Posted on 04/27/2011 10:18:57 AM PDT by RobinMasters
Although President Obama released a purported long-form birth certificate today indicating he was born in Hawaii, he still might not fit the constitutional eligibility requirement that stipulates only "natural born" citizens can serve as U.S. president, according to a recent bestselling book.
An investigation by the authors found that according to correspondence from the original framers of the Constitution as well as multiple Supreme Court rulings and the legal writings that helped establish the principles of the Constitution, Obama is not eligible to serve as president since his father was not a U.S. citizen.
With nearly 900 endnotes, the book, "The Manchurian President: Barack Obama's Ties to Communists, Socialists and Other Anti-American Extremists," was written by WABC Radio host and WND senior reporter Aaron Klein with researcher Brenda J. Elliott.
While the book was released last May, the work takes on renewed relevance today with Obama's release of his purported long-form birth certificate. In a chapter investigating eligibility issues, the book concluded Obama may not be eligible regardless of his place of birth. The authors recommend further legislative and judicial debate.
"It is undisputed that Obama's father was not a U.S. citizen," wrote Klein, "a fact that should have led to congressional debate about whether Obama is eligible under the United States Constitution to serve as president."
(Excerpt) Read more at wnd.com ...
Sorry, but you are wrong. Both parents must be citizens if you want to be ‘Natural’. Go research Vattel and David Ramsey’s input. They were the authorities. You might learn something.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Ramsay_(congressman)
Unfortunately, wikipedia does not supercede US code. Look up that.
The two-parent thing only comes into play if the candidate for prez is born outside of the US.
Even there, it’s not as simple as both being US citizens.
See:
http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_citi.html
You are wrong, and obviously biased.
People think citizen is the same as natural born citizen. Without question there are millions of citizens in this country who have had their “right” to be President disabled constitutionally. The Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue of natural born vs. standard citizen because it would be an exceedingly rare thing to do. The only reason it would become an issue? Someone running for Pres... and HERE we are kids.
People think citizen is the same as natural born citizen. Without question there are millions of citizens in this country who have had their “right” to be President disabled constitutionally. The Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue of natural born vs. standard citizen because it would be an exceedingly rare thing to do. The only reason it would become an issue? Someone running for Pres... and HERE we are kids.
Someone like Andrew Jackson?
Correct. This issue is not related to any law, even the Constitution. This question is about a definition. What does “natural born citizen” mean? That is the entire issue and nothing else matters, including where Obama was born.
What counts is the original intent of the Founding Fathers.
What counts is the original intent of the Founding Fathers.
I agree.
But how is that intent established and enforced?
Tar ‘n Feathers?
(not that there’s anything wrong with that...)
Secondly, it is logically and historically IMPOSSIBLE to apply the British definition of 'natural born subject' to the American context. Citizens and subjects are totally different. The model and theory of government are vastly different. A Constitutional republic is not a Parliamentary monarchy.
George D. Collins, Esq. was the Secretary of the California Bar Association. His name was recognized nationally for cases in the federal courts. In 1884, he published an article in The American Law Review entitled ARE PERSONS BORN IN THE UNITED STATES IPSO FACTO CITIZENS THEREOF? [<=click on link to read]. In the article, he addresses the legal definitions of US citizenship—including the definition of natural born citizenship. He totally destroys every claim you and the other Obama apologists make.
Attorney Collins establishes clearly that there is no national common law in the United States—each State started its own common law tradition, which incorporated British common law at the time the colony was founded, but which evolved independently from British common law, and independently from that of the other colonies (and then States, after independence.) Which is why it's IMPOSSIBLE for the US to have its own national common law. He cites the Supreme Court cases that say exactly that.
He also explains that natural born citizens are in no way, shape or form, the same as natural born subjects, and why that MUST be so.
