Posted on 08/25/2007 2:26:58 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Lowry: The CIA's record leading up to Sept. 11 was one of failure By Rich Lowry Article Last Updated: 08/25/2007 09:07:06 AM MDT
The new report from the CIA's inspector general about the spy agency's pre-9/11 failings could be titled, ''What We Did During Our Holiday From History.'' The stretch between the end of the Cold War and the Sept. 11 attacks was supposed to be a shiny new era of globalized peace and prosperity, to which an intelligence service was considered quaintly irrelevant.
The CIA conformed to the zeitgeist by remaining quaintly irrelevant. George Tenet presided over the agency, failing his way to the second-longest tenure of any director of central intelligence, a Presidential Medal of Freedom and a $4 million book advance. He made the Peter Principle work for him not just by advancing to his level of incompetence, but by benefiting from it handsomely.
Congressional Democrats pushed for the release of the scathing IG report, completed back in June 2005, to embarrass the Bush administration. But most of the failures identified in the report took place during the Clinton administration, which set the CIA's skewed priorities and selected Tenet in the first place. President Bush should be embarrassed only because he didn't fire Tenet upon taking office or after 9/11, while Bush also has failed to undertake a serious retooling of the sclerotic bureaucracy that is the CIA.
Tenet took terrorism seriously, ''sounding the alarm about the threat to many different audiences,'' in the words of the report. Maybe he should have gone on a lecture tour. Where Tenet fell down was in managing his agency. The thought may be father to the deed, but without the actual deed, the thought is only political cover in after-the-fact memoirs.
Tenet insists that he had a ''robust plan'' against al-Qaida. In reality, he only thought he had. He directed that such a plan be formulated, but according to the IG report, it never happened. Worse, Tenet did not ''work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities.''
In Tenet's defense, he operated within the context of a Clinton administration that basically was uninterested in intelligence. Tenet notes that the intelligence community lost 25 percent of its personnel in the 1990s and ''tens of billions of dollars in investment compared with the 1990 baseline.'' He implored the administration for funding increases in 1998 and 1999, but had to go ''outside established channels to work with then-Speaker Gingrich to obtain a $1.2 billion budgetary supplemental.''
Even with more resources, his managers repeatedly moved funds from counterterrorism programs to other needs, without ever raiding other programs to fund counterterrorism, according to the IG report. What could be more important than counterterrorism? Analytic resources were poured into addressing more pressing matters like the Balkans and the environment.
After 9/11, Clinton officials and Tenet argued whether the CIA had been granted the authority to kill Osama bin Laden, with the Clintonites, in a bout of retrospective bloodlust, insisting that it had. The IG report finds that restrictions on the CIA killing bin Laden had been ''arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed'' for a brief period in late 1998 and early 1999 (how Clintonian). But CIA managers refused ''to take advantage of the ambiguities,'' and even if they had, the agency didn't have the covert-action capability to kill bin Laden. Such was life during history's holiday.
What's more scandalous is how the CIA has escaped serious reform even today. Two CIA directors in a row have resisted the IG report's recommendation for an accountability board to evaluate the pre-9/11 performance of CIA officials. That word - not ''board,'' but ''accountability'' - raises hackles at Langley, where everyone is above-average at fighting al-Qaida. Even though as many as 60 CIA employees knew that two of the hijackers were in the U.S. before 9/11 and no one managed to get the word to the FBI, CIA Director Michael Hayden thinks holding anyone accountable for that or other failures would be ''distracting.'' And so the band plays on.
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
GIMF Develops Defensive and Offensive Software for Jihadi Operations
By Abdul Hameed Bakier
In July 2007, jihadi forums announced the creation of a new computer program called the Secrets of the Mujahideen, version 1.0. The objective of the program—which was published and distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) through many jihadi websites—is to replace the old and unreliable PGP corporation encryption tools that jihadis had used in the past. Since the release of the program, jihadi websites, especially the GIMF, are instructing their subscribers to communicate using the program’s encryption keys (http://ebnseren.modawanati.com, March 22). Furthermore, al-Qaeda operatives are using Secrets of the Mujahideen in an attempt to avoid U.S. eavesdropping operations against them (http://el-bilad.com, July 6).
Separately, and on the offensive front, jihadi hackers have also invented their own programs to steal data off other computers, part of a larger “Electronic Jihad.” Some of the Islamic hackers’ targets are computers attached to cameras transmitting live videos from intersections and other busy areas. They claim that these videos can be used to case potential targets.
This article will elucidate the documentation of the Secrets of the Mujahideen, in addition to providing information on the ongoing Electronic Jihad.
The Secrets of the Mujahideen
The GIMF claims that the development of the Secrets of the Mujahideen started years ago to replace PGP encryption programs that apparently have multiple security breaches. According to the GIMF, the new program relies on the “highest standards” attained by encryption science, digital communication engineering and source codes developed after studying research published by the best encryption scientists.
According to the program’s documentation, it is the first Islamic software that offers the highest level of 2048-bit asymmetric and 256-bit symmetric encryption. The program combines the highest level of data compression and uses a new technique call the “stealth cipher” that permits the program to change the random encryption algorithm every time a file is encrypted. The program uses five different algorithms. Furthermore, the program explains how encryption keys are managed and how the software creates files.
The Secrets of the Mujahideen’s characteristics include: encryption using the best five algorithms in cryptography, also known as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); strong symmetric 256-bit encryption keys; asymmetric 2048-bit encryption keys; Zlib software library used for data compression; stealth cipher technique that uses variant keys and algorithms; cipher auto-detection; file shredder without possible retrieval of deleted files; single file program that does not require setup and can run from a flash card.
Keys Management and Program Options
In cryptography, keys management is the art of inventing secret keys and distributing them to the relevant parties. Keys management must contain security protocols that generate, exchange, store, safeguard and replace old or compromised secret keys to ensure protection of data.
Therefore, keys are the first important element in cryptography. The jihadi program illustratively explains, in-depth, the different stages of public and private key generation. The program generates two types of keys after the user chooses a username and a pass phrase for the two keys. One key is called the public key, which is the one the users exchange in the jihadi forums and use for ciphering, and the second is called the private key, which is used for deciphering. Both keys have the extension “.AkF” (Acrobat Key File). Depending on the strength of the computer’s microprocessor, the program takes 2-5 minutes to generate the two encryption keys. The keys are automatically saved in the main folder and imported to the active database.
Separately, there are a number of other features included with the program, such as:
File Compression: The user can choose the degree of selected file compression prior to data encryption. Users are advised to use high compression in text files and low compression in large audio files because the latter is already compressed. The program has 1,000-fold compression capability for text files.
File Shredder: According to the program, the user can shred files up to 10 times making it impossible to retrieve them with any currently available software.
Ciphering Files Using a Public Key: Once the needed file and recipient user ID are selected, clicking on the “encrypt” button will automatically determine the decryption key for the recipient. Additionally, if the “stealth cipher” is selected, the encryption algorithm is randomly chosen; otherwise, the user can choose from five types of encryption algorithms.
Deciphering Using a Private Key: Once the ciphered file, using a public key with the extension “.enc,” is received, the recipient simply presses decrypt and enters his or her password phrase. Thereafter, the program produces a decrypted file with the extension “.dec.” The software recommends that the pass phrase be between 20-36 characters long.
The GIMF, which designed the Secrets of the Mujahideen, assures forum users that the program is a secure way of communicating over the internet because it uses all globally used symmetric encryption techniques with the distinct feature of stealth encryption using five algorithms. The capability of the file shredder in the program is also essential because the first step security forces take when they confiscate jihadis’ computers is to retrieve and undelete every possible piece of data that might have been on the computers.
Software Files
After activating the program, the following additional files are created by the program:
AsrarKeys.db: an encrypted database that contains the active keys inserted in the program. This file is created automatically after program activation where the keys are inserted using the “import key” feature from the file manager.
Asrar.ini: this file holds user settings and is created only if the users choose to change the default settings.
Publicxxxxxxxx.akf: holds the public key and privateyyyyyyyy.akf for the private key. Both files are created after generating the “key pair.”
According to the GIMF, the Secrets of the Mujahideen is a high-level encryption tool that outperforms other internationally used symmetric encryption software. Finally, GIMF dedicates the software to global al-Qaeda operations and mentions 11 more Salafi-Jihadi groups operating inside and outside Iraq. The dedication states: “This program is dedicated to all those who stood up and raised the ummah’s head against the demon soldiers, the Jews and crusaders, and their Islam-grudging Shiite allies.”
