AEI scholar Michael Rubin's very sober analysis of Iran (Interview with Hugh Hewitt)

Hugh Hewitt/Townhall ^ | April 16, 2008

[nuconvert]

I excerpted the transcript a little, just to shorten it a bit.

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

Guess this is the next battle....but first we have Iraq:

End Game On With Sadr Should Bring Sadr’s End ( What will Iran do next?)

************************INTRO EXCERPT**********************

It seems Iran and the Mahdi are getting desperate. The weapons going into Diyala are possibly for al-Qaeda to use, since that is their region of Iraq. It would be another indicator of Iran’s support to both al-Qaeda and the Mahdi. The assassination attempts are clearly attacks Iraq’s government, now a US ally. This is a dangerous game for Sadr and Iran to play. We will not allow defeat easily. - end update

[attiladhun2]

The fanatical 12th Imam messianism aside, the only thing the mullahs understand is force or the credible threat of force. The reason force (or a credible threat to use force against them) is the only thing that can possibly threaten them is that it has the potential to bring down their little racket. Which is why I said from the beginning of the WOT that every nation facilitating terrorism should have been dealt with, including Iran. We are at war with a radical ideology, not a tactic.

[nuconvert]

pong

[gpapa]

Neither a wise nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him. [Dwight D. Eisenhower]

[PGalt]

MR: Yes. Even though the majority of Iraqis may be Shia, one shouldn’t conflate or assume that all Shia get along. Just remember, during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, that most of the conscripts, most of the people at the front, were Shia in the Iraqi Army, and they didn’t pick up and defect to Iran, because nationalism meant more than religion.

Thanks for the ping. Interesting interview.

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

From the interview:

But the more some politicians got up, and for very short term political reasons,

Well,...much of the driving force for the left here in the USA is anti-American....

*************************************************

It’s difficult to imagine they are so blatantly antiAmerican!

See this :

Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left

And a review:

**********************************

By	Kat Bakhu (Albuquerque, NM United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left (Hardcover)

I had long wondered why people on the Left had the propensity to speak more positively about people who would slit their throats than they do about their own country, which affords them more freedom and opportunity than anywhere else. David Horowitz has answered that question thoroughly and convincingly in his Unholy Alliance. Where I felt bewildered and confused, I now feel crystal clear. Unholy Alliance is such a great book.

It begins with the leftist movements at the beginning of the 20th Century, and works its way up to the present day, exploring the anti-American attitude of these movements in detail. Horowitz shows that the enemies of the US back then are largely the same group today, operating under the same misperceptions, making the same mistakes, and pursuing the same impossible utopia.

Individual chapters are included on the Patriot Act (I was persuaded that it is a GOOD thing); the democratic flip-flop on Iraq once G.W. Bush implemented what they agreed with Clinton needed to be done; the driving components of the current anti-war movement; as well as chapters on individual personalities who are major spokespeople of the Left. Horowitz covers a lot of ground, and he covers it concisely and clearly. Unholy Alliance is richly informative without ever being boring or plodding.

This book is so illuminating that I simply cannot do justice to it here. I love people who reason so clearly that they help me get my own reasoning clear. Horowitz is just that type of person! In the terrain of mindless clichés (no-blood-for-oil, etc.), he is a breath of real fresh air.

[BIV]

I don’t think Cheney went over to the ME to say goodbye to his oil buddies or to greet Halliburton lifers or to surrender.

He was delivering a message to Iran. Maybe just a warning instead of a war plan session, but I’d guess it was both.

I don’t think Bush will leave office with a nuclear-armed Iran blackmailing its neighbors and threatening Israel. But, he has disappointed me before.

[BOBTHENAILER]

Thanks for all the great pings today. Printed most of them for reading tonight.

[Kenny Bunk]

The Shiite millenial mindset is so alien to Westerners that it is hard to take seriously, or at least seriously enough.

The Shiites look forward to the end of the world when the planet is destroyed and when every living soul is killed, as a joyous occasion. It is they, the Good Shiite Muslims, who will then be taken into Paradise on a fast track ...faster if one is a martyr. Infidels, and even Bad Muslims, will become their slaves in Paradise for all eternity. Call it the Shiite Rapture.

This will give Allah the chance to start over with a clean slate and build a perfect Shiite world. In effect, the Shiite Theological End Game might well be stated as:

Armageddon? Bring it on, infidels!

