Posted on 07/28/2008 8:37:15 AM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Is U.S. Bioterror Attack Just A Matter of Time?
The overriding question is whether the U.S. is “ready” for a bioterror attack. The answer could well rely on the “other” question of what bio-agent and what’s the source? In 1991, 40,000 Russian scientists dispersed throughout the World, with knowledge of what the U.S.S.R. was doing in chemical and biological weapons. The question is to whom did they sell their knowledge? Some believe former Soviet scientists sold technology to countries like Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Lurking is the spectre of al-Qaeda, a group that the Pentagon says continues to pursue biological weapons.
Another scenario is an outbreak of a pandemic. How would the U.S. deal with an infectious disease outbreak? The picture, despite reassurances, is not pretty. Until now, the U.S. has experienced two major biological attacks.
In 1984, the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and his followers attempted to take over the town of the Dalles, Oregon by contaminating salad bars in the town. In 2001, there was the as yet unsolved mystery of the anthrax letters that killed five people.
But the question of bioterrorism extends to potential threats against our food supply and our clean water resources. It also extends to the threat of outbreaks of diseases in our animals populations. Here, the concern are diseases that attack animals but that can jump to humans. These are referred to as zoonotic diseases. The World Health Organization defines zonnotic diseases as:
Read More
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/topics/ndtas.htm#Top
2008
National Drug Threat Assessment 2008
October 2007
Product No. 2007-Q0317-003 html pdf (9,517 KB)
This interagency assessment provides a strategic overview and predictive outlook of the threat to the United States from the illicit trafficking and use of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous drugs.
National Methamphetamine Threat Assessment 2008
December 2007
Product No. 2007-Q0317-006 html pdf (21,160 KB)
This Threat Assessment is a national-level strategic assessment of methamphetamine trafficking in the United States. It addresses significant trends in methamphetamine production, transportation, distribution, and abuse. It discusses a wide range of issues, including methamphetamine production in Mexico, the increasing availability of Mexican ice methamphetamine in domestic drug markets, and apparent methamphetamine shortages in some western markets.
Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States—Situation Report:
April 11, 2008
Product No. 2008-S0787-005 html pdf (1,548 KB)
The Situation Report illustrates the principle cities/states in which Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate within the United States. This document was prepared using law enforcement reporting available to NDIC as of April 9, 2008; it updates information regarding Mexican DTOs set forth in the National Drug Threat Assessment 2007.
Indian Country Drug Threat Assessment 2008
June 2008
Product No. 2008-R0958-002 html pdf (16,904 KB)
This report is a comprehensive, strategic assessment of the threat posed to Native American communities by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal groups, and gangs and the illicit drugs they distribute on reservations throughout the United States. This report examines the operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of drug traffickers who exploit Indian Country and the difficulties faced by federal, state, and tribal law enforcement officials in combating drug trafficking in Native American communities. It also identifies drug abuse patterns and trends most common to Indian Country, highlighting the illicit drugs posing the greatest threat to Native Americans in the United States. This assessment provides a national-level perspective of the drug-related problems facing reservations throughout the country. It also provides a more particularized regional perspective of the drug-related issues that law enforcement, public health, and tribal officials confront in Native American communities.
Money Laundering in Digital Currencies
June 3, 2008
Product No. 2008-R0709-003 html pdf (485 KB)
This assessment describes digital currencies and the digital currency system and how they are used to launder and move funds.
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2007
National Drug Threat Assessment 2007
October 2006
Product No. 2006-Q0317-003 html pdf (3,873 KB)
This interagency assessment provides a strategic overview and predictive outlook of the threat to the United States from the illicit trafficking and use of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous drugs.
Domestic Cannabis Cultivation Assessment 2007
February 2007
Product No. 2007-L0848-001 html pdf (13,753 KB)
This assessment provides a strategic overview of cannabis cultivation and marijuana production in the United States. It addresses major trends in domestic cannabis cultivation, both indoor and outdoor, with a focus on cannabis cultivation operations in primary areas of production in the state and county level.
National Methamphetamine Threat Assessment 2007
This interagency assessment provides a strategic overview and predictive outlook of the threat to the United States from the illicit trafficking and use of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous drugs.
November 2006
Product No. 2006-Q0317-003 html pdf (4,445 KB)
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2006
National Drug Threat Assessment 2006
January 2006
Product No. 2006-Q0317-001 html pdf (6,204 KB)
This assessment addresses the status and outlook of the drug threat to the United States. It covers the trafficking and abuse patterns associated with cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, MDMA, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous drugs.
Prepaid Stored Value Cards: A Potential Alternative to Traditional Money Laundering Methods—Assessment
October 2006
Product No. 2006-R0803-001 html pdf (418 KB)
This document provides a brief description of the use of stored value cards as a means to launder illicit drug proceeds. The bulletin further attempts to assess the effect stored value cards will have on the future of money laundering in the United States. Included is NDIC’s response to Network Branded Prepaid Card Association’ letter dated November 15, 2006 (pdf document).
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2005 [continues]
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/topics/dmas.htm#Top
Drug Market Analyses
Drug Market Analyses
These intelligence bulletins examine the market dynamics and the trafficking, distribution, and abuse patterns associated with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, methamphetamine, and other dangerous drugs within United States High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs).
PDF files are provided to produce high quality copies of our products.
Listed Alphabetically
Appalachia High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-001 html pdf (909 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-001 html pdf (5,218 KB)
Atlanta High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-003 html pdf (474 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-003 html pdf (4,32KB)
Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-002 html pdf (762 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-002 html pdf (4,745 KB)
California Border Alliance Group
June 2007 2007-R0813-005 html pdf (539 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-005 html pdf (4,042 KB)
Central Valley High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-007 html pdf (627 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-007 html pdf (3,758 KB)
Chicago High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-008 html pdf (386 KB)
April 2008 2008-R0813-008 html pdf (3,130 KB)
Hawaii High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-010 html pdf (374 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-010 html pdf (4,096 KB)
Houston High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-011 html pdf (725 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-011 html pdf (4,818 KB)
Lake County High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-012 html pdf (410 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-012 html pdf (3,093 KB)
Los Angeles High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-013 html pdf (977 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-013 html pdf (6,373 KB)
Michigan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-014 html pdf (734 KB)
April 2008 2008-R0813-014 html pdf (4,010 KB)
Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-015 html pdf (849 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-015 html pdf (5,173 KB)
Milwaukee High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-016 html pdf (403 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-016 html pdf (4,513 KB)
Nevada High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-017 html pdf (484 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-017 html pdf (3,827 KB)
New England High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-018 html pdf (620 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-018 html pdf (4,445 KB)
New York/New Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-024 html pdf (884 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-024 html pdf (5,140 KB)
North Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-020 html pdf (823 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-020 html pdf (4,166 KB)
North Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-021 html pdf (566 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-021 html pdf (4,607 KB)
Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-022 html pdf (826 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-022 html pdf (4,736 KB)
Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-023 html pdf (772 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-023 html pdf (3,230 KB)
Ohio High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
March 2007 2007-R0813-025 html pdf (641 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-025 html pdf (3,727 KB)
Oregon High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-026 html pdf (468 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-026 html pdf (4,067 KB)
Philadelphia/Camden High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-027 html pdf (578 KB)
April 2008 2008-R0813-027 html pdf (6,417 KB)
Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2008 2008-R0813-028 html pdf (3,217 KB)
Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-029 html pdf (681 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-029 html pdf (4,167 KB)
South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2008 2008-R0813-030 html pdf (3,800 KB)
South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-031 html pdf (540 KB)
April 2008 2008-R0813-031 html pdf (4,128 KB)
Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-004 html pdf (893 KB)
June 2008 2008-R0813-004 html pdf (4,961 KB)
West Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
June 2007 2007-R0813-032 html pdf (575 KB)
May 2008 2008-R0813-032 html pdf (4,032 KB)
[Recently LSD is showing up on the police scanners, as the users are dangerous and the family needs help to control them]
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/topics/drgrpts.htm#Top
NDIC Reports - Drug Assessments
Drug use across America.
NDIC analyzes information from local, state, regional, and federal agencies to produce threat assessments addressing specific drug types.
If you cannot find a previously listed report, please review our Archived Publications list.
PDF files are provided to produce high quality copies of our products. These may be viewed with a free copy of Adobe Acrobat Reader.
* Cannabis/Marijuana
* DXM
* Fentanyl
* GHB
* Heroin
* Inhalants
* Ketamine
* Khat
* LSD
* Methamphetamine
* Miscellaneous
* OxyContin
* PCP
Cannabis/Marijuana
Domestic Cannabis Cultivation Assessment 2007
February 2007
Product No. 2007-L0848-001 html pdf (13,753 KB)
This assessment provides a strategic overview of cannabis cultivation and marijuana production in the United States. It addresses major trends in domestic cannabis cultivation, both indoor and outdoor, with a focus on cannabis cultivation operations in primary areas of production in the state and county level.
Marijuana and Methamphetamine Trafficking on Federal Lands Threat Assessment
February 2005
Product No. 2005-Q0317-007 html pdf (2,170 KB)
This report provides an assessment of marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine production occurring on and transportation through public federal lands.
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DXM
DXM (Dextromethorphan)—Intelligence Bulletin
October 2004
Product No. 2004-L0424-029 html pdf (332 KB)
This intelligence bulletin provides an assessment of DXM availability and abuse in the United States.
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Fentanyl
Fentanyl
June 5, 2006
Product No. SR-000001 html pdf (125 KB)
This report is a brief overview of the drug threat posed by fentanyl.
