You are very welcome.
September 30, 2007 Anti-Terrorism News
Iraqi army says kills 40 militants — arrested 8, defused bombs in operations in Diyala, Salahuddin and Kirkuk
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070930/ts_nm/iraq_army_dc_1;_ylt=AiHPzIUAAtY2QzANgju2PfJX6GMA
(Iraq) Coalition forces disrupt al-Qaeda network; two killed, 21 detained
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14348&Itemid=128
(Iraq) Al-Qaeda senior leader captured in Samara - report — Abdel-Rahman al-Anbary
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/middleeast/news/article_1361103.php/Al-Qaeda_senior_leader_captured_in_Samara_-_report
(Iraq) US says Iranian-made missiles found in Iraq
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_mideast_afp/iraqunrestiranus_070930130734;_ylt=AqLEwL5ONnLITqIEEENn8edX6GMA
(Iraq) U.S. struggle to defeat IEDs takes place in streets, shadows
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21053750/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900750.html?hpid=topnews
Washington Post historical analysis of IEDs issues in Afghanistan and Iraq - summer 2002 - summer 2004
(my title)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900751.html?hpid=topnews
(Iraq) US soldier killed in small arms fire attack in Baghdad
http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=1024037
(Iraq) Death toll in Mosul car bomb rises to 6 killed, 21 injured — update
http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=1023964
(Iraq) Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092901528.html
(Iraq) Diyala sheiks pledge cooperation to oust al-Qaida, but reconciliation remains bumpy
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Rocky-Reconciliation.php
(Iraq) U.S. Embassy reiterates support for unified Iraq
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq.php
(Afghanistan) Six Afghan police killed in Kandahar
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/September/subcontinent_September1167.xml§ion=subcontinent&col=
(Afghanistan) Three civilians, two police killed in Afghanistan — in Paktya — Taliban ambush in Paktya province — 7 Taliban killed and 3 arrested after fighting
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunrest_070930122453;_ylt=Au2jLHKyDznulD.2EzV.xsPOVooA
(Afghanistan) Taliban debating peace, Karzai says
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/afghanistan;_ylt=ApEYZLWziHrk4U3ZJtEOxNrOVooA
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/29/afghanistan.bus.ap/index.html
(Afghanistan) Taliban spurns Karzai’s offer to meet Omar — update - additional detail in later story
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21055255/
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunresttalkstaliban_070930080939;_ylt=AivZw5cU7eyMqvjO6XNJezfOVooA
(Pakistan) Militant attacks leave 1 soldier dead, 14 wounded in northwestern Pakistan, official says
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Violence.php
(Pakistan) Waziristan breeding ground of suicide bombers: UN report — 80 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan came from the Waziristan agencies
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\09\30\story_30-9-2007_pg7_44
(Pakistan) Militants blow up two barbershops in Swat — fail to destroy Buddhist carvings
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\09\30\story_30-9-2007_pg7_19
(Pakistan) ‘Terrorists may attack twin cities’ — Islamabad and Rawalpindi during the coming few days
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\09\30\story_30-9-2007_pg7_50
(India Kashmir) Kashmir mosque siege ends, two Hizb-ul Mujahideen terrorists killed
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=7bcdf400-bc37-4564-93da-956b2fc4ab87&&Headline=J%26amp%3bK+mosque+siege+ends%2c+terrorists+killed
(India) Top cops to meet to tackle financial terror — Hawala transfers, fake currency, foreign
contributions masked as social or religious donations remain key elements in financing
cross-border terrorism
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Top_cops_to_meet_to_tackle_financial_terror/articleshow/2415927.cms
(UK) US airbase bomb plotter on run in UK — German officials disclosed
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2558165.ece
(UK) Islamists ‘urge young Muslims to use violence’ — Hizb ut-Tahrir has urged Muslim
students at British universities to fight Allied troops in Iraq
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/30/nhizb130.xml
(U.S.) Isolating the menace in a sterile “supermax” - Top-security prison now home to terrorists
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21043739/from/RSS/
(U.S.) Gitmo detainees on Supreme Court docket
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070930/ap_on_go_su_co/scotus_new_term
(Iran) Report: US trains Gulf air forces for war with Iran
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=NSOC2O0PJZQGBQFIQMGCFFOAVCBQUIV0?xml=/news/2007/09/30/wiran130.xml
Iran gov’t backs parliament’s ‘terrorist’ label for US army, CIA
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/africa/ME-GEN-Iran-US-CIA.php
Algerian military kills 10 suspected terrorists
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/africa/news/article_1361113.php/Algerian_military_kills_10_suspected_terrorists
(Sudan) Rebels storm peacekeeping base in Darfur, killing 12 soldiers
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/09/30/sudan.darfur.ap/index.html
(Turkey) Death toll in ambush by suspected Kurdish rebels increases to 13
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/europe/EU-GEN-Turkey-Kurds.php
(Spain) ETA issues statement, saying fight for independence from Spain will continue
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/europe/EU-POL-Spain-ETA-Statement.php
(Europe) West is taking fight against terrorism online
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/30/business/net01.php
(Austria) Online List of politicians as possible attack targets surfaces in Austria
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411505523&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
September 21, 2007 news reports on list:
http://communities.canada.com/nationalpost/blogs/posted/archive/2007/09/20/terror-tracking-group-releases-info-on-targets-named-by-austrian-canadian-jihadist-cell.aspx
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5jTK0C1ygyuzbzfz-B_ve-qsO40og
(UK) Terror survival course launched
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7019937.stm
(Saudi Arabia) Terror finance trail vanishes in Saudi Arabia
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news/article3013006.ece
(Lebanon) Camp defeat sends Lebanese militants into hiding
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_mideast_afp/lebanonunrestislamist_070930024637;_ylt=Ak6Vbvzd5ef1GkEDSc3xVHragGIB
(Syria) ‘Arab research center’ in Syria denies reports of IAF air strike
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411514513&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Syria says Israeli air raid aimed at justifying attack
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hcd8yNVwB0Z6ZOjoi1YKbiWIremw
Hezbollah: ‘Israel will pay a heavy price if it attacks Syria’
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/09/hezbollah_israe.php
Egypt allows Hamas members to cross into Gaza
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/September/middleeast_September392.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
Hamas renews call for cease-fire with Israel
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411514633&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Gaza) Senior Fatah Official Arrested in Gaza by Hamas
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/133953
(Gaza) Clash at southern Gaza mosque leaves nine wounded, including two critically
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/29/africa/ME-GEN-Gaza-Mosque-Clash.php
(Thailand) Police captain killed in southern ambush — in Yala province
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/previousdetail.php?id=122152
(Maldives) Has Islamic terrorism arrived on Maldives? Nation run with legal system based on Sharia law
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/30/nmaldives230.xml
Maldives police arrest 7 suspects after bomb blast wounds 12 tourists
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/asia/AS-GEN-Maldives-Explosion.php
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/09/30/maldives.explosion.ap/index.html
(Sri Lanka) Six rebels killed in Sri Lanka: army
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_asia_afp/srilankaunrest_070930102538;_ylt=AvAfIQEJi77GSpGlmrd4tLctM8oA
(North Korea) Nuclear envoys reach ‘comprehensive’ NKorea deal: US
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070930/wl_asia_afp/nkoreanuclearweaponstalks_11;_ylt=AkpbgWeFcVwfDBbzF5Hdtj6CscEA
(Nepal) 4 men arrested in fatal Katmandu bomb blasts
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/30/asia/AS-GEN-Nepal-Bombings.php
(U.S./Columbia) U.S. to assist those forced to aid FARC
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070930/NATION/109300043/1001
(Colombia) Dozens of Colombia politicians killed ahead of vote
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N28447012.htm
Other News:
(U.S.) Michigan: Anti-Jewish, anti-Christian fliers found on cars — flier read: “Kill Jews and
Christians if they don’t believe in Allah and Mohammad.”
http://www.macombdaily.com/stories/092807/loc_fliers001.shtml
(Israel) Haifa succa defaced with swastikas
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1189411512761&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(UK) Virus lab ‘ignored warning of leak’
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2558204.ece
CNN/AP: McCain: I would vote for Muslim president
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/09/30/mccain-i-would-vote-for-muslim-president/
NY Daily News: McCain: No Muslim president, U.S. better with Christian one
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/wn_report/2007/09/29/2007-09-29_mccain_no_muslim_president_us_better_wit.html
Special Dispatch—Iran
October 1, 2007
No. 1728
To view this Special Dispatch in HTML, visit:
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD172807
Activists Tell of Iranian Authorities’ Persecution of Arab Population
in
Iran’s Al-Ahwaz Province
The following are excerpts from a debate on the Arabs of Iran’s
Al-Ahwaz
province, which aired on ANB TV on September 7, 2007.
To view the clip visit http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1567.htm
Musa Al-Sharifi of the Al-Ahwaz Democratic Solidarity Party: “With
regard to
our Arab region of Al-Ahwaz, the [Iranian] government’s policy is to
expropriate lands, to deport the indigenous Arab inhabitants to other
regions,
and to replace them with people from the Persian provinces of central
Iran.”
Interviewer: “How is this done? The Arabs own the lands, which are
expropriated by government decree, or what?”
Musa Al-Sharifi: “Yes, this process began in the days of the Shah with
the
sugar cane projects and so on. They would take the lands from the Arab
farmers
and establish on them camps for the army or the security agencies, or
fictitious economic projects and so on. This process began in the time
of the
Shah, and intensified in the Islamic Republic.”
[...]
Mansour Al-Ahwazi, political activist: “Various methods are used in the
ethnic
cleansing. We did not claim that there were killings... There are
killings,
indiscriminate executions, and all that, but not like what happened in
Yugoslavia and other places. They are trying to finish off our
existence.
[...]
“The first city of Persian settlers is called Shirinshah. You can find
it on
the map, or you can open Google Earth and see this Persian city in the
heart
of the Arab region. Lands in this region were expropriated under the
pretext
of the sugar cane project and were used to build the city of
Shirinshah.
“The first settlement in the time of the Shah was called New Yazd, but
after
the revolution, the Iranians who were brought there fled from New Yazd.
When
the Iranian regime believes that the Arab or international situation
allows it
to get away with these things, it intensifies its actions. After the
Arab
defeat by Israel in 1967, they carried out the first settlement plan of
New
Yazd. They brought people from Yazd, and settled them in Al-Ahwaz. They
did
this when they saw that the condition of the Arabs deteriorated, even
though
the Arabs completely ignore our cause.
“Now that Iraq is no longer competing with Iran, and now that Iran has
gained
a monopoly over the strategic situation in the region, they have
stepped up
the expropriation of lands in Al-Ahwaz. The Iranian regime – despite
all its
claims to support the Arab causes and so on... Whenever it identifies
some
weakness in the [Arab] nation, it escalates its ethnic cleansing
policies in
Al-Ahwaz.
[...]
