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From Texas Darlin's website a few minutes ago:

August 21, 2008 at 5:42 pm

Ok the suit is predicated on his loss of citizenship when his mother took him to live in Indonesia after marrying a foreign national and living in that country with her son for over four years according to the laws on the books at the time.

Even the remedy passed later by INS laws state he had to take an oath of allegiance when he turned 18 to become a “naturalized citizen”, not a natural citizen again. He’s had divided loyalties and can not be a natural born citizen again. This is the federal statutes. He didn’t even do that to regain his citizenship. As soon as we get the court stamped copy we will make it available to everyone. Please help us get the word out. This is not out of some obscure website.

The laws Phil cites are federal regulations handling loss of citizenshp by a minor child who follows his custodial parent’s citizenship. Thank you for any help you can give us to spread it. The media may not pick it up and report it.

Based on the U.S. Department of State regulation on dual citizenship (7 FAM 1162), the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that dual citizenship is a “status long recognized in the law” and that “a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not without more mean that he renounces the other,” (Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717) (1952). In Schneider v. Rusk 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the US Supreme Court ruled that a naturalized US citizen has the right to return to his or her native country and to resume his or her former citizenship, and also to remain a US citizen even if he or she never returns to the United States.

If that applies to naturalized citizens, then its doubly true for natural born citizens, and tripley so for native born citizens.

U.S. citizenship can be forfeited upon the undertaking of various acts,

obtaining naturalization in a foreign state (Sec. 349 (a) (1) INA);
taking an oath, affirmation or other formal declaration to a foreign state or its political subdivisions (Sec. 349 (a) (2) INA);
entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or serving as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces of a foreign state (Sec. 349 (a) (3) INA);
accepting employment with a foreign government if (a) one has the nationality of that foreign state or (b) an oath or declaration of allegiance is required in accepting the position (Sec. 349 (a) (4) INA);
formally renouncing U.S. citizenship before a U.S. diplomatic or consular officer outside the United States (sec. 349 (a) (5) INA);
formally renouncing U.S. citizenship within the U.S. (but only under strict, narrow statutory conditions) (Sec. 349 (a) (6) INA);
conviction for an act of treason (Sec. 349 (a) (7) INA).

However, a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning with Afroyim v. Rusk constitutionally limited the government's capacity to terminate citizenship to those cases in which an individual engaged in conduct with an intention of abandoning their citizenship. In the wake of administrative practice changes adopted by the U.S. Department of State during the mid 1990s, it is now virtually impossible to lose one's citizenship without expressly renouncing it before a U.S. consular officer.

The actions listed above can cause loss of U.S. citizenship only if performed voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing U.S. citizenship. The Department has a uniform administrative standard of evidence based on the premise that U.S. citizens intend to retain United States citizenship.

DISPOSITION OF CASES WHEN ADMINISTRATIVE PREMISE IS APPLICABLE

In light of the administrative premise discussed above, a person who:

is naturalized in a foreign country;
takes a routine oath of allegiance to a foreign state;
serves in the armed forces of a foreign state not engaged in hostilities with the United States, or
accepts non-policy level employment with a foreign government,

and in so doing wishes to retain U.S. citizenship need not submit prior to the commission of a potentially expatriating act a statement or evidence of his or her intent to retain U.S. citizenship since such an intent will be presumed.

When, as the result of an individual's inquiry or an individual's application for registration or a passport it comes to the attention of a U.S. consular officer that a U.S. citizen has performed an act made potentially expatriating by Sections 349(a)(1), 349(a)(2), 349(a)(3) or 349(a)(4) as described above, the consular officer will simply ask the applicant if there was intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship when performing the act. If the answer is no, the consular officer will certify that it was not the person's intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship and, consequently, find that the person has retained U.S. citizenship.

However, dual citizenship is associated with two categories of security concerns: foreign influence and foreign preference. Contrary to common misconceptions, dual citizenship in itself is not the major problem in obtaining or retaining security clearance in the United States. As a matter of fact, if a security clearance applicant's dual citizenship is "based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country", that can be a mitigating condition. However, exercising (taking advantage of the entitlements of) a non-U.S. citizenship can cause problems. For example, possession and/or use of a foreign passport is a condition disqualifying from security clearance and "... is not mitigated by reasons of personal convenience, safety, requirements of foreign law, or the identity of the foreign country" as is explicitly clarified in a Department of Defense policy memorandum which defines a guideline requiring that "... any clearance be denied or revoked unless the applicant surrenders the foreign passport or obtains official permission for its use from the appropriate agency of the United States Government". This guideline has been followed in administrative rulings by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) office of Industrial Security Clearance Review (ISCR), which decides cases involving security clearances for Contractor personnel doing classified work for all DoD components.

That last part would be kind of a strange deal there for Commander in Cheif though, no? "Uh, Mr. President? You're not cleared for that."