These are the people with whom some would like to talk ... negotiate. They'll talk for as long as it takes them to develop the means of the nuclear exchange with Israel or anyone else, that will bring their millenium (and they hope everyone else's) to an end, giving them the holy martyrdom, the destiny for which Shiites pray.

[The_Media_never_lie]

Interesting post!

[Ilya Mourometz]

This is serious stuff that I’ve been following for a while. I studied ancient Iran and India and have maintained a lifelong interest in the region. Shiite millenarianism is more prevelant in Iran, which in many ways is the true birthplace of the great monotheistic religions (starting with zoroaastrianism), and partly because of that, it’s also always been a hotbed of “endtimes” thinking.

What I’m getting at is that there is enough in Iranian cultural history going way back before Islam to feed into a millenarian mindset that isn’t as easily explained as, say, the kind of nutjob endtimers that, for instance, holed up in a cave in Russia last month. These guys in Iran are a helluva lot more serious about it and the twelvers, for instance, have been planning for this for a long, long time. It’s not some whim or fad that happens to affect a fringe element.

Basically, all shiites believe in the notion that the hidden imam will reveal himself. The divisions are between those who believe that the last real imam was the 5th, 7th, or 12th caliph. At any rate, in Iran, the shiites largely took on a particularly apocalyptic vision of the Imam’s return which, as I understand it, is more characteristic of twelvers than the fivers and seveners (who tend to live in places like Pakistan and Iraq—not all shiites are alike anymore than all Protestants are alike just because they aren’t Roman Catholics).

Up till recently, this never was a great cause for concern because shi’ism was historically very non-political. That changed with the Ayatollah Khomeni in the 1940s who, in a purely objective sense, was possibly the most important shiite leader of the last 500 years precisely because he transformed a somewhat morbid, death-obsessed, politically quiet sect into a powerful political force. This was only possible because Khomeni also happened to be a nationalist opposed to the US relationship with the Shah.

In transforming the religion into a political powerhouse, Khomeni ultimately directed that apocalyptic impulse against the US and, to a lesser extent Israel. This is important—Israel is and always has been of secondary concern to radical shiism. The US has always been the great satan to them. Even this might have amounted to a passing movement in the 60s, except that Khomeni came back to Iran after years of exile (in France, of course—like most muslim radicals of all stripes, his political ideology came from leftist french intellectuals living in lebanon in the 1950s).

Most Americans who weren’t around in the 70s think it was a shiite, religious iranian revolution, but it wasn’t at first. It was much more like the Russian revolution and like that revolution, which was hijacked by the bolsheviks, the iranian revolution was hijacked by Khomeni’s backer—all at Carter’s invitation. In order to calm what was a grassroots, populist overthrow of the Shah, Jimmy Carter and the French basically agreed that the Iranian mob needed someone to keep a lid on things, so they deliberately brought Khomeni in.

In order to unify the revolution, Khomeni did the obvious (in addition to executing bundles of non shiites)—he made the US the enemy and had the students take over the embassy. Anywhoo, fast forward, and you have those same people inspired by Khomeni’s anti-american rhetoric now in charge, only this time, on the verge of getting nukes (in fact, it’s widely believed that Ahmadenijad was one of those hostage-taking students at the embassy).

Carter’s incredibly inept handling of the Iranian revolution is easily the worst foreign policy debacle in American History—worse than anything the left can say about Iraq or Vietnam by an hundredfold at least. It has led, by deliberate steps, to a situation in which a large group of apocalyptic nutjobs who literally view the US as a satanic entity are within a few years or months of being able to spark Armageddon. It’s only too convenient that the Sunni style apocalyptic cult, the wahabbists, led by Osama bin Laden, are on the same page. Oh yeah, and there’s Jimmy once again, trying to f*ck things up in the region. But then again, he’s on record as being an apocalyptic christian—or did you all forget that?

Scary stuff.

[CGVet58]

bttt

[nuconvert]

While I can quibble with some other aspects of your post, this one really stands out: “This was only possible because Khomeni also happened to be a nationalist opposed to the US relationship with the Shah.”

Of all things, Khomeini wasn’t, it was a Nationalist. He had absolutely no loyalty or interest in the culture and country of Iran,- and said so from the moment he stepped off the plane when he returned from France - except as a vehicle to further his religious ambitions.
His brand of shiism - his invention - Khomeinism, called for allegiance to him and to allah, not the State.