Core of the argument: The English common law did not distinguish between a “natural born subject” and a naturalized subject. "The English common law provided that an alien naturalized is “to all intents and purposes a natural born subject.” Co. Litt. 129 (quoted and cited in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F.Cass. 785, 790 (1866).). Under English common law, once a person became naturalized, he or she was deemed to be a “natural born subject.” Hence, under English common law a naturalized citizen was considered a “natural born subject.” Hence, giving the “natural born Citizen” clause the same meaning as a “natural born subject” would have allowed a naturalized citizen to be eligible to be President of the new Republic.
Attorney Collins discusses Vattel in great detail. And Collins agrees that to be a natural born citizen one must be born on the soil of parents who were themselves citizens. Collins quotes Vattell.
But more important is the fact that Collins makes it clear Vattel’s definition of “natural born citizen” was not actually Vattel’s definition. Vattel merely codified the pre-existing law of nations. He acted as a lexicographer of existing concepts and terms, not as a policymaker coining new ones.
This is very important.
The definition of “natural born citizen” was not created by Vattel in his treatise, “Law of Nations.” That treatise simply discussed the established body of law known as “the law of nations”. The definition of natural born citizen discussed in Vattel’s treatise was actually the definition established by the body of law known as “law of nations”.
“Secondly, it is logically and historically IMPOSSIBLE to apply the British definition of ‘natural born subject’ to the American context. Citizens and subjects are totally different.”
If you would take the time to READ Lynch, you would see how stupid that statement is. The colonies used NBS in their laws. When free, the states changed those laws and substituted citizen for subject, so the new laws read NBC.
Just a few years later, the same states ratified the Constitution using the phrase NBC. Since there was no debate on the subject, the assumption has to be that they meant the same thing they meant in their own laws - which was an exact equivalence between the two.
“But more important is the fact that Collins makes it clear Vattel’s definition of “natural born citizen” was not actually Vattel’s definition.”
This is also very important. Vattel NEVER wrote ‘natural born citizen’ - not in French. And the first English translation to screw it up and insert NBC instead of indigene was in 1797 - 10 years AFTER the Constitution.
Further, Vattel specified in that section that his discussion did NOT include England, which the USA was part of at the time of his writing. Birthers slander Vattel by misquoting him and taking him out of context!
The framers rejected the notion that the United States was under English Common Law, “The common law of England is not the common law of these States.” —George Mason one of Virginia’s delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
Blackstone states that any person, freeman or alien, except those of diplomats who were born in the realm of the King of England was a natural born subject. There is a problem with a simple substitution of citizen in place of subject, that some people think are synonymous. In England, not all natural born subjects of the Crown can become the King. This is reserved for a very small subset of natural born subjects called the royalty. This is drastically dissimilar to the American concept that any Natural Born Citizen can become President. Under Blackstone’s subjects only a very, very small subset of Natural Born Subjects could rise to be King, the American Presidency is drawn from the largest class of citizens, the natural born. Like the analogy of a field of clover, the Founding Fathers were not looking for that elusive genetic mutation of a four-leaf clover, they were looking for the common, naturally occurring three-leaf clover to be President.
The use of Blackstone's definition of 'natural born subject' gave Great Britain claim over US Citizens, which lead to the war of 1812, when Britain went about impressing American sailors into their navy because English law did not recognize the right of our Founding Father’s naturalizing themselves into our new country. “Once an Englishman, always an Englishman,” was the reason the British used to impress our citizens into service for the Crown. This law and concept of claim to the subjects to the Crown, regardless of place of birth is still in effect in Great Britain, and had the effect of Congress passing a law that required all the officers and three fourths of the seamen on a ship of the United States be natural born citizens. (Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, February 9, 1813) Further, the Crown passed a law that made it treason for former British subjects, even though they were now American citizens to participate on the side of America during the war of 1812. (Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, February 23, 1813.) If the Founding Fathers accepted Blackstone’s definition of a natural born subject, then impressments of American-British citizens into the Royal Navy would not have been a casus belli, for the War of 1812. The fact that Madison included the impressments of American Citizens as a reason for a state of War clearly indicates that they rejected Blackstone’s definition of a natural-born subject.
