Posted on 04/15/2007 4:43:46 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Tackling Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (back)
June 12, 2007
The GIABA plenary session on money laundering and financing of terrorism got off yesterday to a big start at the Kairaba Beach Hotel. The three-day plenary session comprises a technical committee and an ad hoc ministerial meeting.
For the next two days, representatives of ECOWAS/GIABA member states, together with experts, policymakers and development partners will deliberate on how to protect national economies and the financial and banking systems of signatory states against the proceeds of crime and combat the financing of terrorism. In addition, they will examine measures and efforts aimed at combating proceeds from crime.
Money laundering and financing of terrorism threatens socio-economic development and political stability, besides having a negative impact on developing countries with weak financial systems. Economically, money laundering and financing of terrorism could cost a country its reputation with the result that investors get scared away. This inevitably leads to a reduction in opportunities for growth and development. It also leads to a rise in organised crime, which affects public and private institutions.
There are two major challenges facing GIABA member states in their bid to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The first one is how to control large cash transactions. The antidote to this is the vigorous promotion of non-cash instruments of payment. The second one is how to set up an effective legal system that can prosecute culprits of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Since nearly all the countries in West Africa are members of the GIABA, it follows that West African governments are keen to do away with these twin scourges of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Therefore, the West should not hesitate to lend a helping hand to this initiative which is aimed at making the world a safer place for everybody. In all, GIABA should intensify its efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. That is one way they can realise their vision of being a leader in promoting a regional alliance against money laundering and financing of terrorism in the sub region.
Source: http://www.thepoint.gm/Editorial321.htm
TERROR ON TRIAL
T&T Court Shown Photos of Kadir with High-Powered Guns (back)
June 12, 2007
The US Government yesterday revealed in the Port of Spain Magistrates’ Court, photographs of ex-Linden mayor Abdul Kadir with high-powered weapons and strongly objected to bail being granted to him and two other suspects charged with plotting to blow up fuel tanks at the JFK Airport in New York .
Through Senior Counsel Israel Khan, who is representing the T&T Attorney General, the US said Kadir had ties to militants abroad and accused him of volunteering to finance trips of the other plotters to the US . He said Kadir was the one who discussed meeting and involving the radical Jamaat al Muslimeen group of Trinidad to get financing and operational help. The lawyer argued that Kadir had the engineering ability and posited that the men could not be judged by their appearances. ‘No one looks like a terrorist,’ Khan remarked.
He then produced photographs he said were of Kadir and his sons carrying lethal and dangerous firearms. He told the court that the pictures were found on Kadir’s ‘thumb drive’ when he was arrested in Trinidad two Saturdays ago. The pictures were shown to Kadir’s lawyer who objected to their use, saying he did not know what the laws in Guyana were in relation to gun use. Kadir was observed trying to get a look at the photographs.
Yesterday’s court hearing was billed as a status conference and was also designated for the defence to make a bail application. Kadir, Abdul Nur and Trinidadian, Kareem Ibrahim were all charged last Monday with conspiracy to commit a terrorist act against the United States . The charge is extraditable, but the men’s lawyers said they would challenge any attempt to extradite them.
A fourth man, Russell Defreitas who was born in Guyana , but has resided in the US for 30 years is also charged with the crime. His case is being heard in New York .
Addressing a packed courthouse yesterday, Senior Counsel Khan said Kadir was a threat to the community, ‘this upright citizen had multiple semi-automatic weapons... he’s fraternizing with criminals.’
Khan opined that no judicial officer in any commonwealth or Islamic jurisdiction would grant bail at this stage of the proceedings, arguing that the nature and seriousness of the charge alone was reason why bail should not be granted.
Attorney-at-law Rajiv Persad who is representing Kadir and Ibrahim, in his bail application, said the three men are outstanding citizens in their home countries and have strong economic and social ties and are well known. According to Persad, bail should be granted to the trio on condition that the men turn over all of their travel documents to the authorities. ‘They are no threat to society and while the charges they face are very serious these are just allegations until proven otherwise,’ Persad argued. He told the court that Ibrahim has strong community ties, noting that the 62-year-old worked as an accounts clerk at the Tunapuna Piarco Regional Corporation and was also a former executive officer of the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a political party in Port of Spain .
