Notice that "jurisdiction" is political not territorial.
Gray misinterpreted the jurisdiction clause of the 14th Amendment applying it in a territorial rather than political sense, substituting domicile of the parents for citizenship of the parents.
The result of this broadened interpretation was that the children of aliens became citizens, which is a judicial novelty contrary to law.
Prior to WKA there were two kinds of citizenship: native or natural born, and naturalized. Subsequent to WKA this is no longer true.
The court created a distinction where none had existed. It severed "native born citizen" from "natural born citizen".
Subsequent to WKA there are three kinds of citizenship: native born, natural born, and naturalized.
You have done an amazing job of completely screwing up what was written in WKA.
“The result of this broadened interpretation was that the children of aliens became citizens, which is a judicial novelty contrary to law.”
So novel it was completely accepted prior to WKA. That is why WKA was NOT the first son of Chinese parents whose citizenship was challenged but then ruled a US citizen. Nor did WKA in any way sever native born from natural born.
WKA did not, in any way, say what you claim. For anyone who doubts, here is a link to the actual decision:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0169_0649_ZO.html
As discussed in the original WKA decision (District Court, N.D. California, 71 F. 382; 1896):
“The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States must be controlling upon the question presented for decision in this matter, irrespective of what the common-law or international doctrine is. But the interpretation thereof is undoubtedly confused and complicated by the existence of these two doctrines, in view of the ambiguous and uncertain meaning of the qualifying phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” which renders it a debatable question as to which rule the provision was intended to declare. Whatever of doubt there may be is with respect to the interpretation of that phrase. Does it mean “subject to the laws of the United States,” comprehending, in this expression, the allegiance that aliens owe in a foreign country to obey its laws; or does it [**12] signify, “to be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States,” in the sense that is contended for on the part of the government?
This question was ably and thoroughly considered in Re Look Tin Sing, supra, where it was held that it meant subject to the laws of the United States. Mr. Justice Field, sitting as circuit judge, delivered the opinion, which was concurred in by Judges Sawyer and Sabin. There is a [*387] note to the opinion, stating that “Judge Hoffman did not sit on the hearing of this case, but he was on the bench when the opinion was delivered, and concurred in the views expressed.” The opinion discusses and decides the precise question involved in the case at bar. There, as here, a person of Chinese descent, born in the United States, but whose parents had always been subjects of the emperor of China, claimed the right to land in the United States by virtue of his right as a citizen thereof, and, as such citizen, to be unaffected by any of the Chinese exclusion acts. The court held that, although born here of parents who were subjects of the emperor of China, he was a citizen within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment; and that, though he was [**13] without the certificate required by the Chinese exclusion acts of 1882 or of 1884, being a citizen, he could not be prevented from returning to his country. The similarity of the essential facts between that case and the one at bar is obvious from the recital contained in the opinion, which is as follows:
“The petitioner belongs to the Chinese race, but he was born in Mendocino, in the state of California, in 1870. In 1879 he went to China, and returned to the port of San Francisco during the present month (September, 1884), and now seeks to land, claiming the right to do so as a natural-born citizen of the United States. It is admitted by an agreed statement of facts that his parents are now residing in Mendocino, in California, and have resided there for the last twenty years; that they are of the Chinese race, and have always been subjects of the emperor of China; that his father sent the petitioner to China, but with the intention that he should return to this country; that the father is a merchant at Mendocino, and is not here in any diplomatic or other official capacity under the emperor of China. The petitioner is without any certificate under the act of 1882 or of 1884, [**14] and the district attorney of the United States, intervening for the government, objects to his landing, for the want of such certificate.”
The learned justice then continues:
The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.’ This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’ They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must at the time be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of [**15] foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This extraterritoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents. Persons born on a public vessel of a foreign country, whilst within the waters of the United States, and consequently within their territorial jurisdiction, are also excepted. They are considered as born in the country to which the vessel belongs. In the sense of public law, they are not born within the jurisdiction of the United States. The language used has also a more extended purpose. It was designed to except from citizenship persons who, though born or naturalized in the United States, have renounced their allegiance to our government, and thus dissolved their political connection [*388] with the country. The United States recognized the right of every one to expatriate himself and choose another country.”
“With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ it is [**16] evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship; and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.”
After adverting to the objects of the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment, and to the fact that one of the purposes of its enactment was to overturn the doctrine enunciated in the Dred Scott Case, the opinion continues:
“Independently of the constitutional provision, it has always been the doctrine of this country, except as applied to Africans brought here and sold as slaves, and their descendants, that birth within the dominions and jurisdiction of the United States of itself creates citizenship.
