It actually isn't. If the mass of a hadron was a little different, or if the energy of a lepton was a little different, there would be no carbon and oxygen. If, as I pointed out with the Hoyle quote, the resonance of the carbon nucleus was a little bit different, there would be no carbon and no life, or universe, as we know it.
Your argument extrapolates. If we are a statistical accident of high energy physics, it follows that there were other accidents of high energy physics that did not produce the conditions for life as we know it. Either that or the universe got lucky on the first try. But there is no evidence of these other universes, a fact you use in your own argument comparing our universe to others that might have been. There is no proof that a different universe came before us and no proof that a different universe will come after us. It's beyond our ken.
It is in fact a serious problem with the anthropic theory of the universe - that we are capable of questioning the origin of the universe because it produced an environment that allows the evolution of living things that can question their origin. It's a circular argument. It sounds the same as the fundamentalist argument that only God can create beings who can question his existence, therefore the fact that we question his existence proves there is a God.
The simple fact is that this is the universe. By definition, this is all there is. We're stuck with it and we have to understand it in terms that make sense given what we can see. What came before it? What will come after it?
Yo no se. :)
Er, the circularity of the argument is precisely why the argument "a universe capable of generating intelligence is improbable" fails. For obvious reasons, the question can only be posed within a universe that does generate intelligence. Heads I win; tails doesn't count -- the probability of winning is 1.0.
The fallacy in that argument is a completely different one. Either one defines "God" as encompassing anything that can create intelligence (in which case the statement is trivially true, and trivially useless), or not (in which case one concedes that intelligence can possibly arise from some other source, thereby undercutting the original assertion).