The lawyer said Kadir has a degree in civil engineering and is also a Justice of Peace. He mentioned that the former member of Guyana ‘s parliament was also a member of a Linden business association among other things. Persad said both Ibrahim and Kadir have invested their lives in the communities they came from, which was evident in the fact that they were entrusted with leadership positions. The attorney further asked the magistrate to balance the men’s characters against the seriousness of the offence and the fact they might be flight risks.
However, in objecting to bail Khan said that in extradition proceedings good characters mean nothing. He said the accused could be what he termed ‘sleeping agents’. The Senior Counsel then quoted from US court documents that in May 2007 Kadir, Defreitas and the informant had numerous conversations, which were taped by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. According to Khan, the men face five charges: conspiracy to bomb, which carries a sentence of life imprisonment; conspiracy to bomb a public transportation system; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire and conspiracy to bomb an aircraft and conspiracy to bomb a mass transportation facility. The prosecutor noted that because these charges carry life sentences or 20 years imprisonment and because of the men’s ages, they face the possibility of no parole. Khan then said that the evidence against the men was overwhelming.
But Persad objected saying that was a matter for the jury to decide.
After listening to the arguments on both sides, Chief Magistrate Sherman Mc Nicholls denied bail to the trio, saying that the offences were serious.
Meanwhile, yesterday relatives of Kadir confirmed to the media that agents of the FBI on Sunday questioned family members as part of their investigation. Stabroek News was told that the agents seized two computers belonging to the family and other documents. They also took two of Kadir’s brothers to the Mackenzie Police Station where the men were questioned. Stabroek News was told that the FBI agents backed up by ranks of the Guyana Police Force visited Kadir’s Watooka Drive , Linden home in the morning and never left until after 8 pm. The FBI agents arrived in Guyana on Saturday and met President Bharrat Jagdeo and the US Ambassador to Guyana , David Robinson. While in Guyana , the FBI team will work along with local police investigators who are part of a special team that was created to help investigate the alleged terror plot.
Source: http://www.stabroeknews.com/index.pl/article_general_news?id=56522276
Digital Images of JFK Depots Found on Terror Suspect’s Camera (back)
June 10, 2007
When local police arrested Guyanese terror accused Imam Abdul Kadir they handed over his luggage, including a briefcase with his passport, digital camera and flash drive to a man unknown to them and claiming to be Kadir’s friend.
Two days later Special Branch officers were forced to take out a search warrant which they executed at the man’s Diego Martin home to retrieve Kadir’s belongings the Sunday Express confirmed.
Two Friday’s ago [ 1 June] United States authorities asked that Kadir be arrested and gave no detailed information to local law enforcement as to why the Guyanese must be held except to say that he was wanted in the US.
The Sunday Express was told that the Venezuela-bound aircraft Kadir was in had already taxied on to the runway and had to be stopped and turned around to facilitate his arrest.
The arrest was around 11 a.m.
The Diego Martin man went to see Kadir at the Port of Spain CID hours after the United States had revealed why Kadir was wanted.
Police refused to allow the man to see Kadir but handed over his personal belonging to him for ‘safe keeping’.
In the criminal charge against Kadir, part of the FBI’s case is that he had digital images of the JKF fuel depots and that his camera had pictures of him posing with guns, according to the source identified as Terry De Souza known as Anas bin Naddar.
De Souza and terror accused Russell De Freitas came to Trinidad on May 20 around 9.30 p.m. on a flight from Guyana .
De Souza has not been charged with any crime by the US .
Local accused in the matter Kareem Ibrahiim had earlier been asked to host the men an offer to which his daughter Huda Ibrahiim said her father was Islamically obliged to agree.