The Electronic Jihad
On the offensive front, jihadi users are exchanging computer programs that they claim are designed to hack into enemy computer systems to obtain intelligence or inflict economic damage. One such program used for these purposes is al-Mojahid al-Electroni. The program was created by an Islamist nicknamed al-Aqrab al-Aswasd (Black Scorpion), and it appears as “actskn43.ocx” and works on Windows XP and 98 systems. The program, Islamists claim, can take screen shots of hacked computers; steal passwords; record all typed material; and fully control the victim’s files. Furthermore, they claim that the program is undetectable and destroys anti-virus programs.
Another jihadi forum user, nicknamed Qaheer al-Fors, posted a search phrase (intitle:liveapplet inurl:LvAppl) that helps locate many cameras connected to the internet in different countries. Even though these cameras can be easily accessed by ordinary internet users, taking interest in the video feeds and the details of the places they are mounted at is an indication of the mujahideen’s future intentions. Al-Fors says, “by virtue of God, I was able to bring you the codes that you can use to watch some countries in the world through the cameras, those countries mounted to servile people,” but he does not include these codes in his post. It is possible, however, that al-Fors passed these codes through encrypted e-mails using Secrets of the Mujahideen (http://hanein.info, July 20, 2006).
Although al-Fors did not specify the countries where he claims to have hacked into their public cameras, a forum moderator nicknamed al-fedayee (The Commando) posted active links to cameras in Israel. The cameras are for traffic purposes and can be accessed via the links al-Fedayee posted, some of which are cameras mounted in Israel’s Herzliya intersection, Shalom intersection, Holon intersection and eight others (http://hanein.info, July 20). Al-Fedayee says, “Mujahideen, as you do in your jihad against the occupying Zionists, here we are presenting you with this simple gift that was a personal effort to transmit to you live feeds from the Occupied Territories. After hard work, almighty God helped us in penetrating the internal system of the Zionist traffic ministry. We call upon you to take the needed measures and benefit from it because the enemy will soon change the codes of these cameras.” The posting is signed, “Your brother, the son of Aladamia. A gift from the great Iraqi sons to those stationed in the battle fields of Palestine.”
Conclusion
Almost all jihadi websites and forums devote whole sections to computer and internet information. These sections include many different computer programs downloaded from legal websites, cracked and made available for jihadi brothers for free. Certainly, the jihadis concentrate on internet secure communication and hacking programs.
Regardless of the accuracy of the mujahideen’s cyber competence claims, the labeling of internet violations as “jihad” is attracting some Muslim internet users to join the so-called Electronic Jihad. Although few forum users question the ability of this particular Electronic Jihad software, Islamic forum users almost unanimously approve intrusion attempts against Western websites. The perseverance and continuous efforts of Islamic forum members to harm Western internet-based interests could, inevitably, mount to a serious threat in the future.
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http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373681
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Origins of the Niger Delta’s Deewell and Deebam Militias
By Bestman Wellington
Since January 2006, violence in Nigeria’s delta region escalated dramatically as various militant groups and violent confraternities kidnapped Western energy workers in order to call attention to their political grievances. Most recently, kidnappings have begun to take on a more criminal nature, with kidnap-for-ransom schemes plaguing the delta region. While there are many groups involved in these activities, two of the delta’s most notorious cult groups are suspected of engaging in the acts: Deebam and Deewell. These two rival cult groups originated in the 1990s when established confraternities in the Niger Delta created street and creek wings to consolidate their territorial control. Today, both Deebam and Deewell remain responsible for much of the violence in the delta.
Origins of Deebam
Deebam was created in 1991 as a street/creek wing of the Klansmen Konfraternity (KK), a group also called the Eternal Fraternal Order of the Legion Konsortium. In the KK’s parlance, Deebam means “Be Strong.” KK was founded at the University of Calabar in Cross River State in 1983 by five students (The Midweek Telegraph, August 10-16, 2005; Terrorism Monitor, July 6). The first leader of Deebam was the late Onengieofori Terika, popularly called “Occasion Boy.” In Deebam’s terminology, he was known as “Teetan the Great,” or “Teetan the Giant,” meaning the group’s chief. Members who are undergraduate students at universities are called Klansmen and belong to the KK, whereas Deebam is strictly for the street/creek members. There is, however, an organic link between the university-based KK and the street/creek wing Deebam [1].
Deebam has a more formidable and clear leadership structure than its Deewell rival. This is because the initiation into Deebam is extremely tough and membership dues and contributions are high, explaining why many Deebam cultists take to organized crime such as commercial election rigging and other vices to meet their membership obligations. Their membership obligation is approximately 100 naira per month, unless there is an emergency when more money may be demanded [2]. Deewell, on the other hand, relies more on support from politicians and others who are part of their patronage network.
Occasion Boy, the first leader of Deebam, hailed from Bukuma in the Degema Local Government Area of Rivers State. Under him, the group expanded and attracted membership. He was killed on October 9, 2003 when he led scores of his Deebam combatants to take over Tombia, a neighboring community a few kilometers away, and was shot dead by heavily armed Deewell and Icelander cultists. After the death of Occasion Boy, Kingsley Akogu, popularly called “King,” took over the group’s leadership. His tenure was short. He was arrested by security operatives from a brothel in Port Harcourt and taken to the city’s cemetery where he was shot dead. He hailed from Omoku community in the Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State.
Ichechi Iwaka, popularly called “Angel,” took over the leadership of Deebam after the murder of King. Before Owaka’s emergence, his group was already estranged from the state government at the same time that Mujahid Dokubo-Asari was estranged from Rivers State Governor Dr. Peter Odili. Asari decided to leave the Ijaw Youth Council and start the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). Owaka’s Deebam and Dokubo’s NDPVF then forged a common alliance to confront Ateke Tom and his Icelander/Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV)—and by extension the state government whom they accused of funding Ateke’s group to eliminate them. Owaka’s reign was characterized by intense armed insurrection against the state and its agents. He was killed when the military invaded Ogbakiri in June 2004.
Under Owaka’s leadership, Deebam’s headquarters was moved from Tombia in the Degema Local Government Area to Ogbakiri in the Emuoha Local Government Area, all in Rivers State. The purpose of the move was to find a safer area to conduct their activities and to practice their religious rituals [3]. After the death of Owaka, Prince Igodo, the president of the Tombia Youth Council, emerged as the head of Deebam. Even after the death of Angel, Deebam was still working with Asari’s group until November 2005 when disagreements deepened between the cult group and the NDPVF over the share of money accruable from the disarmament program initiated by the Rivers State and federal governments in 2005. Deebam went their separate ways from Dokubo’s NDPVF, while one of the NDPVF commanders, Prince Farah Ipallibo, also broke away from NDPVF and founded a small but dreaded group called the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF).
On May 29, 2007, Igodo and hordes of his Deebam loyalists were shot dead in Tombia by a team composed of the NDSF, led by Ipallibo, Soboma George’s Outlaws and Deewell. During the last elections in April 2007, the state government had allegedly given large sums of money ranging from 10 to 50 million naira to Soboma to mobilize other armed groups to ensure the victory of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the state. Igodo and others who also worked for the party in the Okrika axis felt unhappy, and wanted to cause some violence during the May 29 handover ceremony, perhaps to attract government attention to get their part of the largesse (The Midweek Telegraph, June 6-12). The plan leaked to Soboma and his allies, who were practically working for Governor Celestine Omehia because during the ceremony the new governor had also given some money to Soboma to maintain “peace” and “order” [4]. Therefore, when they had heard about Igodo’s plan, they went into action to eliminate Igodo and his combatants [5]. Since Igodo’s death, no new leader of Deebam has been appointed or elected by the group. After his burial, Deebam cultists have said that a new leader will be appointed by early 2008.
In spite of police and military raids on Deebam’s hideouts, they still have many areas they control, especially in Rivers State. They control large parts of the Ogoni area [6]. They are also in control of all of Emuoha Local Government Area because Deebam’s headquarters is in Ogbakiri, which is located in Emuoha. They also control much of Degema Local Government Area, especially places like Tombia and Bukuma. In Port Harcourt, they are in charge of the majority of the slums, such as Njemanze and Gambia [7]. Since they were the first street gang to emerge in Rivers State, their territory is much larger than Deewell’s. They are in almost all of the Local Government Areas of the state and in remote villages [8]. In Bayelsa, they dominate Local Government Areas like Ogbia and Yenogoa, especially. They are also in Delta State and Akwa Ibom and Cross River states. It is estimated that they can call on more than 700 active members.
Origins of Deewell
Deewell, also called the Junior Vikings Confraternity (JVC), was founded in the mid-1990s as a rival to Deebam. The group was conceived as a street/creek wing of the Supreme Vikings Confraternity (SVC), also known as De Norsemen Club of Nigeria, which itself was founded in 1984 at the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State by a history student (Terrorism Monitor, July 6). The word “Deewell” in the SVC’s terminology means “Be Well.” The group was founded as a secret street cult meant for those who were not university students. The group made its dramatic debut around a squalid neighborhood on the southeastern edges of Port Harcourt called Diobu. In its early days, members were involved in petty street brawls for supremacy and territorial control using broken bottles, machetes and short, locally-created guns called Akwas.
