Posted on 05/11/2010 5:22:12 PM PDT by thackney
Supermajor BP may have been struggling with lost circulation and other problems controlling the Macondo well six weeks prior to the 20 April blowout onboard Transocean semisub Deepwater Horizon according to testimony this afternoon at the joint Coast Guard - Minerals Management Service safety hearing in Kenner, Louisiana.
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Chief Mate Paul Erickson with Tidewater vessel Damon Bankston testified to being on board the supply vessel during an earlier hitch to ferry additional mud to the Transocean rig. Erickson said he heard comments about problems with the well but he could not identify precisely who gave him that information.
"We carried extra mud "because of circulation problem of some kind" and he understood that the "well was difficult".
Erickson also testified to the explosion of mud prior to the blaze, and that it was strong enough to kill birds hovering over the vessel and drop them onto its deck.
He also said he could see what he described as a white liquid "boiling" out of the main deck just aft of the derrick.
Shortly after he said he saw the "flash fire" just above the liquid.
Erickson could not say for certain what the liquid was, suggesting possibly seawater, but at such volumes and pressure he was not sure.
It was distinct from the mud, however.
In earlier testimony, the hearing panel also uncovered an apparent lack of firefighting coordination at the scene and the Coast Guard's inability to respond in that role.
Coast Guard Captain H M Nguyen himself cast the light on the Coast Guard's lack of marine firefighting skills and resources.
It also is not a priority for the Coast Guard as it was busily engaged in search and rescue for the survivors of the rig.
However, even that was mostly accomplished by a private vessel, Tidewater's Damon Bankston, helmed by Captain Alwin James Landry.
Testimony from Captain Landry indicated that four to six supply vessels and crewboats responded to the rig and dumped water on the Deepwater Horizon with permission from the rig's captain.
However, as per customary, no certified fire marshal or other coordinator was directing the firefighting effort, the hearing questioners learned.
"I don't know if there was a formal coordinator out there," said Coast Guard official Kevin Michael Robb, one of the watchstanders at the time of the incident.
Robb said also that the vessels dumping water on the rig had to "back off" around 3am because of the intensity of the blaze.
Captain Landry also said there was fire on the water, which motivated him and his crew to search by spotlight for survivors in the water. Landry said at least three had jumped in the water, including the Deepwater Horizon's captain, who was among the last to abandon ship.
Captain Nguyen observed that the firefighting effort was not coordinated and blasting water onto a vessel in an "uncoordinated action" on any vessel, can cause it to sink.
Robb answered that firefighting in a marine environment requires "significant amount of training" and assets, and "commandant policy" does not restrict Coast Guard involvement in dousing vessel fires, it takes a minimal, "conservative" approach to it.
Gregory Linsin, representing the Marshall Islands, the rig's flag nation, asked who would fulfill the role of fire marshal, to which Robb responded that usually the "owner of the platform" would do it, but since it is not part of the Coast Guard's "response policy", he could not comment more.
The first Coast Guard responders were not on the scene until just over an hour, when the first helicopter arrived.
Indeed, the helicopter actually "slid" on the deck of the Damon Bankston vessel due to the mud splattered all over the vessel, which occurred just prior to the rig explosion, according to Captain Landry.
Captain Landry's testimony garnered rapt attention as the described, to his perception, what happened the minutes before and after the blowout.
According to Landry, his dynamically positioned vessel was assigned to transfer several thousand barrels of drilling mud to the Horizon.
The mud weight was around 14 lbs per gallon, and Captain Nguyen asked if any combustible chemicals were in the mud. Landry could not specifically say, but he confirmed that the mud is stored in unpressurised tanks away from sources of ignition like the engine room.
He said the mud transfer by hose to the rig stopped around 17:17 pm, "I assumed it was for dinner break," he said.
Landry contacted the rig after 21:00 pm the status of the transfer. The rig told him it would be "displacing the riser" he said, meaning mud downhole would be evacuated out of the well and pumped back to the Damon Bankston.
Next thing Landry observed was a hissing sound. He said the noise is not unusual for deep-water, high pressure wells, but it lasted longer than he was accustomed, maybe half a minute. Shortly after that, it was raining mud on the Damon Bankston.
"I saw mud falling on back aft of boat. I thought it might have been a ruptured hose," Landry said.
After an explosion, he saw a "green flash" of light and "bits of debris fly through the air", but he later said all he could visually note was the slick mud on his vessel.
Landry said the rig lost power, lights went off, and then the first three or four crewmembers jump into the water, all within the first 10 minutes.
The Damon Bankston recovered all the survivors, also with the aid of a sport fishing vessel, the Ramblin Wreck.
Secondary explosions also occurred on the rig, according to Landry, who presumed it was from "chemicals" and other items on the rig catching fire.
Landry's course was also questioned. Once Coast Guard was on the scene, the Bankston made for the Ocean Endeavor semi-submersible for medical supplies and "tobacco products", Landry said.
It then made way for the Matterhorn tension leg platform where the vessel picked up Coast Guard, MMS and Tidewater personnel for "interviewing" the survivors.
Once arrived in Port Fourchon, the survivors -- including Captain Landry -- were subjected to drug tests, which Landry described as standard procedure after such an event.
Landry said the Horizon captain made mention of a "kill switch" not working, presumably to shut in the blowout preventer.
Attorney representatives from the following companies are present for the hearing, which continues this afternoon till 5pm: Anadarko, BP, M I Swaco, Cameron, Halliburton, Weatherford, Tidewater, and Transocean.
See link at #20.
BOOKMARK
Good thread. And my thanks to those with the expertise sharing their thoughts. Prayers for those hard at work trying to make repairs under these conditions. I wish them well.
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