In an exclusive interview with the Sunday Express Huda said that her father had never spoken to the men before and at the time of their arrival he was in Tobago .
Ibrahiim went to Tobago two days before the men’s arrival.
De Souza and De Freitas spent six days at Ibrahiim’s Canefarm home and both left on May 26.
‘We knew that they were coming but my father never met or had spoken to them before,’ Huda said.
Huda said that her father did not spend all of his time with the men during their stay and that they had no visitors.
She said that both men went out on their own without her father.
According to the criminal charge one of the places they visited was the Jamaat al Muslimeen.
The Jamaat has said the terror plot is a ‘conspiracy’ to entrap its leader Imam Yasin Abu Bakr who is facing sedition charges in Trinidad .
Naddar is said to have come to Trinidad with surveillance equipment including a high powered camera, sources say.
Naddar took photos of the St Joseph Mosque from about 12 kilometres away on Mount St Benedict which he showed to certain people. He attended Friday prayers and recorded Ibrahiim’s sermon.
At the end of the prayer session Naddar asked Ibrahiim to repeat parts of the sermon in which Ibrahiim spoke about the virtues of self sacrifice.
Source: http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161160075
Eherenfeld vs. Mahfouz - Latest Development (back)
June 13, 2007
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked the New York Court of Appeals on Friday for guidance on whether the state’s long-arm statute confers to the federal court personal jurisdiction over a Saudi businessman who was named as a supporter of terrorism in a New York author’s book.
The author, Rachel Ehrenfeld, is seeking in Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 06-2228-cv, to have the federal court declare that a libel judgment secured by Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz against her in a British court in 2005 is not enforceable in the United States on constitutional and public policy grounds. She also is seeking a declaration by the court that Mr. Mahfouz’s libel action could not succeed against her in New York or the United States , where the plaintiffs’ burden of proof is far more stringent than under English law.
The decision will be published Thursday.
Ms. Ehrenfeld did not appear in the British court. She explained that she lacked the money to travel to the United Kingdom to defend herself and that British libel laws were favorable to plaintiffs. At any rate, she said that she disagreed with her adversary’s tactic as a matter of principle.
A British High Court judge ordered that Ms. Ehrenfeld and her publisher, Bonus Books, excise passages from her 2003 book ‘Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It’ that link Mr. Mahfouz to al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the activities of other terrorists. The British court also ordered her to pay 60,000 British pounds, about $120,000 at today’s exchange rate, as a ‘downpayment’ on damages.
Southern District Judge Richard C. Casey granted Mr. Mahfouz’s motion to dismiss Ms. Ehrenfeld’s action, finding a lack of personal jurisdiction. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 2006 WL 1096816 S.D.N.Y. (April 26, 2006).
But the Second Circuit ruled Friday that a New York state statute, CPLR § 302(a)(1), might provide for personal jurisdiction. In a ruling by Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg, it certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals whether the statute applies to someone who ‘sued a New York resident in a non-U.S. jurisdiction’ and ‘whose contacts with New York stemmed from the foreign lawsuit and whose success in the foreign suit resulted in acts that must be performed by the subject of the suit in New York?’
Prior New York court decisions ‘do not yield a clear answer’ about the scope of CPLR §302(a)(1) in a case like Ms. Ehrenfeld’s, Judge Feinberg wrote.
CPLR §302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a non-New York resident who ‘in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state’ if the cause of action arises out of the defendant’s New York transactions. Ms. Ehrenfeld argues that Mr. Mahfouz’s contact with New York has entailed the serving of numerous papers and documents on her during the course of the libel trial and an overall plan to secure the libel judgment against her as a means of chilling the writing and research she does in New York .
The Court of Appeals is not obligated to answer certified questions from the Second Circuit, but it almost always does.
Important Policy Issues
Judge Feinberg wrote that the Second Circuit believes the public policy issues involved in Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz warrant guidance by the Court of Appeals.
‘The question is important to authors, publishers and those, like Mahfouz, who are the subject of books and articles,’ Judge Feinberg wrote.
