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Conaway v Deane We are not unmindful of the fact that the relationships gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons seek to enter involve intimate and private decisions that extend to the core of the right to personal autonomy. Those decisions do not necessarily require us or th e State to recognize formally those relationships in the form of State-san ctioned marriage. Tha t a liberty interest such as the argued-for right to marry a person of the sex of one’s choosing, even if assumed to be important, does not render autom atically fundam ental that liberty interest. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727 -28, 117 S . Ct. at 2271, 1 38 L. Ed . 2d 772; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 649, 458 A.2d at 786 (“Whether a claimed right is fundamental does not turn alone on the relative desirability or importance of that right.”).... We agree that the State’s asserted intere st in fostering procreation is a legitimate governmental interest. As one of the fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court as a matter of personal autonomy, procreation is considered one of the most important of the fundamental rights. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S. Ct. at 1113, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”) (emphasis added); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386, 98 S. Ct. at 681, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618 (“It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed in the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. . . . [I]t would make little sense to recognize a righ t of privacy with respect to other m atters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of family in our society.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S. Ct. at 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (recognizing that the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children ” is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause). In light of the fundamental nature of procreation, and the importance placed on it by the Supreme Court, safeguarding an environment most conducive to the stable propagation and continuance of the hum an race is a leg itimate government interest... As stated earlier in this opinion, marriage enjoys its fundamental status due, in large part, to its link to procreation. Loving, 388 U.S . at 12, 87 S. C t. at 1823, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (“M arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”) (emphasis added); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S. Ct. at 1113, 86 L. Ed . 1655 (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the ve ry existence an d survival o f the race.”); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211, 8 S. Ct. at 729, 31 L. Ed. 654 (“[Marriage] is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply in teres ted, f or it is the foundatio n of the family and society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”). This “inextricable link” between marriage and procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman only, because it is th at relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of both members (advances in reproductive technologies notwithstanding). Acceptance of this notion is found in the clear majority of opinions of the courts that hav e considered th e issue. See Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 458 (“Implicit in Loving and predecessor opinions is the notion that marriage, often linked to procreation, is a union forged between one man and one woman.”); Dean, 653 A.2d at 332-33 (holding that the right to marriage is deemed fundamental becaus e of its link to procreation); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197 (“[M]arriage is so clearly related to the public interest in affo rding a fav orable environment for the grow th of childre n that we a re unable to say that there is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the protection of its marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one w oman.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982-83 (“But as Skinner, Loving, and Zablocki indicate, marriage is traditionally linked to procreation and survival of the human race. Heterosexual coup les are the on ly couples who can produce biological offspring of the couple.”); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (“The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a fam ily, is as old as the book of Genesis.”) (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S. Ct. at 1113, 86 L. Ed. 2d 1655)... Looking beyond the fact that any inquiry into the ability or willingness of a couple actually to bear a child during marriage would v iolate the fundamental right to marital privacy recognized in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86, 493, 85 S. Ct. at 1681, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, the fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction between whether various opposite-sex couples actually procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation.