The problem is that the military is trying to treat symptoms and not the problem. Which is poor leadership. Commanders should be held accountable for the numbers of suicides from their combat commands.
Guerra's (sp?) “On Combat” and “On Killing” offer “a way” to reduce combat suicides. But the lawyers would freak out if we tried it.
I’m not sure it’s reasonable with most suicides to hold commanders responsible. You can’t catch every signal, and you can’t watch everyone 24/7. There are some where signs and symptoms were so pronounced, and the command response so ignoring of what was taking place that you should hold a psych autopsy and then send letters to commander/nco files. I think that’s the exception rather than the rule, though.
I am interested in Guerra’s(sp) ideas, so if you find a link to them, please let me know. Once upon a time, I taught suicide prevention on a regional basis for the Army, but it was prior to Iraq/Afghanistan. I had a few months after 9/11 before I retired. (My posting from that time on FR probably can still be accessed.)
In any case, I’m coming down on the side of deployment tempo as a major culprit until I read something contrary. I think those periods of time when troops go from mind-blowing danger, back to near total safety, back to danger, back to safety mess with people’s heads and both lead them to think of death to much and of their own death and chance of buying it.
Then there are the other losses associated with year-long absences — broken marriages, relationships, financial opportunities,etc. Also, there are the images of horrifying deaths and wounds that accumulate in troops’ memories, and you have significant obstacles that they must deal with.
Couple that with the danger/safety cycle, and you have people whose heads have really been screwed with.
The last war we fought correctly was WWII. People were brought into service for the duration. It’s actually far more merciful to have the troops on active duty until the war is finished than to bring them in, take them out, bring them in, take them out.
Additionally, it forces the nation to either fight the war of get out.
I’m not sure it’s reasonable with most suicides to hold commanders responsible. You can’t catch every signal, and you can’t watch everyone 24/7. There are some where signs and symptoms were so pronounced, and the command response so ignoring of what was taking place that you should hold a psych autopsy and then send letters to commander/nco files. I think that’s the exception rather than the rule, though.
I am interested in Guerra’s(sp) ideas, so if you find a link to them, please let me know. Once upon a time, I taught suicide prevention on a regional basis for the Army, but it was prior to Iraq/Afghanistan. I had a few months after 9/11 before I retired. (My posting from that time on FR probably can still be accessed.)
In any case, I’m coming down on the side of deployment tempo as a major culprit until I read something contrary. I think those periods of time when troops go from mind-blowing danger, back to near total safety, back to danger, back to safety mess with people’s heads and both lead them to think of death to much and of their own death and chance of buying it.
Then there are the other losses associated with year-long absences — broken marriages, relationships, financial opportunities,etc. Also, there are the images of horrifying deaths and wounds that accumulate in troops’ memories, and you have significant obstacles that they must deal with.
Couple that with the danger/safety cycle, and you have people whose heads have really been screwed with.
The last war we fought correctly was WWII. People were brought into service for the duration. It’s actually far more merciful to have the troops on active duty until the war is finished than to bring them in, take them out, bring them in, take them out.
Additionally, it forces the nation to either fight the war or get out.