Sorry for the jibes. Sincerely. I know it doesn’t help.
What I am trying to say is the following:
1. You MUST understand that this is an EXPERIMENTAL system, and NO part of it will have 100% assurance of success. Nothing made by man will possess such an outlandish requirement.
2. The materials are a fixed condition, and faced with not flying because the proper material is locked out from you or flying in the recognition of a persistent risk, the choice should be obvious.
3. Based on the conditions imposed by point #2, it is the policy of NASA to mitigate insofar as possible the risks by conducting post-flight forensics and continuing analysis and hardware adjustment. In truth, they could have followed this strategy a Loooooong time ago and we would likely still have Columbia. For that, NASA deserves certain scorn.
Experimental Flight Test is a very dangerous endeavor at times, the flight crews accept the risks involved, and the technicians and engineers do whatever they can to reduce danger. But there are limits, which give rise to strategies of mitigation of the effects of those risks.
To bring it all the way back around to current events, the foam strikes post-Columbia are smaller, less frequent, and known. The system has improved, but the management of the system could have learned the lesson without losing seven fine men and women.
The defects in the STS design are being driven out as much as possible in Orion, with the specific problems of foam shed being a biggie. The foam is alway behind and away from the Orion crew vehicle, so no contact is really available.
What I am trying to say is the following:
1. You MUST understand that this is an EXPERIMENTAL system, and NO part of it will have 100% assurance of success. Nothing made by man will possess such an outlandish requirement.
2. The materials are a fixed condition, and faced with not flying because the proper material is locked out from you or flying in the recognition of a persistent risk, the choice should be obvious.
3. Based on the conditions imposed by point #2, it is the policy of NASA to mitigate insofar as possible the risks by conducting post-flight forensics and continuing analysis and hardware adjustment. In truth, they could have followed this strategy a Loooooong time ago and we would likely still have Columbia. For that, NASA deserves certain scorn.
Experimental Flight Test is a very dangerous endeavor at times, the flight crews accept the risks involved, and the technicians and engineers do whatever they can to reduce danger. But there are limits, which give rise to strategies of mitigation of the effects of those risks.
To bring it all the way back around to current events, the foam strikes post-Columbia are smaller, less frequent, and known. The system has improved, but the management of the system could have learned the lesson without losing seven fine men and women.
The defects in the STS design are being driven out as much as possible in Orion, with the specific problems of foam shed being a biggie. The foam is alway behind and away from the Orion crew vehicle, so no contact is really available.”
No Problem I was not questioning the Shuttle in it's complexity was instead probing at the foam which has caused problems and loss of life in the past.now has sort of reared its head again.