In its early days, those who joined the group were red-eyed, hardened petty criminals who had a penchant for violence. There is no record that clearly defines the structure, leadership and names of those who joined the group from its inception. The cult group is neither anti-government nor a rebel group. A lot of unemployed youth and school dropouts embraced Deewell, but it was weak militarily and could not compete violently with its rival, Deebam. Worried by the impotence of Deewell despite the resources invested on it by its parent body, the SVC, who felt that they should control most of Rivers State, began an initiative to form a new group called the Icelander (German) [9]. The Icelander was formed and handed over to Ateke Tom to head [10].
The creation of Ateke Tom’s the Icelander helped to consolidate Deewell. The two groups shared much in common, from their attire, communication codes, initiation rites and general behavior. Many Deewell members fought for Icelander during reprisal attacks from Deebam after the Icelander’s creation. On October 9, 2003, Mr. Owei, a school teacher, and Damiete Rowland, who led the Deewell as head and deputy respectively in Tombia, in alliance with Ateke Tom and his Icelander shot dead Occasion Boy, the first leader of Deebam, during one of their violent struggles for supremacy and territorial control. Nevertheless, Deewell and Icelander were later forced out and Deebam occupied the area.
The founding of the Outlaws, a splinter group of Icelander led by Soboma George, Tom Ateke’s former second-in-command, also added another feather to the violent cap of Deewell. The Outlaws was founded in 2005 as a secret street gang (The Midweek Telegraph, February 7-13). Whether Deewell, Icelander or the Outlaws, their pattern of initiations and other activities are the same and are derived from that of the SVC, their parent body. Like in the case of the Outlaws, many Deewell cultists also double as Outlaws fighters. The Outlaws has also been supporting Deewell with weapons, funds and men to acquire or regain new territories [11].
In Rivers State, Deewell controls the following areas: much of the southern axis of Port Harcourt comprising the old Port Harcourt township; parts of the slum Diobu; some areas of the Emuoha Local Government Area; northeastern parts of Port Harcourt; the entire area called Ken-Khana Kingdom; the heart of Ogoniland, southeast of Port Harcourt; and locations such as Harry’s Town in the Degema Local Government Area. Overall, although Deewell is most formidable in Rivers State, it has members in Bayelsa and Delta states.
The actual numbers of the group can not be determined, but in some villages where they exist they have more than 100 members. For example, in Bane in the Khana Local Government Area of Rivers State there are over 120 members of the cult group. Overall, it is estimated that Deewell has some 400 active members, which makes it smaller than Deebam.
Conclusion
The cult related violence in the delta will continue because the menace is now endemic. Yet, the groups will shrink and aspiring members will be discouraged from joining if the Nigerian government at all levels demonstrates sincerity and transparency in democratic governance, sustainable peace initiatives and provisions of basic social amenities and infrastructure for the population, especially in the Niger Delta region.
Notes
1. Comparing and contrasting Deebam and its parent body, the KK, is an internal analysis by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), Ogale-Nchia, Eleme, Rivers State, January 2006.
2. Author interview with Michael Okoro, a deck officer of Deebam, in Rivers State on September 20, 2007.
3. Author interview with Prince Igodo, October 1, 2004.
4. Author interviews with Ateke Tom on August 10, 2007 and Cynthia Whyte of the Joint Revolutionary Council.
5. Author interview with Boniface Paago, a leader of Deebam in Bodocity community in the Gokana Local Government Area, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, August 30, 2007.
6. The Guardian, July 21, 2006. Also, see “The Bodo War of Attrition: A Brief Paper on the Bodo-Ogoni Cult Crises,” a report issued by the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), July 31, 2006.
7. Author interview with Boniface Paago, a leader of Deebam in Bodocity community in the Gokana Local Government Area, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, August 30, 2007.
8. Ibid.
9. Author interview with Osaro, one of the estranged commanders of Icelander, Diobu, Port Harcourt, April 30, 2005.
10. Ibid.
11. Author interview, anonymous Deewell officer, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, January 29, 2007.
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http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373682
Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives – Part 1
By Gregory D. Johnsen
In mid-September, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh issued a stern warning to the Wa’ilah tribe in northern Yemen: turn over the six al-Qaeda suspects you are sheltering or face serious repercussions (al-Wasat, September 12). The six men that Saleh believes have found refuge with the tribe near the Saudi border are the remnants of a group of 23 prisoners that escaped from a Yemeni political security prison on February 3, 2006. The prisoners escaped by tunneling out of their cell and into a neighboring mosque, which has since been detailed in a lengthy narrative written by one of the escapees and published by the Yemeni paper al-Ghad. The escapees included a number of prominent al-Qaeda militants, among whom were individuals convicted of carrying out attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002.
Six of these suspects have since been killed in clashes with Yemeni or U.S. forces, 11 have either turned themselves back in to authorities or have been recaptured and six of the suspects remain at large. Many of these individuals have continued to fight for al-Qaeda since their escape, and one of them, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, has since been named the new head of Al-Qaeda in Yemen.
Despite differences of age and background, the 23 men who were being held in the cell were linked together through shared experiences. Nearly half of the escapees, 11, were born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents. Several of the men were arrested in late 2002 after a series of bombings in Sanaa and Marib. Seven of these men were part of a 15-man cell that was later charged with planning to attack five foreign embassies as well as to assassinate the then U.S. Ambassador Edmund Hull. Three of the men were convicted of being part of an 11-man cell that was charged with plotting to carry out attacks in Yemen and abroad. Among the escapees, there are also two sets of brothers, Hizam and Arif Mujali and Mansur and Zakariya al-Bayhani, who are themselves brothers of Ghalib and Tawfiq al-Bayhani, who are currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay. Two other escapees, Qasim al-Raymi and Fawaz al-Rabay’I, also have brothers in Guantanamo.
This two-part series presents a biographical sketch of each escapee, along with his current status.
The Dead
Umar Sayd Hasan Jarallah (1979-2006): Jarallah was from the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. Jarallah was also known as Abdullah al-Gharib and Ibn Hafiz. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 2005 for his role in the attack on the Limburg. Along with al-’Umda, Huwaydi and Zayd, Jarallah was hidden for one month following their escape by Muhammad Hajir (22nd May, April 29). He killed himself along with Ahmad Muhamad al-Abiyad in a failed suicide attack on an oil facility in Marib on September 15, 2006. One guard was killed in the attack on the Safir facility (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 21, 2006).
Shafiq Ahmad Umar Zayd (?-2006): Zayd was born in Saudi Arabia to Yemeni parents and is known by the kunya Abu Abdullah. He was extradited to Yemen from Saudi Arabia along with two other individuals in 2003. He was part of an 11-man cell, which was charged with forging passports, weapons and explosives possession, planning to travel to Iraq and forming an armed gang to carry out attacks in Yemen. Along with Mansur al-Bayhani and Abdullah al-Wada’i, he was convicted only of forging passports. Ibrahim al-Muqri, who was part of the same trial, was cleared of all charges (Yemen Times, March 24-27, 2005). All of the men, however, remained in prison until they managed to escape in February 2006. As was mentioned above, Zayd was sheltered by Muhammad Hajir for one month following his escape. He killed himself along with Hashim Khalid al-’Iraqi in a failed suicide attack on an oil port in Hadramawt on September 15, 2006.
Fawaz Yahya Hasan al-Rabay’i (1979-2006): Al-Rabay’i was born in Saudi Arabia, the third of four brothers and four sisters (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). He is also known by the kunya Furqan al-Tajayki (al-Ghad, October 2006). He attended al-Falah school in Saudi Arabia, where he learned to recite the Quran. Along with nearly one million Yemenis, the family was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1990 as a result of Yemen’s support for Saddam Hussein following his invasion of Kuwait. His mother is known as Umm Hasan, after her oldest son. Hasan is a bus driver with six children. According to his family, Hasan is no longer close to them, as he was arrested on two separate occasions in order to put pressure on his younger brothers. Hasan complained that his brothers were trouble makers, and that when he was in jail his children went hungry.
The second brother, Abu Bakr, is currently awaiting sentencing in Yemen for his role in a series of al-Qaeda plots. The youngest brother, Salman, is being held by the United States in Guantanamo Bay (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). According to his father, he was sent to Afghanistan by his family to search for Fawaz, and was subsequently arrested and turned over to the United States. His father denies that either Abu Bakr or Salman have any links to al-Qaeda (News Yemen, October 9, 2006).