He went on, ‘The issue may implicate the First Amendment rights of many New Yorkers, and thus concerns important public policy of the state. Because the case may lead to personal jurisdiction over many defendants who successfully pursue a suit abroad against a New York citizen, the question before us is also likely to be repeated.’
The Second Circuit did uphold Judge Casey’s finding that another part of the CPLR, §302(a)(3), does not provide for personal jurisdiction and also the judge’s refusal to grant Ms. Ehrenfeld request for jurisdictional discovery. Judge Casey died in March.
Circuit Judges Pierre N. Leval and Jose A. Cabranes joined Judge Feinberg in the ruling.
Ms. Ehrenfeld’s attorney Daniel J. Kornstein of Mr. Kornstein of Kornstein Veisz Wexler & Pollard said Friday he was ‘looking forward to presenting our arguments on the jurisdiction issue to the New York Court of Appeals.
The bringing of libel actions in foreign courts by non-U.S. citizens against American authors and publications has been on the increase and is an alarming trend, Mr. Kornstein said.
‘It is a vitally important issue for the publishing industry and for authors because of the concerns it raises about the chilling effect on free speech,’ he said.
Amicus curiae briefs supporting Ms. Ehrenfeld have been filed by a coalition of writers groups and communications associations, including the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Authors Guild, Association of American Publishers and the Online News Association.
Ms. Ehrenfeld is head of the New York City-based American Center for Democracy, a group that researches terrorism, primarily in the Middle East . Her other books include ‘Evil Money’ and ‘Narcoterrorism.’
Mr. Mahfouz is a former president and chief executive officer of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia . His personal wealth has been estimated by Forbes magazine in excess of $3 billion.
Mr. Mahfouz has insisted that he condemns terrorism and has never assisted Osama Bin Laden or other terrorists.
Timothy J. Finn of Bonner, Kiernan, Trebach & Crociata in Washington , D.C. , represented Mr. Mahfouz. Mr. Finn did not return a call seeking comment.
Source: http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/index.jsp
POLICE AND CRIME ISSUES
FBI Seizes Computers in Guyana (back)
June 12, 2007
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detectives have seized two computers and several documents from the Guyana residence of alleged JFK terror suspect Abdul Kadir.
Sources said yesterday the FBI made the seizure following a raid on Kadir’s Linden home on Sunday. The search is said to have started around 7 a.m. and ended just after 8 p.m. (See Page 16)
Two of Kadir’s brothers were taken into custody shortly after the search. However, they were released during the early yesterday.
Guyanese sources said the FBI will conduct similar searches in other places which other accused, Guyanese nationals Abdel Nur and Russell Defreitas, frequented.
The search came just mere hours before Kadir, along Nur and Trinidadian accused Kareem Ibrahiim were denied bail when they appeared before Chief Magistrate Sherman McNicolls.
All three are challenging a request made by the US government to have them stand trial on four charges, resulting out of an alleged terror plot to blow up the JFK International Airport in New York .
During yesterday’s hearing, relatives, friends and supporters filled the benches of the court to hear the matter.
The men were taken into the prisoners’ dock around 9.20 a.m. McNicolls entered the court around 9.30 a.m. and called the matter.
Several people seated in the courtroom scoffed at statements made by attorney Israel Khan, SC, who appears on behalf of the US government along with Dana Seetahal, SC, and Head of the Central Authority David West
Khan referred to evidence against the accused as being overwhelming and even poked fun at their attire, saying, ‘I am hearing people saying they (the accused) have no money to pay a lawyer and they have to apply for legal aid.
‘But this has nothing to do with anything. If they are improvised or how they look, whether it be like vagrants or otherwise, let it be known that terrorists come in all form, shape and fashion.’
Pointing out that Kadir was held on a flight to Venezuela where he was en route to Iran , Khan said the men were part of a conspiracy and needed to be extradited to face the charges against them.
As Khan continued his submissions, relatives of the men sat in disbelief, shook their heads and at times smiled at what he was saying.
The accused also shook their heads and smiled.
