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An amazing revelation. Before air reconnaissance, commanders were at the mercy of what they could see in line of sight, and what they could gather from intelligence (cavalry and spies). High ground was important, but did not necessarily solve all of the visibility problems. This has been the case since the beginning of warfare. It’s amazing that these scholars spent all of their time reconfirming what any student of military history knows.

I don't know that the scholars were doing it for themselves or history buffs, so much as they were doing it for the average person. The average person has probably wondered why Lee would dare attack such a large opposing force, because the average person cannot comprehend military leaders making decisions based on sketchy information that could be hours, or even a day or two, old. The idea that military leaders had to make decisions based on theri gut instincts

What I would call "modern reconnaissance" really didn't come into being until WWII, and even then the photos and information could be a half-day old. When you put Lee's decisions within the proper context, it actually makes his victories that much more amazing/significant (and gives you a sense of how intelligent and how sharply honed his logic could be), and sometimes makes his defeats that much more obvious.

I am prejudiced - I've visited Gettysburg several times, and have walked over quite a few other battlefields, and the Air Force guy in me noted that a helluva lot parts of the battlefields were not visible to the commanding generals.

And we are in an era when privates and corporals on the battlefield will have more information about the battlefield/battlespace available to them within 30 seconds than somebody like Eisenhower would have had in the whole of WWII.

I'm thankful for the technology, but I sometimes wonder what would happen if our forces lost access to a lot of that stuff - computers, GPS, etc.

Intelligence also is subject to manipulation.

Magruder before the 7 days battles marched men forward in plain view, and marched them back covertly. Lee was happy to work with Pinkerton to provide men for McClellan to count, and the illusion that the Confederates had 250,000 men or more had much to do with McClellan’s methods. When pushed away from Richmond, McClellan never had more than 90,000 men opposed to him.

The German Tank Problem is (in English) a treatment of how to estimate enemy numbers based on incomplete information. German fed enemy intelligence tank production numbers that were false, leading to estimates of 1400 tanks a month produced. From two tanks, serial numbers on various parts (engines, chassis, transmissions, road wheels) were compared, and the difference between them was very small, leading to a more correct estimate of less than 270 tanks per month. Analysis of German production records after the war revealed that tank production never exceeded about 275.

Thaddeus Lowe performed the first air reconnaissance over Virginia, and was able to report that after Bull Run, the insurrection was not ready to attack.

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was still in the future: By measuring something, you change it. An alert enemy, such as the insurrection, was able to participate in the measurement process, and influence the smart decision makers that used the various measurements.