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GHB and Analogs
GHB Analogs: GBL, BD, GHV, and GVL—Information Bulletin
August 2002
Product No. 2002-L0424-003 html pdf (391 KB)
This information bulletin provides an update on the availability of, demand for, production, transportation, and distribution of GHB analogs.
GHB Trafficking and Abuse—Intelligence Bulletin
September 2004
Product No. 2004-L0424-015 html pdf (294 KB)
This report provides an assessment of GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyrate) trafficking and abuse in the United States. It includes information on the drug’s availability, abuse, production, transportation and distribution.
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Heroin
The Availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States: A Market Analysis
March 2007
Product No. 2007-R0912-001 html pdf (406 KB)
This Market Analysis reports on the availability of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States. It includes Heroin Signature Program results from 2004 and Heroin Domestic Monitor Program data from 2000 to 2005 that provides indicators of the geographic origins of heroin available at the wholesale and retail level in the United. States.
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Inhalants
Huffing - The Abuse of Inhalants—Intelligence Brief
November 2001
Product No. 2002-J0403-001 html pdf (327 KB)
En Español 2002-L0508-002 html pdf (556 KB)
En Français 2002-L0521-002 html pdf (258 KB)
This intelligence brief discusses the abuse of inhalants in the United States.
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Ketamine
Ketamine—Intelligence Bulletin
July 2004
Product No. 2004-L0424-007 html pdf (261 KB)
This Intelligence Bulletin discusses the trafficking and abuse of ketamine hydrochloride. It presents background information, smuggling from Mexico, abuse, effects, and its use in drug-facilitated sexual assault.
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Khat
Khat (Catha edulis)—Intelligence Bulletin
May 2003
Product No. 2003-L0424-002 html pdf (589 KB)
This bulletin indicates that the availability of khat, a plant containing stimulants regulated under the Controlled Substances Act, is increasing in the United States.
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LSD
LSD Trafficking and Abuse—Intelligence Bulletin
September 2004
Product No. 2004-L0424-026 html pdf (261 KB)
This intelligence bulletin provides an assessment of LSD trafficking and abuse in the United States.
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs27/27986/index.htm
Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States
Publication Date: April 11, 2008
Document ID: 2008-S0787-005
Cover image for Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States.The Situation Report illustrates the principle cities/states in which Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate within the United States. This document was prepared using law enforcement reporting available to NDIC as of April 9, 2008; it updates information regarding Mexican DTOs set forth in the National Drug Threat Assessment 2007.
Your questions, comments, and suggestions for future subjects are welcome at any time. Addresses are provided at the end of the page.
Contents
Preface
Discussion
Appendix A. Maps
Appendix B. U.S. Locations With a Reported Mexican DTO Presence and the Mexican Drug Cartel Affiliation
Sources
List of Maps in Appendix A.
Map 1. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations.
Map 2. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Federation.
Map 3. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Gulf Coast Cartel.
Map 4. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Juárez Cartel.
Map 5. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Tijuana Cartel.
List of Tables in Appendix B.
Table. U.S. Locations With a Reported Mexican DTO Presence and the Mexican Drug Cartel Affiliation
Preface
The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has prepared this Situation Report to illustrate the principal cities/states in which Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate within the United States. This document was prepared using law enforcement reporting available to NDIC as of April 9, 2008; it updates information regarding Mexican DTOs set forth in the National Drug Threat Assessment 2007.1
To Top To Contents
Discussion
Mexican DTOs are the most pervasive organizational threat to the United States. They are active in every region of the country and dominate the illicit drug trade in every area except the Northeast. Mexican DTOs are expanding their operations in the Northeast and have developed cooperative relationships with DTOs in that area in order to gain a larger share of the northeastern drug market.
Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting reveals that Mexican DTOs operate in at least 195 cities throughout the United States (see Map 1 in Appendix A and the table in Appendix B). In 129 cities,2 law enforcement officials reported the presence of Mexican DTOs with affiliations to at least one of the four principal Mexican drug cartels that supply illicit drugs to U.S. markets—Federation, Gulf Coast, Juárez, and Tijuana. Specifically, Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Federation Cartel have been identified in at least 82 cities (see Map 2 in Appendix A), to the Gulf Coast Cartel in at least 43 cities (see Map 3 in Appendix A), to the Juárez Cartel in at least 44 cities (see Map 4 in Appendix A), and to the Tijuana Cartel in at least 20 cities (see Map 5 in Appendix A). Law enforcement officials also reported the presence of Mexican DTOs in 66 additional cities but did not identify an affiliation with a principal Mexican drug cartel.
End Notes
1. Appendix A, Map 4, “Areas of influence of drug trafficking organizations in the United States.”
2. Several locations have multiple cartel-affiliated DTOs operating within their jurisdictions.
Addresses
National Drug Intelligence Center
319 Washington Street, 5th Floor
Johnstown, PA 15901-1622
Tel. (814) 532-4601
FAX (814) 532-4690
E-mail NDIC.Contacts@usdoj.gov
National Drug Intelligence Center
United States Department of Justice
Robert F. Kennedy Building (Room 1335)
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Tel. (202) 432-4040
FAX (202) 514-4252
Web Addresses
ADNET: http://ndicosa
DOJ: http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/
LEO: https://www.leo.gov/http/leowcs.leopriv.gov/lesig/ndic/index.htm
RISS: ndic.riss.net
Gangs in Central America
Updated August 2, 2007
Clare M. Ribando
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
[Full report]
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4310
The List: The World’s Most Dangerous Gangs
Posted May 2008
Their darkest dealings often go unreported and unnoticed. But from Nairobi to São Paulo, many urban gangs are becoming more sophisticated, more brutal, and more powerful than ever.
STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images
The Mungiki, Kenya
Membership: as many as 100,000 men from the Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest ethnic group
Stronghold: the slums of Nairobi, where they manage multimillion-dollar rackets over everything from electricity to public transportation
Known for: formerly, for dreadlocks and bathing in blood; now, for forced female circumcision and the beheading of any opposition, be they members of rival ethnic groups or disloyal minibus drivers
Why they’re dangerous: The Mungiki are just one of Kenya’s many machete-wielding ethnic gangs—some of which sport names like the “Kosovo Boys” or the “Taliban” (an entirely Christian gang that apparently just thought the name sounded tough). But in recent years, the Mungiki, whose name means “multitude” in the Kikuyu language, have become a political force. Most recently, they played a central role in the violence and chaos that wracked Kenya for months before and after its last presidential election. Seven months before the December vote, severed heads began appearing mounted on poles in Nairobi, marking the worst of a spike in Mungiki violence that analysts attribute to rising distrust between gang leaders and Kikuyu politicians. Kenyan police responded to the violent outbreaks by arresting or killing many gang members. But after the hotly contested election on Dec. 27, in which Mwai Kibaki, the Kikuyu incumbent, claimed a dubious win over challenger Raila Odinga, the Mungiki reemerged in full force, brutally killing women and children from rival, pro-opposition ethnic groups. For now, Kenya is at peace after Kibaki and Odinga agreed upon a power-sharing deal. But if instability returns, the Mungiki could help throw the country back into a sea of violence.
-/AFP/Getty Images
Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Brazil
Membership: 6,000 dues-paying members and 140,000 inmates and other fellow travelers
Stronghold: São Paulo’s state prison system and its citywide favelas
Known for: its brutal control of prison life, widespread kidnapping, and bringing São Paulo to its knees for four straight days in May 2006
Why they’re dangerous: The gang got its start as a prison-league soccer team, but today the PCC’s word is law in São Paulo prisons, and if an inmate thinks otherwise, he might just lose his head—literally. But the gang’s influence extends far beyond the prison gates. In addition to orchestrating drug deals with illicit trade networks such as Rio’s Red Command and Colombia’s FARC, the PCC let the world know in spring of 2006 that it was more than a bunch of disgruntled inmates. On Friday, May 12, the city of São Paulo came under siege as anonymous attackers burned buses, banks, and public buildings, gunning down police and instilling chaos as they went. Simultaneously, 73 prisons around the state erupted in rebellion. For days, the city and the prisons were at a standstill while local leaders floundered, unsure how to respond. By the end, at least 150 people were dead, and the secretary of prisons was out of a job. Then, almost a year later, the PCC spread rumors of possible deadly attacks, a power play that Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called “terrorism” that “must be dealt with by the strong hand of the Brazilian state.” But with the PCC’s decentralized power structure, the “strong hand” might not find much to grab onto.
Jose CABEZAS/AFP/Getty Images
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), United States and Central America
Membership: 70,000 worldwide (60,000 in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico, plus 10,000 in 42 U.S. states and Washington, D.C.)
Stronghold: Central America and U.S. suburbs
Known for: elaborate tattoos (which makes ending gang membership almost impossible), suburban bloodshed, and a loose but widespread network of subsidiary groups, perfect for disseminating drugs and brutal violence
Why they’re dangerous: The MS-13 grew out of a posse (mara) of street-tough Salvadorans (Salvatruchas) who fled to Southern California in the 1980s in the wake of El Salvador’s bloody civil war. With each new wave of vulnerable immigrants from Central America, MS-13 grew in strength and breadth, forming a lose cohort of semiautonomous subsidiary gangs across the United States and Central America. Though their hallmark tattoos and violent outbursts dot North America, analysts are still uncertain just how interconnected the maras really are. In the United States, the strongest maras are based in Southern California, the northeast, and the mid-Atlantic, including the Washington, D.C., metro area. Just last spring, Salvatruchas hacked away at a rival gang member in the D.C. suburb of Alexandria, Virginia. But U.S. maras are nothing compared with their counterparts further south. Fueled by gang members deported from the States, maras in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala terrorize police and residents in hundreds of communities across the region.
