Thus, for example, Rastafarians have been prohibited from sacrificing animals in furtherance of their religious observance. Nor can Mormons practice polygamy in furtherance of their tenets.
The harder cases come when the state attempts to compel medical practitioners to participate in abortions contrary to their religious beliefs or pharmacists to sell the morning-after pill.
If one considers the cases on the principle that driving on the highways is a privilege which the state can regulate reasonably, the Amish should be made to comply. If one applies that principle to those who choose to engage in the business of medical treatment, nurses should be made to participate in abortions.
On the other hand, if one analyzes the cases on the basis that the nurses are being affirmatively required to violate their religious principles, they should not be compelled to participate in abortions. One can say that the mere participation in an industry does not deprive one of the freedom of religion when the regulation is not directly related to public safety or the police power. It is related to a social good perceived by the legislature, to wit, that nurses should be properly trained in committing abortions but that is hardly a compelling justification to deprive one of religious liberty guaranteed in the First Amendment.
We can play with the idea that it is within the state's power to prohibit activity such as animal sacrifice or polygamy and religious belief does not prevail against the general police power. There is, after all, an argument to be made justifying laws against animal sacrifice and polygamy which, whether one is persuaded or not, cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable.
But a distinction might be made that the state has less power affirmatively to compel people to do something, such as commit abortions, than it does to prohibit activity, such as driving without required markings-especially when that activity is connected to a privilege, driving on the roads, rather than a right, such as free speech. We can say that when one ventures onto the roads he makes a choice which submits him to regulations for the general welfare, such as driving on the right, stopping on red, and having tail lights and markings. But when one decides to practice medicine one has not made a decision which submits him to that degree of regulation. The contrary argument, of course, is that a nurse who was not trained in abortion might subsequently engage in an abortion and cause a patient harm. Would we extend that argument to cover euthanasia?