During the late 1990s, al-Rabay’i took a job in the personnel department in the presidential office in Yemen. In early 2000, he traveled to Afghanistan with two other men, including a former agent in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). Like many young men who head off to fight in Afghanistan or Iraq, al-Rabay’i did not tell his family where he was going. Later, he called his father, Yahya, to tell him that he was in Afghanistan. The family claims that they knew nothing of his activities in Afghanistan, although he did mention to his father that his salary contradicted Islamic law and that his goal was to die as a martyr (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). According to one source, al-Rabay’i trained with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (al-Ghad, October 2006). He is also known to have spent time with at least two of the September 11 hijackers, Muhammad Atta and Zayd Jarah (al-Ghad, October 2006).
Al-Rabay’i spent one year in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen in 2001, as the head of a 12-man cell (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). In 2002, the United States asked Yemen to arrest him on the suspicion of belonging to al-Qaeda. He escaped security forces two separate times that year before finally being captured in 2003. In August, he managed to escape a raid on his house in Sanaa dressed only in his pajamas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 2, 2006). The raid did result in the death of one member of his cell, Samir al-Hada’. He also escaped from a security checkpoint, when the car he and Hizam Mujali were traveling in was stopped in the southern governorate of Abyan. Instead of allowing their car to be searched, the two shot one of the two soldiers, Hamid Khasruf, manning the checkpoint and fled (Yemen Times, April 7-13, 2004). The pair was later arrested in March 2003 in Marib (BBC, April 5, 2003). During the time that al-Rabay’i was on the run, he was sheltered by different tribes in Marib and Abyan.
On August 30, 2004, al-Rabay’i was sentenced to 10 years in prison for attacking a Hunt Oil helicopter in November 2002, which was reportedly done with the authorization of Abu Ali al-Harithi (Yemen Times, May 31-June 2, 2004). He was also fined 18.3 million Yemeni riyals, roughly $99,450, for his role in a 2002 attack on the Civil Aviation Authority building in Sanaa (News Yemen, October 1, 2006). Six months later, in February 2005, al-Rabay’i was again on trial for his role in the attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg, and for killing a soldier. The court sentenced him to death on these charges. During his trial, al-Rabay’i frequently alleged that he was being tortured by Yemeni security officers (Yemen Times, December 27-January 2, 2004-2005). He did, however, find time during his trial to arrange to be married to a daughter of Yahya Salih Mujali, the brother of Hizam and Arif (News Yemen, October 9, 2006).
Following his escape from the security prison in February 2006, he was charged with planning the dual suicide attacks in Marib and Hadramawt on September 15, 2006. This operation was partially funded by four million Saudi riyals that al-Rabay’i received from Bandar al-Akwa through Said al-’Akbar. Both al-Akwa and al-’Akbar are currently awaiting sentencing for their roles in the attack (22nd May, April 29). During this time, he also paid a visit to his father, Yahya, who was in the hospital. According to reports that surfaced after his death, al-Rabay’i did not wear a disguise when he made the visit (News Yemen, October 9, 2006). Al-Rabay’i was killed on October 1, 2006 along with Muhammad al-Daylami during an early morning shoot-out with Yemeni security forces in the Bani Hashish region just north of Sanaa. In a story about the escapees, the Yemeni newspaper al-Ghad mentioned that some sources claim that al-Rabay’i was murdered in “cold blood” after he surrendered himself to soldiers (al-Ghad, June 25). Security forces also arrested three individuals it claimed had assisted the pair (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 2, 2006).
Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Daylami (c.1978-2006): Al-Daylami was charged with participating in the November 2002 attack on a Hunt Oil helicopter, planning to attack five foreign embassies and a 2003 plot to assassinate Edmund Hull, the U.S. ambassador in Yemen. He was sentenced to five years in prison in February 2005. In October 2006, he was killed along with Fawaz al-Rabay’i in a shootout with Yemeni security forces in the region of Bani Hashish.
Yasir Nasir Ali al-Hamayqani (c.1978-2007): Al-Hamayqani was also known by the kunya Abu Khalid. He was charged with traveling to Iraq. Al-Hamayqani was killed in clashes with Yemeni security forces in the Sabah district of the southern governorate of Abyan on January 15 (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 17). According to a security official, al-Hamayqani was in possession of a machine gun and two hand grenades when he was surrounded by security forces. He managed to wound two officers before he was killed (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 17).
Mansur Nasir ‘Awadh al-Bayhani (1974-2007): Al-Bayhani was born in 1974 in the city of Tabuk in Saudi Arabia to a Yemeni migrant worker from al-Rida’a in the governorate of al-Baydha. He took his kunya, Abu ‘Assam al-Tabuki, from his boyhood home. Mansur’s brother, Zakariya, was also among the escapees. Additionally, both his older brother Tawfiq (1972) and his younger brother Ghalib (1980) are currently in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay. Al-Bayhani made his way to Afghanistan via Pakistan in the 1990s, where he joined the Taliban. Later that decade, he was part of Samir Salih Abdullah al-Suwaylim’s Arab brigade that fought in Chechnya against Russian forces. During their time in Chechnya, al-Suwaylim, who was better known as al-Khattab, was poisoned by Russian security forces, while al-Bayhani was wounded in the right eye. Following the death of Suwaylim, he traveled back to Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces, before returning to Saudi Arabia where he was arrested and extradited along with five companions, including his brother Zakariya, to Yemen.
Al-Bayhani was eventually brought to trial, along with 10 others, on charges of forging passports, weapons and explosives possession, planning to travel to Iraq and forming an armed gang to carry out attacks in Yemen. He was acquitted in March 2005 of all charges save for forging Saudi, Iraqi and Yemeni passports (Yemen Times, March 24-27, 2005). Shafiq ‘Umar and Abdullah al-Wada’i were also convicted of forging passports. Ibrahim al-Muqri, who was part of the same trial, was acquitted of all charges. All of the men, however, remained in prison until they managed to escape in February 2006. Al-Bayhani later turned himself in to Yemeni authorities, and was later released following a security guarantee. Mansur eventually made his way to Somalia, where he was killed in a U.S. naval strike by the USS Chafee on June 2, 2007.
** Part Two of this article will examine those suspects who have surrendered or were captured and those who are still at large.
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Volume 5, Issue 18 (September 27, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies
By Hassan Abbas
The government of President Pervez Musharraf is facing policy failure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province). A lethal combination of Musharraf’s political predicament and declining public support, a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army and the reluctance of soldiers deputed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily further exacerbates this impasse. Observing this, many militants associated with local Pakistani jihadi groups have moved to FATA to help their “brothers in arms” and benefit from the sanctuary. In the midst of this, election season is descending upon Pakistan and Musharraf’s survival prospects are diminishing. This dim scenario has consequences for Pakistan’s policy in the FATA region. Pakistan will predictably revert to “peace deals” in the short-term, leading to a lowering of the number of military checkpoints in the area (Daily Times, September 23). If history is any indicator, this will help Talibanization in the region and provide more opportunities to the ISI to indirectly support some Taliban commanders sympathetic to Pakistan’s objectives. Overall, this will likely reduce trouble in downtown Islamabad, but the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area will remain on fire.
Poor coordination between the Pakistani army and NATO/ISAF, Hamid Karzai’s failure to make Afghanistan a functional state and the abundance of drug money in southern Afghanistan are some of the important variables in this context. Additionally, Musharraf himself admits that the crisis in the area is increasingly turning out to be a Pashtun insurgency. However, the factors that “limit” Pakistan’s effective clampdown on all things Taliban in FATA remain linked to its fear about increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan if the Taliban are comprehensively defeated, and the lack of Pakistani public support for anything that appears to be done in pursuance of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. These perceptions significantly affect the morale of army commanders and soldiers operating in the region. Musharraf has largely failed to make a strong case to his people about the need for strong military action against the Taliban in FATA. He has often called this policy as being in the “national interest,” but has not convincingly explained how the army alone defines the national interest. More so, Pakistanis have seen the military defining such interests too often in the past with devastating effects for the state, and interpret Pakistan’s current fight against the Taliban in terms of succumbing to U.S. demands and interests.
With this backdrop in view, this analysis outlines what is happening today in each of the seven tribal agencies in FATA and what the implications are for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.
Bajaur Agency
Bajaur Agency overlooks Afghanistan’s Kunar province, where U.S. forces are battling al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri escaped the reportedly CIA-led attack at Damadola in Bajaur on January 13, 2006, while one of his close relatives was among the 18 killed. Damadola is considered a stronghold of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) units, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) has representation in parliament from Bajaur (Daily Times, February 13, 2006). Bajaur during the 1980s and 1990s was known as the “Poppy Kingdom,” and many Afghan refugee camps (functioning until 2005) were a source of pro-Taliban recruitment in the area.