PATRICK LIN/AFP/Getty Images
United Bamboo (Zhu Lien Bang), Taiwan
Membership: 10,000 mainly ethnic Chinese members and associates living in Taiwan
Stronghold: Taiwan
Known for: Drug smuggling, human trafficking, and “silencing” journalists as far away as Northern California. A good rule of thumb: If it’s illegal, they do it.
Why they’re dangerous: United Bamboo emerged as the largest of several Beijing-backed assassination machines in the wake of the Communist takeover of mainland China. In 1984, their dissident hunt took them as far as suburban San Francisco where they murdered Chinese-American journalist Henry Liu in his own garage. Two decades later, United Bamboo’s gangsters are just as international but now have their hands in “virtually every facet of illegal activity imaginable,” including human trafficking, gunrunning, and the drug trade, according to the Asia Times. The scale of its illicit trade is only magnified by its shady, wide-reaching networks, with direct links to fellow illicit groups such as the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza, and gang members active from the United States to Europe to Australia. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau even thinks United Bamboo’s drug trade has reached North Korea with direct approval from Kim Jong Il’s regime. A well-structured, underground mob, United Bamboo and its wheelings and dealings usually fly below the radar. But in May 2005, when a 10-km procession of men in black shirts turned out for the funeral of one-time gang leader Hsu Hai-ching (at 93, Hsu had met his end choking on a piece of nigiri sushi), Taipei was reminded that United Bamboo and its yakuza counterparts were still a force to be reckoned with.
http://wwwwbipicomlink.blogspot.com/2008/07/yaser-abdel-said-murder-suspect-hiding.html
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
YASER ABDEL SAID, MURDER SUSPECT, HIDING IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY NY ?
YASER ABDEL SAID, MURDER SUSPECT, HIDING IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY NY ? Fox news reporter Gregg Jarrets seems to think so, see Fox News Video here or click image for video.
Yaser Abdel Said the Honor Killing suspect of his own two daughters is very possibly hiding in the Shrub Oak area of Westchester County NY, his son Islam Said has made numerous trips to this location after the murder of his two sisters. Yaser Abdel Said’s brother Yassein Said owns property in the Shrub Oak, NY area of Westchester County (see him on the video), the son Islam Said has been here a number of times since the murder of his two sisters. Westchester County is a primarily suburban county located in the U.S. state of New York with about 950,000 residents. It is part of the New York Metropolitan Area
Yaser Abdel Said had over $9,000 in cash hidden (from State welfare investigators.. no checking accounts) in his rental house that he shared with his wife Patricia, son Islam and the two murdered girls. Patricia Said had taken $5,000 when she split on or about 12/25/2007 with the two girls, Sarah Yaser Said, 17, and Amina Yaser Said, 18, when she returned on or about 1/01/2008, she brought back most of the $5,000.
Son Islam, gets a monthly check form the State of Texas, some sort of mental disabilities, supposed to have been home schooled for the last 5 or 6 years. On the day of the murder 1/01/2008, Patricia Said (she drives an older mini-van) took Amina from her boyfriends house to meet Yaser at his cab, near the Said rental house, Sarah was in the front seat of the cab, they (the girls) never went into the Said rental house.
Yaser Said did borrow the cab he used to kill the girls, he owned no vehicles, his only work in the last 8 years or so was driving cab, Yaser Said was flying under the radar of the State of Texas.
On the day of the murder 1/01/2008, Yaser Abdel Said took the Egyptian Passport and the $9,000 in cash and nothing else and then took the girls for a ride in the cab (premeditated and a plan was in play).
Yaser Abdel Said called brother Mohsen, on his cell phone, after the murders to meet for coffee (trouble meeting, need help), the 3 other brothers are tight with Yaser and would help, as per Aunt Gail.
Bill Warner
Private Investigator
www.wbipi.com
[Check out this link, he has a suggested ‘maybe’ mailer:]
TERROR THREAT IS IN THE CARDS, EERIE MAILINGS PREDICT NYC BOMBINGS TO FOX NEWS PRODUCER
http://wwwwbipicomlink.blogspot.com/2008/07/terror-threat-is-in-cards-eerie.html
FAN MAIL FROM AL-SHABAAB aka AL-SHABAB TERROR GROUP PROMOTER “ABUSHABAAB”.
http://wwwwbipicomlink.blogspot.com/2008/07/fan-mail-from-al-shabaab-aka-al-shabab.html
WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE; MEMBERS OF AL-SHABAAB AND/OR...
http://wwwwbipicomlink.blogspot.com/2008/07/wanted-dead-or-alive-members-of-al.html
WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE; Al-Qaida Operatives in East Africa;
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (photo on L. aka Harun Fazul): Senior al-Qaida operative in East Africa; was indicted for his alleged involvement in the bombings of the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania & Nairobi, Kenya, August 7, 1998.
Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan: (photo on R) Senior al-Qaida operative in East Africa; Wanted for questioning in connection with the 2002 attacks against a hotel and an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya.
Issa Osman Issa: Al-Qaida operative implicated in the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya; maintained contact with the leaders of al Shabaab and commanded militia fighting for the now-defunct Council of Islamic Courts near the interim capital of Baidoa.
Leaders Of Al-Shabaab (aka Al-Shabab, Mujahideen Youth Movement)
Aden Hashi Ayrow: (KILLED BY A MISSLE FIRED FROM TAMPA FL) Trained with al-Qaida in Afghanistan prior to 2001. Issued statements praising al-Qaida leader Usama bin Laden, inviting foreign fighters to participate in “holy war” against Ethiopian and Ugandan forces in Somalia, and linking Somalia to al-Qaida’s global operations. Responsible for assassination of a Somali peace activist in July 2005 and multiple targeted assassinations and harassment of civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. Implicated in the murder of an Italian nun in Mogadishu in September 2006.
Mukhtar Robow (aka Abu Mansoor): Senior military commander spokesman for al-Shabaab; provided logistical support for al-Qaida operatives inside Somalia; has called for attacks on the African Union forces in Somalia.
Ahmed Abdi Godane: Senior member of al-Shabaab; trained and fought with al-Qaida in Afghanistan; implicated in the murders of Western aid workers in Somaliland in 2003 and 2004.
Ibrahim Haji Jama (aka al Afghani): Senior member of al-Shabaab; trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir before returning to Somalia in the early 1990s.
Al-Shabaab terror group; On February 29, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated al-Shabaab (aka al-Shabab, aka Shabaab, aka the Youth, aka Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, aka Mujahideen Youth Movement, aka Mujahidin Youth Movement, aka MYM, aka Harakat Shabab al-Mujahidin, aka Hizbul Shabaab, aka Hisb’ul Shabaab, aka al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, aka Youth Wing, aka al Shabaab al-Islaam, aka al-Shabaab al-Jihaad, aka the Unity of Islamic Youth) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as amended) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 (as amended).
Pre-Existing Terrorist Linkages
Hassan Abdullah al-Turki: Designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 for his associations with al-Qaida. Implicated in the murder of an American citizen inside Somalia in 1999. Runs a military training camp for al-Shabaab fighters near the Kenya-Somalia border.
Hassan Dahir Aweys: Designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 for his associations with al-Qaida.
Al-Shabaab’s offical website is seen here, they solicit funds and recruit additional “fighters” online, the website is hosted in the USA by the Dotster Web Hosting Company in Vancouver WA.
Al-Shabaab in Somalia is Al-Qaeda.
Dotster web hosting; DOTSTER INC
8100 NE Parkway Dr #300
Vancouver, WA 98662, USA
Abuse: abuse@dotster.com
legal@dotster.com
Phone 1-360-449-5985 or 1-360-449-5900
Posted by BILL WARNER at 4:31 PM
2 comments:
Abushabaab said...
This bill you have to admit is beyond ridiculous, you are nothing more than a parrot when it comes to American foreign policy. on the topic of Al-shabaab (and many other issues), there are NO concrete or verifiable information that Al-shabaab as an organization is officially linked to Al-Qaeda... of course the CIA and other american agencies are known for flimsy information and blatant lying when it comes to organisation they cant deal with such as Al-qaeda and Al-shabaab.
In Somalia the only terrorist that people will kill and drag their bodies are Ethiopians, african soldiers and somali stooges, of course the americans had their fingers burnt so they decided stay out (cowards and terrorists)... when Al-shabaab fighter killed an innocent civilian on purpose, he was killed according to the Sharee’ah. But When a disgusting animal piece worthless trash american GI rapes a 14 year old girl and kills her along with her family he called a “bad apple” and taken to prison. THATS why Al-shabaab,Taliban and Al qaeda popular.
You and your like (ie petjawa) are not going to any effect on the jihad, I call you to embrace islaam, for no amount of lying or boot licking will save from hell fire. Oh and by the way, tell Petjawa no one was arrested at abushabaab due to the scandanavian police raids months ago.
July 28, 2008 7:06:00 PM EDT
BILL WARNER said...
AbuShabaab,
You are a coward of “allah” who hides in the shadows of evil and supports the al-Qaeda linked head hunters of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Abushabaab, I will track you down and be there when law enforcement (in the UK it will be MI6) puts you in a prison cell and throws away the key.
Sleep tight AbuShabaab, I am on your trail !
