New map may explain Lee's decisions at Gettysburg

Yahoo News ^ | June 29,2013 | Michael Rubinkam

[Mad Dawgg]

"Even the oft maligned ‘Pickett's Charge’ was a viable plan, one that went awry due to the poor aim of the artillery bombardment which failed to accomplish it's task."

One of the issues often missed in the third day of fighting at Gettysburg is that Pickett's Charge was one half of the battle plan. The other Half was Stewart's Calvary to sweep around the Union position and attack the rear thus forcing Meade into defending two fronts. However Stewart got tangled in a skirmish with some infantry and just as he was about to break out a newly promoted General led a Banzai charge of his Calvary Unit into Stewart's flank and stumped his breakthrough.

That Newly appointed General was brash and reckless and lost over 70% of his troops but his maneuver probably saved many Union lives and maybe even kept Lee from a third day victory. However at the time his name was not mentioned much as being a large contributor to the Union Victory like the praise given Chamberlain and Bufford and so on.

13 years later that brash General with the long blonde hair would achieve notoriety in a hilly area of Montana in a place called "Little Big Horn"...

[Straight Vermonter]

The study has mild interest in that it attempted to recreate what Lee actually saw. However, I agree with you a waste of time and money.

People do these studies because they need to "publish or perish". Better this one than "Homosexual Themes in the Writings of Geoffrey Chaucer".

[Sherman Logan]

Yup, it is possible to argue that Custer won the Battle of Gettysburg.

The weirdest part is that 3 days before he was a captain.

[Sherman Logan]

Thomas was a very good good general, but it is generally agreed he often moved too slow.

Part of being methodical, I guess, but knowing when to throw the methodical part overboard and go for it is a big part of generalship.

[Verginius Rufus]

This morning C-SPAN re-showed a talk by Jeff Shaara held at a bookstore in Jackson, Mississippi, in May, mainly about his new novel about the siege of Vicksburg. Very interesting talk--but don't know when it might be shown again.

Michael Shaara wrote only one Civil War novel, about Gettysburg, which did not sell well in his lifetime. Jeff has written a series of novels--the Vicksburg book is the second in a four-book trilogy (bad math) on the western campaigns. He had a lot of interesting points that are not well known.

He told from a soldier's point of view what it would have been like to be part of Pickett's Charge, very effectively--but he did not reveal that he was describing Pickett's Charge until the very end.

He told how his father took him to Gettysburg in 1964 when he was 12. His father knew the story of how Lewis Armistead and Winfield Scott Hancock had been friends before the war and were both in California when the war started. When they parted Armistead, who supported the South, told Hancock that if he ever fought against him that he hoped God would strike him dead. Shaara told of how his father found the marker at Gettyburg where Armistead fell (during Pickett's Charge, I believe) and how for the first time in his life he saw his father crying. It was at that point that Michael Shaara decided to write his novel about Gettysburg, which took him 7 years.

[Theoria]

Best General is a thread all to itself. There are lots a guys who don't get the credit they deserve.

Cleburne, Joe Johnston.

They all had various strengths and weaknesses.

[Kenny Bunk]

I have often wondered why General Lee didn’t simply refuse the battle there and establish himself on terrain nearby more suitable to defense.

That was exactly what he was trying to do, that is fight defensively at the The Battle of Cashtown. A.P.Hill precipitated the larger battle at Gettysburg, more or less against orders. Then Early misinterpreted his orders and neglected to to take and hold the ridge for the Confederates, allowing Meade, who really didn't want to fight at Gettysburg either, to do so.

It was a mix-up based on faulty, or rather primitive, intelligence all around. How, for example, did Meade's staff miss the importance of Little Round Top until it was almost too late?

Let's face it, you unrepentant rebels out there, Marse Robert was damn good on defense and counter-punching on home ground in VA, he was less than stellar on the invasion thing and a more or less complete dunderhead logistically. The Confederates, who had admittedly less to work with than the Union in materièl, were nonetheless very poor at Quartermastering what they did have, failing even to feed and clothe their troops at a basic level. No excuse for it.

What the Civil War really proved militarily is that you cannot fight a massive war without centralized command and control. In other words, a strong centralized Federal government that tells the states what to do. The Confederacy, actually the second confederacy in our history, had less power over their states.

Wars, whether necessary like 1812, or unnecessary, like 1898 and WWI, lead inexorably to centralized Federal power and away from the original Constitution and the rights of sovereign states. We are still organized for war, not for peace nor for government as envisioned by our Founders.

[Kenny Bunk]

Johnston was one hell of a brilliant general, especially considering his results/resources ratio.

Cleburne definitely makes the All Star line-up, too. For my money, more effective than even Jackson, hagiography aside.

[Mad Dawgg]

"Yup, it is possible to argue that Custer won the Battle of Gettysburg."

Well not sure if I would go that far but I guarantee Stewart attacking in force at Meade's rear would have dramatically changed the outcome of the third day of fighting.

It might have turned the tide for the South or maybe extended the confrontation another day or two. But the devastation to the Southern forces on that third day forced Lee to disengage. Stewart could have changed that dramatically!

[Flag_This]

"I have often wondered why General Lee didn’t simply refuse the battle there and establish himself on terrain nearby more suitable to defense."

" His senior subordinate, Longstreet, counseled a strategic move—the Army should leave its current position, swing around the Union left flank, and interpose itself on Meade's lines of communication, inviting an attack by Meade that could be received on advantageous ground. Longstreet argued that this was the entire point of the Gettysburg campaign, to move strategically into enemy territory but fight only defensive battles there. Lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. He wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor, an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at Chancellorsville."
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[af_vet_rr]

An amazing revelation. Before air reconnaissance, commanders were at the mercy of what they could see in line of sight, and what they could gather from intelligence (cavalry and spies). High ground was important, but did not necessarily solve all of the visibility problems. This has been the case since the beginning of warfare. It’s amazing that these scholars spent all of their time reconfirming what any student of military history knows.