John Jay’s letter to Washington address this dual and permanent loyalty to England that Blackstone introduces. To George Washington, President of the Constitutional Convention, Jay writes “Permit me to hint whether it would not be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of foreigners into the administration of our national government ; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on any but a natural born citizen.” Jay not only knew of Vattel, , as can be seen from his correspondence with James Madison in 1780 during treaty negotiations with Spain, but he was also a proponent of Vattel as well.
Founder historian, David Ramsay, who in his A Dissertation on the Manners of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen (1789) told us that after July 4, 1776, birthright citizenship was preserved only for a child born to U.S. citizens, making no mention of place of birth. In his 1789 article, Ramsay first explained who the “original citizens” were and then defined the “natural born citizens” as the children born to citizen parents. He said concerning the children born after the declaration of independence, “[c]itizenship is the inheritance of the children of those who have taken part in the late revolution; but this is confined exclusively to the children of those who were themselves citizens….” Id. at 6. He added that “citizenship by inheritance belongs to none but the children of those Americans, who, having survived the declaration of independence, acquired that adventitious character in their own right, and transmitted it to their offspring….” Id. at 7. He continued that citizenship “as a natural right, belongs to none but those who have been born of citizens since the 4th of July, 1776….” Id. at 6. As we can see, Ramsay put forth a definition of a “natural born Citizen” that only depended upon the child being born to U.S. citizen parents with no mention of place of birth.
Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830) (the majority, which included Chief Justice John Marshall, cited Vattel on the right of election to change one’s allegiance and thus citizenship in the context of the new nation being formed after revolution. The Court found on principles consistent with Vattel’s jus sanguinis and not on the English common law rule of jus soli, that simply being born in New York, after July 4, 1776 and before September 15, 1776, when the British took possession of New York, was not sufficient to establish one’s status as an American citizen, for a child of minor years is incapacitated from making any citizenship election but rather followed the citizenship held or chosen by the father. On the contrary, relying upon principles of the English common law, Justice Johnson and Justice Story, who wrote separate minority concurring opinions, would have found the child born in New York during the same time period a citizen of the State of New York or American citizen, respectively, regardless of the citizenship of his parents. Id. 136 and 164. This case shows what the majority rule was on citizenship and that it followed the Vattelian doctrine that a child when born took on the national character of his or her father (meaning father and mother under the doctrine of merger of the wife’s citizenship into the husband) and did not acquire his or her citizenship from the territory in which he or she was born); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (Justice Daniels concurring cited Vattel and The Law of Nations and provided his definition of natural born citizens and took out of Vattel’s definition the reference to “fathers” and “father” and replaced it with “parents” and “person,” respectively, and stated: “'The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights.' Again: 'I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. . . .'”);
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (confirmed that a child born in the United States to a naturalized U.S. citizen father and naturalized citizen mother, the mother being derivatively naturalized by marrying a U.S. citizen, was a “natural born Citizen.”
On Vattel: The correct title of Vattel's Book I, Chapter 19, section 212, is “Of the citizens and naturals”. It is not “Of citizens and natives” as it was originally translated into English. While other translation errors were corrected in reprints, that 1759 translation error was never corrected in reprints. The error was made by translators in London operating under English law, and was mis-translated in error, or was possibly translated to suit their needs to convey a different meaning to Vattel to the English only reader. In French, as a noun, native is rendered as “originaire” or “indigene”, not as “naturel”. For “naturel” to mean native would need to be used as an adjective. In fact when Vattel defines "natural born citizens" in the second sentence of section 212 after defining general or ordinary citizens in the first sentence, you see that he uses the word "indigenes" for natives along with "Les naturels" in that sentence. He used the word "naturels" to emphasize clearly who he was defining as those who were born in the country of two citizens of the country. Also, when we read Vattel, we must understand that Vattel's use of the word "natives" in 1758 is not to be read with modern day various alternative usages of that word. You must read it in the full context of sentence 2 of section 212 to fully understand what Vattel was defining from natural law, i.e., natural born citizenship of a country. Please see the photograph of the original French for Chapter 19, Section 212, here in the original French if you have any doubts (I speak French and Russian, by the way.) Please do not simply look at the title as some have suggested that is all you need to do. Vattel makes it quite clear he is not speaking of natives in this context as someone simply born in a country, but of natural born citizens, those born in the country of two citizens of the country. Our founding Fathers were men of high intellectual abilities, many were conversant in French, the diplomatic language of that time period. Benjamin Franklin had ordered 3 copies of the French Edition of “Le droit des gens,” which the deferred to as the authoritative version as to what Vattel wrote and what Vattel meant and intended to elucidate.".
