Over the past couple of weeks, most of the drive-by media's attention has been focused on events in Libya and the American responses to it.
For a quick recap --
Christopher Stevens, an American diplomat assigned to Libya, and some others in the consulate were violently attacked without warning and ended up dead...on 9/11.
Ignoring the significance of the date, the Obama administration acted curiously: denying any possible connection to terror, and stonewalling with a pre-programmed chorus of disgust over a low-budget film
[snip]
Over the past week or so, disturbing cracks began appearing in this story, such as the fact that one of those in the consulate was actually communicating with other people away from the scene when the attack began, and he said there was no riot; nothing, in fact, but the security guards taking pictures. (This made him alarmed enough that he wrote "if we are still alive tonight..." or similar).
If this were not enough, it came out that the facility was not guarded by US marines, but by local security: who were the ones casing the joint. And it came out that the policy of having no Marines, and having a "no loaded weapons" policy, came straight from the top, from Secretary of State Lady Macbeth.
Oh, and it also came out that the Libyan authorities had notified our government about the possibility of the place being attacked, several days before, only to be ignored. And there's that matter of Stevens having been brutalized and raped before being killed.
Oh, and it came out that one of the ringleaders of the attack was someone who had been imprisoned in Guantanamo -- I guess this puts paid to the idea (probably from some Ivy League educated homosexual from the State Department) that "treating the terrorists humanely would yield tremendous PR dividends for us.
(Come on, Democrats lie through their teeth all the time for petty advantage, or just to keep in practice -- such as Harry Reid (Cadaver-NV) lying about Mitt Romney's tax returns -- so why do Dems assume Third World terrorists wouldn't lie as well?
And yet the first reaction to the embassy attack from Lady Macbeth was one of naive surprise --"How could they *do* this to us? We *liberated* that town!" (So much for realpolitik.)
So the current thinking is that well, maybe the spin was designed to deflect attention from the abysmal failings of the Administration, in not guarding the facilities, not listening to warnings, and the like.
But there are a couple of other things.
First, notice that since the event, both the President and Secretary Lady Macbeth have gone onto massive apology tours:
not to the US public (you know, since it was our ambassador killed, the first one killed in 33 years), but to the Arab Street, including spending $70,000 for public service ads in Pakistan. And sending the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lean on a Florida minister supportive of the films; and the midnight raid and "taking into custody" of the film-maker behind the clip. (What First Amendment?)
The response?
More riots, more violence, and stiffer demands for even more silencing of criticism of Islam: -- there is even talk that Obama will throw Christianity under the bus at an upcoming U.N. conference. ("For I will stand with the muslims should the political winds shift in an ugly direction" --Barack Obama) is chillingly misleading: nobody suspected he meant that the ugly winds would be a firestorm of hate directed at Christendom and the West by a nascent Caliphate. -- And this is only strengthened by the rumors that Obama is negotiating with Egypt to release the blind sheik who was behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, and also considering the release of 1/3 of the terrorists in Guantanamo...not to mention the recent abortive effort to remove Israel and God from the DNC Party Platform.)
More:
Cross-posting my post (#11 -- See also post 13) from the above thread:
Rather than focusing on terrorism as the sole method of group action, as is the case with Al-Qaeda, in perfect postmodern fashion the use of terror falls into a multiplicity of options available to progressively infiltrate, confront, and eventually establish Islamic domination over the West. The following tactics and techniques are among the many recommendations made in The Project:
In reading The Project, it should be kept in mind that it was drafted in 1982 when current tensions and terrorist activities in the Middle East were still very nascent. In many respects, The Project is extremely prescient for outlining the bulk of Islamist action, whether by “moderate” Islamist organizations or outright terror groups, over the past two decades.
One renowned international scholar of Islamist movements who also spoke with Besson, Reuven Paz, talked about The Project in its historical context:
The Project was part of the charter of the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was official established on July 29, 1982. It reflects a vast plan which was revived in the 1960s, with the immigration of Brotherhood intellectuals, principally Syrian and Egyptians, into Europe.
