Both the issues noted by Chase [1) at the time of filing this bill, or 2) is not now one of the United States] were addressed. The state of Texas having been conquered by military force rendered any anterior legal status to be a moot point. The court correctly notes that Texas was not represented in Congress, and that she must be readmitted to representation.
But if the acts of secession were illegal then Texas had never ceased being a state and no readmission was needed.
Try again, Even Chase admits 'The next [duty] was that of re-establishing the broken relations of the State with the Union ... There being then no government in Texas in constitutional relations with the Union.'
The question of secession was ratio decidendi and not obiter dicta.
Bwahahahahaha! Don't give up your IT job! The state of Texas sued to prevent payment, since the contracted items (cotton cards and medicines) had not been delivered by White & Chiles. The ratio decidedendi is this, provided by Chase,
Without entering, at this time, upon the inquiry whether any contract made by such a board can be sustained, we are obliged to say that the enlarged powers of the board appear to us to have been conferred in furtherance of its main purpose, of war against the United States, and that the contract, under consideration, even if made in the execution of these enlarged powers, was still a contract in aid of the rebellion, and, therefore, void.The court held that any contract that aided the rebellion was void.
In context.
"There being then no government in Texas in constitutional relations with the Union, it became the duty of the United States to provide for the restoration of such a government. But the restoration of the government which existed before the rebellion, without a new election of officers, was obviously impossible, and before any such election could be properly held, it was necessary that the old constitution should receive such amendments as would conform its provisions to the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford adequate security to the people of the State."
The people of the state. Not territory. Not former state. And they were, and had been people of the state because, as the Chief Justice wrote a few paragraphs before, "Our conclusion therefore is that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion." Ergo, the acts of secession which might have changed that status were illegal. And the Court did have jurisdiction. Which was a matter for the court's consideration and the ruling was entirely proper.
The ratio decidedendi is this, provided by Chase...
And this, also provided by Chief Justice Chase: "Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union."