Before the accused left the prisoners’ docks, Ibrahiim told the court he was anxious for the matter to start, since ‘my health is in a serious situation and I would like to deal with it as soon as possible’.
When the matter was adjourned, relatives and supporters milled around at the side entrance of the court and shouted ‘God is the greatest’. They then presented fliers to reporters and passers-by proclaiming Ibrahiim’s innocence.
Source: http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=161160789
Jihad U’s Student Internship (back)
June 12, 2007
As I’ve documented in two previous articles in recent months, “Jihad U” and “Saudi Press Plugs America’s Jihad U”, the Al-Maghrib Institute has quickly become the most popular Islamic studies program in North America featuring active programs in almost 20 different cities across the country and thousands of supporters nationwide. With strong ties to both the Saudi Wahhabi religious establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Maghrib has leveraged its flashy presentations and motivational-style speakers to advance a radical jihadist ideology and extremist religious worldview. Thus far, at least one apt Al-Maghrib pupil has been willing to follow the implications of those teachings and put his education to use by taking up arms as a willing participant in the global jihad.
In a federal courtroom in Houston on April 19th, Daniel Joseph Maldonado, a.k.a. Daniel Aljughaifi, pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization – the first American to ever plead guilty to waging jihad overseas according to a Department of Justice press release. Maldonado was captured by Kenyan military forces in January of this year as the dwindling forces of the al-Qaeda-linked Somali Islamic Courts Union were attempting to flee from Ethiopian and Somali troops that had taken back most of Somalia from the terrorist organization’s control. He was turned over the American authorities in February, and following to his guilty plea he is due to be sentenced on June 29th.
According to a Houston Chronicle article, Maldonado grew up in New Hampshire the son of Puerto Rican immigrants and converted as an adult to Islam along with his wife. They both were high school drop-outs and their first child was born out-of-wedlock. Soon after converting, Maldonado began forcing his wife to wear a burqa, and the two allegedly fought after he had caught her shopping in jeans and a blouse.
Maldonado’s jihad student internship began when he moved to Egypt with his family in November 2005. In September 2006, he began explosives training in two al-Qaeda camps with an Islamic Courts Union bomb maker, was issued an AK-47, and equipped with military uniforms and boots. His military and physical fitness training continued until December, when he joined Islamic Courts Union forces tasked to defend against the military campaign by joint Ethiopian and Somali troops to reinstall the UN-recognized Somali government.
His connection to Al-Maghrib began when he moved to Houston to work for the company that owned and administered the notorious ClearGuidance.com jihadist online forum. While he was living in Houston he joined Al-Maghrib’s program, and the Al-Maghrib online forum still carries his public profile.
My critics will accuse me of engaging in guilt by association by noting Maldonado’s ties to the Al-Maghrib Institute. They will claim that he wasn’t actively involved with the organization or possibly even deny that any tie existed at all (though his online profile on the Al-Maghrib’s website would quickly put that claim to rest). I will readily admit that probably few Al-Maghrib students are currently planning to engage in violent or terrorist activities.
But nothing that Maldonado learned in his time with Al-Maghrib would contradict his jihadist ideology; quite the contrary, it would have reinforced it. Fed a steady diet of justifications for jihad, recitations of grievances against non-Muslims, and recounting of the history of Islamic imperialism and triumphalism, Maldonado’s extremist views found a nurturing environment in the Al-Maghrib Institute. He arrived in Houston with pre-existing radical views, but left Houston a jihadist. And even in Africa, Maldonado continued to log-on to Al-Maghrib’s online forums, for his latest activity on the website is dated August 21, 2006 – almost a year after he left Houston for Egypt .
Admittedly, only Daniel Maldonado can answer the question of how influential Al-Maghrib’s teachings were to developing his jihadist views or how his matriculation in Jihad U prepared him for his student internship waging jihad in Somalia .