Bill Warner
Private Investigator
July 28, 2008 9:05:00 PM EDT
http://wwwwbipicomlink.blogspot.com/2008/07/3-sarasota-men-face-mortgage-fraud.html
Monday, July 28, 2008
3 Sarasota Men Face Mortgage Fraud Charges, Neil Mohamed Husani of Sarasota is on the run in Jordan with the cash at the “Arab Bank” !
TAMPA - Three businessmen and a Sarasota lawyer have been charged with participating in an $82.8 million mortgage loan fraud, a scheme which defrauded seven banks, the U.S. Attorney’s Office said this morning.
The lawyer, John A. Yanchek, 48, was arrested this morning. Two other defendants are expected to surrender Tuesday: Larry P. Nardelli, 49, Tampa, a businessman associated with Elba International and other companies; and Michael A. Tringali, 46, of Sarasota, owner and principal officer of G&T Land Development, which purchased and developed commercial real estate, primarily in Sarasota and Manatee counties. The criminal investigation was conducted by the Sarasota office of the FBI and the Internal Revenue service. Between October 2003 and March 2006, Husani completed 27 real estate transactions in Manatee and Sarasota counties, buying land for a total of $69 million and reselling it for $147 million, records filed with county courts show.
Investigators are still looking for the fourth defendant, Neil Mohamed Husani, 38, formerly of Sarasota and owner and principal officer of Capital Force Inc., which bought and sold commercial real estate in Sarasota and Manatee counties.
It turns out that Husani, whose business dealings in Southwest Florida had been investigated by the FBI, was in Amman, Jordan, at one point in 2006. His mother-in-law, Kafaya Zahran, saw Husani entering the Holiday Inn in Amman, Jordan which is her hometown. Husani would not speak to her, so she confronted his brother, Waleed, demanding that Husani give her daughter a divorce. Federal authorities described Husani’s whereabouts as “unknown,” but the Herald-Tribune reached him by phone in Amman, Jordan, on Monday 7/28/08. He said he did not know about the indictment. “I didn’t do any of that anyway,” Husani said, referring to the 37 individual federal charges against him. “This is something I didn’t know. It got me by surprise.”
Just five years ago, Husani was so strapped for cash that he wrote bad checks, a crime he pleaded guilty to in circuit court in Manatee in 2002. The next year, he was placed on two years’ probation after pleading guilty to stealing $14,000 in furniture from a vendor who supplied Husani’s Palmetto furniture store.
Husani started using slightly different names that involved changes in order or spelling. He would be “Neil Hussani” in one document and “Neal Mohamed” in another. The name changes helped Husani to hide his past, but trouble followed him and his financial woes persisted. In October 2002, Gwendolyn Newbloom sued Husani in circuit court in Hillsborough County, claiming that he was trying to cheat her out of buying an Apollo Beach apartment. Husani told Newbloom he owned the Apollo Beach apartment and there were no liens or encumbrances on it, the suit says. But after she signed the contract to buy the apartment and made a $12,500 deposit, she discovered that Husani did not own it and the actual owner had not kept up to date with mortgage payments.
According to a 44-page indictment handed up Thursday and unsealed this morning, between May 2004 and June 2006, the four defrauded Orion Bank, Mercantile Bank, Bank Atlantic, Coast Bank, Fifth/Third Bank, Wachovia Bank and First State Bank.
How much of the millions in cash that Neil Mohamed Husani ripped off from the Banks in Sarasota Fl is now in the “Arab Bank “ in Amman Jordan supporting terrorism !
The “Arab Bank” in Amman Joirdan with $32 billion in assets and operations in 30 countries, has been sued in the United States by relatives of bombings in Israel who allege that it supported terrorism by funneling donations to Palestinian suicide bombers and their families. Families of about 40 U.S. citizens killed in attacks in Israel sued Arab Bank of Amman Jordan in federal court in New York last year, accusing it of channeling money to Palestinian terrorist groups and of making insurance payments to beneficiaries of suicide bombers.
Muslim commercial real estate flipper Neil Mohamed Husani, who almost single handedly triggered an economic downturn in Sarasota Fl and jeopardised several Sarasota banks, is now living the high life in Amman Jordan with his scamed Sarasota millions of dollars sitting in the terrorist linked “Arab Bank” !
According to the Tampa indictment: The defendants and others agreed to purchase commercial real estate properties, intending to simultaneously resell the properties to other conspirators at substantially higher price. The defendants would apply for loans at the higher price, allowing them to purchase the properties at the lower price without any equity and keeping the excess loan proceeds.
In applying for the loans, the defendants would make false statements to the financial institutions regarding subjects, including the financial resources and credit worthiness of the purchaser, the amount and source of equity the borrower had contributed, the price they had paid for the properties and the distribution of loan proceeds.
Bill Warner
Private Investigator
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/congress/2sept19_06.html
Religious Radicalization Behind Bars
Testimony of Gregory B. Saathoff
Executive Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group
University of Virginia School of Medicine
Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
September 19, 2006
Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, I would like to thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on this subject of national importance. Your collaborative leadership on homeland security issues examines national vulnerabilities. The issue of religious radicalization in U.S. prisons pertains not only to your interest in Homeland Security, but also your committee’s interest in health and public safety, ethics, government management and information technology.
I would like to echo the testimony of the opening speaker on this panel, Frank Cilluffo. I am especially appreciative to have previously shared the opportunity to brief a bipartisan Congressional panel. This was very helpful in identifying the key issues that concern policy makers. It has also been a privilege to serve with Mr. Cilluffo as the co-chair on the Prisoner Radicalization Task Force. His Homeland Security Policy Institute, at The George Washington University, was a critical partner in enabling us to build the network of expertise responsible for producing the report that we have released today: Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization. We began with a strong foundation of multidisciplinary expertise and experience. This was essential through the course of our many briefings by government leadership, law enforcement officials and religious prison experts.
Throughout the last decade, I have assisted in the coordination of briefings between behavioral science experts in the FBI and an international group of religion scholars. During these yearly meetings of the American Academy of Religion, I have become convinced that the most enigmatic issues faced by law enforcement require a multidisciplinary approach. When religion is a focus of concern, insights of religion scholars are often essential.
During the last fifteen years, as a member of the faculty of the University of Virginia’s School of Medicine, I have provided consultation in more than ten state prisons, federal prisons and jails. In that time I have performed more than twenty thousand separate assessments for more than 5,000 inmates. It is an opportunity for teaching of psychiatry to medical students. In their subsequent medical careers, some have gone on to provide treatment to inmates as a result of that exposure. I have been fortunate to consult to institutions with good safety records. In my experience, the vast majority of correctional employees are conscientious and professional in their approach to meeting the needs of inmates, despite the challenges of working under often difficult conditions.
Through this work, I have had an opportunity to evaluate and treat inmates for mental illness, but also to witness the importance of the media, the power of social networks, the changing role of information technology, the response to health care, the benefits of structure, the importance of family, and the often vital role that religion plays in rehabilitation, if not redemption. In my brief remarks today, I will speak to the issue of radicalization from a behavioral science perspective.
Within any system, there is the potential for corruption and abuse, and the prison system is no exception. For example, although most inmates appreciate the value of good medical care, there are some who use symptoms as tactics in order to gain special advantage in the system, using the cover of illness to obtain unnecessary medication, or evade responsibility, or to attempt escape. Access to radio and television programming is often constructive, although some are susceptible to the violent and sexual content, and react in kind. Affiliation with others on work crews and sports teams can prepare inmates for life in society. Affiliation of course can be destructive, though when inmates join violent groups and gangs that achieve identity by advocating violence and demonizing others. Volunteers in prison can provide an enormous benefit toward the rehabilitation of inmates, and this can not be overstated. As with other valuable enterprises, the volunteer system within prisons can be exploited by those who would use it to build a violent network. This is particularly true when systems within states and localities do not confirm and share information about the vast number of volunteers and visitors who daily enter our jails and prison.
In the same way that medical care, communications, affiliation and the volunteer system can be exploited within prisons, so too can be religion if it is used as a means to advocate violence or antisocial behavior. The Constitutional protections given to speech and religion provide a strong foundation for our society, as well as our prison system in the United States. In order to safeguard these rights, we must insure that religious protections are not exploited in order to radicalize and recruit inmates toward violence.
While the federal prison system has made strides in addressing the issue of religious radicalization and recruitment within prisons, our level of awareness and understanding is still quite limited, particularly at the level of state prisons, community corrections and local jails. This is significant, because the vast majority of the greater than two million incarcerated inmates are held in these state and local systems, rather than the federal system.
Indeed, in Director Mueller’s 2005 testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, he stated that “prisons continue to be fertile ground for extremists who exploit both a prisoner’s conversion to Islam while still in prison, as well as their socioeconomic status and placement in the community upon their release.” In addition, The FBI’s Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division, John Pistole, testified that “Some of these terrorists seek to exploit our freedom to exercise religion, we believe, to their advantage by using radical forms of Islam to recruit operatives. Unfortunately, U.S. correctional institutions are a viable venue for such radicalization and recruitment.”
In order to understand issues that face current prisons and prisoners, we must be sure that we have an adequate understanding of the modern prison system. Those of us who are old enough to remember the politically motivated violence in prisons of the 1960’s and 1970’s should be aware that prison violence could again become a central point of discussion and galvanize public opinion. But unlike the politically motivated, secular upheaval of the last generation, we face a great risk of religiously motivated violence.
