Posted on 03/30/2010 5:11:19 PM PDT by SJackson
From the outset, the Obama administration's exploitation of the Ramat Shlomo announcement strained credulity. As we noted last week, Prime Minister Netanyahu months before had explicitly excluded Jerusalem from his acceptance of a 10-month freeze on settlement construction. In addition, the administration's acquiescence in the caveat - Secretary of State Clinton described the plan as "unprecedented" - seemed to signal that the president recognized his earlier insistence that Israel cease all settlement construction was a non-starter. Israel did not yield - and indeed it should have been recognized that it couldn't.
For one thing, a complete freeze in the West Bank, and even a temporary freeze in Jerusalem, would feed the perception that Israel was reconsidering its claims to those areas before negotiations. For another, Mr. Netanyahu's coalition could not survive any such gesture. Indeed, the limited restrictions he did commit to, was as far as he could prudently go. But even if one tries to view this from Mr. Obama's vantage point, the new flare-up has a strange dimension to it.
In her speech to AIPAC last week, Secretary Clinton defended the full court press against Prime Minister Netanyahu over Ramat Shlomo by saying such a reaction was required for the U.S. to act as an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians:
New construction in East Jerusalem or the West Bank undermines America's unique ability to play a role - an essential role - in the peace process. Our credibility in this process depends in part on our willingness to praise both sides when they are courageous.
she made some comments as to the responsibility of the Palestinians to end their incitement and for the Arab world to be more hospitable to Israel, she was silent about the elephant in the room. What purpose would any negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas and the PA serve when it is common knowledge that were Israel to withdraw its military umbrella, Hamas would most certainly sweep across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Further, a settlement freeze, after all is said and done, is, a precondition to negotiations. Yet Secretary Clinton was silent about Israel's precondition - summarily rejected by Mr. Abbas - that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish state."
Perhaps most curious is the failure to learn from President Obama's early insistence on a total freeze, everywhere - "no ifs, ands or buts," as the secretary of state put it at the time. The Palestinians, loath to look a gift horse in the mouth, promptly declared they would not return to negotiations until Israel complied, even though they had earlier participated in negotiations without any freeze at all. Universal commentary stated the obvious: The Palestinians would be crazy to accept less than what the U.S. was trying to secure for them.
So things remained, until the U.S. accepted Prime Minister Netanyahu's compromise. But the Palestinians persisted in their refusal until Washington came up with the "proximity talks" approach, giving the Palestinians a fig leaf to maintain the fiction of non-participation while actually participating in some fashion.
Of course, for Israel proximity talks represent a step backward since indirect talks had always been an Arab ploy to deal with Israel while not conceding it any legitimacy as a sovereign state. More important, the result confirmed in Palestinian minds that American involvement inevitably means a dilution of Israeli freedom of action vis-à-vis the Palestinians; it also assured the Palestinians that if they wait long enough, the impatient and anxious Americans can be counted on to start pressuring Israel for concessions.
In this context, the resumption of the settlements-construction controversy is astonishing. When his secretary of state publicly states that the administration wishes to be seen as an honest broker, why would the president go out of his way to humiliate Prime Minister Netanyahu? Especially when the controversy itself reflects a change of policy about the settlements - not by Israel but by the Obama administration. Why is the president not concerned about losing the confidence of Israel?
Nor should anyone lose sight of the fact that the role of honest broker, with its connotation of even-handedness, is inconsistent with the notion of a special relationship between Israel and the U.S. - all claims and protestations by administration officials notwithstanding. To be sure, Secretary Clinton did speak about it being in Israel's interests to move forward with negotiations - and in such negotiations, American facilitation is key.
But shouldn't friends let friends direct their own destiny? And wouldn't a forthright declaration of a tilting toward Israel persuade the Palestinians they'd better get serious because they will not have the U.S. to do its bidding?
If youd like to be on or off, please FR mail me.
..................
From the outset, the Obama administration's exploitation of the Ramat Shlomo announcement strained credulity... Secretary Clinton was silent about Israel's precondition - summarily rejected by Mr. Abbas - that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish state." ...So things remained, until the U.S. accepted Prime Minister Netanyahu's compromise. But the Palestinians persisted in their refusal until Washington came up with the "proximity talks" approach, giving the Palestinians a fig leaf to maintain the fiction of non-participation while actually participating in some fashion. Of course, for Israel proximity talks represent a step backward since indirect talks had always been an Arab ploy to deal with Israel while not conceding it any legitimacy as a sovereign state... Why is the president not concerned about losing the confidence of Israel?I'm stumped.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.