Excellent reply. But I am a bit confused by what you mean by “So in these disciplines, the theory is the paradigm to explain the quantization of the historical continuum...” Could you elaborate?
A continuum is coherent whole.
A quantization is one instance in the continuum.
The geologic record is a historical record which has captured certain quantizations, e.g. the remains of certain creatures became fossils which are contained in the geologic record.
Likewise, the geologic record contains artifacts, records and structures left by humans which evidently existed long ago.
The historical sciences look at these quantizations of the historical record as data points (quantizations) in their blueprint, theoretical continuum.
Darwin's tree of life is "the" theoretical continuum into which one of the fossils would be fit.
Archeological theory concerning the Mayans is "the" theoretical continuum into which one of the artifacts would be fit.
In these historical science disciplines, the theory is not merely one alternative explanation but rather "the" paradigm for the discipline.
Egyptology, for instance, presupposes a linear progression of Egyptian civilization in its theoretical continuum.
Another way to look at it would be to envision a big blueprint (tree of life) into which the scientist fits whatever he finds. The historical scientist is focused on the data.
Physical cosmology - like physics and chemistry etc. - works differently. They don't have a paradigm theory. Theories (more than one usually) are built to explain what is observed.
It is a fundamental difference:
4. Biologists' views of the relation of biology to physics
Many biologists consider physical laws, artificial life, robotics, and even theoretical biology as largely irrelevant for their research. In the 1970s, a prominent molecular geneticist asked me, "Why do we need theory when we have all the facts?" At the time I dismissed the question as silly, as most physicists would. However, it is not as silly as the converse question, Why do we need facts when we have all the theories? These are actually interesting philosophical questions that show why trying to relate biology to physics is seldom of interest to biologists, even though it is of great interest to physicists. Questioning the importance of theory sounds eccentric to physicists for whom general theories is what physics is all about. Consequently, physicists, like the skeptics I mentioned above, are concerned when they learn facts of life that their theories do not appear capable of addressing. On the other hand, biologists, when they have the facts, need not worry about physical theories that neither address nor alter their facts. Ernst Mayr (1997) believes this difference is severe enough to separate physical and biological models: "Yes, biology is, like physics and chemistry, a science. But biology is not a science like physics and chemistry; it is rather an autonomous science on a par with the equally autonomous physical sciences."