As Paz notes, The Project was drafted by the Muslim Brotherhood as part of its rechartering process in 1982, a time that marks an upswing in its organizational expansion internationally, as well as a turning point in the alternating periods of repression and toleration by the Egyptian government. In 1952, the organization played a critical support role to the Free Officers Movement led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, which overthrew King Faruq, but quickly fell out of favor with the new revolutionary regime because of Nasser’s refusal to follow the Muslim Brotherhood’s call to institute an ideologically committed Islamic state. At various times since the July Revolution in 1952, the Brotherhood has regularly been banned and its leaders killed and imprisoned by Egyptian authorities.
Since it was rechartered in 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread its network across the Middle East, Europe, and even America. At home in Egypt, parliamentary elections in 2005 saw the Muslim Brotherhood winning 20 percent of the available legislative seats, comprising the largest opposition party block. Its Palestinian affiliate, known to the world as HAMAS, recently gained control of the Palestinian Authority after elections secured for them 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Its Syrian branch has historically been the largest organized group opposing the Assad regime, and the organization also has affiliates in Jordan, Sudan, and Iraq. In the US, the Muslim Brotherhood is primarily represented by the Muslim American Society (MAS).
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Excerpt from THE PROJECT:
The Muslim Brotherhood "Project" (Continued) By: Patrick Poole
FrontPageMagazine.com | Thursday, May 11, 2006
[NOTE: The following English translation of The Project has been prepared by Scott Burgess and was first published in serial form by The Daily Ablution in December 2005 (Parts I, II, III, IV, V, Conclusion). It is copyrighted and reprinted here with his permission. It is based on the French text of The Project published in Sylvain Besson, La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des Islamistes (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005), pp. 193-205.]
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent and Merciful
S/5/100 report
1/12/1982 [December 1, 1982]
Towards a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy
(Points of Departure, Elements, Procedures and Missions)
This report presents a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy [or "political Islam"]. Local Islamic policies will be drawn up in the different regions in accordance with its guidelines. It acts, first of all, to define the points of departure of that policy, then to set up the components and the most important procedures linked to each point of departure; finally we suggest several missions, by way of example only, may Allah protect us.
The following are the principal points of departure of this policy:
Point of Departure 1: To know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for its planning and execution.
Point of Departure 2: To demonstrate proof of the serious nature of the work.
Point of Departure 3: To reconcile international engagement with flexibility at a local level.
Point of Departure 4: To reconcile political engagement and the necessity of avoiding isolation on one hand, with permanent education and institutional action on the other.
Point of Departure 5: To be used to establish an Islamic State; parallel, progressive efforts targeted at controlling the local centers of power through institutional action.
Point of Departure 6: To work with loyalty alongside Islamic groups and institutions in multiple areas to agree on common ground, in order to "cooperate on the points of agreement and set aside the points of disagreement".
Point of Departure 7: To accept the principle of temporary cooperation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances. This will require, on the other hand, limited contacts between certain leaders, on a case by case basis, as long as these contacts do not violate the [shari’a] law. Nevertheless, one must not give them allegiance or take them into confidence, bearing in mind that the Islamic movement must be the origin of the initiatives and orientations taken.
Point of Departure 8: To master the art of the possible on a temporary basis without abusing the basic principles, bearing in mind that Allah's teachings always apply. One must order the suitable and forbid that which is not, always providing a documented opinion. But we should not look for confrontation with our adversaries, at the local or the global scale, which would be disproportionate and could lead to attacks against the dawa or its disciples.
Point of Departure 9: To construct a permanent force of the Islamic dawa and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world, to varying degrees and insofar as possible.
Point of Departure 10: To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement. In fact, surveillance, policy decisions and effective communications complement each other.
Point of Departure 11: To adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy plan and by means of jihad, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today.
Point of Departure 12: To know how to turn to self-criticism and permanent evaluation of worldwide Islamic policy and its objectives, of its content and its procedures, in order to improve it. This is a duty and a necessity according to the precepts of shari’a.