Replies

“Abu Bakr” (”the second of the two” in the verses surrounding the cave quoted in one of Zawahiri’s tapes this week) according to the 9-11 Commission Report, is also the name of a senior Al Qaeda leader who was at the center of a much larger attack planned as a follow-on to 9-11.

If 9-11-2001 began with Bojinka (1995) and, according to the August 2001 PDB in an earlier link, the summer threat in 2001 in the days before 9-11 had been growing for years with the the African Embassy bombings in 1998 at the Millenium plot in 1999/2000.

http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/04/10/august6.memo/

Then it stands to reason that if the “dots”connecting together the 9-11 operation were scattered over six years, then it is entirely likely that the “dots” connecting together the coming attack are scattered over the six years since 9-11 (which is why TM “veterans” from 2003-2006 might remember seeing some things now that are familiar from years ago).

Looking only to developments in recent days, weeks, and months can be myopic. When new information emerges, it has to be compared not only to threats from the past few weeks or the past few months, but to have any chance at putting the picture together, compared to threats/plots going back over several years.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/615cglnt.asp?pg=2

” . . . Tenet also discloses new intelligence about the activities of the al Qaeda leadership living under what he calls “loose house arrest” in Iran:

From the end of 2002 to the spring of 2003, we received a stream of reliable reporting that the senior al-Qa’ida leadership in Saudi Arabia was negotiating for the purchase of three Russian nuclear devices. Saudi al-Qa’ida chief Abu Bakr related the offer directly to the al-Qa’ida leadership in Iran, where Sayf al-Adl and Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri (described as al-Qa’ida’s “nuclear chief” by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) were reportedly being held under a loose form of house arrest by the Iranian regime. The al-Qa’ida leadership had obviously learned much from their ventures into the nuclear market in the early 1990s. Sayf al-Adl told Abu Bakr that no price was too high to pay if they could get their hands on such weapons. However, he cautioned Abu Bakr that al-Qa’ida had been stung by scams in the past and that Pakistani specialists should be brought to Saudi Arabia to inspect the merchandise prior to purchase.”

http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_bakr_al-azdi.htm

Abu Bakr al-Azdi
Al-Qaeda Senior Operative

Narrative and Notes

Reliable

On June 26, 2003, he turned himself in at the home of Saudi deputy interior minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayaf in Riyadh.

He was initially assigned to take part in 9-11 but was held in reserve by Osama bin Laden for another, larger operation.1

Possible

He may have set out from Saudi Arabia for Chechnya but was diverted to Afghanistan for training.1

Sources
1 The 9-11 Commission Final Report, July 22, 2004, Footnotes.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Notes.htm

107. Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad,Apr. 5, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 20, 2004. The candidate operatives were . . .

3. Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi. (aka Abu Bakr al Azdi) He reportedly was to have been part of the planes operation but was held in reserve by Bin Ladin for a later, even larger operation. Like other muscle hijackers, he reportedly set out for Chechnya but diverted to Afghanistan. See Intelligence reports, interrogations of Abu Bakr al Azdi, July 23, 2003; Sept. 25, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 6, 2003.