In August this year, talks between the Taliban and a tribal jirga (supported by the Pakistani government) to improve the law and order situation in Bajaur failed as the Taliban wanted the government to first release some arrested militants (Daily Times, August 7). Trouble had broken out in the area with the news of the proposed construction of a U.S. helipad in Afghanistan’s Kunar province as the tribal leaders sympathetic to the Taliban framed it as a threat to Pakistan (Daily Times, June 17). The strength of the Taliban in the area can be gauged from two recent events: since July this year, they have successfully enforced Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday, which is the official weekly holiday (Daily Times, July 14); secondly, Abdul Ghani Marwat, who headed the government’s vaccination campaign in Bajaur, was killed in a bomb attack in February this year amid the Taliban-sponsored rumor that the Pakistani government-run polio vaccination drive was a U.S. plot to sterilize Muslim children (Daily Times, February 20). The rumor was so widespread (projected by Taliban fatwas) that, according to government estimates (which are always conservative), parents of around 24,000 children had refused to give them the polio vaccine (Daily Times, Feb 20).
Khyber Agency
Khyber Agency is the main artery connecting Peshawar to Kabul via the Khyber Pass. Today, many men are seen wearing traditional caps in the agency because of fear, as a local religious outfit sympathetic to the Taliban, Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam), has declared it binding on all men of the agency to wear caps. The leader of the group, Mangle Bagh, in his radio address last week issued this edict and announced that violators’ heads will be shaved and they will face a monetary fine (Statesman, September 22). It is pertinent to point out that there is a serious battle going on in the agency between Ansar-ul-Islam—led by Pir Saif ur Rahman—and Lashkar-i-Islam—led by Gul Maiden and Mufti Munir Shakir—since 2005-06 (Daily Times, November 17, 2006, April 1, 2006, December 3, 2006). Both factions have built their militias over the last few years and have entrenched themselves in castle-like strongholds. In essence, this is an intra-Sunni (Deobandi vs. Barelvi) war (Daily Times, March 30, 2006).
After banning music in the tribal areas, the local Taliban in Khyber Agency have also started fining taxi drivers and citizens Rs 500 (about $8) for listening to music cassettes in their cars (Daily Times, March 1). Also recently, militants started distributing pamphlets in Bara Bazaar in Khyber Agency saying that the “Taliban have finally reached Bara,” while warning that “if anyone tries to hinder our movement and activities, we will launch a holy war against them” (Mashriq, September 3).
In comparison to other tribal agencies, Khyber Agency (because of its proximity to Peshawar, the capital of the North-West Frontier Province) is more accessible to Pakistani government functionaries and some development work has been done in the area. For instance, in 2005, Stephen Hadley, the then adviser on national security to President Bush, inaugurated a primary school building project in Surkamar town of Khyber Agency that was financed by the U.S. and Japanese governments in collaboration with the FATA Secretariat (Daily Times, September 28, 2005). Conditions have changed for the worse since then. The extent of the writ of the state can be ascertained from the fact that around a dozen people were killed in June this year when the Taliban attacked the house of the Khyber Agency political agent, Syed Ameeruddin Shah (Daily Jang, June 1).
Kurram Agency
Surrounded by lofty mountains and Afghan territory on three sides, Kurram Agency is the second largest tribal region in FATA. Its headquarters is in Parachinar, just about 90 kilometers from Kabul. According to intelligence estimates, it was also the first geographical point where fleeing al-Qaeda members from Afghanistan landed after the September 11 attacks. Within Pakistan, the route to Kurram goes through Kohat district of the NWFP where permits are obtained to travel to Kurram. Many al-Qaeda militants had moved on to Kohat because Kurram Agency is widely known as pro-Northern Alliance because of its significant Shiite population—a factor that has impacted Taliban objectives in the agency negatively. Shiite-Sunni violence remains the hallmark of this agency, as pro-Taliban factions believe that the Shiites of the area are active against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Various peace jirgas were instituted to bring peace to the area, but without much success (Mashriq, April 14). In April 2007 alone, around 100 people were killed in sectarian clashes (Daily Times, April 28).
The government of Pakistan is planning to construct two small dams in the agency at a cost of 400 million rupees in fiscal year 2007-08 to improve the agricultural sector and thereby improve the economic situation in the area. This will be an important test case for Pakistan, success of which can help the state machinery to increase its control at least in this area as it is an important transit point for cross-border movement into Afghanistan.
Mohmand Agency
Sandwiched between Bajaur and Khyber agencies, this area was considered to be a relatively peaceful region. Pro-Pakistan government tribal leaders still have some control, which is evident from the fact that houses of those giving sanctuary to some proclaimed offenders were attacked as recently as last week (Daily Times, September 23). This was in pursuance of a recent peace deal inked between the Mohmand Agency political administration and the Safi tribesmen, in which the Safi tribesmen agreed to not provide any sanctuary to foreigners (The News, September 15). They also agreed to protect government property and allow the government to move freely in the area, ensuring the safety of roads that pass through the agency. The presence of 200 tribal elders during the signing of the agreement shows some element of success on the part of the government, but the very nature of the deal explains that the government’s writ was failing before.
The relative peace in the agency in the last few years owed a lot to the constructive work done by the Pakistani army in the area in 2003-04—by building roads, clinics and schools (Daily Times, July 15, 2004). One of the secrets of this success was sealing the agency’s 68 kilometer border with Afghanistan by the Pakistani army in late 2003 (Dawn, July 14, 2004). Unfortunately, conditions have changed since then. In recent months, Taliban militants occupied two Khasadar checkpoints in the Qandharo and Halimzai areas of Mohmand Agency and snatched weapons from officials manning the post. In early September, 10 soldiers of the Frontier Corps were kidnapped in the area as well (Daily Times, September 3). The most tragic development, however, has been the blowing up of a hospital, al-Sehat, earlier this month. It was built by an NGO and located about 10 kilometers away from the Mohmand Agency headquarters, Galanai. It was meant to discourage NGOs operating in the area as the armed men mercifully forced the hospital staff to leave the facility before the attack (The News, September 17).
North Waziristan Agency
As early as late 2005, Pakistani Taliban leaders had declared an Islamic state in North Waziristan. Pakistan opted to cut a peace deal with the power brokers in the area in September 2006 (after convincing the U.S. administration of its utility), but the strategy failed (Daily Times, March 2). Now, abductions of government functionaries and soldiers of the Frontier Corps are a matter of routine. The Taliban of the area maintain that direct U.S. attacks amounted to a violation of the peace deal and hence they are retaliating. Roadside bombs are now a common occurrence. Even those providing food to the army units in the area are targeted (Dawn, September 24). For Musharraf, this is the worst of times because given his precarious political situation, any military action before his re-election as president in October this year is expected to backfire politically. Furthermore, he has committed to give up his position as the army chief after the presidential election, which means he will no longer be actively commanding the Pakistani army.
Orakzai Agency
Orakzai Agency was also largely considered a relatively better governed area within FATA until 2005, but Shiite-Sunni battles of the adjacent Kurram Agency spilled over, creating sectarian tension that consequently attracted the Taliban to this agency. The quarrel over a shrine that both communities venerate became a point of contention. The government was tardy in resolving the dispute and the political agent of Orakzai Agency unduly sided with one of the groups, further complicating the crisis (Daily Times, October 22). Even before this issue, the Taliban patron in Orakzai Agency, Akhunzada Aslam Farooqui, was known to be a close ally of Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Dawn, November 6, 2001).
Like other agencies, Taliban activities are expanding into adjacent districts of the NWFP from this agency as well. In a recent development in Kohat, which is part of the NWFP and borders Orakzai Agency, local Taliban have warned tailors to strictly observe religious codes while sewing clothes for men and women. In a letter sent to tailors, the Taliban threatened to blow up the shops of those not following the orders (Dawn, September 24).
South Waziristan
South Waziristan is at the center of Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the region along with neighboring North Waziristan. Recently, Mehsud tribesmen aligned with Taliban forces abducted 205 Pakistani troops (135 army soldiers and 70 Frontier Corps troops) along with seizing 20 of their vehicles. The most striking fact, however, is that the government forces offered no resistance while being kidnapped. After more than three weeks, a majority of the soldiers are still in the custody of the Taliban, and the government has been practically forced to engage in negotiations with them. This reflects government weakness in the face of their growing strength and influence, to say the least. Pamphlets being distributed in the agency, while warning local tribes not to side with government forces, assert that “like in Afghanistan, we have established suicide squads for attacks on troops and their allies in Pakistan” (Daily Times, September 3).
Earlier this year, the Pakistani army partially succeeded in tackling al-Qaeda through supporting Maulvi Nazir, a Taliban leader somewhat sympathetic to government objectives. He started an effective campaign against Uzbek militants aligned with al-Qaeda in the area and largely accomplished his goal of evicting Uzbeks from the agency. However, he is pursuing his religious agenda unabatedly, and it is hardly distinguishable from the Taliban’s worldview. The death of notorious militant leader Nek Mohammad (now remembered as a hero in the area) in 2004 has helped the Pakistani army take some control out of the hands of Taliban militants, but the vacuum created by his elimination seems to now be filled, and Taliban forces have revived their influence and control.
