Replies

Still from your searches GREAT STUFF Granny..

Up to this point, I have focused on the evolution of al-Qa’ida’s ideological arguments, as well as how it has appealed to potential recruits and sympathizers. But the most important question for US national security, in my opinion, is how have audiences responded to al-Qa’ida’s appeal? And, for the purposes of this hearing, to what degree has ideology contributed to the audiences’ responses? To answer these questions, it is useful to explore the radicalization processes thatindividuals and clusters of individuals have gone through as they progressed from being sympathetic to the al-Qa’ida worldview to being willing to ‘pick up a gun’. Note that most research suggests that one single pathway to terrorism does not exist.

14And my comments should be taken in that context. Thus, when I discuss ‘radicalization processes’ I meanto imply multiple processes with variation along the way. These processes can be understood as having three separate and distinct phases.

In the first phase, termed ‘availability,’ environment factors make certain individuals susceptible to appeals from terrorist groups.15Of course, these factors are likely to vary according to location, but they might include being brought up in a family that articulates a violent Salafi worldview, frustration with local government policies, peer group influences, or frustration with foreign policies. For example, in his research on suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, Ami Pedahzur has noted that one particular cell played soccer together prior to their recruitment into Hamas.

16Shazhad Tanweer, one of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, apparently had expressed frustration with UK foreign policy, particularly the conflict in Iraq.17Of course, that is not to say that all soccer players or individuals frustration with the conflict in Iraq are potential terrorist recruits, but rather, at the “availability” stage multiple factors can make al-Qa’ida’s appeal attractive.

The second phase, termed ‘recruitment and indoctrination,’ occurs after initial contact betweenindividuals and the clandestine groups. In examining the recruitment phase, it is useful to focus on

13Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-184, 2005. 14Andrew Silke, ed., Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2003) 15Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002.16Ami Pedahzur, “The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombings,” presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC as part of the Eisenhower Speaker Series, 17 February 2005. 17Paul Temelty, “An In-Depth Look at the London Bombers,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 15, July28, 2005.

Page 10
8 ‘nodes’ or gateways through which individuals come into contact with terrorist leaders, members orrecruiters.18Some potential recruitment ‘nodes’ include prayer groups, sports clubs, charitableorganizations, or even criminal gangs. For example, in December 2001 Singaporean authorities disrupted a plot to attack Western as well as local targets in that country.

According to a WhitePaper released by that government, some of the arrested individuals had been recruited through religious study groups in Singapore.19Importantly, these nodes vary according to country and community. So it is difficult to identify a laundry list of potential recruitment nodes worldwide.

If any commonalities exist in recruitment nodes, they appear to be best grouped into ‘diaspora communities’ versus ‘majority Muslim communities.’20But al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt todifferent recruiting environments, adjusting both message and method of recruitment. The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals.

To be honest, this final step has been the most difficult to isolate during the course of our research, because it seems to vary the most individual by individual. In some instances, aspecific grievance appears to have acted as a final trigger.

So, for example, Galib Andang akaCommander Robot, a former member of the now defunct Moro Nationalist Liberation Front in the Philippines, was motivated in part by the death of his grandmother and the hands of the FilipinoArmy.

21Another common factor, at least for diaspora communities, appears to be participation in aforeign jihad.

22Somehow the process of fighting overseas seems to make individuals more willingto engage in terrorism back home as well.

18This concept also was used by Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Office, Department of Homeland Security, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs entitled, “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in US Cell Blocks?”, 19 September 2006.

19“White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,” Singapore Government, 7 January 2003.

20For more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004. 21MNLF leaders negotiated a peace agreement with the Philippines as part of the Davao Accords in 1996. 22Ibid, “White Paper;” for more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.

Page 11
9 I should say, at this point, that my description of radicalization processes for individual terroristsand sympathizers is not particularly unique. That is, Philip Zimbardo, who is probably best knownfor his Stanford prison experiment, has observed similar processes with the recruitment of highschool students into cults in the United States.

23But I find it a useful construct to understanding all the various factors that motivate individuals to ‘pick up a gun.’ So, I am often asked, ‘what motivates terrorism? Is it ideology, politics, or poverty?’ And my answer is, ‘yes, all three, at least to varying degrees.’ The key analytical question then becomes what role does ideology play in motivating terrorism, given that politics and poverty also play apart?

I am not certain that we truly have the answer to that question. Preliminary research suggests that extremist ideology shapes how individuals and communities view problems in the world that need to be resolved, be that corruption or injustice or poor governance. But political and economic grievances justify the use of violence to resolve theseproblems.

That is, individuals and communities understand the problems in their world through anideological lens. But this disgruntlement does not, on its own, motivate violence. That motivationmost often emerges in an environment of political and/or economic grievances, which thentranslate that worldview into action, be it picking up a gun or providing financial and other forms ofsupport. Which brings me back to the initial question posed in this hearing: do we have an accurateunderstanding of the ideological dimensions of the global war on terrorism? I would have to say,‘probably not.’

But I believe that we have come a long way, especially as researchers have begun to account for debates within the wider Salafi movement, as well as how those debates gettranslated and applied on a local level.

As we move forward, I would encourage you not to divorce the ideological dimensions of theconflict from the political and economic. Just like it is impossible to divorce military from non-military activities in the GWOT, it is impossible to truly divorce ideological from political and economic motivations. In fact, doing so only addresses part of the problem.

23Philip Zimbardo and C. Hartley, “Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process,” Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1985, pp. 91—147.