“The Al-Ahwaz issue highlights the contradictions of the Iranian
government.
The Iranian government professes to call for unity, to avoid
sectarianism, and
to defend the Shiites. It tries to use the Shiite bargaining chip in
some Arab
countries in order to promote its plans and in order to extract some
concessions from the U.S. or from some of the other Western powers. If
Iran
really defends the Shiites, why does it oppress the [Arab] Shiites of
Al-Ahwaz? The majority [of the Arabs] there are Shiite. If it really
defends
the [Arab] peoples in Lebanon and Palestine, why does it oppress its
own Arab
people? This is the greatest contradiction in the policy of the Iranian
government.
“This issue highlights the contradictions of the Iranian government on
all
levels – on the sectarian level, as well as the Islamic level. The
Iranian
government is, in fact, coming to a dead-end, not only in terms of its
foreign
policy, but domestically as well.
“For example, some time ago they closed the Al-Ashraq cultural
institute,
which was the only Arab cultural institute in Al-Ahwaz. It was closed
two days
ago, as you can read on the Internet. This was done for no reason
whatsoever.
It did not support violence or any political organization. All it did
was
distribute Arab and Islamic books. It was attacked and was closed down.
“This is part of the faltering policy of the Ahmadinejad government –
just
like it chose to run ahead with its nuclear program, it failed to start
a
dialogue with its [non-Persian] peoples, and to find a formula of
compromise
in this regard. It has now begun to escalate its indiscriminate arrests
and
its attacks.
“There have been many more executions in recent years, since the rise
of
Ahmadinejad, and many cultural institutes have been closed down. [The
Iranian
government] has begun to push matters towards a dead end, and to
encourage
people to rise up and create unrest. What is happening now in
Baluchistan... I
am sure that you have heard about the kidnappings. In Kurdistan, two
helicopters were attacked. They blame the West for all this unrest, and
try to
say this is the result of conspiracies, but it is the result of their
own
policy.
[...]
“Iran rules Al-Ahwaz by virtue of the status quo alone. It enjoys no
historical, political, or even popular legitimacy in Al-Ahwaz.
[...]
“As the international situation deteriorates for the Iranian
government, its
control will weaken. Their fear of this leads them to escalate the
oppression
in Al-Ahwaz.
[...]
“The unity of Iran has begun to face very grave dangers, because the
broadest
common denominator – the religious or Shiite element – has weakened
greatly.”
Interviewer: “In what sense has it weakened? They derive strength from
this.”
Mansour Al-Ahwazi: “No, this element has weakened greatly, because the
government’s policy. Take, for example, the issue of the veil. They
impose the
veil, but in the early days of the revolution, it was worn out of
personal
conviction, and no one imposed it. Iranian women seek any opportunity
to
express their rage at the policies of the Iranian government, which
imposes
the veil.
“In the past, Iranian women wore the veil out of personal conviction.
Now, it
has become a matter of oppression, and you can see how they mobilize
armies in
order to attack and humiliate women and to force them to wear the
veil.”
*********************
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent,
non-profit
organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East.
Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background
information, are
available on request.
MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used
with
proper attribution.
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
(UK) Islamists ‘urge young Muslims to use violence’ — Hizb ut-Tahrir has urged Muslim students at British universities to fight Allied troops in Iraq
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/30/nhizb130.xml
By Tom Harper
Last Updated: 12:16am BST 30/09/2007
An extremist Islamist group, which remains legal despite Government promises to ban it, has urged Muslim students at British universities to fight Allied troops in Iraq.
Hizb ut Tahrir, which wants to overthrow democracy and establish a worldwide Islamic theocracy, distributed leaflets to young Muslims inciting them to resist the occupation of Islamic lands, according to a TV documentary by a former group member.
One leaflet read: “Your forefathers destroyed the first crusader campaigns. Should you not proceed like them and destroy the new crusaders?
“Let the armies move to help the Muslims in Iraq, for they seek your help.” Another leaflet, handed out last August, pours scorn on the UN and tells followers to embark on a Jihad, or “holy war”.
Former Hizb ut Tahrir member Shiraz Maher presents his account of the group’s activities in an edition of Panorama on BBC1 tomorrow night.
Tony Blair promised to ban the organisation after the July 7 London bombings but Labour has since claimed there is not enough evidence to demonstrate Hizb ut Tahrir is violent.
The Panorama documentary contains the first testimony indicating it has advocated the use of force. The group has been accused of fuelling terrorism in the past, but has always denied involvement in any form of violent activity.
Omar Shariff, the first UK suicide bomber, who blew himself up in a Tel Aviv bar in 2003, is alleged to have been radicalised by Hizb ut Tahrir.
The organisation denies this and says no relationship has ever been established by the police or the security services.
Omar Khayam, who was jailed last year for dressing as a suicide bomber during the Danish cartoon protests, is also alleged to have been an supporter in Bedford, which the group also denies.
David Davis, the Shadow Home Secretary, said: “Hizb ut Tahrir is part of a global organisation whose affiliates, members and supporters are anti-semitic, anti-democracy and support violence.
“Due to its clear links to terrorism, the Government pledg-ed to ban it two years ago but has failed to take action.”
Panorama has also uncovered a speech made in August last year by Ata Abu-Rishta, the global leader of Hizb ut Tahrir, when he called for the “destruction” of Hindus living in Kashmir, Russians in Chechnya and Jews in Israel.
“The Caliphate (global Islamic government) will liberate the countries and the people from the influence of the Kafer (non-believer) and its allies and the tyranny of its men and followers,” he said.
Rishta also spoke recently at its annual conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, where, as video footage in the Panorama exposé shows, he whipped the 100,000-strong crowd into a frenzy by calling for a war on Jews. Saleem Atchia, a senior member of Hizb ut Tahrir UK, later made a firebrand speech from the same platform.
Maher, a former friend of the bombers who tried to blow up Glasgow Airport in June and the organisation’s north-east ‘director’ until he left in 2005, claims its aims are the same the world over.
He says its British disciples believe they will eventually fight on these shores.
“Hizb ut Tahrir despises democracy and believes Shariah law must be imposed over the whole world, by force if necessary,” he said.
“I think unless we challenge this we are sleepwalking into a very dangerous future.”
Parmjit Dhanda, a minister at the Department for Communities and Local Government and Labour MP for Gloucester, says the organisation has escaped a ban because the Government is frightened of a successful legal challenge.
He said: “What a propaganda coup it would be if we tried banning them but lost in the courts.”
A spokesman for Hizb ut Tahrir said the programme was “based on no more than hearsay and innuendo” and said it was not anti-semitic.
He said: “Hizb ut Tahrir remains firmly committed in undertaking its political struggle against the tyrants of the Muslim world in order to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world and end the brutal era of colonialism.”
Last year, the Government warned more than 20 universities that extremists were targeting students.
RADICAL JIHADIST THREAT INSIDE THE U.S.
Inside the Ring
Bill Gertz
http://washingtontimes.com/article/20070914/NATION04/109140086/1008
“Sen. Joe Lieberman pressed senior U.S. intelligence and security
officials
this week on what the Bush administration is doing to counter the
ideology
of Islamic extremism domestically and internationally. The answer from
the
top officials: Not much. Mr. Lieberman, chairman of the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, said during a hearing
Monday
that a war of ideas is needed to counter Islamic extremists. “Because
this
is a war, but it is ultimately a war against, and with, an ideology
that is
inimical to our own values of freedom and tolerance and diversity,” the
Connecticut independent said. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III
revealed
during the hearing that the FBI has no counterideology response other
than
its “outreach” to Muslim-American communities so they “understand the
FBI”
and address “the radicalization issue,” he said. Asked whether the FBI
has a
responsibility to wage a battle of ideas within U.S. Muslim-American
communities, Mr. Mueller said: “You put that where I would say no, that
it
would not be our responsibility for any religion to engage in the war
of
ideas.”
The FBI’s responsibility, he said, is “to explain that once one goes
over
the line and it becomes not a war of ideas but a criminal offense, this
is
what you can expect, and to elicit the support of those in whatever
religious community to assist us in assuring that those who cross that
line
are appropriately investigated and convicted.” The comment shows that
despite the creation of a dedicated FBI intelligence-gathering branch,
the
bureau remains limited to investigation and law enforcement.”
The international Sunni jihadist group Muslim Brotherhood set up
numerous
U.S. front groups since the 1990s that should be regarded as hostile
and a
threat to the United States, a Pentagon Joint Staff analyst said.
Stephen Caughlin, a lawyer and military intelligence specialist on the
Joint
Staff, stated in a Sept. 7 memorandum that many U.S. Muslim groups
viewed as
moderate by the Justice Department and other government agencies
secretly
are linked to the pro-terrorist Muslim Brotherhood. The groups also are
engaged in influence and deception operations designed to mask their
true
aims, he said.
Documents entered into evidence in the federal terrorism trial in
Dallas of
the Holy Land Foundation, a charity charged with illegally funding the
Palestinian Hamas terrorist group, reveal new security threats from a
network of more than 29 U.S. Muslim groups.
“These documents are beginning to define the structure and outline of
domestic jihad threat entities, associated nongovernmental
organizations and
potential terrorist or insurgent support systems,” Mr. Caughlin said.
Specifically, a 1991 Muslim Brotherhood memorandum “describes aspects
of the
global jihad’s strategic information warfare campaign and indications
of its
structure, reach and activities,” Mr. Caughlin said.
The Muslim Brotherhood memo on organizing Muslims in North America said
that
all members “must understand their work in America is a kind of grand
jihad
in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within, and
‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of
believers
so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all
other religions.”
Mr. Caughlin said in his memo that “consequently, outreach strategies
must
be adjusted in the face of credible information that seeming Islamic
humanitarian or professional nongovernmental organizations may be part
of
the global jihad with potential for being part of the terrorist or
insurgent
support system,” he said.
Mr. Caughlin said the 1991 memorandum identifies the Islamic Society of
North America (ISNA) as part of the Muslim Brotherhood. The ISNA, one
of
more than 300 unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation
trial,
recently became a subject of controversy among officials who opposed
the
Justice Department’s participation in a conference held last month,
despite
opposition from two members of Congress.
continued.............
Plot exposes possible threat of terrorists from Caribbean
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/world/5174403.html
Plot exposes possible threat of terrorists from Caribbean
PORT OF SPAIN, TRINIDAD - With bustling shopping malls, jammed highways
and
towering construction cranes dotting its skyline, this booming
Caribbean
capital resembles heartland America, not some faraway land where
anti-U.S.
sentiment holds sway.
In June, however, news that a band of Islamic extremists born here and
in
neighboring Guyana allegedly plotted to blow up fuel lines supplying
New
York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport raised troubling questions
about whether Americans should worry about terror threats emerging from
their own hemispheric backyard.
Last month, a Trinidad court ordered three of the plotters extradited
to the
United States, and news reports said documents in the case showed the
men
were seeking assistance from Iran.
