The best example of invalid "early information", of course, is the infamous Oct. 28, 2002, Washington Post Article titled "FBI's Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted."
Here are the opening paragraphs of that article:
A significant number of scientists and biological warfare experts are expressing skepticism about the FBI's view that a single disgruntled American scientist prepared the spores and mailed the deadly anthrax letters that killed five people last year.
These sources say that making a weaponized aerosol of such sophistication and virulence would require scientific knowledge, technical competence, access to expensive equipment and safety know-how that are probably beyond the capabilities of a lone individual.
The "experts" cited in that ridiculous article were Richard Spertzel (who openly admitted his ignorance by stating that "even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good") plus a manufacturer of spray dryers, a pharmaceutical scientist and three chemical engineers. They are the "scientists" who the Post considered to be "experts" who would know more about spores than microbiologists who actually work with spores every day.
In his August 2006 article in Applied And Environmental Microbiology, FBI Scientist Douglas Beecher stated that "Individuals familiar with the compositions of the powders in the letters have indicated that they were comprised simply of spores purified to different extents." Beecher also specifically named that Washington Post article as fostering "erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations."
And how did the Washington Post report on this? On September 25, 2006, they published an article titled "FBI Is Casting A Wider Net in Anthrax Attacks." They pretended it was news to them that the spores were not super-sophisticated. Here are the opening paragraphs of that article:
Five years after the anthrax attacks that killed five people, the FBI is now convinced that the lethal powder sent to the Senate was far less sophisticated than originally believed, widening the pool of possible suspects in a frustratingly slow investigation.
The finding, which resulted from countless scientific tests at numerous laboratories, appears to undermine the widely held belief that the attack was carried out by a government scientist or someone with access to a U.S. biodefense lab.
What was initially described as a near-military-grade biological weapon was ultimately found to have had a more ordinary pedigree, containing no additives and no signs of special processing to make the anthrax bacteria more deadly, law enforcement officials confirmed.
That is the kind of new information showing old information to be invalid that I was talking about.
On September 26, 2006, in an article titled "Anthrax Not Weapons-Grade, Official Says," Bill Broad at The New York Times also wrote about the Beecher article, and he said this:
Seeking to clear up public confusion, an F.B.I. official has reiterated the bureau’s judgment that the anthrax in the letter attacks five years ago bore no special coatings to increase its deadliness and no hallmarks of a military weapon.
And this:
The misconceptions in the case began early, reinforced by edgy public officials and federal scientists struggling to assess an unfamiliar threat quickly. In Washington, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology studied the anthrax and found what it believed to be added silica, a signature of military anthrax.
“This was a key component,” an institute official said at the time. “Silica prevents the anthrax from aggregating, making it easier to aerosolize.”
Last year, Edward G. Lake, a retired computer systems analyst in Racine, Wis., self-published a book, “Analyzing the Anthrax Attacks,” that documented the silica misunderstanding as well as many other federal and private blunders. “There were,” Mr. Lake said in an interview, “a lot of false assumptions.”
For its part, the F.B.I. has quietly but fairly consistently argued for a humdrum explanation. In November 2001, it said the culprit was probably a domestic loner with at least limited scientific expertise who was able to use laboratory equipment obtained for as little as $2,500.
As this shows, the FBI has stated all along that the powder was NOT COATED. But some people who know absolutely nothing about microbiology, like you, absolutely refuse to believe it and, instead, look for vast conspiracies to cover up the "truth".
Why did Meselson lie about the spectrum AFIP published to C&E News?