Conclusion
A UN report released earlier this month said that 80 percent of suicide bombers in Afghanistan had come from the Waziristan agencies. Yet while the Pakistani government has offered to introduce reforms in FATA, little has been done (Dawn, September 26). Political agents continue to dole out funds to handpicked people, often in an attempt to buy peace—hardly an inclusive policy. The $750 million worth of U.S. aid for the uplift of FATA is in the pipeline, but there is no publicly known strategy in place on how to channel the funds, leading to much apprehension and conspiracy theories about who will really benefit in the area.
Furthermore, Pakistan has been rattled by 39 suicide attacks in 2007, so far killing around 350 people, and most of these attacks targeted the Pakistani army, the Frontier Corps and government officials in FATA and the NWFP (GEO TV, September 19). A series of attacks in the Rawalpindi region in August this year were especially meant to attack the Special Services Group (an elite commando unit) and the ISI. This is unprecedented in Pakistan. Many interpret these attacks as a consequence of Musharraf’s tough handling of the Red Mosque crisis in July. Clearly, a majority of these attacks relate to the volatile FATA situation and the Pakistani army is now on the defensive. The killings of Abdullah Mehsud and Mullah Dadullah were expected to hit Taliban forces hard, but the Taliban are showing uncommon resilience. Indeed, Musharraf’s capacity to respond militarily is curtailed because of political compulsions. For Afghanistan and the United States, this means a troublesome scenario. Pakistan’s return to democracy may potentially change things for the better, but Musharraf’s move in this direction is sluggish and uncertain.
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[August 2007]
Volume 5, Issue 16 (August 16, 2007) | Download PDF Version
Italy’s Underground Islamist Network
By Kathryn Haahr
In late July, Italian police announced that they had arrested three Moroccans in a counter-terrorism operation codenamed “Hammam.” The operation was aimed at breaking up a terrorist cell believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda and with proven connections to Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) members tied to the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. Police reportedly are still looking for a fourth accomplice who may have fled Italy. The three, the imam of the Ponte Felcino Mosque, Perugia Province, and his two aides, had stored 60 chemical substances (including nitrates, acids and cyanide) in the mosque’s cellar, the majority of which were of high toxicity and of the type to fabricate explosive artifacts (EuropaPress.es, July 21; Corriere Della Sera, July 21-23; La Vanguardia, July 21). The imam used the mosque to proselytize radical Islam and to train young men in the use of arms, explosives and toxic substances in terrorist operations. Police uncovered propaganda films and documents downloaded from the internet, used to instruct the recruits on how to prepare poisons and explosives, pilot a Boeing 747 and send encrypted messages (El Pais, July 22; Corriere Della Sera, July 23; La Stampa, July 23; Las Provincias, July 23).
Officers of the Italian Division for General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) and the Central Office for General Investigations and Special Operations (UCIGOS) also reported that they discovered maps of aqueducts in Umbria—which they surmise might have been targets for potential poisoning attempts—as well as pictures of Rome’s Fiumicino Airport. Investigations to date lay no doubt that the Ponte Felcino mosque was a “school of terrorism, embedded within a system of small cells that act autonomously,” according to Carlo de Stefano, director of UCIGOS (El Pais, July 22). In a related development, police searches of the Perugia mosque led them to another imam in Pierantonio, a small village in Perugia Province, who had a map with five or six cities marked. These activities led the Muslim World League chairman, Mario Scialoja, to say that Italy is now “full of dangerous fundamentalists” and argue for an official register of imams in Italy (La Stampa, July 22).
Significance of Perugia as a Jihadi Epicenter
The recent activity in Perugia demonstrates the reach of Salafi Islamism from northern Italy into the south. Most known “jihadi” activity by Salafi Islamists has centered in Milan, Lombardy Province, and Turin, Piemonte Province. There are an estimated 20 Islamic centers, cultural institutions and associations in Piemonte, and circa 15 in Lombardy. Perugia reportedly has five Islamic centers, cultural institutions and associations.
The most significant aspect of radicalization in Italy is Salafi Islamism’s espousal of radical activities, namely recruiting for global jihad in sermons and outreach activities at official and unofficial mosques. The Italian intelligence services—in close coordination with the Spanish, German and Dutch counter-terrorism authorities—now believe that the majority of Islamists in Italy—most espousing radical jihad—are connected to North African radical groups (predominantly the GSPC and GICM) and to Ansar al-Islam, an organization primarily based in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. To date, Islamists have increased their presence in the regions of Piedmont, Tuscany, Umbria and Liguria. Turin and Milan are the epicenters for jihadi activities, but other cities and towns show indications of Islamist activities. A distinct development for Italy is the appearance of Islamist enclaves in parts of major cities—particularly Milan and Turin—in which Islamist traditions, doctrine and lifestyles frequently challenge Italian legal laws (abuse against women, espousal of holy war against “infidels”) and social norms [1].
A case study is Turin, Piemonte, which has become a “Kabul of the Piemonte” due to its history of Islamist imams calling on its faithful to support Osama bin Laden and to engage in jihad against the infidels. Most of the Muslims in the Turin area are Moroccans. In 2005, Italian police detained three Moroccans, believed to be members of GICM, for planning attacks in Italy and abroad, and for recruiting extremists to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq (El Mundo, May 18, 2005). In April 2007, prosecutors in Turin were scheduled to start investigating Mohammed Kohaila, the imam at the Cottolengo mosque, for calling on Muslims to hate Christians and Jews and praying for their deaths. According to media group AKI on April 3, “the DVD portraying Kohaila’s sermon was filmed with a hidden camera by a faithful attending the prayers on behalf of a news program on state broadcaster RAI’s second channel, Annozero.”
According to information as of January 2007, there are 258 mosques officially registered with the Interior Ministry, but their number may be much larger due to their rapid growth (La Stampa, January 5). The oldest mosque is the one in Rome, which belongs to the Islamic Cultural Center of Italy, Italy’s oldest Muslim organization; it is the only mosque to have a special recognition as “ente di culto” (entity for religious worship). All Islamic centers function as places of worship and have sites for libraries, Quranic schools and bookstores [2].
Cultural Aspects of Islam and Islamism in Italy
There is no general culture of a global jihad movement among Italian Muslims, which likely can be attributed to the fact that Islam in Italy is not monolithic since no one ethnic group predominates. While groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and a few foreign imams have given verbal and spiritual support to violent jihadi groups, most Muslim organizations do not espouse militant Islam. However, the exportation to Italy of new forms of Islamist movements and ideologies, especially Salafi Islamism, has introduced Middle Eastern and North African Islamist imams, their radical ideologies and their militant Islam activities. This new brand of Salafism, coined Salafi-Jihadis by the French scholar Gilles Kepel, exhorts Muslims to engage in jihad. These “new” ideologies, coupled with the allure of defending the plight of the global ummah, have begun to alter the cultural reference points for Italian Muslims. These subtle exogenous factors, combined with various indigenous cultural characteristics that this author defines as “Cultural Variables,” appear to be transforming traditional cultural reference points for Italian Muslims, which could lead to an increased attraction to Islamism.
Existing empirical research on Islam in Italy demonstrates that the process of Islamization in Italy has increased since the early 1990s, while simultaneously younger generations of Italian Muslims have become more oriented toward socio-religious perspectives and positions versus the more traditional socio-economic platforms of the first generation [3]. Sociological studies demonstrate that for the majority of Muslims, the sense of not being represented at the national level increases their sense of “vulnerability,” and they thus look to alternative sources of authority who can better protect their religious and socio-economic interests—unfortunately, organizations such as Union of Muslim Students in Italy, which are influenced by Wahhabi tendencies and are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, are filling this void. Some of the cultural variables affecting attitudes and behavior among Italian Muslims include: a sense of social inclusion; a sense of alienation due to negative Italian media attitudes toward Muslims; increasing Salafi and Wahhabi influences in make-shift mosques and the power of foreign Islamist imams; internet sites that exhort Muslims to support the global jihad against the infidel; and, the diffused meaning of Muslim identification when ethnicity no longer matters as it did for the first generation—ethnicity is now global and they think and act globally as opposed to locally. Sociological and political studies of mosques, the imams preaching in mosques and Muslim families indicate that these cultural variables are prominently manifested in the sermons of radical imams seeking to influence the attitudes and behavior of young Italian Muslims.