Regional experts agree that the terror threat from the Caribbean is
generally low, although they say the recently unveiled plot and the
violent
history of an Islamic extremist group in Trinidad should not be
ignored.
“In Trinidad people were laughing at the whole thing, but that’s not to
deny
that the Caribbean, because of its location and use as a corridor for
drug
trafficking, is vulnerable and needs attention,” said Anthony Bryan, a
Trinidad native and analyst for the Center for Strategic and
International
Studies, a Washington, D.C. think tank.
A potential target
Further complicating the picture is the fact that Trinidad supplies
nearly
three-quarters of America’s liquefied natural gas, all of it shipped to
U.S.
ports aboard vessels that terror experts have identified as potential
targets.
A recent report by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm
of
the U.S. Congress, warned that lax security and corruption at Caribbean
ports warranted more attention. The report’s author also expressed
concerns
over the “growing influence” of Islamic extremist groups in the region.
Experts also point to the role of Venezuela’s socialist president, Hugo
Chavez, in whipping up anti-American sentiment in the region. While not
perceived as a direct threat to the U.S., Chavez has forged new ties
with
Iran, establishing trade links to cement an ideological bond aimed at
undermining U.S. influence in the region.
“Chavez is providing Iran an entree into the region,” said Dan Erikson,
a
Caribbean analyst at Inter-American Dialogue, another D.C.-based think
tank.
“He’s set up direct flights between Caracas and Tehran and signed trade
deals. It is not something to ignore.”
Until the June arrests of the JFK plotters, few Americans were aware
that
the Caribbean was home to even a small Islamic population.
Trinidad and Tobago supports one of the largest, a mix of immigrants
from
India and Afro-Caribbean residents who converted to Islam. About 6
percent
of Trinidad’s 1.3 million residents are Muslim.
Active militant group
The highest-profile Islamic group here is Jamaat al-Muslimeen, a
militant
sect that emerged in the 1960s, paralleling the rise of Black Power
groups
in the U.S.
Instead of fading from the scene, however, Jamaat in 1990 staged a
bloody
coup attempt in Trinidad, wounding the prime minister and killing 24
people
in an assault mounted by more than 100 heavily-armed militants. The
coup
quickly fizzled, however, when the Trinidad population refused to back
it,
and Jamaat’s leaders negotiated a surrender in which they escaped
prosecution.
In the years since, Jamaat’s leader, Yasin Abu Bakr, has stayed in the
news.
He beat charges of ordering the assassination of two dissidents from
his
group, was investigated for links to a string of bombings and is
awaiting
trial on sedition charges. A member of his group was also convicted in
South
Florida in 2004 in a plot to smuggle weapons to Trinidad.
American officials believe the JFK plotters approached Bakr for
assistance,
but Bakr told reporters he “knows nothing of these matters.”
Trinidad residents doubt the JFK plotters posed a credible threat to
the
U.S. or that Bakr’s group has designs on anything but local power, but
they
still shake their heads over the reports linking their island to
Islamic
extremism.
“Trinidad poses no threat to the U.S.,” said Narine Maharaj, a Trinidad
taxi
driver. “This group is very small. But it is troubling that the
authorities
don’t seem able to bring any charges against them that stick.”
Ahmadinejad says US Putting Him in Same Boat as Bin Laden
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=10362
Ahmadinejad says US Putting Him in Same Boat as Bin Laden
29/09/2007
Tehran (dpa) - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Saturday
blamed some circles within the United States of putting him in the
same boat as the head of the terrorist network al-Qaeda Osama bin
Laden.
“Some US circles wanted to sabotage my trip to New York by for example
putting my picture next to bin Laden,” Ahmadinejad told the news
network Khabar.
Ahmadinejad also blamed the US government and New York City officials
for rejecting his request to visit the site of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.
“All I wanted to do was pay my respect and tribute at the site to the
victims but this simple request was rejected,” he said.
Ahmadinejad said that the world in general and the US in particular
should evaluate the roots of the September 11 attack and not simply
take the occasion to create general prejudice and suspicion.
Ahmadinejad compared the status of September 11 to the Holocaust,
saying that both issues were used against the Islamic world.
Iranian officials and state media have in recent days accused the US
of failing in its alleged effort to distort Ahmadinejad’s image during
his visit to the United Nations General Assembly.
I Think that I might say “This is a Saudi’s take on the U.S. news about Saudi Arabia.”
[2005 threat/plan]
http://siteinstitute.org/bin/printerfriendly/pf.cgi
Map of Future Al-Qaeda Operations
By SITE Institute
February 14, 2005
A message posted to a leading al-Qaeda-frequented Jihadist message board on February 12, 2005, purports to answer the questions: “What is the future of al-Qaeda? And what will the upcoming operations be?” In answering these questions the message claims to lay out a future “map of the operations against America and its interests,” with coverage of the following categories:
A big operation inside America: The message states: “Regarding the big operation, God willing, it is going to take place inside the American territory; the date of this operation is approaching, for 3 years and 4 months have gone by since the September 11, 2001 blessed attack. That period gave the American people enough chance [time] to reconsider their position and their way of thinking, but they have not done so; therefore, the future attack is going to be strong and unconventional, in order to cause the largest amount of material and human losses.” The message notes further that Usama bin Laden’s pre-US election statement to the American people was a “warning and an invitation to the American people to change the policy of its Government before pain is inflicted upon them as a result of their silence and their approval of the crimes committed by their Government. This would be the last or penultimate message, after which they will endure the pain that will fall upon them, and they must choose between their lives and the Crusader-Zionist project that will only bring them destruction, poverty, fear and death.”
Operations against American forces and points of interest: The message warns of a “number of operations against American Forces, and against points of interest of Americans and their allies, Arabs and others.” The message explains that these attacks will be in two broad sectors: (1) “Depleting the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan through an escalation in carrying out more painful attacks against it.” (2) “Targeting the American points of interest in all the countries, mainly oil facilities in the Persian Gulf that represent the main artery of the American economy.” The message notes that attacks on oil facilities will have several adverse consequences for the US, including that they will (a) “cause harm to the American economy as a result of the rise in the price of oil,” (b) “cause an embarrassment to America before all the countries in the world, which will be certain of America’s inability to provide oil supply contrary to what it claims,” and (c) “cause a loss of confidence in the capability of [America’s] slaves in the Arabian Peninsula to protect its interests,” forcing American forces to patrol them itself, thereby coming into direct contact with Muslim citizens which “will increase the scandalous behavior of those [Muslim] regimes that will comply with all of America’s demands” and “will facilitate the opening of a new front, and the drowning of America in a new swamp that will be more difficult than the swamps of Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Targeting America’s allies through assassinations: The message warns: “As for America’s allies, they will be targeted by the assassination of the heads of the regimes, security officers, a number of presidents, and kings; this is in addition to the assassination of security officials such as intelligence officers who will be forming in their country a kind of a mafia….” The further explains that “future assassinations will serve political and strategic goals that aim at striking the American plan, by targeting individuals that America relies on for the success of this plan. The list of targeted regimes includes the regimes of Al-Saud in the Arabian Peninsula, Mubarak in Egypt, and the Jordanian regime, in addition to collaborators of the Americans in Iraq such as al-Rafida [Shiites] and others.” The further points out: “Also, with the targeting of intelligence officers, America will lose an important source of information, in addition to the protection provided by those individuals to its points of interest in the region.”
Palestine: Finally, the message turns to “the captured Palestine, in whose name speaks the Bahai Mahmoud Abbas Mirza, who does not even know Sûrah al-Fatiha [Opening verse of the Qur’an] by heart.” The message warns that the Palestinians “must make up their minds and choose between Allâh, His Prophet, Islam, and Palestine, and those criminal traitors, be they Palestinians or Arabs.”
A full translation of the message is provided to our Intel Service members.
[2005 threat / plan, appears to match some of the reports we are now reading.......granny]
http://siteinstitute.org/bin/printerfriendly/pf.cgi
Instructions on How to Carry Out an Islamic Revolution Given on a Jihadist Message Board
By SITE Institute
February 18, 2005
A message entitled “The Military Revolution” was posted on February 17, 2005 to a popular Jihadist message board that contains a specific section for jihad military training. The message includes instructions for carrying out a military revolution by force.
The message, written by an author identified only as “Hamza”, calls on the armed forces to lead the revolution and points out, “if we want the revolution to succeed, we must first and foremost rely on one basic element: the military.” The message explains that “the revolution should be brought about by recruiting the military commanders and elements with the proper tenacity, who desire to change the present situation.” Different branches, including the air force, the infantry, the armored corps, the light armory, the communications unit, and the reserve forces are all called upon to complete important functions in the revolution.
The directions describe the places that must be seized; military bases, homes of senior officers, and communication centers: “Communications should be cut off within the military base, and the people in them should be either killed or taken captive, relieved of all weapons and cellular phones.” The author also enumerates the targets that must be destroyed; the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of the Interior and Intelligence, and the Airports.
The instructions conclude with emphasis on the speed of action, “All this should take place simultaneously and rapidly, in the blink of an eye. Timing is extremely important: any delay in implementing the plan will have a direct impact on the status of the revolution.”
A full translation of the message is provided to our Intel Service members.
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
GIMF Develops Defensive and Offensive Software for Jihadi Operations
By Abdul Hameed Bakier
In July 2007, jihadi forums announced the creation of a new computer program called the Secrets of the Mujahideen, version 1.0. The objective of the program—which was published and distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) through many jihadi websites—is to replace the old and unreliable PGP corporation encryption tools that jihadis had used in the past. Since the release of the program, jihadi websites, especially the GIMF, are instructing their subscribers to communicate using the program’s encryption keys (http://ebnseren.modawanati.com, March 22). Furthermore, al-Qaeda operatives are using Secrets of the Mujahideen in an attempt to avoid U.S. eavesdropping operations against them (http://el-bilad.com, July 6).
Separately, and on the offensive front, jihadi hackers have also invented their own programs to steal data off other computers, part of a larger “Electronic Jihad.” Some of the Islamic hackers’ targets are computers attached to cameras transmitting live videos from intersections and other busy areas. They claim that these videos can be used to case potential targets.
This article will elucidate the documentation of the Secrets of the Mujahideen, in addition to providing information on the ongoing Electronic Jihad.
The Secrets of the Mujahideen
The GIMF claims that the development of the Secrets of the Mujahideen started years ago to replace PGP encryption programs that apparently have multiple security breaches. According to the GIMF, the new program relies on the “highest standards” attained by encryption science, digital communication engineering and source codes developed after studying research published by the best encryption scientists.
According to the program’s documentation, it is the first Islamic software that offers the highest level of 2048-bit asymmetric and 256-bit symmetric encryption. The program combines the highest level of data compression and uses a new technique call the “stealth cipher” that permits the program to change the random encryption algorithm every time a file is encrypted. The program uses five different algorithms. Furthermore, the program explains how encryption keys are managed and how the software creates files.