Since the 1990’s, religiously motivated terrorism has resulted in intense acts of violence, creating greater numbers of fatalities than the more calculated violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations. These differences were noted by Bruce Hoffman, Mark Juergensmeyer and other scholars even before September 11, 2001. Hoffman explained the increased level of violence through examination of religious terrorism’s “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with his secular counterpart”. According to Hoffman, religious terrorists see their acts as divine duties to the point that they constitute “sacramental acts.” Rather than seeking sympathizers, they are much more alienated and therefore more destructive as they engage in total war.
In addition, Juergensmeyer wrote presciently before 9/11 about the concept of “performance violence,” in which opponents are demonized and perpetrators become martyrs. In his interviews with jailed religious terrorists, he detailed an embrace of violence within various radicalized religions. The shift in society from secular to religious violence internationally has also been reflected nationally in our prison system.
U.S. Prisoners Today
In order to understand how the process of radicalization might affect prison inmates, it is important to know about the types of people that we are incarcerating in the United States. State and local correctional systems provide an ideal backdrop for radicalization of young men and women. Research on the characteristics of terrorist recruits abroad has identified youth, unemployment, alienation, a need for a sense of self-importance, and a need to belong to a group as common factors, all of which are present among U.S. prison populations. These inmates are vulnerable to extremist versions of the religion. The threat of terrorist recruiting in U.S. prisons was highlighted in October 2003 during a hearing before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, which identified two major areas of concern in the U.S. federal prison system. First, a variety of socioeconomic and psychological factors make inmates vulnerable to radical ideology. Second, groups known to support terrorist causes have distributed radical literature to the prison population. Witnesses stated that serious problems with the screening of religious service providers have created an opportunity for radicalization.
For a variety of reasons, new prisons have increasingly been built in rural areas. This may decrease the opportunities for prisoners to maintain contact with family and decrease the opportunities for religious instruction. When in remote locations, it is more difficult to contract for qualified religious service providers. This is important with regard to religious radicalization, because it leaves a void that may be filled by poorly qualified religious practitioners who bring their own brand of religious radicalization within prison walls.
The social and psychological backgrounds of many prisoners reflect a vulnerability to recruitment by groups that advocate violence. While not a justification for criminal behavior, family histories of inmates include more abandonment, abuse and neglect than non-incarcerated Americans. Violence is the norm. Inmates often see themselves as victims of society and therefore seek retribution. Because structure is often lacking in their development, the prison environment can be a vehicle for new growth in that it holds and contains the individual, providing time and space for either constructive or destructive pursuits.
American prisons have seen an increase in population, largely due to the longer sentences given to drug offenders. Despite the prison building boom, some state and local facilities remain overcrowded, housing many more inmates than originally designed. Although the numbers of inmates have increased, rehabilitation programs within prisons have not always kept pace, and have arguably fallen behind.
Prisons have always been a repository for society’s unsolved problems. Perhaps one of the most serious challenges to prisons has been the influx of inmates who suffer from serious mental illness. The promises of deinstitutionalization have not been kept by society. Instead, we have seen trans-institutionalization of patients. Mentally ill have been shifted from mental hospitals to the streets and then to prison. This is relevant because the necessary emphasis on mental health care has further stretched the resources of prisons, thus limiting the capabilities for investigation and intelligence collection.
Behavior is Contagious
The landscape of prison life has also changed dramatically, in that the 24-hour news cycle available within prisons acts as a force multiplier. Why is this important? Behavior is contagious, whether it occurs in exuberant fans crowding onto a sports field after victory, or angry inmates who riot within a facility. I learned this myself when I was called to see an inmate who had set his cell on fire. It was only after I treated him that I realized that the image of a raging fire on television provoked him to torch his cell. This can also occur on a macro level. Two days after the World Trade Center attack, I consulted to a prison that I thought I knew well. Anxious inmates informed me that that the televised images of the 9-11 attack were cause for celebration among many of the inmates. In fact, they estimated that a third of the inmates praised the attacks, and their cheers could be heard in cellblock after cellblock.
Of course, access to radio and television can have a significant positive impact within prisons. Technology advances and culture follows in its wake. However, one of the byproducts of our smaller, more information connected world is the globalization of grievance. Images of distant conflicts are burned into the memories and identities of impressionable inmates. While these images make for compelling television, they also provide the opportunity for inmates to ultimately adopt and embrace a chosen trauma that will fuel future rage into succeeding generations. Television transmissions of bombings and beheadings have immense power, and their impact within the prison environment cannot be overstated.
The internet has been a boon for religious radicalization and recruitment. Training for recruits that previously occurred in terrorist training camps can now be accomplished via electronic, globally accessible correspondence courses. The web can capture and rapidly disseminate information to the world. We have not begun to fully grasp the implications of this in our society, but the internet is perhaps the most potent vehicle for training and information sharing. It is increasingly being used by individuals and groups seeking affirmation and identity through the use of violence.
Just as the internet has revolutionized the way that we look at communication in modern society, it has acted as dramatic means in prison for broadening social networks. Although I am not aware of any correctional system that currently provides direct unregulated internet access for inmates, there has been a dramatic increase in indirect use of the internet. During the past decade, pen pal correspondence between prison inmates and the public has rapidly gained acceptance on the internet. The days when inmates were limited by the time and delay of individual letters have now passed. Currently, the inmate who had access to 5 pen pals can just as easily have access to 50 or 500. Although one state passed a law banning inmates’ access to the internet, this state law has been overturned in Federal Court.
Radicalization: What do we know?
More than 200 years ago, Thomas Jefferson looked to France when he drew up plans for the proposed Richmond penitentiary based on a model from a prison in Lyon, France. Today, it would be wise to look to France, Great Britain, and other European countries to learn from their experience. Radicalization in prisons is a global problem and threatens the national security of the U.S. Information sharing between and among the U.S. and other countries is crucial. The task force report released today examines these issues from the perspective of European prisons.
Defining Terms
For consistency, I would like to refer to the task force report, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization for the following definitions of radicalization and recruitment. Our report provides the background for definition development on relevant issues related to radicalization. The following definitions are taken directly from the report.
Radicalization - refers to the process by which inmates…adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes. By “extreme views,” this report specifies beliefs that are anti-social, politically rebellious and anti-authoritarian.
Recruitment - “is used to mean the solicitation of individuals to commit terrorist acts or engage in behavior for a terrorism purpose.” Non-radicalized inmates may be persuaded to participate in actions that directly benefit the terrorist network. Therefore, a recruited individual would include anyone in the prison environment who provides support to terrorists. Many members of a terrorist network may not be fully aware of the value that their actions bring to the network, as in the case of a prisoner who is coerced through blackmail to smuggle cell phone parts into a prison.
Individual radicalization – results from exposure to a radical religious service provider or charismatic inmate espousing radical ideas. This type of individual may decide to pursue violence on his own, becoming a “lone-wolf” terrorist. He would not necessarily have the support of a network, but may seek out a network in the future, and may be at risk for recruitment at some later date.
Organized radicalization – a process supported by external groups who seek to influence vulnerable inmates. These groups coordinate the entry of radical religious service providers into prisons and jails. They provide inmates with reading materials that include non-traditional or extremist interpretations of the Qur’an. Once released, inmates are also directed to supportive groups that espouse violence, such as radical mosques. The social services offered by radical groups act as a vehicle for “top-down recruiting,” also known as “scouting”. This involves radical groups identifying released inmates with valuable skills who can be recruited to carry out specific actions in support of the group’s radical agenda. This process occurs over the long term and direct recruiting may result long after the inmate has become radicalized.
Gang radicalization - makes use of pre-existing prison gangs or networks to attract inmates. A principal reason for joining an existing gang is the belief that membership in such a group confers physical protection and psychological support. Gangs also give disillusioned youth a sense of belonging. Once these groups become radicalized, their money, communications networks and intimidation factor can be used to recruit others and support terrorist networks.
Most prisoners who join Islamic gangs for protection adopt Islam temporarily out of necessity, a phenomenon called “Prislam” by officials of the New York Police Department. In contrast, a small but influential proportion of the prisoners who adopt Prislam later become engaged in terrorist activity.
Para-radicalization - takes place when non-radicalized individuals, including inmates, correctional officers, or other prison staff, aid or abet radicalized networks. Wittingly or not, they are an important part of terrorist network operations in the prison setting. Using bribery and intimidation, radical inmates can obtain, for example, smuggled communications devices, pass messages, and cause the strategic transfer of particular inmates.
The Problem
Overview of the Process of Radicalization
As previously discussed, prison inmates in general are particularly vulnerable to radical religious ideology due to their anti-social attitudes and the need to identify with other inmates sharing the same background, beliefs, or ethnicity. When there has been little exposure to organized religion in the community, the inmates’ understanding of religion is dependent upon the religious leadership and materials at their facilities. Radical rhetoric may therefore exploit the inmate’s vulnerabilities and lack of grounded religious knowledge by providing validation to the inmate’s disillusionment with society and by creating an outlet for their violent impulses. Psychological factors that increase vulnerability include high level of distress, cultural disillusionment, lack of intrinsic religious beliefs or values, dysfunctional family system, or dependent personality tendencies. From an ideological standpoint, radical religious groups allow inmates to demonize their perceived enemies and view themselves as righteous. Inmates may also be drawn to radical groups out of the need for protection or to gain status among other prisoners.
