“Types Of Citizenship: Jus Soli, Jus Sanguinis, Natural Born, Native Born, Naturalized”
SCOTUS does not and will not recognize various types of U.S. Citizenship. Either you are a citizen of the U.S. or you are not. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), was a United States Supreme Court case which invalidated a law that treated naturalized and native-born citizens differentially under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
When discussing rights of US citizenship, SCOTUS will acknowledge the manner a person acquired his/her citizenship. For example, the WKA case held he was a citizen of the U.S. and acquired his citizenship as a Natural born citizen would acquire his citizenship. In other words, WKA’s US citizenship was of the same dignity and co-extensive with the rights of any other Natural born citizen.
No person has a right to be classified as a Statutory citizen, Naturalized citizen, Native born or Natural born citizen. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 827-28, “[The naturalized citizen] is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the distinction. The law makes none.”
Natural born citizenship status is undefined and will remain undefined until a Constitutional Amendment is passed.
Sven, it doesn't seem as though you READ his essay. He pointed out quite persuasively that no man made law can define "natural" citizenship. That is defined as a characteristic of nature.
It is tantamount to asserting that Congress can pass a law making everyone's hair blond. As hair color is a characteristic of nature, no such law will change anyone's hair color. Therefore, no such law can change anyone's natural born citizen status. It is a function of the laws of nature, not man.
Firstly, the sentence you quoted in my essay was not about the classes of citizenship that US law may or may not recognize. It was about the ontological categories of citizenship used to define the semantic space of citizenship applicable to any and all countries. It was presented very early in the document as an aid to understanding historical and legal texts that use those terms in discussing citizenship.
Secondly, the fact that US law requires all citizens to be treated exactly the same is a completely separate issue from whether or not different conceptual classes of citizenship exist in peoples's minds, and whether US law will use each one in different cases in order to determine whether or not someone is or is not a citizen. There is more than one way to qualify as a citizen. How one does so is a separate issue from the privileges and immunities that citizenship bestows.
US courts absolutely will use jus sanginuis but not jus soli to rule that someone is a citizen. They have done so. And they will also use jus soli but not jus sanguinis to rule someone else to be a citizen in a different case. They have done that, too. And in Minor vs. Happersett, they used both principles to rule that someone was not just a citizen, but a natural born citizen.
The reasons or principles by which citizenship are legally determined is a completely separate issue from the privileges and immunities provided by citizenship. You are almost correct that US law recognizes no differences whatsoever between the citizenship of one person versus that of another as far as the privileges and immunities of citizenshp are concerned, regardless of the principles by which a person's citizenship was acquired. The one exception is eligibility to be President. The courts have no choice on that: It's a Constitutional requirement. And Constitutional requirements cannot, by definition, be Unconstitutional.
Either you are a citizen of the U.S. or you are not. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), was a United States Supreme Court case which invalidated a law that treated naturalized and native-born citizens differentially under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Federal and state laws can be invalidated for such reasons. Constitutional prohibitions cannot.
When discussing rights of US citizenship, SCOTUS will acknowledge the manner a person acquired his/her citizenship. For example, the WKA case held he was a citizen of the U.S. and acquired his citizenship as a Natural born citizen would acquire his citizenship. In other words, WKA’s US citizenship was of the same dignity and co-extensive with the rights of any other Natural born citizen.
There is no statement in Wong Kim Ark that states that someone born in the US to alien (permanent resident) parents is a natural born citizen eligible to President. If that's false, it should be easy to prove. Please provide the exact words from the majority opinion that say what you claim.
No person has a right to be classified as a Statutory citizen, Naturalized citizen, Native born or Natural born citizen. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 827-28, “[The naturalized citizen] is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the distinction. The law makes none.”
By "the law," the Court meant Congressional statutes. But it acknowledged that the Constitution does make such a distinction by using the phrase "except so far as the constitution makes the distinction." Which it in fact does, as all can easily see by reading Article II, Section 1, Clause 5.
Natural born citizenship status is undefined and will remain undefined until a Constitutional Amendment is passed.
The Constitution cannot define that term without creating a logical contradiction, as my essay makes clear. But the Supreme Court can. And did, in Minor vs. Happersett, as my essay also makes clear.
All citizens within the jurisdiction of the United States have the same rights under the Constitution. All except one right, and that is the right to be eligible to the position of the President of the United States.
The Supreme Court can be overly-verbose in its definitions until paper runs out in Washington. Nothing will change this simple, elegant fact.
Seems pretty simple (you need to re-read the last sentence or two of what you posted).
“No person has a right to be classified as a Statutory citizen, Naturalized citizen, Native born or Natural born citizen. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 827-28, “[The naturalized citizen] is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the distinction. The law makes none.””
The constitution makes the distinction and there is ample evidence as to its consequence.