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As I look at all of the cases against BHO and his questionable NBC status, as well as the legal precedence surrounding election cases, I note the following (”LANCE ET AL. v. MIKE COFFMAN, COLORADO” March 5, 2007, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-641.pdf).

NOTE: THIS LIES AT THE HEART OF THE "STANDING" ISSUE AT THE SCOTUS:

Immediately after Salazar was decided, four Colorado citizens—none of whom had participated in Salazar—filed the instant action in Federal District Court. They argued that Article V, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violates their rights under the Elections Clause.

The District Court initially determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but we vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). On remand, the District Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs had standing to bring their Elections Clause challenge. Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154– 1155 (2006). The court went on, however, to hold that the suit was barred by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs “stand in privity with the Secretary of State and the General assembly,” who were on the losing side in the Salazar litigation. 444 F. Supp. 2d, at 1161. The concurring judge concluded that appellants lacked standing to sue in the first place. Id., at 1162 (Porfilio, J., concurring in result). Plaintiffs appeal once again.

Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95 (1998). **[*Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.]**” One component of the case-or-controversy requirement is standing,which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the now-familiar elements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). “We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest inproper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Id., at 573–574. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. _, _ (2006) (slip op., at 8) (refusing to create an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for challenges to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that tax payer standing has been rejected “because the alleged injury is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally’” (citation omitted).

Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized grievances has a lengthy pedigree. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 (1922), for example, a citizen sued the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to challenge the procedures by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. We dismissed the suit because it was “not a case within the meaning of . . . Article III.” Id., at 129. The plaintiff sought to assert “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted.” Ibid. “Obviously,” we held, “this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.” Id., at 129–130.

Our two decisions construing the term “Legislature” in the Elections Clause do not contradict this holding. Each of these cases was filed by a relator on behalf of the State rather than private citizens acting on their own behalf, as is the case here. See State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184 Min. 647, 238 N. W. 792 (1931) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916).

In neither case did we address whether a private citizen had alleged a”concrete and particularized” injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III.

The WORK-AROUND:

Part of the answer may have been stumbled upon by Cort Wrotnowski on a radio show, reflected by Art. III, Sect 2, Clause 1 of the US Constitution:

“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treatboies made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; (See Note 10)—between Citizens of different States, —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. “

THERE'S LOTS OF ROOM IN THIS CLAUSE TO FIND ANY NUMBER OF WAYS TO DERIVE SCOTUS STANDING ON A CASE AGAINST BHO, EVEN NOW HE'S IN OFFICE... JUST USE YOUR IMAGINATION...

So, when some of us say here that "it's only a matter of time," they are exactly right... a case WILL push through using any number of ingenious "work arounds" and FORCE this issue and very soon too.

IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, TRY, TRY AGAIN. ;)