The Secrets of the Mujahideen’s characteristics include: encryption using the best five algorithms in cryptography, also known as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); strong symmetric 256-bit encryption keys; asymmetric 2048-bit encryption keys; Zlib software library used for data compression; stealth cipher technique that uses variant keys and algorithms; cipher auto-detection; file shredder without possible retrieval of deleted files; single file program that does not require setup and can run from a flash card.
Keys Management and Program Options
In cryptography, keys management is the art of inventing secret keys and distributing them to the relevant parties. Keys management must contain security protocols that generate, exchange, store, safeguard and replace old or compromised secret keys to ensure protection of data.
Therefore, keys are the first important element in cryptography. The jihadi program illustratively explains, in-depth, the different stages of public and private key generation. The program generates two types of keys after the user chooses a username and a pass phrase for the two keys. One key is called the public key, which is the one the users exchange in the jihadi forums and use for ciphering, and the second is called the private key, which is used for deciphering. Both keys have the extension “.AkF” (Acrobat Key File). Depending on the strength of the computer’s microprocessor, the program takes 2-5 minutes to generate the two encryption keys. The keys are automatically saved in the main folder and imported to the active database.
Separately, there are a number of other features included with the program, such as:
File Compression: The user can choose the degree of selected file compression prior to data encryption. Users are advised to use high compression in text files and low compression in large audio files because the latter is already compressed. The program has 1,000-fold compression capability for text files.
File Shredder: According to the program, the user can shred files up to 10 times making it impossible to retrieve them with any currently available software.
Ciphering Files Using a Public Key: Once the needed file and recipient user ID are selected, clicking on the “encrypt” button will automatically determine the decryption key for the recipient. Additionally, if the “stealth cipher” is selected, the encryption algorithm is randomly chosen; otherwise, the user can choose from five types of encryption algorithms.
Deciphering Using a Private Key: Once the ciphered file, using a public key with the extension “.enc,” is received, the recipient simply presses decrypt and enters his or her password phrase. Thereafter, the program produces a decrypted file with the extension “.dec.” The software recommends that the pass phrase be between 20-36 characters long.
The GIMF, which designed the Secrets of the Mujahideen, assures forum users that the program is a secure way of communicating over the internet because it uses all globally used symmetric encryption techniques with the distinct feature of stealth encryption using five algorithms. The capability of the file shredder in the program is also essential because the first step security forces take when they confiscate jihadis’ computers is to retrieve and undelete every possible piece of data that might have been on the computers.
Software Files
After activating the program, the following additional files are created by the program:
AsrarKeys.db: an encrypted database that contains the active keys inserted in the program. This file is created automatically after program activation where the keys are inserted using the “import key” feature from the file manager.
Asrar.ini: this file holds user settings and is created only if the users choose to change the default settings.
Publicxxxxxxxx.akf: holds the public key and privateyyyyyyyy.akf for the private key. Both files are created after generating the “key pair.”
According to the GIMF, the Secrets of the Mujahideen is a high-level encryption tool that outperforms other internationally used symmetric encryption software. Finally, GIMF dedicates the software to global al-Qaeda operations and mentions 11 more Salafi-Jihadi groups operating inside and outside Iraq. The dedication states: “This program is dedicated to all those who stood up and raised the ummah’s head against the demon soldiers, the Jews and crusaders, and their Islam-grudging Shiite allies.”
The Electronic Jihad
On the offensive front, jihadi users are exchanging computer programs that they claim are designed to hack into enemy computer systems to obtain intelligence or inflict economic damage. One such program used for these purposes is al-Mojahid al-Electroni. The program was created by an Islamist nicknamed al-Aqrab al-Aswasd (Black Scorpion), and it appears as “actskn43.ocx” and works on Windows XP and 98 systems. The program, Islamists claim, can take screen shots of hacked computers; steal passwords; record all typed material; and fully control the victim’s files. Furthermore, they claim that the program is undetectable and destroys anti-virus programs.
Another jihadi forum user, nicknamed Qaheer al-Fors, posted a search phrase (intitle:liveapplet inurl:LvAppl) that helps locate many cameras connected to the internet in different countries. Even though these cameras can be easily accessed by ordinary internet users, taking interest in the video feeds and the details of the places they are mounted at is an indication of the mujahideen’s future intentions. Al-Fors says, “by virtue of God, I was able to bring you the codes that you can use to watch some countries in the world through the cameras, those countries mounted to servile people,” but he does not include these codes in his post. It is possible, however, that al-Fors passed these codes through encrypted e-mails using Secrets of the Mujahideen (http://hanein.info, July 20, 2006).
Although al-Fors did not specify the countries where he claims to have hacked into their public cameras, a forum moderator nicknamed al-fedayee (The Commando) posted active links to cameras in Israel. The cameras are for traffic purposes and can be accessed via the links al-Fedayee posted, some of which are cameras mounted in Israel’s Herzliya intersection, Shalom intersection, Holon intersection and eight others (http://hanein.info, July 20). Al-Fedayee says, “Mujahideen, as you do in your jihad against the occupying Zionists, here we are presenting you with this simple gift that was a personal effort to transmit to you live feeds from the Occupied Territories. After hard work, almighty God helped us in penetrating the internal system of the Zionist traffic ministry. We call upon you to take the needed measures and benefit from it because the enemy will soon change the codes of these cameras.” The posting is signed, “Your brother, the son of Aladamia. A gift from the great Iraqi sons to those stationed in the battle fields of Palestine.”
Conclusion
Almost all jihadi websites and forums devote whole sections to computer and internet information. These sections include many different computer programs downloaded from legal websites, cracked and made available for jihadi brothers for free. Certainly, the jihadis concentrate on internet secure communication and hacking programs.
Regardless of the accuracy of the mujahideen’s cyber competence claims, the labeling of internet violations as “jihad” is attracting some Muslim internet users to join the so-called Electronic Jihad. Although few forum users question the ability of this particular Electronic Jihad software, Islamic forum users almost unanimously approve intrusion attempts against Western websites. The perseverance and continuous efforts of Islamic forum members to harm Western internet-based interests could, inevitably, mount to a serious threat in the future.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373681
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Origins of the Niger Delta’s Deewell and Deebam Militias
By Bestman Wellington
Since January 2006, violence in Nigeria’s delta region escalated dramatically as various militant groups and violent confraternities kidnapped Western energy workers in order to call attention to their political grievances. Most recently, kidnappings have begun to take on a more criminal nature, with kidnap-for-ransom schemes plaguing the delta region. While there are many groups involved in these activities, two of the delta’s most notorious cult groups are suspected of engaging in the acts: Deebam and Deewell. These two rival cult groups originated in the 1990s when established confraternities in the Niger Delta created street and creek wings to consolidate their territorial control. Today, both Deebam and Deewell remain responsible for much of the violence in the delta.
Origins of Deebam
Deebam was created in 1991 as a street/creek wing of the Klansmen Konfraternity (KK), a group also called the Eternal Fraternal Order of the Legion Konsortium. In the KK’s parlance, Deebam means “Be Strong.” KK was founded at the University of Calabar in Cross River State in 1983 by five students (The Midweek Telegraph, August 10-16, 2005; Terrorism Monitor, July 6). The first leader of Deebam was the late Onengieofori Terika, popularly called “Occasion Boy.” In Deebam’s terminology, he was known as “Teetan the Great,” or “Teetan the Giant,” meaning the group’s chief. Members who are undergraduate students at universities are called Klansmen and belong to the KK, whereas Deebam is strictly for the street/creek members. There is, however, an organic link between the university-based KK and the street/creek wing Deebam [1].
Deebam has a more formidable and clear leadership structure than its Deewell rival. This is because the initiation into Deebam is extremely tough and membership dues and contributions are high, explaining why many Deebam cultists take to organized crime such as commercial election rigging and other vices to meet their membership obligations. Their membership obligation is approximately 100 naira per month, unless there is an emergency when more money may be demanded [2]. Deewell, on the other hand, relies more on support from politicians and others who are part of their patronage network.
Occasion Boy, the first leader of Deebam, hailed from Bukuma in the Degema Local Government Area of Rivers State. Under him, the group expanded and attracted membership. He was killed on October 9, 2003 when he led scores of his Deebam combatants to take over Tombia, a neighboring community a few kilometers away, and was shot dead by heavily armed Deewell and Icelander cultists. After the death of Occasion Boy, Kingsley Akogu, popularly called “King,” took over the group’s leadership. His tenure was short. He was arrested by security operatives from a brothel in Port Harcourt and taken to the city’s cemetery where he was shot dead. He hailed from Omoku community in the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State.
Ichechi Iwaka, popularly called “Angel,” took over the leadership of Deebam after the murder of King. Before Owaka’s emergence, his group was already estranged from the state government at the same time that Mujahid Dokubo-Asari was estranged from Rivers State Governor Dr. Peter Odili. Asari decided to leave the Ijaw Youth Council and start the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). Owaka’s Deebam and Dokubo’s NDPVF then forged a common alliance to confront Ateke Tom and his Icelander/Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV)—and by extension the state government whom they accused of funding Ateke’s group to eliminate them. Owaka’s reign was characterized by intense armed insurrection against the state and its agents. He was killed when the military invaded Ogbakiri in June 2004.
Under Owaka’s leadership, Deebam’s headquarters was moved from Tombia in the Degema Local Government Area to Ogbakiri in the Emuoha Local Government Area, all in Rivers State. The purpose of the move was to find a safer area to conduct their activities and to practice their religious rituals [3]. After the death of Owaka, Prince Igodo, the president of the Tombia Youth Council, emerged as the head of Deebam. Even after the death of Angel, Deebam was still working with Asari’s group until November 2005 when disagreements deepened between the cult group and the NDPVF over the share of money accruable from the disarmament program initiated by the Rivers State and federal governments in 2005. Deebam went their separate ways from Dokubo’s NDPVF, while one of the NDPVF commanders, Prince Farah Ipallibo, also broke away from NDPVF and founded a small but dreaded group called the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF).
On May 29, 2007, Igodo and hordes of his Deebam loyalists were shot dead in Tombia by a team composed of the NDSF, led by Ipallibo, Soboma George’s Outlaws and Deewell. During the last elections in April 2007, the state government had allegedly given large sums of money ranging from 10 to 50 million naira to Soboma to mobilize other armed groups to ensure the victory of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the state. Igodo and others who also worked for the party in the Okrika axis felt unhappy, and wanted to cause some violence during the May 29 handover ceremony, perhaps to attract government attention to get their part of the largesse (The Midweek Telegraph, June 6-12). The plan leaked to Soboma and his allies, who were practically working for Governor Celestine Omehia because during the ceremony the new governor had also given some money to Soboma to maintain “peace” and “order” [4]. Therefore, when they had heard about Igodo’s plan, they went into action to eliminate Igodo and his combatants [5]. Since Igodo’s death, no new leader of Deebam has been appointed or elected by the group. After his burial, Deebam cultists have said that a new leader will be appointed by early 2008.