Occasionally, I am asked to describe the typical radicalized inmate. While it seems a reasonable question, I would suggest that focusing only on individual inmates is not an appropriate solution. In fact, terrorism is a team sport. Social bonding is not only the magnet but also the glue that holds groups together. Hypotheses like brainwashing are simple, attractive and wrong. Thoughtful comparisons between violent radical religious groups and new religious movements, sometimes known as cults, reveal that we can best understand terrorist groups through an understanding of networks. The most effective terrorists are team players, who play different positions on a radicalized field. Our overcrowded prisons provide an opportunity for a deep bench. Even more importantly, para-radicalization occurs in prison. In this exploitative environment, inmates, visitors and even prison employees can be unwitting players who can be cajoled, bribed or coerced into transmitting messages and materials without being aware of their real purpose.
In order to effectively understand a business, we must appreciate the capabilities of not only its employees, but also the needs and interests of its customers. In a similar way, it is not enough to understand terrorism in prison by learning only about the inmates. One must also have an understanding of those who visit and volunteer in prisons. Although prisons may appear to be closed systems, the walls are in fact quite permeable. A state prison system with 30,000 inmates may easily host 300,000 visitors and volunteers.
Studies have suggested that terrorist recruitment methods are not always expected to yield a high number of recruits. Radical messages may be delivered to many prisoners with the understanding that most will resist radicalization. As demonstrated in the New Folsom plot, detailed in the prisoner radicalization task force report, a single radicalized inmate can be a significant threat. Even if the radical message resonates with only a few inmates, they could then be targeted for more intense one on one instruction. The New Folsum plot also demonstrates the communication that occurs between the prison and community. The impact and destructive potential of a prison-directed terrorist cell is enormous.
There is a difference between a radicalized prisoner, who holds radical religious or political beliefs, and a prisoner who has been recruited by a terrorist group and who has chosen to commit violence. A sequence from radicalization to violence occurs, beginning with the conditions of the prison setting and first exposure to radical ideas, and ending with the decision to become a terrorist. Only a few who become radicalized go on to actively pursue terrorism. An important resource for combating terrorism would be to determine which factor or factors influence some radicalized prisoners to make the specific leap from radical beliefs to violence in the name of those beliefs.
Diverse and Dispersed
Prison systems are administered at the federal, state and local levels. While there are good reasons to have a decentralized prison system, our prisons have not adapted to share information with other facilities and agencies. Currently, 3500 jails are city or county operated facilities. Some of these are huge, dwarfing many prisons in size. For example, more than 25 jails house more than 3,000 inmates. While most prison and jail systems are separate, some states combine their jail and prison systems under the state department of corrections. In the era of privatization, more private companies are running prisons. State governments operate nearly a thousand facilities, private companies run more than 150 facilities. Coordination and collaboration between publicly and privately managed facilities has not yet been achieved, and presents a serious problem in the national struggle against radicalization and terrorism.
The Research Search
The history of research within U.S. prisons has been marked by human subject research abuse. As a result of these abuses, Congress passed special federal regulations governing research on human subjects in these facilities. Nationally recognized scholars who are interested in doing further research are often constrained, if not denied outright.
While maintaining rights of prisoners and maintaining the security of institutions is a primary obligation, we cannot forget that without the light afforded by good research, we are left with the heat of case-related investigations by government and the media. Effective policy should be driven by good research on radicalization rather than through random case reports.
We have an obligation to inmate populations, but also to those who are charged with maintaining safe prisons. Good intelligence needs to be provided not only in a top-down fashion, but also generated from the bottom-up. Just as we seek to protect our soldiers by providing them with the most up-to-date intelligence, we are also obligated to use our enhanced knowledge to safeguard the lives of our correctional officers.
As we have stated in our task force report, we currently lack the necessary data to determine both the extent and patterns of radical religious recruitment for incarcerated prisoners and released inmates. Even if a religious provider is removed from one facility, that provider can simply apply to enter into a prison in another state. No database exists to track inmates after release or to identify inmates associated with radical groups. No comprehensive database exists to track religious service providers who are known to expose inmates to radical religious rhetoric.
First Describe, Then Prescribe
A compelling case can be made for a review of our prison system, particularly at the state and local levels. In order to defeat a networked opponent, our prisons need to be “networked” through information technology systems that are truly integrated. This will facilitate much needed research into not only the “what” of religious radicalism, but also the “how” and “why.” Improved intelligence will be beneficial not only in limiting religious radicalization and recruitment within prisons, but also in assisting in better determination of how criminal gangs operate within a prison environment. This intelligence will prepare us for future threats that we encounter within our prisons. When serious symptoms present, it is tempting to try to reach for a treatment before we have a diagnosis. History reveals that government works best when it first shines light rather than heat upon concerns that involve religious questions and conflict.
Government must be proactive. We must base our operations on real intelligence, rather than gut reactions. Unless we understand the nature and extent of the problem of religious radicalization in prison, we are likely to first neglect it, and then over-react in a way that unnecessarily antagonizes and polarizes our prison population. In addition to being an assault on civil liberties, an aggressive over-reaction by government in the absence of good intelligence would lose hearts and minds to radicalization and recruitment, playing into the very hands of those who want to subvert our system.
Although at one point the issue may have involved “connecting the dots”, many of those dots are now widening blots, bleeding through prison walls into the community. Our briefings revealed that while the New Folsum plot was discovered in the community accidentally by virtue of a dropped cell phone, the response of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Los Angeles was superb. Federal, state and local leadership rapidly deployed personnel in order to determine the extent of a serious operation that had grown over time. Expecting the Joint Terrorism Task Force to be the primary force for dealing with this complex problem is like expecting emergency rooms to provide all medical care. A rapidly mobilized Joint Terrorism Task Force response to a serious threat is like an emergency medical response for patients with critical symptoms. It is necessary but not sufficient. Proactive, integrated intelligence-sharing systems are critical to identify blots before they become plots.
Conclusion
In my role as a consulting psychiatrist to prisons, I also teach the medical students who accompany me. Prison can be a humbling place, where teachers once again find themselves to be students.
I will never forget one of the first challenges that faced me in prison. A suicidal inmate was to be placed in a stripped cell without any possessions. As he was led from my office, he begged me to allow him to keep just one possession – his Bible. At such a time, it appeared obvious to me that this request could easily be granted. Without hesitation, I instructed the officer to give him his Bible. Before doing so, the officer flipped through the pages, reached into the book of Revelations, and pulled out a razor blade. “Doc”, he said. “Do you want him to have this too?” The inmate smiled weakly and said “I guess I don’t need my Bible after all.”
Unfortunately, we are living in more complex times. An officer who can easily identify and remove a razor blade from a Bible will most likely not be able to identify the razors of radicalization – jihadist material that advocates violent measures against innocent civilians, gangs who are willing to masquerade their violence as religion, and radicalized individuals who are willing to take the last step towards terrorism.
In closing, I would like to recognize the Committee and their staff for their professionalism, and the School of Medicine at the University of Virginia and its resources within the Critical Incident Analysis Group. I would especially like to thank the Homeland Security Policy Institute at the George Washington University for their dedication to this process. I would like to extend to you an open offer to continue to work closely with them. Thank you and I would be pleased to try to answer any questions you may have.
The Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) at the University of Virginia School of Medicine represents a collaborative, multidisciplinary “think-net” that examines critical issues through a multidisciplinary lens of crisis analysis. As a flexible network, the Critical Incident Analysis Group benefits from the intersecting perspectives of government, academe and the private sector. By volunteering their time and counsel, CIAG participants distill current knowledge, providing opportunities to identify and build productive networks and policies that enhance resilience while safeguarding our liberties.
Mueller, Robert, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 16, 2005.
Pistole, John, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, October 14, 2003.
Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.
Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, University of California Press, 2000.
Hudson, R.A. 1999. The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes and
Terrorist and Why? Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. p. 24.
Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons, Tuesday,
October 14, 2003. United States Senate, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary.
Volkan, V., Bloodlines, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997, pp. 48-49.
Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty v. Terry L. Stewart, 2002.
Boyd, J, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Princeton, N.J., 1953.
F. Cilluffo, G. Saathoff, et. al., Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, HSPI/CIAG Task Force on Prisoner Radicalization. 2006.
S. Gerwehr and S. Daly, Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment, (McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 2006), Chapter 5, p. 84.
M Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2000, pp 124-130.
S. Gerwehr and S. Daly, Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment, (McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 2006), Chapter 5, p. 84.
C Bell, Correctional Psychiatry, in Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, Eighth Edition, Kaplan and Sadock, Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins, Philadelphia, Vol 2, 2005, p 4002.
[How easy is it to form a terror group....VERY easy]
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/news/globe0522.htm
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
May 22, 2008
A media-distribution enterprise for global terror
By Colin Freeze
In Internet Jihad circles, GIMF - or the Global Islamic Media Front - is known as one of the oldest and most far-reaching networks.
“GIMF is not so much a group as a media-distribution enterprise,” says Frank Cilluffo, a former adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush on homeland security issues. “They will release information and get it as widespread as possible.”
Whether the material is video clips of roadside bombs blowing up coalition soldiers, or tracts describing the world’s most influential Islamist insurgencies, or a shoot-’em-up video game known as the Night of Capturing Bush, the propaganda is regarded as crucial to cultivating the next generation of jihadist wannabes.
“I look at al-Qaeda as a brand. ... What makes brands grow and what makes brands atrophy?” said Mr. Cilluffo, now at George Washington University.
“The real centre of gravity is the narrative: They are fighting a media campaign.”
Over the years, GIMF has served as a mouthpiece for a highly influential Syrian Islamist, Abu Musab al-Surri, who was captured in Pakistan after a $5-million (U.S.) bounty was put on his head.
The Internet helped ensure the thinker’s catchphrases, such as “Terrorism is a gift” and “System, not organization,” became slogans for the new global jihad.