The person who translated “les naturels, ou indigenes” into late 18th-century English as "natural born citizens," in full knowledge that that phrase was used in Article II of the new Constitution, can only mean that the translator's expert opinion was that that was what those words meant in context. The translator chose that phrase precisely because, in his professional opinion, de Vattel's "les naturel, ou indigenes" meant the same as what the Framers meant by "natural born Citizen." And de Vattel's usage of "ou" (or) to connect "les naturels" with "indigenes" by logical conjunction indicates he meant those terms to be understood as synonyms, at least as he was using them.
We are not under common law, but common law provided the legal language. NBC = NBS, and the meaning of NBS was found in the common law.
When the USA became independent, every NBS automatically became a NBC, because the terms are equivalent. As the Supreme Court agreed, citing The Supreme Court of North Carolina:
“Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens. . . . Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina than was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an European King to a free and sovereign [p664] State; . . . British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; . . . and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State. . . . The term “citizen,” as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term “subject” in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State.”
The French phrase for NBC/NBS is “sujets naturel”, as can be found in legal documents of the time. Vattel never used the phrase.
The passage you birthers cite was admittedly not about England - which the US was a part of at the time - and indigene does NOT translate NBC.
Further, that bad translation was not made until 10 years AFTER the Constitution, so the error could not have inspired the Founders.
What was the source? A common legal term, found in the laws of the ratifying states, or the French word “indigene”? It takes a remarkably dishonest person to reply, “Indigene!”
But to be fair, what you meant to say is that there are strong analogies between the meanings of subject and citizen, and between the meanings of "natural born subject" and "natural born citizen." No one disagrees with that. The point of contention is where the similarities stop and the differences begin. Analogies are never perfect, for otherwise they would cease to be analogies at all.
de Vattel defined what he meant by "les naturels" and "indigenes" in the text itself. He was plainly and beyond possibility of dispute explaining and defining a concept. That concept was defined ostensively as the set of all persons both born in a country and born to parents both of whom were citizens. The words he wrote make it plain that he was assigning the terms "les naturels" and "indigenes" as two equivalent referents (labels) to his concept. In doing so, he made it explicit that the normative meanings of "indigene" (native) and "naturel" (natural) were not what he intended. He was defining "les naturels" and "indigenes" as terms of art in the domain of international law, and not using them normatively.
You're quite right that de Vattel did NOT use the phrase "sujets naturels." Why should he, when that phrase's normative meaning was NOT the one he intended to use, convey or define? It's precisely because the concept he was defining was NOT the normative meaning of "sujets naturel" that he didn't use that term!
You're also quite right that he explicitly stated that the concept of purest citizenship he was defining (the name doesn't matter yet) was not used in England. So if the Constitutional Convention was relying either on the law of nations in general, or on de Vattel's description of it, when they wrote "natural born citizen," then that would be yet another proof that "natural born citizen" and "natural born subject" differ in their meanings in ways other than the differences between a subject and a citizen.
Which brings us right back to where we started: Did the Constitutional Convention intend to leverage the meaning of "natural born subject" by the term "natural born citizen," with the only difference being the one between a subject and a citizen? Or not?