In spite of police and military raids on Deebam’s hideouts, they still have many areas they control, especially in Rivers State. They control large parts of the Ogoni area [6]. They are also in control of all of Emuoha Local Government Area because Deebam’s headquarters is in Ogbakiri, which is located in Emuoha. They also control much of Degema Local Government Area, especially places like Tombia and Bukuma. In Port Harcourt, they are in charge of the majority of the slums, such as Njemanze and Gambia [7]. Since they were the first street gang to emerge in Rivers State, their territory is much larger than Deewell’s. They are in almost all of the Local Government Areas of the state and in remote villages [8]. In Bayelsa, they dominate Local Government Areas like Ogbia and Yenogoa, especially. They are also in Delta State and Akwa Ibom and Cross River states. It is estimated that they can call on more than 700 active members.
Origins of Deewell
Deewell, also called the Junior Vikings Confraternity (JVC), was founded in the mid-1990s as a rival to Deebam. The group was conceived as a street/creek wing of the Supreme Vikings Confraternity (SVC), also known as De Norsemen Club of Nigeria, which itself was founded in 1984 at the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State by a history student (Terrorism Monitor, July 6). The word “Deewell” in the SVC’s terminology means “Be Well.” The group was founded as a secret street cult meant for those who were not university students. The group made its dramatic debut around a squalid neighborhood on the southeastern edges of Port Harcourt called Diobu. In its early days, members were involved in petty street brawls for supremacy and territorial control using broken bottles, machetes and short, locally-created guns called Akwas.
In its early days, those who joined the group were red-eyed, hardened petty criminals who had a penchant for violence. There is no record that clearly defines the structure, leadership and names of those who joined the group from its inception. The cult group is neither anti-government nor a rebel group. A lot of unemployed youth and school dropouts embraced Deewell, but it was weak militarily and could not compete violently with its rival, Deebam. Worried by the impotence of Deewell despite the resources invested on it by its parent body, the SVC, who felt that they should control most of Rivers State, began an initiative to form a new group called the Icelander (German) [9]. The Icelander was formed and handed over to Ateke Tom to head [10].
The creation of Ateke Tom’s the Icelander helped to consolidate Deewell. The two groups shared much in common, from their attire, communication codes, initiation rites and general behavior. Many Deewell members fought for Icelander during reprisal attacks from Deebam after the Icelander’s creation. On October 9, 2003, Mr. Owei, a school teacher, and Damiete Rowland, who led the Deewell as head and deputy respectively in Tombia, in alliance with Ateke Tom and his Icelander shot dead Occasion Boy, the first leader of Deebam, during one of their violent struggles for supremacy and territorial control. Nevertheless, Deewell and Icelander were later forced out and Deebam occupied the area.
The founding of the Outlaws, a splinter group of Icelander led by Soboma George, Tom Ateke’s former second-in-command, also added another feather to the violent cap of Deewell. The Outlaws was founded in 2005 as a secret street gang (The Midweek Telegraph, February 7-13). Whether Deewell, Icelander or the Outlaws, their pattern of initiations and other activities are the same and are derived from that of the SVC, their parent body. Like in the case of the Outlaws, many Deewell cultists also double as Outlaws fighters. The Outlaws has also been supporting Deewell with weapons, funds and men to acquire or regain new territories [11].
In Rivers State, Deewell controls the following areas: much of the southern axis of Port Harcourt comprising the old Port Harcourt township; parts of the slum Diobu; some areas of the Emuoha Local Government Area; northeastern parts of Port Harcourt; the entire area called Ken-Khana Kingdom; the heart of Ogoniland, southeast of Port Harcourt; and locations such as Harry’s Town in the Degema Local Government Area. Overall, although Deewell is most formidable in Rivers State, it has members in Bayelsa and Delta states.
The actual numbers of the group can not be determined, but in some villages where they exist they have more than 100 members. For example, in Bane in the Khana Local Government Area of Rivers State there are over 120 members of the cult group. Overall, it is estimated that Deewell has some 400 active members, which makes it smaller than Deebam.
Conclusion
The cult related violence in the delta will continue because the menace is now endemic. Yet, the groups will shrink and aspiring members will be discouraged from joining if the Nigerian government at all levels demonstrates sincerity and transparency in democratic governance, sustainable peace initiatives and provisions of basic social amenities and infrastructure for the population, especially in the Niger Delta region.
Notes
1. Comparing and contrasting Deebam and its parent body, the KK, is an internal analysis by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), Ogale-Nchia, Eleme, Rivers State, January 2006.
2. Author interview with Michael Okoro, a deck officer of Deebam, in Rivers State on September 20, 2007.
3. Author interview with Prince Igodo, October 1, 2004.
4. Author interviews with Ateke Tom on August 10, 2007 and Cynthia Whyte of the Joint Revolutionary Council.
5. Author interview with Boniface Paago, a leader of Deebam in Bodocity community in the Gokana Local Government Area, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, August 30, 2007.
6. The Guardian, July 21, 2006. Also, see “The Bodo War of Attrition: A Brief Paper on the Bodo-Ogoni Cult Crises,” a report issued by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), July 31, 2006.
7. Author interview with Boniface Paago, a leader of Deebam in Bodocity community in the Gokana Local Government Area, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, August 30, 2007.
8. Ibid.
9. Author interview with Osaro, one of the estranged commanders of Icelander, Diobu, Port Harcourt, April 30, 2005.
10. Ibid.
11. Author interview, anonymous Deewell officer, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, January 29, 2007.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373682
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives – Part 1
By Gregory D. Johnsen
In mid-September, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh issued a stern warning to the Wa’ilah tribe in northern Yemen: turn over the six al-Qaeda suspects you are sheltering or face serious repercussions (al-Wasat, September 12). The six men that Saleh believes have found refuge with the tribe near the Saudi border are the remnants of a group of 23 prisoners that escaped from a Yemeni political security prison on February 3, 2006. The prisoners escaped by tunneling out of their cell and into a neighboring mosque, which has since been detailed in a lengthy narrative written by one of the escapees and published by the Yemeni paper al-Ghad. The escapees included a number of prominent al-Qaeda militants, among whom were individuals convicted of carrying out attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002.
Six of these suspects have since been killed in clashes with Yemeni or U.S. forces, 11 have either turned themselves back in to authorities or have been recaptured and six of the suspects remain at large. Many of these individuals have continued to fight for al-Qaeda since their escape, and one of them, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, has since been named the new head of Al-Qaeda in Yemen.
Despite differences of age and background, the 23 men who were being held in the cell were linked together through shared experiences. Nearly half of the escapees, 11, were born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents. Several of the men were arrested in late 2002 after a series of bombings in Sanaa and Marib. Seven of these men were part of a 15-man cell that was later charged with planning to attack five foreign embassies as well as to assassinate the then U.S. Ambassador Edmund Hull. Three of the men were convicted of being part of an 11-man cell that was charged with plotting to carry out attacks in Yemen and abroad. Among the escapees, there are also two sets of brothers, Hizam and Arif Mujali and Mansur and Zakariya al-Bayhani, who are themselves brothers of Ghalib and Tawfiq al-Bayhani, who are currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay. Two other escapees, Qasim al-Raymi and Fawaz al-Rabay’I, also have brothers in Guantanamo.
This two-part series presents a biographical sketch of each escapee, along with his current status.
The Dead
Umar Sayd Hasan Jarallah (1979-2006): Jarallah was from the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. Jarallah was also known as Abdullah al-Gharib and Ibn Hafiz. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 2005 for his role in the attack on the Limburg. Along with al-’Umda, Huwaydi and Zayd, Jarallah was hidden for one month following their escape by Muhammad Hajir (22nd May, April 29). He killed himself along with Ahmad Muhamad al-Abiyad in a failed suicide attack on an oil facility in Marib on September 15, 2006. One guard was killed in the attack on the Safir facility (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 21, 2006).
Shafiq Ahmad Umar Zayd (?-2006): Zayd was born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents and is known by the kunya Abu Abdullah. He was extradited to Yemen from Saudi Arabia along with two other individuals in 2003. He was part of an 11-man cell, which was charged with forging passports, weapons and explosives possession, planning to travel to Iraq and forming an armed gang to carry out attacks in Yemen. Along with Mansur al-Bayhani and Abdullah al-Wada’i, he was convicted only of forging passports. Ibrahim al-Muqri, who was part of the same trial, was cleared of all charges (Yemen Times, March 24-27, 2005). All of the men, however, remained in prison until they managed to escape in February 2006. As was mentioned above, Zayd was sheltered by Muhammad Hajir for one month following his escape. He killed himself along with Hashim Khalid al-’Iraqi in a failed suicide attack on an oil port in Hadramawt on September 15, 2006.
Fawaz Yahya Hasan al-Rabay’i (1979-2006): Al-Rabay’i was born in Saudi Arabia, the third of four brothers and four sisters (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). He is also known by the kunya Furqan al-Tajayki (al-Ghad, October 2006). He attended al-Falah school in Saudi Arabia, where he learned to recite the Quran. Along with nearly one million Yemenis, the family was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1990 as a result of Yemen’s support for Saddam Hussein following his invasion of Kuwait. His mother is known as Umm Hasan, after her oldest son. Hasan is a bus driver with six children. According to his family, Hasan is no longer close to them, as he was arrested on two separate occasions in order to put pressure on his younger brothers. Hasan complained that his brothers were trouble makers, and that when he was in jail his children went hungry.
The second brother, Abu Bakr, is currently awaiting sentencing in Yemen for his role in a series of al-Qaeda plots. The youngest brother, Salman, is being held by the United States in Guantanamo Bay (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). According to his father, he was sent to Afghanistan by his family to search for Fawaz, and was subsequently arrested and turned over to the United States. His father denies that either Abu Bakr or Salman have any links to al-Qaeda (News Yemen, October 9, 2006).
During the late 1990s, al-Rabay’i took a job in the personnel department in the presidential office in Yemen. In early 2000, he traveled to Afghanistan with two other men, including a former agent in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). Like many young men who head off to fight in Afghanistan or Iraq, al-Rabay’i did not tell his family where he was going. Later, he called his father, Yahya, to tell him that he was in Afghanistan. The family claims that they knew nothing of his activities in Afghanistan, although he did mention to his father that his salary contradicted Islamic law and that his goal was to die as a martyr (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). According to one source, al-Rabay’i trained with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (al-Ghad, October 2006). He is also known to have spent time with at least two of the September 11 hijackers, Muhammad Atta and Zayd Jarah (al-Ghad, October 2006).
