No offense but it surprises me why there were 8 companies with only 262 men in the regiment. The ideal company size then was 100. Yankee infantry units baffle me.....
Certainly no offense taken. A quick look at the Wiki for the unit mentions that the unit had about 313 present for duty after Antietam, but that had been so long previous that it appears that the regiment was never reinforced.
Another history notes that the regiment actually was so depleted that it fought as a skirmish line at the Battle of Bristow Station before being mustered out in 1864. Some of its members formed the cadre for the First Minnesota Heavy Artillery and others formed a battalion, which fought at Petersburg among other places.
However, whittling a unit down to the nub is not unheard of in military history. The Germans did the same in World War II for some of their formations and simply created new formations with their “welles”, or draft calls.
And I must say, one of my favorite places on the battlefield happens to be the Virginia Memorial. The statue of General Lee astride Traveller is a wonderful image.
There were two companies on detached duty, that day. And as for why their numbers were so small, they were the first regiment, and had been suffering attrition since they acted as rear guard when the rest of the Army of the Potomac broke at Bull Run.
Both sides had understrength units. New units were raised by various states, and made available to the central governments. When soldiers were wounded, the regiment got along without them. When they died, the regiment got along without them. New regiments were raised. Occasionally an old regiment would be disbanded, or upon death of the commander could be combined with another regiment from the same state. New commanders would come with new men from the state, being politically appointed by the Governor. Many of the younger officers would be elected by the men in their company.
Sherman wrote that new units were not as useful as the old units, and that a replacement system would be better to put new men under experienced officers and sergeants. He wrote, after the war that nearly all methods of raising men had been tried, conscription, bought substitutes (mercenaries), and volunteers. Of those, the volunteers were the best.
I read a story about some Texas men from Hood’s brigade that went to Jeff Davis to protest the planned merging of their unit with men from other states. Don’t blame them, just that all units at that time were, after their first battle, understrength, and there was no systematic means to push reinforcements to depleted units. Wounded men sent home to get well in Georgia in particular were redrafted by their state, and sent off in new units, rather than being permitted to return to their old unit. A soldier could be considered AWOL from his old unit while serving in their new unit, and if caught in that situation could have some ‘splaining to do.
The individual replacement system used by the US during WWII was also a problem. New men were often pushed forward to depleted units with little time to train with and integrate into their receiving units. Some died before anyone even knew their name.
German practice tried to pull units off the line so replacements could train with experienced cadre, but as they were pressed very hard at the end of the war, the cadres were increasingly small, and the time available for training decreased.
I am not sure that anyone has the right answer on personnel management in war, even today.