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From your searches...good read..Who is the Knights of the Cross?

http://209.85.215.104/search?q=cache:26rgRes9rOcJ:www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/228.pdf+U.S.+prison+gangs,+whose+members+seem+to+be+particularly+susceptible+to+terrorist+and+other+extremist+recruitment.&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us&client=firefox-a

...Internal al-Qa’ida documents reinforce this hypothesis. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point recently released a series of al-Qa’ida documents captured in Afghanistan by US forcesunder the title Harmony and Disharmony.

Amongst these documents is a letter written in 1993 by an al-Qa’ida member in Somalia to the leadership in Sudan. The author complained that Somalifighters were caught up in tribal squabbles and could not be convinced to adopt the al-Qa’ida ideological worldview; thus, the author argued, al-Qa’ida’s objective was not being achieved in Somalia.

Al-Qa’ida leaders responded to this complaint as follows,

When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The situation changed,however, after the intervention by America and the Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds onit. Suddenly, a bald eagle lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn’t the hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it? The American bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leaveit permanently disfigured.

If you do that, you will have saved Sudan, Yemen, Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the waters of the Nile. Could you want more magnificent objectives of war than those?

86Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005). 7Letters from bin Laden, al-Qa’ida Advice and Reform Committee, US military document number AFGP-2002-003345, available in Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s

Organizational Vulnerabilities, (New York: West Point Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).8Five Letters to the Africa Corps, September 1993 - May 1994, US military document number AFGP-2002-600053, available in Harmony and Disharmony.

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5 This reply is particularly interesting, because it demonstrates that al-Qa’ida leaders were willing to accept short-term political objectives at a local level. In addition, it demonstrates another layer of al-Qa’ida rhetoric that emerged in the 1990s – anti-Americanism. Given the ascendancy of al-Qa’ida and its worldview in the 1990s, I think it is important not to underestimate the appeal of this entire package: violent Salafism, local political objectives and anti-Americanism.

Indeed, theconfluence of all three appeals laid the foundation for al-Qa’ida’s war against ‘Jews andCrusaders,’ declared in 1998.

In a post 9/11 world, al-Qa’ida leaders have attempted to position themselves at the forefront of the violent Salafi jihadi movement. This approach can be seen in statements issued over the past six years by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as other ideologues.

WhileAbdullah Azzam mobilized the youth for jihad in the 1980s with leaflets distributed throughout the Muslim world, al-Qa’ida leaders and likeminded ideologues have used the internet, and to a certain extent mainstream media, to articulate their ideas. An examination of jihadi websites reveals some emerging trends in the Salafi jihadi movement.

For example, a new generation of strategic thinkers and ideologues has emerged in this movement, including Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu Bakr Naji, Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Saif al-Adl and Louis Atiyatallah. Indeed, Will McCants, from the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, recently published a report entitled Militant Ideology Atlas.

In this study, McCants observed that thesethinkers are cited and referred to more often in jihadi chatrooms and on websites than Osama binLaden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. These thinkers appear more willing now than was evidenced in thepast to make tactical concessions on the issues of local Muslim practices, tribal politics and even nationalism to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of local communities.

It’s worth noting, however, that hardcore al-Qa’ida leaders, such as al-Zawahiri, still evidence reticence to make tactical concessions. Moreover, it is possible that they feel threatened by thelegitimacy garnered by other ideologues and terrorist groups. As an illustration of this point, al-Qa’ida leaders have criticized the leaders of other terrorist groups in their bid to remain at theforefront of this wider ideological movement.

A recent example is the ongoing debate between al-Qa’ida and Hamas. Immediately following the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, al-Zawahiri rebuked Hams for participating in these elections, stating, 9Bruce Lawrence, ed., A Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Messages to the World” the Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York: Verso, 2005), 23-30.