New words and terms of art are invented all the time. And the meaning of words and phrases change over time. Such changes do not occur due to inscrutable, random processes, nor because of error in teaching children the native language of their culture. The meanings change because the old meanings lose their utility, and new meanings gain utility, because the society and culture themselves change. Sometimes the word or phrase will be slightly altered to help disambiguate the old and new meanings, but not always.
The context and situation of the United States and Britain were not the same. Britain was ruled by a royal family. Only members of the royal family could assume the role of head of state and commander of the armed forces. And Britain was a world empire. None of that was true of the United States at the time. That establishes a compelling motive for a term that would be more restrictive than "natural born subject" in order to limit who would be eligible to become President of the United States, since the British definition of "natural born subject" would allow persons to be President who had allegiance to foreign powers. The point being that, with such a compelling motive, it would be invalid to assume without evidence that the only difference between "natural born citizen" and "natural born subject" is the one between citizen and subject.
Again, consider John Jay’s letter to Washington: “Permit me to hint whether it would not be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of foreigners into the administration of our national government ; and to declare expressly that the command in chief of the American army shall not be given to, nor devolve on any but a natural born citizen.” That establishes the fact that the Framers were worried about the undivided loyalty of the President, and thought that the requirement that he be a natural born citizen would be sufficient to address that issue.
But how could that be, if "natural born citizen" differs from "natural born subject" solely in the difference between a subject and a citizen? A British "natural born subject" could have multiple nationalities, and owe allegiance to multiple sovereigns. The only way the "natural born subject" requirement can prevent a person from having allegiance to a foreign sovereign is if its meaning is the same as the one de Vattel defined and labelled "les naturel, ou indigenes." If both your parents are citizens (or subjects) of the same sovereign, and you were born in that same sovereign's territory, then and only then is it impossible for any foreign sovereign to have a claim to your allegiance under the law of nations as commonly understood. John Jay's request to Washington makes no sense otherwise.
If that reasoning is sound, then "natural born citizen" must have been intended to have the same meaning as de Vattel defined for his term-of-art phrases "les naturels, ou les indigenes." In which case the 1797 translation of de Vattel is no error at all, but a perfectly correct usage of terms in American English that had the exact same meaning at that time and place as intended by de Vattel.
The SCOTUS decision you cite can only set precedent with respect to issues legally before the court, which had to do with State citizenship in North Carolina, not with national citizenship of the United States. Any assertions in court decisions that don't decide the issue legally before the court are dicta, and have no value as precedent.
The operative meaning of "natural born citizen" in general, or how it applies for a putative President of the US, has never been before the Supreme Court. So there are no precedents.
"The term "citizen," as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term "subject" in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a "subject of the king" is now "a citizen of the State."
Vattel never wrote about natural born citizens or subjects. Ever. And the passage birthers misquote was not written about English law, with the US being a subset of it, since the USA didn't exist at the time Vattel wrote.
In the USA, citizenship is primarily from birth, not parentage. Vattel, discussing other countries, had it different - but Vattel is not US law.
Irrefutable point: Article II, section 1, pa. 5 states: "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States." That limits who may be President to persons who meet the following requirements:
Why did the Constitutional Convention include that last exception, allowing those who were citizens at the time the Constitution was adopted to be President? The ONLY POSSIBLE REASON FOR THAT EXCEPTION IS THAT WITHOUT IT, NO ONE COULD CONSTITUTIONALLY BECOME PRESIDENT, BECAUSE NO ONE COULD SATISFY THE CONSTRAINT OF BEING A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN.
If "natural born citizen" means "born on US soil, with parents who are US citizens," then it would in fact be true that no one alive at the time could have satisfied the "natural born citizen" requirement, in which case there is a good reason for the exception.
But if "natural born citizen" means essentially the same as "natural born subject" (differing only to the extent that a citizen differs from a subject,) then any citizen of the US at the time the Constitution was adopted would satisfy the "natural born citizen" requirement, so there would be no need for the exception, and its inclusion in the Constitution makes no sense. No sense at all.
You are refuted beyond any reasonable doubt.
BRILLIANT POST!!!!! My hat is off to you!
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