Lately, the GIMF imprimatur has been affixed to several accused terrorist suspects who allegedly wanted to do more than post messages.
Last September, police in Vienna arrested three alleged GIMF members, accusing them of plotting to set off a car bomb.
The same week, police in Maskinonge, Que., arrested a 34-year-old suspect whom they accused of being the Canadian end of the conspiracy.
Said Namouh was a Moroccan-Canadian who is reported to have gone by the name “Ashraf” on the Internet and sending messages to Austria such as, “My dear brother, my big dream is to be a martyr by your side,” according to bail-hearing evidence.
But long before authorities were onto the current GIMF membership, they were on the trail of an elusive figure known only as “Abu Banan.”
In 2002, Reuters reported that someone by that name posted messages announcing the formation of an “Islamic al-Qaeda Organization in Palestine” that supposedly wanted to carry out suicide attacks against Israel.
In April of 2003, after Baghdad fell to U.S. forces, the San Jose Mercury News reported on a Montreal-based Yahoo outfit known as the “Abu Banan Global Islamic Media group.”
The eponymous founder was said to have circulated an article calling the U.S. occupation of Iraq “a great catastrophe that the [Muslim] nation should be prepared to face.”
Laura link:
Pulled jihadi websites:
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/congress.htm
[live links on site]
Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to Better Serve State, Local, and Tribal Needs
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee
April 24, 2008
Religious Discrimination and Prisoners’ Rights
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
February 8, 2008
Assessing and Addressing the Threat: Defining the Role of a National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee
June 14, 2007
The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
May 3, 2007
The Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee
September 20, 2006
Prisoner Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
September 19, 2006
Religious Radicalization Behind Bars
Statement of Gregory B. Saathoff, Executive Director CIAG
Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
September 19, 2006
Homeland Security: The Next 5 Years
Statement of Daniel B. Prieto, Senior Fellow
Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
September 12, 2006
Bioterrorism and Pandemic Influenza: Are We Prepared?
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
May 23, 2006
The National Guard and Homeland Defense
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
May 4, 2006
Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
March 8, 2006
Preventing Terrorist Attacks on America’s Chemical Plants
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity
June 15, 2005
Combating Terrorism: Developing Effective Strategies Against Terrorism
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
February 3, 2004
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Who’s in Charge
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Reform
October 4, 2001
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach
Testimony of Dr. Jerrold Post
Before The House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
October 12, 2001
The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Spread of Infectious Diseases
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
September 05, 2001
Wired World: Cyber Security and the U.S. Economy
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress
June 21, 2001
Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations U.S. House Committee on Government Reform
March 27, 2001
Combating Terrorism: Options To Improve The Federal Response
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management and the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
April 24, 2001
Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-Governmental Organizations
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations U.S. House Committee on Government Reform
April 03, 2001
The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime
December 13, 2000
Cyber Attack: The National Protection Plan and its Privacy Implications
Testimony of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information Committee on the Judiciary
February 1, 2000
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and U.S. Preparedness
Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
October 2, 1998
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/pubs/hspi_pubs.htm
Reports and Journal Articles
HSPI Issue Briefs and Op-Eds
Reports and Journal Articles
Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders (PDF*)
Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
Spring/Summer 2007
HSPI/CIAG Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization, “NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy” (PDF*)
May 3, 2007
Stopping Surprise Attacks: Thinking Smarter About Homeland Security
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Frank J. Cilluffo, Richard Weitz, Ph.D. and Jan Lane
April 23, 2007
HSPI/CIAG release report on prisoner radicalization entitled, “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization” (PDF*)
September 19, 2006
Cyberstrategy 2.0 (PDF*)
April 2006
Frank Cilluffo and J. Paul Nicholas
Journal of International Security Affairs
Number 10, Spring 2006
HSPI releases report on regionalizing Homeland Security (PDF*)
June 30, 2006
HSPI/ Heritage Foundation release report: “Empowering America: A Proposal for Enhancing Regional Preparedness” (PDF*)
April 6, 2006
HSPI releases White Paper on Terrorism Risk Insurance (PDF*)
December 5, 2005
Enhancing Preparedness for Cyanide Terrorism (PDF*)
Paul Maniscalco and Donald Walsh, Presentation to the “Third World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism,”
Dubrovnik, Croatia
September 20, 2005
Hot Zone: Ice Cube on Plate Glass Window First Responders should support increased EMS funding (PDF*)
Paul Maniscalco and Gregg Lord
Homeland First Response
July/August 2005
Public Preparedness: A National Imperative (PDF*)
January 28, 2005
Countering Terrorist Financing: We Need a Long-Term Prioritizing Strategy
Sina Lehmkuhler
Journal of Homeland Security
April, 2003
Local Emergency Response: Enduring the Rhetoric While Trying to Define Readiness. (PDF*)
Paul M. Maniscalco, James Denney, Keith A. Holtermann, and Daniel Kaniewski
Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Bulletin
Third Quarter 2002
The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence (PDF*)
Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi
The Washington Quarterly
Winter 2002
Create a House Select Committee on Homeland Security.
Daniel J. Kaniewski
Journal of Homeland Security
February 2002
The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence (PDF*)
Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi
The Washington Quarterly
Winter 2002
Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Strategy
Frank J. Cilluffo, task force chairman and author, Sharon L. Cardash, task force coordinator and author, Gordon N. Lederman, task force coauthor
CSIS
May 2001
Cyber Threats and Information Security: Meeting the 21st Century Challenge
Arnaud de Borchgrave, task force cochairman, Frank J. Cilluffo, task force cochairman, Sharon L. Cardash, task force coordinator, Michèle M. Ledgerwood, task force coauthor
CSIS
May 2001
Fighting Terrorism
Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin
NATO Review
2001
Cyber-Attack: The National Protection Plan and Its Privacy Implications
Frank J. Cilluffo
Journal of Homeland Security
November 2000
Cyber Threats: Ten Issues to Consider
Frank Cilluffo & Paul Byron Pattak
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000
And the Winner is...The Albanian Mafia (PDF*)
Frank Cilluffo and George Salmoiraghi
The Washington Quarterly
Autumn 1999
reproduced with permission
Responding to New Terrorist Threats.
By: Frank J. Cilluffo, Jack Thomas Tomarchio
Orbis
Vol. 42, Issue 3, Summer 1998
Information Warfare and Strategic Terrorism (PDF*)
Cilluffo, Frank J.and Gergely, Curt H
Terrorism and Political Violence
9(1): Spring 1997
reproduced with permission from the Frank Cass Co
Between War and Peace: Deterrence and Leverage.
Frank Cilluffo and Robert Kupperman
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
Winter/Spring, 1997
reproduced with permission
HSPI Issue Briefs and Op-Eds
HSPI Issue Brief: Poverty and Terrorism
Andrew Whitehead
August 21, 2007
Transit Security Requires Chaotic Approach
Frank J. Cilluffo and Laura P. Keith
USA Today
February 28, 2007
HSPI Issue Brief: “Back to the Future: An Agenda for Federal Leadership of Emergency Medical Services” (PDF*)
May 2, 2005
Press release (PDF*)
A Doomsday Priority
Daniel J. Kaniewski
The Washington Times
April 6, 2005
Don’t rush toward a trinational security strategy
Frank J. Cilluffo
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
March 21, 2005
HSPI Issue Brief: “Consolidating the House’s homeland security efforts: The time to act is now” (PDF*)
December 29, 2004
Commission’s Proposals Fall on Deaf Ears (PDF*)
Frank J. Cilluffo, Daniel J. Kaniewski
Roll Call
August 16, 2004
War Requires Homeland Panels’ Attention, Too (PDF*)
Daniel J. Kaniewski
Roll Call
March 24, 2003
House Homeland Panel Needs Own Jurisdiction
Daniel J. Kaniewski
Roll Call
March 9, 2003
Home alone; Congress needs security plan
Daniel J. Kaniewski
The Washington Times
May 14, 2002
First Responders to a Sneak Attack.
Frank J. Cilluffo; Thomas I. Herlihy
The Washington Post
June 26, 1998
The Role of Intelligence in Identifying, Preventing and Responding to Transnational Terrorism: A Framework for U.S. National Security Planners
Remarks by Frank J. Cilluffo to the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law & National Security
December 10, 1996
Understanding Terrorist
Ideology
KIM CRAGIN
CT-283
June 2007
Testimony presented before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June
12, 2007
[complete report]
I have to quit, so am posting my searches:
Now in U.S. Military:
Links to last the night:
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/resources.htm
TerrorismMonitor
Volume IV
Issue 21
November 2, 2006
1
Al-Qaeda’s Caucasian Foot Soldiers
By Hayder Mili
In the West, Islamic terrorism is a threat traditionally associated with Middle
Eastern men whose faces are easily perceived as “alien” and who present a
suitable profile around which to organize law enforcement monitoring. Recent
events have again shown that this profile is outdated. The July 7, 2005 London
bombings and the further discovery of other operational cells in Britain and
Canada included several converts, such as 25-year-old Hindu-Canadian convert
Steven Chand and Germaine “Jamal” Lindsay, the young Briton who not only
participated in but led the four-man suicide bombing cell on July 7. The activities
of converts, or rather those who adopt a militant ideology inspired by Salafi-
Jihadi interpretations of Islam, have become increasingly important in executing
terrorist attacks. The incorrect perception of the “face of terror” risks obscuring
our understanding of how terrorist groups operate. In monitoring and preventing
terrorist activity, law enforcement agencies need to move beyond the current
profile and react to the empirical reality.