Al-Rabay’i spent one year in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen in 2001, as the head of a 12-man cell (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). In 2002, the United States asked Yemen to arrest him on the suspicion of belonging to al-Qaeda. He escaped security forces two separate times that year before finally being captured in 2003. In August, he managed to escape a raid on his house in Sanaa dressed only in his pajamas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 2, 2006). The raid did result in the death of one member of his cell, Samir al-Hada’. He also escaped from a security checkpoint, when the car he and Hizam Mujali were traveling in was stopped in the southern governorate of Abyan. Instead of allowing their car to be searched, the two shot one of the two soldiers, Hamid Khasruf, manning the checkpoint and fled (Yemen Times, April 7-13, 2004). The pair was later arrested in March 2003 in Marib (BBC, April 5, 2003). During the time that al-Rabay’i was on the run, he was sheltered by different tribes in Marib and Abyan.
On August 30, 2004, al-Rabay’i was sentenced to 10 years in prison for attacking a Hunt Oil helicopter in November 2002, which was reportedly done with the authorization of Abu Ali al-Harithi (Yemen Times, May 31-June 2, 2004). He was also fined 18.3 million Yemeni riyals, roughly $99,450, for his role in a 2002 attack on the Civil Aviation Authority building in Sanaa (News Yemen, October 1, 2006). Six months later, in February 2005, al-Rabay’i was again on trial for his role in the attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg, and for killing a soldier. The court sentenced him to death on these charges. During his trial, al-Rabay’i frequently alleged that he was being tortured by Yemeni security officers (Yemen Times, December 27-January 2, 2004-2005). He did, however, find time during his trial to arrange to be married to a daughter of Yahya Salih Mujali, the brother of Hizam and Arif (News Yemen, October 9, 2006).
Following his escape from the security prison in February 2006, he was charged with planning the dual suicide attacks in Marib and Hadramawt on September 15, 2006. This operation was partially funded by four million Saudi riyals that al-Rabay’i received from Bandar al-Akwa through Said al-’Akbar. Both al-Akwa and al-’Akbar are currently awaiting sentencing for their roles in the attack (22nd May, April 29). During this time, he also paid a visit to his father, Yahya, who was in the hospital. According to reports that surfaced after his death, al-Rabay’i did not wear a disguise when he made the visit (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). Al-Rabay’i was killed on October 1, 2006 along with Muhammad al-Daylami during an early morning shoot-out with Yemeni security forces in the Bani Hashish region just north of Sanaa. In a story about the escapees, the Yemeni newspaper al-Ghad mentioned that some sources claim that al-Rabay’i was murdered in “cold blood” after he surrendered himself to soldiers (al-Ghad, June 25). Security forces also arrested three individuals it claimed had assisted the pair (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 2, 2006).
Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Daylami (c.1978-2006): Al-Daylami was charged with participating in the November 2002 attack on a Hunt Oil helicopter, planning to attack five foreign embassies and a 2003 plot to assassinate Edmund Hull, the U.S. ambassador in Yemen. He was sentenced to five years in prison in February 2005. In October 2006, he was killed along with Fawaz al-Rabay’i in a shootout with Yemeni security forces in the region of Bani Hashish.
Yasir Nasir Ali al-Hamayqani (c.1978-2007): Al-Hamayqani was also known by the kunya Abu Khalid. He was charged with traveling to Iraq. Al-Hamayqani was killed in clashes with Yemeni security forces in the Sabah district of the southern governorate of Abyan on January 15 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 17). According to a security official, al-Hamayqani was in possession of a machine gun and two hand grenades when he was surrounded by security forces. He managed to wound two officers before he was killed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 17).
Mansur Nasir ‘Awadh al-Bayhani (1974-2007): Al-Bayhani was born in 1974 in the city of Tabuk in Saudi Arabia to a Yemeni migrant worker from al-Rida’a in the governorate of al-Baydha. He took his kunya, Abu ‘Assam al-Tabuki, from his boyhood home. Mansur’s brother, Zakariya, was also among the escapees. Additionally, both his older brother Tawfiq (1972) and his younger brother Ghalib (1980) are currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay. Al-Bayhani made his way to Afghanistan via Pakistan in the 1990s, where he joined the Taliban. Later that decade, he was part of Samir Salih Abdullah al-Suwaylim’s Arab brigade that fought in Chechnya against Russian forces. During their time in Chechnya, al-Suwaylim, who was better known as al-Khattab, was poisoned by Russian security forces, while al-Bayhani was wounded in the right eye. Following the death of Suwaylim, he traveled back to Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces, before returning to Saudi Arabia where he was arrested and extradited along with five companions, including his brother Zakariya, to Yemen.
Al-Bayhani was eventually brought to trial, along with 10 others, on charges of forging passports, weapons and explosives possession, planning to travel to Iraq and forming an armed gang to carry out attacks in Yemen. He was acquitted in March 2005 of all charges save for forging Saudi, Iraqi and Yemeni passports (Yemen Times, March 24-27, 2005). Shafiq ‘Umar and Abdullah al-Wada’i were also convicted of forging passports. Ibrahim al-Muqri, who was part of the same trial, was acquitted of all charges. All of the men, however, remained in prison until they managed to escape in February 2006. Al-Bayhani later turned himself in to Yemeni authorities, and was later released following a security guarantee. Mansur eventually made his way to Somalia, where he was killed in a U.S. naval strike by the USS Chafee on June 2, 2007.
** Part Two of this article will examine those suspects who have surrendered or were captured and those who are still at large.
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Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies
By Hassan Abbas
The government of President Pervez Musharraf is facing policy failure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province). A lethal combination of Musharraf’s political predicament and declining public support, a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army and the reluctance of soldiers deputed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily further exacerbates this impasse. Observing this, many militants associated with local Pakistani jihadi groups have moved to FATA to help their “brothers in arms” and benefit from the sanctuary. In the midst of this, election season is descending upon Pakistan and Musharraf’s survival prospects are diminishing. This dim scenario has consequences for Pakistan’s policy in the FATA region. Pakistan will predictably revert to “peace deals” in the short-term, leading to a lowering of the number of military checkpoints in the area (Daily Times, September 23). If history is any indicator, this will help Talibanization in the region and provide more opportunities to the ISI to indirectly support some Taliban commanders sympathetic to Pakistan’s objectives. Overall, this will likely reduce trouble in downtown Islamabad, but the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area will remain on fire.
Poor coordination between the Pakistani army and NATO/ISAF, Hamid Karzai’s failure to make Afghanistan a functional state and the abundance of drug money in southern Afghanistan are some of the important variables in this context. Additionally, Musharraf himself admits that the crisis in the area is increasingly turning out to be a Pashtun insurgency. However, the factors that “limit” Pakistan’s effective clampdown on all things Taliban in FATA remain linked to its fear about increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan if the Taliban are comprehensively defeated, and the lack of Pakistani public support for anything that appears to be done in pursuance of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. These perceptions significantly affect the morale of army commanders and soldiers operating in the region. Musharraf has largely failed to make a strong case to his people about the need for strong military action against the Taliban in FATA. He has often called this policy as being in the “national interest,” but has not convincingly explained how the army alone defines the national interest. More so, Pakistanis have seen the military defining such interests too often in the past with devastating effects for the state, and interpret Pakistan’s current fight against the Taliban in terms of succumbing to U.S. demands and interests.
With this backdrop in view, this analysis outlines what is happening today in each of the seven tribal agencies in FATA and what the implications are for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.
Bajaur Agency
Bajaur Agency overlooks Afghanistan’s Kunar province, where U.S. forces are battling al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri escaped the reportedly CIA-led attack at Damadola in Bajaur on January 13, 2006, while one of his close relatives was among the 18 killed. Damadola is considered a stronghold of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) units, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) has representation in parliament from Bajaur (Daily Times, February 13, 2006). Bajaur during the 1980s and 1990s was known as the “Poppy Kingdom,” and many Afghan refugee camps (functioning until 2005) were a source of pro-Taliban recruitment in the area.
In August this year, talks between the Taliban and a tribal jirga (supported by the Pakistani government) to improve the law and order situation in Bajaur failed as the Taliban wanted the government to first release some arrested militants (Daily Times, August 7). Trouble had broken out in the area with the news of the proposed construction of a U.S. helipad in Afghanistan’s Kunar province as the tribal leaders sympathetic to the Taliban framed it as a threat to Pakistan (Daily Times, June 17). The strength of the Taliban in the area can be gauged from two recent events: since July this year, they have successfully enforced Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday, which is the official weekly holiday (Daily Times, July 14); secondly, Abdul Ghani Marwat, who headed the government’s vaccination campaign in Bajaur, was killed in a bomb attack in February this year amid the Taliban-sponsored rumor that the Pakistani government-run polio vaccination drive was a U.S. plot to sterilize Muslim children (Daily Times, February 20). The rumor was so widespread (projected by Taliban fatwas) that, according to government estimates (which are always conservative), parents of around 24,000 children had refused to give them the polio vaccine (Daily Times, Feb 20).
Khyber Agency
Khyber Agency is the main artery connecting Peshawar to Kabul via the Khyber Pass. Today, many men are seen wearing traditional caps in the agency because of fear, as a local religious outfit sympathetic to the Taliban, Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam), has declared it binding on all men of the agency to wear caps. The leader of the group, Mangle Bagh, in his radio address last week issued this edict and announced that violators’ heads will be shaved and they will face a monetary fine (Statesman, September 22). It is pertinent to point out that there is a serious battle going on in the agency between Ansar-ul-Islam—led by Pir Saif ur Rahman—and Lashkar-i-Islam—led by Gul Maiden and Mufti Munir Shakir—since 2005-06 (Daily Times, November 17, 2006, April 1, 2006, December 3, 2006). Both factions have built their militias over the last few years and have entrenched themselves in castle-like strongholds. In essence, this is an intra-Sunni (Deobandi vs. Barelvi) war (Daily Times, March 30, 2006).
After banning music in the tribal areas, the local Taliban in Khyber Agency have also started fining taxi drivers and citizens Rs 500 (about $8) for listening to music cassettes in their cars (Daily Times, March 1). Also recently, militants started distributing pamphlets in Bara Bazaar in Khyber Agency saying that the “Taliban have finally reached Bara,” while warning that “if anyone tries to hinder our movement and activities, we will launch a holy war against them” (Mashriq, September 3).
In comparison to other tribal agencies, Khyber Agency (because of its proximity to Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province) is more accessible to Pakistani government functionaries and some development work has been done in the area. For instance, in 2005, Stephen Hadley, the then adviser on national security to President Bush, inaugurated a primary school building project in Surkamar town of Khyber Agency that was financed by the U.S. and Japanese governments in collaboration with the FATA Secretariat (Daily Times, September 28, 2005). Conditions have changed for the worse since then. The extent of the writ of the state can be ascertained from the fact that around a dozen people were killed in June this year when the Taliban attacked the house of the Khyber Agency political agent, Syed Ameeruddin Shah (Daily Jang, June 1).
