Here is the critical part:
“The jurisdiction clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat different from the jurisdiction clause of the 1866 Act...”
The Supreme Court has already ruled on what the phrase means. If the Congress wanted, they could have inserted the same phrase from the 1866 Civil Rights Act for ratification, but they didn’t.
The court is responsible for reading what was written and ratified, not what was written at a previous time and apparently rejected for insertion into the Constitution. It would be judicial activism of the first order for the Court to substitute the 1866 CRA for the 14th Amendment.
“Textually, such an interpretation is manifestly erroneous, for it renders the entire “subject to the jurisdiction” clause redundant. Anyone who is “born” in the United States is, under this interpretation, necessarily “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.”
Meese errs. As the court has already ruled, an ambassador is not, and neither is the member of an invading army. I would also argue that illegal aliens are essentially an invading army, here in violation of the will of the government and thus NOT “under the jurisdiction”.
Now, in the case you cite to support yourself, was Hamdi recognized as a citizen by the Court? Including the dissents?
Here is Scalia’s dissent: “Several limitations give my views in this matter a relatively narrow compass. They apply only to citizens, accused of being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court. This is not likely to be a numerous group; currently we know of only two, Hamdi and Jose Padilla.”
From the decision itself “At this difficult time in our Nation’s history, we are called upon to consider the legality of the Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an “enemy combatant”
I skimmed Thomas’s dissent, and cannot find any indication he rejects Hamdi as a citizen. As best I can tell, it was 9-0 that Hamdi IS a citizen of the USA.
Furthermore, just because the court relied on English law that was used in WKA, does not make it right & true as to the original meaning thereof in the Constitution and of the framers who wrote the 14th that is clearly recorded. Meese used congressional records that Grey also used in his deciding opinion in Elk. In WKA, Grey overturned his own decision as the 9th curcuit just did in the AZ voter registration case in which there, the Chief Justice also wrote a scathing dissent.
Courts overturn themselves ALL the time these days depending on the political philosophy of the judges & the make-up of the court. If our Constitution is a living breathing document, then we have no Constitution or supreme Law because the law is always subject to change based on the opinions of a few and in 1898, there was plenty of congressional record & case law as well as Acts of Congress as to who were the “born” citizens. There was absolutely no reason for Gray to have to refer to English law.
The entire crux of the definition goes to its origins, a subject is a member of society by conference and does not always include political rights, a citizen is a member of society by consent, either direct or tacit and an alien parent does not have the authority of law to consent for their children to be members of a society in which they are not members as they hold no political rights. Also, according to English law, a naturalized subject becomes a natural born thus if English law IS the law, then by right, every naturalized citizen of the US became natural born and thus they should be eligible for president.
This is what you are saying...do you not know how absolutely absurd you sound when you consistently rely on the liberal progressive theology feudal law that has no foundation in "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"? The Declaration is listed as the 1st law of the land, the Articles of Confederation 2nd, & the Constitution 3rd and English Law is not mentioned in any of them as our foundation, but the Laws of Nature are.
Contee v. Godfrey, 6 Fed. Cas. 361 (#3140) (U.S.C.C. D.C. 1808), denied that the British-born daughter of an American antenatus who had chosen the British side could claim citizenship under the statute 7 Anne c. 5 (discussed in Kettner, Am. Citizenship, 20) which in English law had extended subjectship to the foreign-born children of subjects. In this case, the parent’s choice of alienage (before the daughter’s birth) clearly affected the descendant.