Blue-Eyed Emirs
That empirical reality has been apparent for some time, particularly in France.
The logistical support cell involved in the Algerian Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA)
1995 bombing campaign in France included two converts, David Vallat and
Joseph Raime, who had been converted to Salafi-Jihadism while in prison by GIA
“emir” and Afghan veteran Ahtmane Saada. Beyond logistical support, French
law enforcement also found operational converts when they investigated the
ultra-violent jihadi-gangster Roubaix Gang (Terrorism Monitor, January 12).
Notably, the gang was composed of Algerians led by two ethnic Frenchmen,
TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org
IN THIS ISSUE:
AL-QAEDA’S CAUCASIAN FOOT SOLDIERS
By Hayder Mili....................................................................................................................1
DEVISING A NEW COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN EUROPE
By Ludo Block................................................................................................................... 4
COMBATING THE IDEOLOGY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN
By Waliullah Rahmani.................................................................................................... 7
THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN SURINAME
By Chris Zambelis............................................................................................................ 9
Volume IV, Issue 21
November 2
,
2006
Thank you for the ping, granny.
All my California friends are safe, even if they were “all shook up, un hunh, un hunh”. (A little music there from Elvis.)
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ned=us&q=%22homeland+security%22
[Will not copy]
Homeland Security workers to be told: Be vigilant
The Associated Press - Jul 28, 2008
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Homeland Security Department will soon tell its employees to review security and emergency plans as the country enters into a period ...
Report: US to Heighten Terror Alert FOXNews
DHS Urges Vigilance Over Next 12 Months Washington Post
US Headed for ‘Heightened Alert’ Stage ABC News
Daily Breeze - United Press International
all 97 news articles
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ned=us&q=transportation+security+administration&ie=UTF-8&ct=rels_4
Several here:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ned=us&q=transportation+security+administration&ie=UTF-8&ct=rels_4
Several:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ned=us&q=department+of+homeland+security&ie=UTF-8&ct=rels_0
More on the threats:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ned=us&q=dhs&ie=UTF-8&ct=rels_2
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h-jp7Q8U9YCtyENXESTqV4Zg4E5wD927U18G0
Russian emigrants in Pa. charged with asylum fraud
By MARYCLAIRE DALE – 1 hour ago
PHILADELPHIA (AP) — A group of Russian-born immigrants made $3 million helping 380 asylum-seekers file bogus applications over a four-year period, federal authorities charged Tuesday.
David Lynn, 33, posed as an immigration lawyer and coached natives of eastern Europe on how to claim persecution on religious, sexual orientation or other grounds, prosecutors said.
He charged $8,000 per person or $10,000 to $12,000 per family, according to officials who said they found $560,000 in cash and two gold bars hidden in floorboards of Lynn’s home during a 2007 raid.
Federal authorities also moved to retain more than $1.3 million in seized cash and other assets, including funds kept in a Swiss bank account.
continues..............
Homes lost reduced to 21 in Telegraph fire
(Tuesday, July 29, 8:30 p.m.) The number of homes confirmed lost in the Telegraph fire is 21, according to Mariposa County Public Information Officer and CAO RIck Benson. A total of 16 homes has been lost on West Whitlock Road, 4 on Sherlock Road, and 1 on Mosher Road. Additional loses are expected.
Source: http://www.mariposagazette.com/
—
Check out my blog at http://eclecticarcania.blogspot.com/
Check out my online scanner feed: http://scanner.alecwasserman.com/cencoastscanner.m3u
__._,_.___
Be sure to check out our Links Section at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/californiadisasters/links
Please join our Discussion Group at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/californiadisasters_discussion/ for topical but extended discussions started here or for less topical but nonetheless relevant messages.
I am glad to hear your friends are safe.
There were so many posts coming in, that I lost track of the aftershocks, but more are expected.
And the fires continue.
Stay safe, things are going crazy.
MSU steps up vigil after bomb threat
Times of India - India
VADODARA: Facing a bomb scare for the first time in its history, the MS
University on Tuesday began taking steps to up the vigil on its sprawling
campus. ...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Ahmedabad/MSU_steps_up_vigil_after_bomb_threat/articleshow/3304294.cms
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Ahmedabad/MSU_steps_up_vigil_after_bomb_threat/articleshow/3304294.cms
The Stawell bomb threat
The Wimmera Mail Times - Horsham,Victoria,Australia
Buckle had underestimated the amount of explosives in the home- made bomb.
Large boulders of stone and granite, heavy equipment and machinery in the
yard of ...
http://wimmera.yourguide.com.au/news/local/news/general/the-stawell-bomb-threat/1230790.aspx
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://wimmera.yourguide.com.au/news/local/news/general/the-stawell-bomb-threat/1230790.aspx
Bomb threats
Laurel Leader Call - Laurel,MS,USA
Don McKinnon, director of Jones County Emergency Management Agency, said
the first bomb threat came to the DHS office. “At about 10:45 am today,
...
http://www.leadercall.com/local/local_story_211095513.html
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.leadercall.com/local/local_story_211095513.html
Panama gov’t staff evacuated after bomb threat
Xinhua - China
PANAMA CITY, July 29 (Xinhua) — A false bomb threat caused alarm and
prompted a staff evacuation in the Panamanian Labor Ministry headquarters
here, ...
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/30/content_8847833.htm
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/30/content_8847833.htm
Gull Road Wal-Mart Cleared of Bomb Threat
WKZO News - Kalamazoo,Michigan,USA
KALAMAZOO — Kalamazoo County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to a bomb threat
shortly before 4 PM Tuesday afternoon at the Wal-Mart on Gull Road. ...
http://wkzonews.blogspot.com/2008/07/gull-rd-wal-mart-cleared-of-bomb-threat.html
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://wkzonews.blogspot.com/2008/07/gull-rd-wal-mart-cleared-of-bomb-threat.html
Bomb threat keeps Nadapuram on tenterhooks
Newindpress - Chennai,Tamil Nadu,India
The person, who spoke in Malayalam with a Malabar slang, said a bomb is
planted at the Nadapuram bus stand, which will go off at 12.30 pm Police
tried to ...
http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IER20080729141721&Page=R&Title=Kerala&Topic=0
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp%3FID%3DIER20080729141721%26Page%3DR%26Title%3DKerala%26Topic%3D0
Bomb threat forces train evacuation in South Amboy
New Brunswick Home News Tribune - New Brunswick,NJ,USA
... AMBOY —About 200 New Jersey Transit passengers were evacuated from a
train this morning after a note with a bomb threat was discovered on the
train. ...
http://www.mycentraljersey.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080729/NEWS/80729026
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.mycentraljersey.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article%3FAID%3D/20080729/NEWS/80729026
Bomb Threats: Should we evacuate or not?
Officer.com - USA
The traditional response to a bomb threat has been total evacuation.
Forcing a complete evacuation can cause serious problems, especially since
most bomb ...
http://www.officer.com/interactive/2008/07/29/bomb-threats-should-we-evacuate-or-not/
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.officer.com/interactive/2008/07/29/bomb-threats-should-we-evacuate-or-not/
Hoax bomb threat to telephone exchange in Kerala
Times Now.tv - Mumbai,Maharashtra,India
Two anonymous calls claiming that powerful bombs have been planted in and
around a telephone exchange at communally-sensitive Nadapuram area near
Kozhikode ...
http://www.timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=12227
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx%3FNewsID%3D12227
Oregon teen jailed here on desertion charge
Shreveport Times - Shreveport,LA,USA
A Shreveport woman was arrested Monday in connection with a bomb threat
against a local grocery store. Charlesetta Murray, 24, was charged with ...
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080729/NEWS03/807290328/1062
See all stories on this topic:
http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ncl=http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article%3FAID%3D/20080729/NEWS03/807290328/1062
E-mail bomb threat in Kolkata turns out to be hoax
Kolkata: The email threat about serial bombings in the city on Tuesday evening turned out to ...
http://www.headlinesindia.com/archive_html/30July2008_79895.html
India News
http://www.headlinesindia.com
Email bomb threat in Kolkata turns out to be hoax
By IANS
Kolkata, July 29 (IANS) The email threat about serial bombings in the city Tuesday evening turned out to be a hoax. The email had threatened multiple bomb blasts in the city at 10 pm Tuesday. On tracking the Internet protocol (IP) ...
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/email-bomb-threat-in-kolkata-turns-out-to-be-hoax_10077528.html
Thaindian News
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal
Bomb threat forces train evacuation in South Amboy
About 200 New Jersey Transit passengers were evacuated from a train Tuesday morning after a note with a bomb threat was discovered on the train.
http://www.mycentraljersey.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080729/NEWS/80729026/1001/rss
mycentraljersey.com - NEWS
http://www.mycentraljersey.com
Bomb Threat
10 block of East Main Street (UPDATE AS OF 6:40 PM) The backpack, and any items in or around it, were rendered safe by the Dane County Bomb Squad. Madison Police …
http://www.cityofmadison.com/incidentReports/incidentDetail.cfm?id=9281
City of Madison, Wisconsin Police...
http://www.cityofmadison.com
California Man’s Computer Used to Send Bomb Threat in India
By bigboss
InfoSec News: California Man’s Computer Used to Send Bomb Threat in India: http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/07/california-mans.html By Kim Zetter Threat Level Wired.com July 28, 2008 A California man currently renting a home in ...
http://www.maildir.net/2008/07/29/california-mans-computer-used-to-send-bomb-threat-in-india/
Maildir.net
http://www.maildir.net
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