Japan.
In the 30s the Japanese were quite literally faced with a choice between continued expansion into SE Asia to get the markets and resources they needed to maintain a first-world economy. Or a retreat to the home islands and perhaps Korea and Formosa. Which were not even capable of growing adequate food for the exploding Japanese population.
After WWII Japan survived by selling its products all over the world, first cheap crap and then increasingly value-added stuff. This wasn’t an option in the 30s, because tariffs imposed by other nations prevented them from selling their products.
So when FDR imposed the sanctions, the Japanese couldn’t stay where they were, and retreat wasn’t a very attractive option. Their only real option was to strike for regional empire that would allow them to survive as an imperial power.
IOW, Paul was right that FDR intentionally forced the Japanese into a no-win situation. His mistake was in thinking the Japanese would be unable to do anything about it.
Since the Japanese had started two previous wars, against China and Russia, by surprise attacks on the enemy’s premier naval base, at the very least American naval and political thinkers showed an amazing lack of forethought as to the possible repercussions of their policies.
Whoa.... be careful there pal. A rational explanation of the truth often doesn’t go well with the knee-jerk brigade. (Great explanation by the way)
(2) Japan had adequate land to feed its population, which grew about 15% from 1920 to 1940.
(3) The US government and population were well aware that Japan would likely attack the US. They did not anticipate that Japan would try as unorthodox a move as to strike first at Pearl Harbor: most observers assumed that the Philippines would have been the rational choice.