This subject was elaborately considered by Assistant Vice Chancellor Sandford in Lynch v. Clarke, found in the first volume of his reports (1 Sandf. Ch. 583). In that case one Julia Lynch, born in New York, in 1819, of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn in that city, returned with them the same year to their native country, and always resided there afterwards. It was held that she was a citizen of the [**17] United States. After an exhaustive examination of the law, the vice chancellor said that he entertained no doubt that every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever the situation of his parents, was a natural-born citizen; and added that this was the general understanding of the legal profession, and the universal impression of the public mind.
In illustration of this general understanding, he mentions the fact that when, at an election, an inquiry is made whether the person offering to vote is a citizen or an alien, if he answers that he is a native of this country the answer is received as conclusive that he is a citizen; that no one inquires further; no one asks whether his parents were citizens or foreigners; it is enough that he was born here, whatever was the status of his parents.
He shows also that legislative expositions on the subject speak but one language, and he cites to that effect not only the laws of the United States, but the statutes of a great number of the states, and establishes conclusively that there is on this subject a concurrence of legislative declaration with judicial opinion, and that both accord with the general [**18] understanding of the profession and of the public.”
The opinion concludes as follows:
“As to the position of the district attorney that the restriction act prevents the re-entry of the petitioner into the United States, even if he be a citizen, only a word is necessary. * * * Being a citizen, HN4the law could not intend that he should ever look to the government of a foreign country for permission to return to the United States, and no citizen can be excluded from this country except in punishment for crime. Exclusion for any other cause is unknown to our laws, and beyond the power of congress. The petitioner must be allowed to land, and it is so ordered.”
In 1892, the question was again passed upon; this time by the circuit court of appeals for this circuit (Ninth), in the case of Gee Fook Sing v. U.S., supra. Gee Fook Sing, the appellant, had sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the court below (district court for the Northern district of California), claiming that he was illegally restrained of his liberty, and imprisoned on board the steamship Belgic, at the port of San Francisco, by the master of the vessel, on the ground that he was a Chinese person prohibited by law from [**19] entering into this country.
The appellant contended that he was a citizen [*389] of this country, and was not prohibited, therefore, from entering into the United States. The lower court found, upon the evidence adduced, that Gee Fook Sing had not established to its satisfaction that he had been born here, and remanded him. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. The court was composed of Judges Deady, Hanford, and Hawley, and the opinion was delivered by Judge Hanford. The case was submitted upon the record, without argument. In the course of the opinion, which was quite short, the court simply stated its conclusions upon the identical question presented here for decision, as follows:
“We have considered all the questions of law and fact which we find involved, and our conclusions are that, inasmuch as the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States declares that all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside, the laws excluding emigrants who are Chinese laborers are inapplicable to a person born in this country and subject to the [**20] jurisdiction of its government, even though his parents were not citizens, nor entitled to become citizens under the laws providing for the naturalization of aliens; that any person alleging himself to be a citizen of the United States, and desiring to return to his country from a foreign land, and that he is prevented from doing so without due process of law, and who on that ground applies to any United States court for a writ of habeas corpus, is entitled to have a hearing and a judicial determination of the facts so alleged, and that no act of congress can be understood or construed as a bar to such hearing and judicial determination.”
The authority of In re Look Tin Sing is not referred to by the court, nor, in fact, are any authorities cited, or a discussion of the question indulged in; but it is safe to assume that Mr. Justice Field’s decision was considered and followed. In 1888, Judge Deady, sitting in the circuit court for the district of Oregon, reached the same conclusion in the case of In re Chin King, 13 Sawy. 333, 35 Fed. 354. He cites In re Look Tin Sing, supra, and Lynch v. Clarke, supra, and holds that the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment is but declaratory [**21] of the common-law doctrine. See, also, In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437.
It is clear that these decisions, — the one rendered in the circuit court of appeals and the other rendered in the circuit court of this district, — determining, as they do, the identical question involved in the case at bar, are conclusive and controlling upon this court, unless the supreme court of the United States has directly and authoritatively, and not by way of dictum, announced and laid down a doctrine at variance with that expounded in the cases in this circuit.”
The court created a distinction where none had existed. It severed "native born citizen" from "natural born citizen".
Subsequent to WKA there are three kinds of citizenship: native born, natural born, and naturalized.
Simply and absolutely not true.
In fact, the Wong Court ruled that the 14th Amendment had AFFIRMED THE ANCIENT RULE OF CITIZENSHIP that had always applied in the United States.
Yes, however, according to Gray's explicit ruling, one's alien parents had to be PERMANENTLY domiciled in the U.S. at the time of one's birth to be granted birthright U.S. citizenship.
Obama's father was never permanently domiciled in the U.S. He was always in the U.S. on only a "temporary stay" (exact DoJ quote) which expired when his studies were completed.