Looking to the Future
Since the September 11 attacks, Muslims have felt pressure to declare their rejection of radical Islam and to adhere to European values. The interaction between Muslim immigrants from diverse countries, cultures and ideologies could facilitate the robustness of the doctrine of jihadi views: if the sense of alienation stemming from social difficulties (unemployment, living in a “foreign” society such as Italy) in individual ethnic Muslim communities in Italy were to accentuate, one could see the development of minorities of disaffected Muslim youth (male and female) accepting Islamist ideas, especially that of the “non-territorial Islamic state” espoused by Islamist groups and al-Qaeda. It is unclear to what extent the appeal of new radical trends is resonating within ethnic Muslim communities, such as Salafi Islamism, but this is an area that bears serious research. Certainly, the continuing absence of a unified/centralized Islamic leadership is not helpful to this situation. Italian journalist Magdi Allam alluded to this problem in his 2002 book, “Bin Laden in Italy: Travels in Radical Islam,” in which he identifies several personalities that he defines as Islamist (such as the director of the Union of Islamic Communities in Italy, or UCOII, as well as the imams of the Turin, Milan, Bologna and Naples mosques) and their radical impact on Italian Muslims.
Intra-ethnic tensions, which already play out in the competition between various Islamic and Islamist organizations, could cause a splintering between groups and their followers. Although Arab and South Asian Muslim organizations and influences are nowhere as prevalent as they are in the United Kingdom, the appearance of new groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, should be studied. Moreover, the strengthening of Muslim Brotherhood organizations and ideologies is something to be observed. Organizational rivalries are evident in the emergence of two types of Islam, each of which has its adherents: an Islam of the mosques (organizations such as UCOII, which represents numerous Islamic mosques throughout Italy), and Islam of the “state” (the ICI in Milan, and other mosques that receive foreign state funding from Saudi Arabia). The friction between Islam of the mosques and Islam of the “state” is that those mosques that receive foreign state funding tend to have a fundamentalist orientation, such as toward Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood—this tension is visible in the politics of each Muslim organization [4].
Conclusion
The existence of Salafi networks and cells, and their proven connections to other cells throughout Europe, are in and of themselves worrisome because they could not exist without a minimum amount of sympathy and support from the general population in which they live and operate. Perugia, like Turin and other cities, can be viewed as a laboratory in which competing ideologies (reform Islam vs. Salafi Islamism) are playing out. Deeper studies should explore the context in which immigration might be inducing an Islamist shift and the underpinnings of religious belonging.
Notes
1. Author interview with Lorenzo Vidino, 2007.
2. For a descriptive narrative of mosques and Islamic centers in Italy, please refer to Stefano Allievi’s, “Islam Italiano; Viaggio Nella Seconda Religione del Paese.”
3. Guolo, Renzo, “Xenofobi e Xenofili – Italiani e L’Islam,” Editori Laterza, 2003; Saint Blancat, Chantal, “Why are Mosques a Problem? Local Politics and Fear of Islam in Northern Italy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, November 2005.
4. Negri, Augusto Tino; Introvigne, Silvia Scaranari; Berzano, Luigi, and Guolo, Renzo, “Musulmani in Piemonte: in moschea, al lavoro, nel contesto sociale,” Guerini e Associati, Milano, 2005.
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http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373623
RAND | Research Areas | Terrorism and Homeland Security ...
The voices of jihad are numerous, varied, and constantly evolving. ...
By
compiling the Voices of Jihad Database and making it available to the
public, ...
http://192.5.14.110/research_areas/terrorism/database/
[check out the Rand Database, interesting, needs digging into,
granny]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904790/posts
Did A’jad predict Armageddon at the UN?
American Thinker ^ | 10-01-07 | James Lewis
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:00:49 AM PDT by Renfield
This will sound alarming. A literal reading of Ahmadi-Nejad’s UN address suggests that he is predicting a total war coming soon.
The key is in his invocation and his conclusion. Normal official communications by Muslims start with, “In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.” A’jad followed that formula immediately with:
“Oh God, hasten the arrival of Imam Al-Mahdi and grant him good health and victory and make us his followers and those who attend to his rightfulness.” [italics in the official Iranian version]
Sounds like a pretty standard invocation, but it’s not. It is a specific call for the Shiite Messiah, who will bring a final holy war, the final jihad, which in the Khomeini cult implies all-out war with the infidels to bring about the Millenarian Age of Paradise on Earth. (For Khomeini, the term “infidels” includes Sunni Muslims, who do not recognize the Mahdi). That is why Khomeini started the nuclear program twenty years ago, and why it has been pushed consistently by all the major cult leaders.
A’jad put the message explicitly in his peroration, i.e., his summary and conclusion.
continued.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904793/posts
University of Memphis Football Player Fatally Shot(School in lockdown. Monday classes canceled.)
Fox News ^ | October 01, 2007 | staff
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:10:42 AM PDT by kellynla
A student at the University of Memphis was fatally shot late Sunday on the campus of the school.
Authorities did not immediately release the victim’s name, but said he was shot in the chest and was pronounced dead a short time later at the Regional Medical Center.
Second thread with updates:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/1904842/posts
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904804/posts
Grambling State probes lab school’s noose lesson
2theadvocate.com ^ | 10/01/07 | AP
Posted on 10/01/2007 5:42:45 AM PDT by TornadoAlley3
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904819/posts
Head of IAEA Defies Criticism on Iran
AP via NYT ^ | September 29, 2007 | Staff
Posted on 10/01/2007 6:13:56 AM PDT by Schnucki
VIENNA, Austria - Criticized by the U.S. but backed by other world powers, chief U.N. nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei is walking a fine line in trying to cajole Iran into revealing past nuclear secrets.
Since wresting a promise from Tehran in July to clear up its nuclear record by year’s end, ElBaradei — head of the International Atomic Energy Agency — has been vilified as pro-Tehran, and accused of overstepping his authority.
continued.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904823/posts
Muslim group touts local political clout
Washington Times ^ | October 1, 2007 | Audrey Hudson
Posted on 10/01/2007 6:18:36 AM PDT by 3AngelaD
How much political power does the Muslim American Society wield?....”Ask Jim Webb what kind of impact we have. Ask the governor of Virginia...,” Mahdi Bray, the Muslim American Society’s executive director told The Washington Times...
The Muslim American Society (MAS) claims credit for helping Jim Webb, Democrat, defeat incumbent Republican Sen. George Allen in 2006...MAS said it has registered 65,000 voters in Virginia since the 2005 gubernatorial race, and most of them backed Mr. Webb...
“The Democrat’s win hinged on the Muslim vote,” Mr. Bray said during interviews about the organization’s political activities planned for upcoming elections...
On Thursday, however, the clout established by MAS was put to a political test. The appointment last month of MAS President Esam S. Omeish to Mr. Kaine’s immigration commission was suddenly withdrawn after Steve Emerson, of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, posted videos on YouTube showing the Northern Virginia surgeon making references to the “Israeli war machine” and the “Jihad way.”
Mr. Kaine asked for his resignation, and Dr. Omeish complied...He said that he did not wish to interfere with the committee’s duties, but later blamed the fracas on a religiously motivated “smear campaign.”
According to other Muslim leaders, the dust-up probably will lead MAS to shift the focus of its political clout, although it isn’t clear what the overall effect will be on its efforts to register thousands of voters nationwide and to recruit future policy-makers and politicians from within its ranks.
“The fiasco associated with the appointment and resignation of Dr. Esam Omeish may actually empower MAS more within their own limited activist Islamist community because it allows them to trump up their victimization agenda even more,” said Zuhdi Jasser, a physician and president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy....
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtontimes.com ...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904977/posts
Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq
The Long War Journal ^ | September 30, 2007 9:14 PM | Bill Roggio
Posted on 10/01/2007 10:48:15 AM PDT by Ernest_at_the_Beach
Multinational Forces Iraq and the Iraqi military continue to attack the Iranian-backed Special Groups while interdicting weapons flowing from the neighboring country. Fifteen members of the Special Groups were captured in Baghdad on Sunday. The US military has disclosed the identity of the Qods Force officer captured in the northern Kurdish province of Sulimaniyah on September 20, and has stated Iran is sending portable surface-to-air missiles to Shia insurgents.
During a Sunday press briefing in Baghdad, Rear Admiral Mark Fox identified Mahmudi Farhadi as the Iranian Qods Force officer captured in Sulimaniyah. Farhadi is the sixth Qods Force officer that the US has announced is in custody. Five senior Qods Force officers were captured in Irbil in January 2007.
Iran closed the northern border immediately after Farhadi was captured, claiming he was a businessman. “I find it hard to believe that they would close the border for a businessman,” Fox said.
Fox also stated Iran has supplied the Special Groups with Misagh-1 man-portable surface-to-air missiles. The Special Groups is a terrorist organization trained, funded, and supplied by Iran and is set up on the lines of Lebanese Hezbollah by the Qods Force.