I don't know that the scholars were doing it for themselves or history buffs, so much as they were doing it for the average person. The average person has probably wondered why Lee would dare attack such a large opposing force, because the average person cannot comprehend military leaders making decisions based on sketchy information that could be hours, or even a day or two, old. The idea that military leaders had to make decisions based on theri gut instincts

What I would call "modern reconnaissance" really didn't come into being until WWII, and even then the photos and information could be a half-day old. When you put Lee's decisions within the proper context, it actually makes his victories that much more amazing/significant (and gives you a sense of how intelligent and how sharply honed his logic could be), and sometimes makes his defeats that much more obvious.

I am prejudiced - I've visited Gettysburg several times, and have walked over quite a few other battlefields, and the Air Force guy in me noted that a helluva lot parts of the battlefields were not visible to the commanding generals.

And we are in an era when privates and corporals on the battlefield will have more information about the battlefield/battlespace available to them within 30 seconds than somebody like Eisenhower would have had in the whole of WWII.

I'm thankful for the technology, but I sometimes wonder what would happen if our forces lost access to a lot of that stuff - computers, GPS, etc.

[Redmen4ever]

In his memoirs, and perhaps aided by hindsight, Longstreet said the Union line, being curved in, would enable the Yankees to reinforce any position that came under attack. He also projected that the Yankees had amassed a huge force, from stale intel, by considering Union forces known to be en route to Gettysburg and the distance infantry in forced march could move per day.

Having said this, it should be pointed out that the Yankees “won” the Battle of Gettysburg only in the sense that Lee did not defeat them. On the other, all Lee would have accomplished had he defeated Meade was to be confronted by what I will call a phantom army of 70,000 under the command of the Governor of Pennsylvania. This phantom army was drawn from the militia and the civilian populations of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, almost overnight, at Harrisburg, by the Pennsylvania RR and other railroad companies.

Gettysburg was a strategic and moral victory for the North because the war had become a war of attrition, and the Union states were several times larger in population and capital.

[Sherman Logan]

I think Stuart’s role was not so much to cooperate with Pickett in the attack as to exploit the confusion created by Pickett’s successful attack.

No success by Pickett and no resulting confusion would have meant Stuart attacking formed infantry with cavalry, which in this war never worked out very well.

[Kenny Bunk]

In re: Genl. Thomas and the "Slow" thing. That was a key part of Sherman and Grant's backbiting PR campaign. Who, for example could have been slower than Grant at Vicksburg, where he spent an inordinate amount of time drunk, and when sober, drafting orders to Thomas to "hurry up! CC: Genl Halleck."

And yeah, Thomas was rather methodical preferring solid low-casualty operations rather than battles of attrition. BTW, Sherman took his best troops, most of his artillery, and all his cavalry horses for the "March to the Sea."

Thomas reorganized and won the Battle of Nashville, a textbook victory, in his own sweet time, the most clear cut Federal victory of the war. Sour grapes for Grant and Sherman!

[af_vet_rr]

That Newly appointed General was brash and reckless and lost over 70% of his troops but his maneuver probably saved many Union lives and maybe even kept Lee from a third day victory. However at the time his name was not mentioned much as being a large contributor to the Union Victory like the praise given Chamberlain and Bufford and so on.

13 years later that brash General with the long blonde hair would achieve notoriety in a hilly area of Montana in a place called "Little Big Horn"...

I don't know if I would credit him with a lot of the reason for the Union victory, but I do agree with you that Custer doesn't get the recognition he deserves for helping to obtain victory.

A part of me wonders if he doesn't get the credit he deserves because there wasn't a lot of thought put into his attack. It was just pointing his troops at Stuart and pushing them into him. Deadly as hell, but effective.

[Sherman Logan]

Even the oft maligned ‘Pickett's Charge’ was a viable plan, one that went awry due to the poor aim of the artillery bombardment which failed to accomplish it's task.

I think this is a mistake, though a common one. The charge failed because the Union soldiers stopped it. The Confederacy wasn't the only army on the field, and their mistakes weren't the only thing affecting the outcome.

[FreedomPoster]

When your eyes and ears are out foraging instead of developing operational intelligence on enemy formations, you’re pretty much screwed. And yes, spot on with your summary.

I’m sure it was fun playing with the computers and maps, though.

[Moonman62]

IMNVHO, Best general in the Civil War on either side: General George B. Thomas, victim of a PR cabal by Grant, Sherman, Schofield, and their pals in DC, all of whom admitted it long after the war.

I think you mean George Henry Thomas (he really gets no respect).

In 1877, Sherman published an article praising Grant and Thomas, and contrasting them to Robert E. Lee. After noting that Thomas, unlike his fellow Virginian Lee, stood by the Union, Sherman wrote:

During the whole war his services were transcendent, winning the first substantial victory at Mill Springs in Kentucky, January 20th, 1862, participating in all the campaigns of the West in 1862-3-4, and finally, December 16th, 1864 annihilating the army of Hood, which in mid winter had advanced to Nashville to besiege him.

His horse, Billy, was named after Sherman.

[FreedomPoster]

It is possible to be on the strategic offensive but fight a tactical defense. Alesia comes to mind.

[catfish1957]

Just watched the movie again, and it makes it look like the 20th Maine single handledly held off the Rebel Army. Love watching, it but I had to call BS on that one.