To think that the regime is or has been interested in what’s best for Iran and Iranians, is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Revolution and the regime is all about. Unfortunately, there are many in Washington (and in the media) who don’t get it.

[astounded]

...”To think that the regime is or has been interested in what’s best for Iran and Iranians, is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Revolution and the regime is all about. Unfortunately, there are many in Washington (and in the media) who don’t get it.”

I agree. The regime does not equate with the “people”. The latter are hostage - for the most part - to islamic radicalism. There are grave dangers there that need to be addressed - sooner than later.

[Ilya Mourometz]

We can agree to disagree. Khomeini authored numerous Iranian nationalist poems from the 1940s onward; he despised the arab states—including those that were majority shiite, he refused to even consider recognition of the term “arabian gulf”, etc. The purpose of the revolution was to overthrow the Shah, not to create the Islamic republic. It was largely motivated by middle class landowners—a recently created group that didn’t even exist until major land reforms that began in the 1950s. The Iranian middle class flexed their muscles for more political freedom to go along with their new economic freedoms and the Shah responded with a massive crackdown. This led to the “pressure cooker” effect and caused the revolution to explode. It was not about radical shiism or Khomeini at first, but had been brewing for some time. No person can seriously claim that post-revolutionary Iranian shi’ism can be understood outside of the context of Iranian culture. It is precisely because of this that the revolution never spread in all these years, despite iran’s attempt to use Hizbollah in this fashion.

The inability to see that nationalism, politics and religion are inseparably mixed in post-revolutionary iran is what has been the great failing of American policy toward Iran. It’s the mistaken notion that it’s strictly about religion (as we understand religion) that’s caused the US to consistently misread what’s been going on over there for thirty years. Iran was America’s strongest non-European ally for nearly forty years and it could have survived the overthrow of the Shah; only because of Carter’s utter incompentence did that reverse course.

[nuconvert]

“The purpose of the revolution was to overthrow the Shah, not to create the Islamic republic.”

In the eyes of the people who were in favor of the revolution, yes. They had no idea what was coming.
It’s important to separate the anti-Shah group who were not interested in a strict islamic country, from the Khomeini followers & loyalists.

The nationalism you speak of in post-Shah Iran is a tool used by the regime to placate and control the people and further the regime’s own agenda. It’s used to make the regime seem like one of the people. The regime is not interested in Iranian/Persian culture before the time of Mohammed. They would prefer it never existed.

Did you know that Persian was not Khomeini’s native tongue? And that he never spoke it well?

Yes, politics and religion are inseparable under Khomeinism. But Nationalism is used as a means to an end because the people are nationalistsic, not the regime.

And yes, “Iran was America’s strongest non-European ally” under the Shah, and “Carter’s utter incompentence did that reverse course.”

[nuconvert]

Correction: “In the eyes of the people who were in favor of the revolution”

I should have written, In the eyes of the people who were in favor of the overthrow of the Shah.

[Ilya Mourometz]

I think we’re actually in agreement for the most part. I don’t know whether the leaders of Iran since Khomeini did or didn’t have any stake in Iranian culture, but I suspect that they didn’t—at least their public pronouncements seem to indicate that. To be fair, stories of them destroying Persepolis or exterminating the few zoroastrians left in the country turned out to be false (in fact, there remains relatively healthy jewish community in western iran). On the other hand, as a general rule, they are not interested in the pre-islamic past. I agree that to the extent they rely on nationalism, it’s merely a tool to sway the masses.

I also agree that the people of Iran remain staunchly “iranian” insofar as that means they identify with their glorious past and accomplishments; and that this probably exceeds their adherence to the post-Khomeini cult that Ahmadinejhad is trying to enforce and spread into the rest of the region. In the end, though, I think he in particular is a true apocalyptic sort and possibly the most dangerous man on the planet right now irrespective of whether he’s able to spread his brand of shi’ism into Iraq and beyond.

I don’t think it’s that significant that Khomeini wasn’t a native speaker of Persian. Many, if not most, Iranians don’t speak Persian as their native tongue. There are dozens of languages in Iran; Persians are the ruling elites, but they are a minority (think about 30% or so). The turkic speakers may outnumber those who speak persian, kurdish, and other indoiranian tongues. I used to know the numbers but don’t have them handy.