[sometime lurker]

I think you're still misunderstanding. I said the quote he used in #387 wasn't in Rogers v Bellei, particularly since the Rogers v Bellei opinion included the jus soli portion I quoted.

Googling his quote brings one to this site. The quote from #387 is posted there, along with the writer's admission that he is not sure where it came from, he thinks it might be Rogers v. Bellei or one other case (which I can't find the text of online.) His quote is not in Rogers v. Bellei, and indeed, the "jus soli" portion of Rogers v. Bellei contradicts his quote, showing that considering Rogers v Bellei as the source was very inconsistent with the R v. B opinion.

And now I really should be working - so no more posts from me for a while.

[philman_36]

I think you're still misunderstanding.
I've got you now.

...or one other case (which I can't find the text of online.)
From your link...I’m not sure which SCOTUS case I took this from. It’s either the Bellei case or the Flores-Villar case:
Here ya go...@Flores-Villar v. United States
Holding: An equally divided Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit upholding, against a constitutional challenge, a citizenship-transmission statute that imposes different standards for children born out of wedlock outside of the United States depending on whether the child's mother or father is a U.S. citizen. (Kagan, J., recused).

Judgment: Affirmed by an equally divided Court on June 13, 2011. (Kagan, J., recused).

They've got lots of links so it may take a while if anyone wanted to go looking for that quote.

[philman_36]

Some text for you...@Flores-Villar v. United States (09-5801)

I found this...interesting. (emphasis not in the original)

The United States counters this argument by focusing on the validity of the gender classification as it relates to the substantial government interest in reducing the risk of statelessness—the primary interest Congress sought to advance through the differential statutory scheme. The United States adds that both parties agree that statelessness is an abhorrent condition that renders individuals vulnerable and without legal rights. The United States notes that traditionally, the United States applies a jus soli standard of citizenship, while many foreign countries apply a jus sanguinis standard. According to the United States, the issue of statelessness arises when a person is born in a jus sanguinis country, yet is unable to obtain citizenship because most jus sanguinis countries will ignore maternal transmission of citizenship if the father legitimates his parental relationship to the child. In addition, the United States contends that the legislative history of Sections 1401 and 1409 demonstrates that Congress was primarily motivated by statelessness concerns in creating differential residency requirements for men and women.

Snip...

The United States claims that Congress could have eliminated the possibility of statelessness by enacting a jus sanguinis law to supplement the Fourteenth Amendment’s jus soli rule, but specifically chose not to do so. The United States notes that Congress, in formulating the residency requirement, was reconciling competing interests of preventing statelessness and ensuring that foreign-born children with parents of differing citizenships have sufficient ties to the United States to merit citizenship. Thus, the United States contends that Congress balanced these interests while recognizing that children of unwed mothers were more susceptible to statelessness than all other citizen parents. Moreover, the United States posits that unwed mothers and unwed fathers are not similarly situated because the mother is the only parent able to transmit citizenship upon birth in jus sanguinis countries, and is thereby subject to greater risk of statelessness if non-citizen father legitimates his relationship to the child In addition, the United States contends that the balance Congress struck is rationally related to the unique statelessness risk faced by unwed mothers, and this legal reality demonstrates that unwed mothers and unwed fathers are not similarly situated.

What was that I posted again?
Judgment: Affirmed by an equally divided Court on June 13, 2011. (Kagan, J., recused).