“We’ve said that we’ve found these things [the Misagh 1 missiles], we’ve seen them employed,” Fox said. The Misagh-1 design is based on the Chinese made QW-1, which “caught the attention of foreign media and research institutions when it was first introduced to the public [at an air show in 1994] because it was claimed to surpass the US Stinger in maximum effective range, target seeker tracking capability, warhead power and other indicators,” according to Global Security.
It is unclear if the Misagh-1s have been successful in downing US or allied aircraft. The investigation into the downing of a British Lynx helicopter in Basra in May 2006 found that a “lucky shot” with an RPG was the cause of the crash.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904858/posts
Man claiming to be terrorist arrested at Logan
Boston Herald ^ | 10/01/07 | Joe Dwinell & Mike Adaskaveg
Posted on 10/01/2007 7:33:57 AM PDT by raccoonradio
An irritable passenger offended by security grilling faces bomb threat charges in court today after reportedly telling Logan Airport security Saturday he was an Al-Qaeda terrorist here to “blow things up.”
Massport officials tell the Herald the 27-year-old man had a ticket on his bag from Dubai of the United Arab Emirates and security began asking him questions.
“He seemed aggravated and said ‘I’m Al-Qaeda and I’m here to blow things up,’ ” said Massport spokesman Phil Orlandella.
Orlandella said the man, Asfaw Ermiyas of Washington, D.C., was taken into custody at the AirTran gate Saturday night at 7:15 p.m.
He is set to be arraigned today in East Boston District Court on a charge of making a bomb threat.
Massport officials say Ermiyas was heading to Baltimore and listed his occupation as self-employed taxi driver.
State police confronted Ermiyas after he appeared to become annoyed with security questions. That’s when he lashed out, officials say.
Airport officials say they are treating the threats seriously, yet they believe his boasts were not a credible.
Massport officials sent a clear message today they won’t tolerate threats.
“This airport is not going to tolerate any outrageous threats of using a bomb or identifying themselves with a terrorist organization,” said Orlandella.
Orlandella praised gate security for not backing down from the suspect’s alleged threatening behavior.
This is the second bomb scare at Logan in the past two weeks. An MIT student, Star Simpson, 19, walked into the airport Sept. 21 with a circuit board strapped to her chest and carrying a glob of Play-Doh. She too was arrested and faces charges.
[photo in post #20]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904896/posts
Anti-Jewish, anti-Christian fliers found on cars (Michigan-”Kill Jews and Christians”)
Macomb Daily ^ | 9-28-07 | Gordon Wilczynski
Posted on 10/01/2007 8:30:12 AM PDT by yankeesdoodle
Sterling Heights police Detective Sgt. Paul Jesperson said three separate complaints were filed by residents Tuesday who found the fliers on their windshields.
He said the flier said: “Kill Jews and Christians if they don’t believe in Allah and Mohammad.”
continued.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904857/posts
Explosives-Carrying Man Arrested Near US Embassy in Vienna (Austria)
Deutsche Presse—Agentur (via Monsters and Critics News) ^ | 10/1/2007 | n/a
Posted on 10/01/2007 7:31:55 AM PDT by Pyro7480
Vienna - A man was arrested in Vienna Monday after he planted a backpack filled with explosives and nails in a street near the US embassy to Austria, the Austrian press agency reported.
According to initial information the suspect, a man with Bosnian background living outside Vienna, suddenly dropped the bag filled with hand grenades and other explosives in Pfluggasse in Vienna’s 9th district. Before that he had visited the US-embassy in nearby Boltzmanngasse, police said.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904923/posts
TEEN BOY HANGED IN AFGHANISTAN FOR HAVING U.S. CURRENCY
http://www.nypost.com/seven/10012007/news/worldnews/teen_boy_hanged_in_afghanistan.htm ^
Posted on 10/01/2007 8:59:28 AM PDT by traumer
October 1, 2007 — KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Taliban militants hanged a teenager in southern Afghanistan because he had U.S. money in his pocket, and they stuffed five $1 bills in his mouth as a warning to others not to use dollars, police said Monday. Taliban militants elsewhere killed eight police.
The 15-year-old boy was hanged from a tree on Sunday in Helmand, the most violent province in the country and the world’s No. 1 poppy-growing region.
“The Taliban warned villagers that they would face the same punishment if they were caught with dollars,” said Wali Mohammad, the district police chief in Sangin.
Dollars are commonly used in Afghanistan alongside the afghani, the local currency, although the U.S. currency is more commonly seen in larger cities where international organizations are found.
Militants often justify their attacks and executions as a response to U.S. meddling in Afghan affairs.
(Excerpt) Read more at nypost.com ...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904928/posts
TSA, remote-controlled cars, and goose creek
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,298745,00.html ^
Posted on 10/01/2007 9:07:46 AM PDT by Weight of Glory
The Transportation Security Administration announced Monday that it has stepped up screenings of remote-control toys in carry-on luggage.
Though the increased screenings are not tied to a specific terrorist threat, “TSA is aware that remote control toys can be used to initiate devices used in terrorist attacks,” the agency said Monday in a press statement.
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
[see comments for updates and backgrounds].
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1904930/posts
Hezbollah is Secretly Building Battle Positions
National Review ^ | October 1, 2007 | W. Thomas Smith Jr.
Posted on 10/01/2007 9:09:42 AM PDT by DetailMan
I know for a fact that Hezbollah is building defenses and fortifications from which they can launch attacks in the south (where I was two days ago), in the Bekaa Valley, and in Al Dahiyeh (the Hezbollah security square in Beirut, which we covertly entered and moved through twice during our photo-reconnaissance a few days ago). ... he houses are being rebuilt – as they were — with secret interconnecting corridors linking the houses together in a link-by-link network of fighting positions. There are tunnels running beneath the houses linking them with other buildings and adjacent neighborhoods, as well as to huge underground command posts. And there are walls being constructed with concealed weapons-storage spaces.
(Excerpt) Read more at tank.nationalreview.com ...
[This has a comments section, that is full of links to more info]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1902655/posts?page=7
Spy Officials Tracking Key Scientists (anthrax)
Associated Press (Fox) ^ | September 26, 2007 | Pamela Hess
Posted on 09/26/2007 2:31:31 PM PDT by ZacandPook
WASHINGTON — Tracking scientists moving from country to country to share their expertise in building biological weapons is a major challenge, a top U.S. intelligence official said Wednesday.
...
Because they are easier to hide than nuclear weapons or missiles, biological weapons are best tracked by monitoring those with expertise to make them _ a formidable challenge in itself, Murrett said.
“The kind of challenge we have for proliferation which I think is tougher is, for example, the transfer of individual scientists from country A to country B,” he said at a breakfast with defense reporters.
Tracking individuals trying to spread biological weapons know-how is beyond the capabilities of his agency alone, Murrett said. It requires multiple intelligence agencies to combine their intercepts, data bases and analyses.
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1904938/posts?page=38
Woo hoo!! The first two percent is in!! Thank you FReepers and Lurkers!!
Russians employed at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor suddenly depart in a body..
DEBKAfile ^ | October 1, 2007 | DEBKAfile
Posted on 10/01/2007 9:29:57 AM PDT by AU72
The Khorramshar News Agency, which is published by the ethnic Arab underground of Iran’s oil-rich Khuzestan, reported early Oct. 1 that the entire staff of Russian nuclear engineers and experts employed in building the nuclear reactor at Bushehr had abruptly packed their bags Friday, Sept. 28, and flew back to Russia. The agency’s one-liner offers no source or explanation. DEBKAfile have obtained no corroboration of its report from any other source.
The story appears to have originated with the ethnic Arabs who live near the reactor or who come in contact with its Russian staff. If true, DEBKAfile can offer three hypothetical scenarios to account for the Russians’ precipitate departure:
1. Another crisis has cropped up in the patchy Russian-Iranian dealings over the Bushehr reactor. This is unlikely because Russian president Vladimar Putin is due for a high-profile visit to Tehran on Oct. 16, when he plans to sign a series of nuclear accords with the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, Moscow, like Beijing, stands foursquare behind Iran’s efforts to delay harsher sanctions for its continued uranium enrichment. Only this week, the two powers gained Iran two to three months’ grace by forcing a delay in the UN Security Council session that was to have approved a third round of sanctions.
2. Moscow or Tehran has been tipped off that a US or Israeli attack is imminent on the Bushehr plant and Iran’s other nuclear installations and acted to whip Russian personnel out of harm’s way.
3. Moscow has learned that an Iranian pre-emptive attack is imminent against American targets in Iraq and the Persian Gulf and/or Israel.
Aside from these hypothetical scenarios, DEBKAfile’s Iranian sources report that the Khorramshar News Agency keeps its ear to the ground on happenings in Bushehr, because it is claimed by Khuzistan separatists as Arab land which they will fight to liberate from Iranian “occupation.”
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