Kurram Agency
Surrounded by lofty mountains and Afghan territory on three sides, Kurram Agency is the second largest tribal region in FATA. Its headquarters is in Parachinar, just about 90 kilometers from Kabul. According to intelligence estimates, it was also the first geographical point where fleeing al-Qaeda members from Afghanistan landed after the September 11 attacks. Within Pakistan, the route to Kurram goes through Kohat district of the NWFP where permits are obtained to travel to Kurram. Many al-Qaeda militants had moved on to Kohat because Kurram Agency is widely known as pro-Northern Alliance because of its significant Shiite population—a factor that has impacted Taliban objectives in the agency negatively. Shiite-Sunni violence remains the hallmark of this agency, as pro-Taliban factions believe that the Shiites of the area are active against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Various peace jirgas were instituted to bring peace to the area, but without much success (Mashriq, April 14). In April 2007 alone, around 100 people were killed in sectarian clashes (Daily Times, April 28).
The government of Pakistan is planning to construct two small dams in the agency at a cost of 400 million rupees in fiscal year 2007-08 to improve the agricultural sector and thereby improve the economic situation in the area. This will be an important test case for Pakistan, success of which can help the state machinery to increase its control at least in this area as it is an important transit point for cross-border movement into Afghanistan.
Mohmand Agency
Sandwiched between Bajaur and Khyber agencies, this area was considered to be a relatively peaceful region. Pro-Pakistan government tribal leaders still have some control, which is evident from the fact that houses of those giving sanctuary to some proclaimed offenders were attacked as recently as last week (Daily Times, September 23). This was in pursuance of a recent peace deal inked between the Mohmand Agency political administration and the Safi tribesmen, in which the Safi tribesmen agreed to not provide any sanctuary to foreigners (The News, September 15). They also agreed to protect government property and allow the government to move freely in the area, ensuring the safety of roads that pass through the agency. The presence of 200 tribal elders during the signing of the agreement shows some element of success on the part of the government, but the very nature of the deal explains that the government’s writ was failing before.
The relative peace in the agency in the last few years owed a lot to the constructive work done by the Pakistani army in the area in 2003-04—by building roads, clinics and schools (Daily Times, July 15, 2004). One of the secrets of this success was sealing the agency’s 68 kilometer border with Afghanistan by the Pakistani army in late 2003 (Dawn, July 14, 2004). Unfortunately, conditions have changed since then. In recent months, Taliban militants occupied two Khasadar checkpoints in the Qandharo and Halimzai areas of Mohmand Agency and snatched weapons from officials manning the post. In early September, 10 soldiers of the Frontier Corps were kidnapped in the area as well (Daily Times, September 3). The most tragic development, however, has been the blowing up of a hospital, al-Sehat, earlier this month. It was built by an NGO and located about 10 kilometers away from the Mohmand Agency headquarters, Galanai. It was meant to discourage NGOs operating in the area as the armed men mercifully forced the hospital staff to leave the facility before the attack (The News, September 17).
North Waziristan Agency
As early as late 2005, Pakistani Taliban leaders had declared an Islamic state in North Waziristan. Pakistan opted to cut a peace deal with the power brokers in the area in September 2006 (after convincing the U.S. administration of its utility), but the strategy failed (Daily Times, March 2). Now, abductions of government functionaries and soldiers of the Frontier Corps are a matter of routine. The Taliban of the area maintain that direct U.S. attacks amounted to a violation of the peace deal and hence they are retaliating. Roadside bombs are now a common occurrence. Even those providing food to the army units in the area are targeted (Dawn, September 24). For Musharraf, this is the worst of times because given his precarious political situation, any military action before his re-election as president in October this year is expected to backfire politically. Furthermore, he has committed to give up his position as the army chief after the presidential election, which means he will no longer be actively commanding the Pakistani army.
Orakzai Agency
Orakzai Agency was also largely considered a relatively better governed area within FATA until 2005, but Shiite-Sunni battles of the adjacent Kurram Agency spilled over, creating sectarian tension that consequently attracted the Taliban to this agency. The quarrel over a shrine that both communities venerate became a point of contention. The government was tardy in resolving the dispute and the political agent of Orakzai Agency unduly sided with one of the groups, further complicating the crisis (Daily Times, October 22). Even before this issue, the Taliban patron in Orakzai Agency, Akhunzada Aslam Farooqui, was known to be a close ally of Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Dawn, November 6, 2001).
Like other agencies, Taliban activities are expanding into adjacent districts of the NWFP from this agency as well. In a recent development in Kohat, which is part of the NWFP and borders Orakzai Agency, local Taliban have warned tailors to strictly observe religious codes while sewing clothes for men and women. In a letter sent to tailors, the Taliban threatened to blow up the shops of those not following the orders (Dawn, September 24).
South Waziristan
South Waziristan is at the center of Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the region along with neighboring North Waziristan. Recently, Mehsud tribesmen aligned with Taliban forces abducted 205 Pakistani troops (135 army soldiers and 70 Frontier Corps troops) along with seizing 20 of their vehicles. The most striking fact, however, is that the government forces offered no resistance while being kidnapped. After more than three weeks, a majority of the soldiers are still in the custody of the Taliban, and the government has been practically forced to engage in negotiations with them. This reflects government weakness in the face of their growing strength and influence, to say the least. Pamphlets being distributed in the agency, while warning local tribes not to side with government forces, assert that “like in Afghanistan, we have established suicide squads for attacks on troops and their allies in Pakistan” (Daily Times, September 3).
Earlier this year, the Pakistani army partially succeeded in tackling al-Qaeda through supporting Maulvi Nazir, a Taliban leader somewhat sympathetic to government objectives. He started an effective campaign against Uzbek militants aligned with al-Qaeda in the area and largely accomplished his goal of evicting Uzbeks from the agency. However, he is pursuing his religious agenda unabatedly, and it is hardly distinguishable from the Taliban’s worldview. The death of notorious militant leader Nek Mohammad (now remembered as a hero in the area) in 2004 has helped the Pakistani army take some control out of the hands of Taliban militants, but the vacuum created by his elimination seems to now be filled, and Taliban forces have revived their influence and control.
Conclusion
A UN report released earlier this month said that 80 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan had come from the Waziristan agencies. Yet while the Pakistani government has offered to introduce reforms in FATA, little has been done (Dawn, September 26). Political agents continue to dole out funds to handpicked people, often in an attempt to buy peace—hardly an inclusive policy. The $750 million worth of U.S. aid for the uplift of FATA is in the pipeline, but there is no publicly known strategy in place on how to channel the funds, leading to much apprehension and conspiracy theories about who will really benefit in the area.
Furthermore, Pakistan has been rattled by 39 suicide attacks in 2007, so far killing around 350 people, and most of these attacks targeted the Pakistani army, the Frontier Corps and government officials in FATA and the NWFP (GEO TV, September 19). A series of attacks in the Rawalpindi region in August this year were especially meant to attack the Special Services Group (an elite commando unit) and the ISI. This is unprecedented in Pakistan. Many interpret these attacks as a consequence of Musharraf’s tough handling of the Red Mosque crisis in July. Clearly, a majority of these attacks relate to the volatile FATA situation and the Pakistani army is now on the defensive. The killings of Abdullah Mehsud and Mullah Dadullah were expected to hit Taliban forces hard, but the Taliban are showing uncommon resilience. Indeed, Musharraf’s capacity to respond militarily is curtailed because of political compulsions. For Afghanistan and the United States, this means a troublesome scenario. Pakistan’s return to democracy may potentially change things for the better, but Musharraf’s move in this direction is sluggish and uncertain.
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[August 2007]
Volume 5, Issue 16 (August 16, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Italy’s Underground Islamist Network
By Kathryn Haahr
In late July, Italian police announced that they had arrested three Moroccans in a counter-terrorism operation codenamed “Hammam.” The operation was aimed at breaking up a terrorist cell believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda and with proven connections to Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) members tied to the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. Police reportedly are still looking for a fourth accomplice who may have fled Italy. The three, the imam of the Ponte Felcino Mosque, Perugia Province, and his two aides, had stored 60 chemical substances (including nitrates, acids and cyanide) in the mosque’s cellar, the majority of which were of high toxicity and of the type to fabricate explosive artifacts (EuropaPress.es, July 21; Corriere Della Sera, July 21-23; La Vanguardia, July 21). The imam used the mosque to proselytize radical Islam and to train young men in the use of arms, explosives and toxic substances in terrorist operations. Police uncovered propaganda films and documents downloaded from the internet, used to instruct the recruits on how to prepare poisons and explosives, pilot a Boeing 747 and send encrypted messages (El Pais, July 22; Corriere Della Sera, July 23; La Stampa, July 23; Las Provincias, July 23).
Officers of the Italian Division for General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) and the Central Office for General Investigations and Special Operations (UCIGOS) also reported that they discovered maps of aqueducts in Umbria—which they surmise might have been targets for potential poisoning attempts—as well as pictures of Rome’s Fiumicino Airport. Investigations to date lay no doubt that the Ponte Felcino mosque was a “school of terrorism, embedded within a system of small cells that act autonomously,” according to Carlo de Stefano, director of UCIGOS (El Pais, July 22). In a related development, police searches of the Perugia mosque led them to another imam in Pierantonio, a small village in Perugia Province, who had a map with five or six cities marked. These activities led the Muslim World League chairman, Mario Scialoja, to say that Italy is now “full of dangerous fundamentalists” and argue for an official register of imams in Italy (La Stampa, July 22).
Significance of Perugia as a Jihadi Epicenter
The recent activity in Perugia demonstrates the reach of Salafi Islamism from northern Italy into the south. Most known “jihadi” activity by Salafi Islamists has centered in Milan, Lombardy Province, and Turin, Piemonte Province. There are an estimated 20 Islamic centers, cultural institutions and associations in Piemonte, and circa 15 in Lombardy. Perugia reportedly has five Islamic centers, cultural institutions and associations.
The most significant aspect of radicalization in Italy is Salafi Islamism’s espousal of radical activities, namely recruiting for global jihad in sermons and outreach activities at official and unofficial mosques. The Italian intelligence services—in close coordination with the Spanish, German and Dutch counter-terrorism authorities—now believe that the majority of Islamists in Italy—most espousing radical jihad—are connected to North African radical groups (predominantly the GSPC and GICM) and to Ansar al-Islam, an organization primarily based in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. To date, Islamists have increased their presence in the regions of Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria and Liguria. Turin and Milan are the epicenters for jihadi activities, but other cities and towns show indications of Islamist activities. A distinct development for Italy is the appearance of Islamist enclaves in parts of major cities—particularly Milan and Turin—in which Islamist traditions, doctrine and lifestyles frequently challenge Italian legal laws (abuse against women, espousal of holy war against “infidels”) and social norms [1].
