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In short, the threads having been permanently altered by the act of unmaking, will never return to their former state.

Excellent insight spirited irish!

Implicit in NicknamedBob's proposal is the presupposition that nature is fundamentally material and mechanical. Therefore, systems in Nature, just like machines, can be taken apart and reassembled without any loss of information whatsoever, completely reconstituting the original whole. Thus, the whole is simply nothing more than the sum of its parts.

Yet this expectation, matched against experience (e.g., as you point out, the alteration of the parts that necessarily occurs just by handling them) falls like a house of cards even at the machine level.

And yet it's now pretty clear that complex systems in Nature — preeminently living organisms — are not "material machines" and cannot be reduced to their parts and then later reconstituted back into their originals. (This is obvious from direct observation anyway.) The reduction itself destroys vital information necessary at all organizational levels of the system. Thus the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts.

The question for biology: What is "lost" upon such a hypothetical reduction?

I wonder when biologists will begin to ask this question, but I'm not holding my breath. Evidently, they are too committed to the Newtonian Paradigm to think it worth asking. And that is why biology is "in crisis" right now....

“Implicit in NicknamedBob's proposal is the presupposition that nature is fundamentally material and mechanical. Therefore, systems in Nature, just like machines, can be taken apart and reassembled without any loss of information whatsoever, completely reconstituting the original whole. Thus, the whole is simply nothing more than the sum of its parts.

Yet this expectation, matched against experience (e.g., as you point out, the alteration of the parts that necessarily occurs just by handling them) falls like a house of cards even at the machine level.”

Need I remind you that it was you who invited Mister Mikulecky to the party? “I came across a notable paper the other day, by Donald C. Mikulecky”

Here is the gist of what I was responding to:

“In the machine, each model analytic or synthetic, is formulated in terms of the material parts of the system. Thus any model will be reducible and can be reconstructed from its parts.

This is not the case in a complex system. There are certain key models which are formulated in an entirely different way. These models are made up of functional components which do not map to the material parts in any one to one manner. The functional component itself is totally dependent on the context of the whole system and has no meaning outside that context. This is why reducing the system to its material parts loses information irreversibly.”

Now, just as a short reprise, I remind you that I asked whether Mikulecky, or Rosen for that matter, would distinguish between a candle as a simple machine, and a lit candle as an example of a more complex system.

I was simply pointing out that complexity grows rapidly in the mental game of trying to reduce a system to its parts. I did not imply one thing or another about where I thought machines, and life, stood in the scales of that weighing.

Perhaps it is time to give some consideration to that.

"And yet it's now pretty clear that complex systems in Nature — preeminently living organisms — are not "material machines" and cannot be reduced to their parts and then later reconstituted back into their originals. (This is obvious from direct observation anyway.) The reduction itself destroys vital information necessary at all organizational levels of the system. Thus the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts.

The question for biology: What is "lost" upon such a hypothetical reduction?"

Socratically, which is a good way to deal with philosophical questions, what is lost or gained when a fertilized ovum divides and separates spontaneously to form twin zygotes?

Are twins victims of a diminished soul complex?

If one of the twins should die in utero, as occasionally happens, does its "soul" migrate back to the viable partner?

Makes you think, doesn't it?

Well, anyway, regardless how much fun it is to entertain these philosophical questions, we are not likely to garner anything other than opinion in response.

How about a little further analysis of our previous scenario, disassembling machines?

If one should carefully disassemble a small, battery-operated tape recorder, in whatever detail one wishes to surmise, and then reassemble it, without recharging the batteries, or reestablishing the magnetic domains previously recorded on the tape, then obviously one would have failed to consider, recognize, and remanufacture all the necessary conditions that were in the machine.

This reproduction would scarcely be of any more benefit that a straw cargo-cult image of the thing.

But suppose one did take these considerations into account?

Would then your expert testimony be accurate in saying it was exactly the same machine? Suppose, instead of disassembling and reassembling a single machine, you were presented with two machines of apparently identical origins. How would you tell them apart?

In the old "Perry Mason" trials, the D.A. would be asked to identify a weapon. He would often say, "Yes, this is the weapon found at the scene of the crime. I placed a mark on the weapon previously, and I recognize that mark as the one I placed on it."

I don't think Mr. Mason ever presented the hapless District Attorney with an identical weapon, bearing an identical mark, but you can imagine his confusion and frustration should that have happened.

We depend often on circumstantial evidence to corroborate our memories, especially in the matter of recognition.

Now, let us return again to this wonderful formulation: "This is not the case in a complex system. There are certain key models which are formulated in an entirely different way. These models are made up of functional components which do not map to the material parts in any one to one manner."

"... which do not map to the material parts in any one to one manner ..." Hmm. How about if we do map them according to their complex functions, orientations, states of charge and directions of motion? How then would you discriminate between them?

We cannot reassemble complex systems. Then how do surgeons reattach severed limbs to include even their ability to be moved and to feel?

Our abilities in these areas grow as our understanding grows. Despite the fact that we have been studying electricity for hundreds of years, and surgeons have miraculously reattached severed limbs, no one has yet energized a Frankenstein's Monster to terrorize the villagers.

At least, not yet.