A case study is Turin, Piemonte, which has become a “Kabul of the Piemonte” due to its history of Islamist imams calling on its faithful to support Osama bin Laden and to engage in jihad against the infidels. Most of the Muslims in the Turin area are Moroccans. In 2005, Italian police detained three Moroccans, believed to be members of GICM, for planning attacks in Italy and abroad, and for recruiting extremists to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq (El Mundo, May 18, 2005). In April 2007, prosecutors in Turin were scheduled to start investigating Mohammed Kohaila, the imam at the Cottolengo mosque, for calling on Muslims to hate Christians and Jews and praying for their deaths. According to media group AKI on April 3, “the DVD portraying Kohaila’s sermon was filmed with a hidden camera by a faithful attending the prayers on behalf of a news program on state broadcaster RAI’s second channel, Annozero.”
According to information as of January 2007, there are 258 mosques officially registered with the Interior Ministry, but their number may be much larger due to their rapid growth (La Stampa, January 5). The oldest mosque is the one in Rome, which belongs to the Islamic Cultural Center of Italy, Italy’s oldest Muslim organization; it is the only mosque to have a special recognition as “ente di culto” (entity for religious worship). All Islamic centers function as places of worship and have sites for libraries, Quranic schools and bookstores [2].
Cultural Aspects of Islam and Islamism in Italy
There is no general culture of a global jihad movement among Italian Muslims, which likely can be attributed to the fact that Islam in Italy is not monolithic since no one ethnic group predominates. While groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and a few foreign imams have given verbal and spiritual support to violent jihadi groups, most Muslim organizations do not espouse militant Islam. However, the exportation to Italy of new forms of Islamist movements and ideologies, especially Salafi Islamism, has introduced Middle Eastern and North African Islamist imams, their radical ideologies and their militant Islam activities. This new brand of Salafism, coined Salafi-Jihadis by the French scholar Gilles Kepel, exhorts Muslims to engage in jihad. These “new” ideologies, coupled with the allure of defending the plight of the global ummah, have begun to alter the cultural reference points for Italian Muslims. These subtle exogenous factors, combined with various indigenous cultural characteristics that this author defines as “Cultural Variables,” appear to be transforming traditional cultural reference points for Italian Muslims, which could lead to an increased attraction to Islamism.
Existing empirical research on Islam in Italy demonstrates that the process of Islamization in Italy has increased since the early 1990s, while simultaneously younger generations of Italian Muslims have become more oriented toward socio-religious perspectives and positions versus the more traditional socio-economic platforms of the first generation [3]. Sociological studies demonstrate that for the majority of Muslims, the sense of not being represented at the national level increases their sense of “vulnerability,” and they thus look to alternative sources of authority who can better protect their religious and socio-economic interests—unfortunately, organizations such as Union of Muslim Students in Italy, which are influenced by Wahhabi tendencies and are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, are filling this void. Some of the cultural variables affecting attitudes and behavior among Italian Muslims include: a sense of social inclusion; a sense of alienation due to negative Italian media attitudes toward Muslims; increasing Salafi and Wahhabi influences in make-shift mosques and the power of foreign Islamist imams; internet sites that exhort Muslims to support the global jihad against the infidel; and, the diffused meaning of Muslim identification when ethnicity no longer matters as it did for the first generation—ethnicity is now global and they think and act globally as opposed to locally. Sociological and political studies of mosques, the imams preaching in mosques and Muslim families indicate that these cultural variables are prominently manifested in the sermons of radical imams seeking to influence the attitudes and behavior of young Italian Muslims.
Looking to the Future
Since the September 11 attacks, Muslims have felt pressure to declare their rejection of radical Islam and to adhere to European values. The interaction between Muslim immigrants from diverse countries, cultures and ideologies could facilitate the robustness of the doctrine of jihadi views: if the sense of alienation stemming from social difficulties (unemployment, living in a “foreign” society such as Italy) in individual ethnic Muslim communities in Italy were to accentuate, one could see the development of minorities of disaffected Muslim youth (male and female) accepting Islamist ideas, especially that of the “non-territorial Islamic state” espoused by Islamist groups and al-Qaeda. It is unclear to what extent the appeal of new radical trends is resonating within ethnic Muslim communities, such as Salafi Islamism, but this is an area that bears serious research. Certainly, the continuing absence of a unified/centralized Islamic leadership is not helpful to this situation. Italian journalist Magdi Allam alluded to this problem in his 2002 book, “Bin Laden in Italy: Travels in Radical Islam,” in which he identifies several personalities that he defines as Islamist (such as the director of the Union of Islamic Communities in Italy, or UCOII, as well as the imams of the Turin, Milan, Bologna and Naples mosques) and their radical impact on Italian Muslims.
Intra-ethnic tensions, which already play out in the competition between various Islamic and Islamist organizations, could cause a splintering between groups and their followers. Although Arab and South Asian Muslim organizations and influences are nowhere as prevalent as they are in the United Kingdom, the appearance of new groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, should be studied. Moreover, the strengthening of Muslim Brotherhood organizations and ideologies is something to be observed. Organizational rivalries are evident in the emergence of two types of Islam, each of which has its adherents: an Islam of the mosques (organizations such as UCOII, which represents numerous Islamic mosques throughout Italy), and Islam of the “state” (the ICI in Milan, and other mosques that receive foreign state funding from Saudi Arabia). The friction between Islam of the mosques and Islam of the “state” is that those mosques that receive foreign state funding tend to have a fundamentalist orientation, such as toward Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood—this tension is visible in the politics of each Muslim organization [4].
Conclusion
The existence of Salafi networks and cells, and their proven connections to other cells throughout Europe, are in and of themselves worrisome because they could not exist without a minimum amount of sympathy and support from the general population in which they live and operate. Perugia, like Turin and other cities, can be viewed as a laboratory in which competing ideologies (reform Islam vs. Salafi Islamism) are playing out. Deeper studies should explore the context in which immigration might be inducing an Islamist shift and the underpinnings of religious belonging.
Notes
1. Author interview with Lorenzo Vidino, 2007.
2. For a descriptive narrative of mosques and Islamic centers in Italy, please refer to Stefano Allievi’s, “Islam Italiano; Viaggio Nella Seconda Religione del Paese.”
3. Guolo, Renzo, “Xenofobi e Xenofili – Italiani e L’Islam,” Editori Laterza, 2003; Saint Blancat, Chantal, “Why are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, November 2005.
4. Negri, Augusto Tino; Introvigne, Silvia Scaranari; Berzano, Luigi, and Guolo, Renzo, “Musulmani in Piemonte: in moschea, al lavoro, nel contesto sociale,” Guerini e Associati, Milano, 2005.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373623
RAND | Research Areas | Terrorism and Homeland Security ...
The voices of jihad are numerous, varied, and constantly evolving. ...
By
compiling the Voices of Jihad Database and making it available to the
public, ...
http://192.5.14.110/research_areas/terrorism/database/
[check out the Rand Database, interesting, needs digging into,
granny]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904790/posts
Did A’jad predict Armageddon at the UN?
American Thinker ^ | 10-01-07 | James Lewis
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:00:49 AM PDT by Renfield
This will sound alarming. A literal reading of Ahmadi-Nejad’s UN address suggests that he is predicting a total war coming soon.
The key is in his invocation and his conclusion. Normal official communications by Muslims start with, “In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.” A’jad followed that formula immediately with:
“Oh God, hasten the arrival of Imam Al-Mahdi and grant him good health and victory and make us his followers and those who attend to his rightfulness.” [italics in the official Iranian version]
Sounds like a pretty standard invocation, but it’s not. It is a specific call for the Shiite Messiah, who will bring a final holy war, the final jihad, which in the Khomeini cult implies all-out war with the infidels to bring about the Millenarian Age of Paradise on Earth. (For Khomeini, the term “infidels” includes Sunni Muslims, who do not recognize the Mahdi). That is why Khomeini started the nuclear program twenty years ago, and why it has been pushed consistently by all the major cult leaders.
A’jad put the message explicitly in his peroration, i.e., his summary and conclusion.
continued.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904793/posts
University of Memphis Football Player Fatally Shot(School in lockdown. Monday classes canceled.)
Fox News ^ | October 01, 2007 | staff
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:10:42 AM PDT by kellynla
A student at the University of Memphis was fatally shot late Sunday on the campus of the school.
Authorities did not immediately release the victim’s name, but said he was shot in the chest and was pronounced dead a short time later at the Regional Medical Center.
Second thread with updates:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1904842/posts
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904804/posts
Grambling State probes lab school’s noose lesson
2theadvocate.com ^ | 10/01/07 | AP
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:42:45 AM PDT by TornadoAlley3
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904819/posts
Head of IAEA Defies Criticism on Iran
AP via NYT ^ | September 29, 2007 | Staff
Posted on 10/01/2007 6:13:56 AM PDT by Schnucki
VIENNA, Austria - Criticized by the U.S. but backed by other world powers, chief U.N. nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei is walking a fine line in trying to cajole Iran into revealing past nuclear secrets.
Since wresting a promise from Tehran in July to clear up its nuclear record by year’s end, ElBaradei — head of the International Atomic Energy Agency — has been vilified as pro-Tehran, and accused of overstepping his authority.
continued.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904823/posts
Muslim group touts local political clout
Washington Times ^ | October 1, 2007 | Audrey Hudson
Posted on 10/01/2007 6:18:36 AM PDT by 3AngelaD
How much political power does the Muslim American Society wield?....”Ask Jim Webb what kind of impact we have. Ask the governor of Virginia...,” Mahdi Bray, the Muslim American Society’s executive director told The Washington Times...
The Muslim American Society (MAS) claims credit for helping Jim Webb, Democrat, defeat incumbent Republican Sen. George Allen in 2006...MAS said it has registered 65,000 voters in Virginia since the 2005 gubernatorial race, and most of them backed Mr. Webb...
“The Democrat’s win hinged on the Muslim vote,” Mr. Bray said during interviews about the organization’s political activities planned for upcoming elections...
On Thursday, however, the clout established by MAS was put to a political test. The appointment last month of MAS President Esam S. Omeish to Mr. Kaine’s immigration commission was suddenly withdrawn after Steve Emerson, of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, posted videos on YouTube showing the Northern Virginia surgeon making references to the “Israeli war machine” and the “Jihad way.”
Mr. Kaine asked for his resignation, and Dr. Omeish complied...He said that he did not wish to interfere with the committee’s duties, but later blamed the fracas on a religiously motivated “smear campaign.”
According to other Muslim leaders, the dust-up probably will lead MAS to shift the focus of its political clout, although it isn’t clear what the overall effect will be on its efforts to register thousands of voters nationwide and to recruit future policy-makers and politicians from within its ranks.
“The fiasco associated with the appointment and resignation of Dr. Esam Omeish may actually empower MAS more within their own limited activist Islamist community because it allows them to trump up their victimization agenda even more,” said Zuhdi Jasser, a physician and president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy....
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtontimes.com ...