An article in the North Andover Eagle-Tribune notes that Maldonado’s court-appointed attorney has claimed that his client had renounced his violent beliefs before his arrest, even though he was captured while traveling with other members of the Islamic Courts Union terrorist organization. Maldonado has also told law enforcement authorities that he didn’t believe the 9/11 attacks were evil and he wouldn’t have a problem killing other Americans. Hopefully, the federal judge in his case will take that into consideration when deciding his prison sentence.
Tragically, Maldonado’s wife, Tamekia, paid the ultimate price for her husband’s jihadist ideology. The Houston Chronicle reports that she died of malaria while the family was attempting to flee from Somalia , just days before Maldonado was captured by Kenyan troops. She is buried in an unmarked grave in an unknown location somewhere in Somalia . Her mother only learned of her daughter’s fate when the US Embassy in Nairobi contacted her after her son-in-law’s capture. The Maldonado’s now-orphaned children were flown back the US by the US government and are being cared for by his parents in Londonderry , New Hampshire – three additional innocent victims of the global jihad.
Al-Maghrib has thus far not issued any public statement on their former pupil.
Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28677
TERRORIST CONNECTIONS
A Terror Compound in New York ... or Misunderstood Neighbors? (back)
June 12, 2007
Hidden in a remote area off a primitive dirt road lies a mysterious 70-acre compound in which more than 100 Muslims live in seclusion, following the teachings of its founder, a radical cleric with alleged ties to terrorism.
It’s neither a Taliban stronghold outside Jalalabad, nor an extremist madrassa on the outskirts of Karachi .
It’s a place called Islamberg, a closed and seemingly quiet community at the foot of the Catskill Mountains in upstate New York , about three hours north of Manhattan .
It’s also a compound shrouded in local rumors, mystery — and fear — sitting near the huge reservoir system that provides New York City with most of its drinking water.
Quietly nestled in the woods, Islamberg remained unnoticed for the two decades leading up to Sept. 11, 2001, when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked by a determined band of Islamic extremists.
That’s when people started questioning the community’s ties to a Pakistani cleric allegedly connected to worldwide terrorism. They also started talking about the unusual sounds of gunfire and explosions some said they heard emanating from the compound.
But before you leap to conclusions and head to the Catskills to personally fight the war on terror — you need to know the entire story. The truth, as is often the case, is a lot more complicated than the headlines suggest.
Islamberg got its start about 20 years ago, when — inspired by the words of the Sufi cleric Sheikh Syed Mubarik Ali Shah Gilani — a group of primarily black Muslims from Brooklyn left New York City to escape crime, poverty and racism. Aiming to lead what they believed was a peaceful and holy Muslim life, they built a community of some 40 family houses, their own grocery store and a bookstore.
And they weren’t alone. Other groups, also inspired by Gilani, have set up similiar communities in 19 other states. According to the group’s own Web site, the Islamberg community is still ‘struggling,’ and is asking for donations to complete its mosque.
According to locals, the land previously belonged to a Deposit, N.Y., woman who opened up her home in the in the late 1970s or early ‘80s to disadvantaged youths from the city so that they could avoid being led astray by a financially and morally bankrupt urban environment.
Those boys, according to locals who were friendly with some of the group, eventually went on to form Islamberg, and at some point they were joined by another group of more militant Muslims, who created something of a rival faction within the community.
The group lived quietly there for years with little interaction with the local communities except for forays into town for supplies or to sell baked goods at the weekly flea market. Some of the men had jobs at a local credit-processing center or working for the Port Authority in New York City (where they are said to maintain a residence near a bridge that runs between two boroughs).
In the few instances when they did have relationships with the locals, they were almost always friendly, many said. Sometimes local children would visit their friends in the compound.
‘There was a sense of camaraderie with them,’ one woman said.
There was a notable exception, a situation involving the local schools in the late 1990s when some of the Islamberg boys got into a scuffle with local boys.
‘They broke my nephew’s nose,’ said a Hancock, N.Y., woman, who asked that her name not be used.
Another man said the Muslim boys ‘trashed’ the school in Deposit.
Locals variously blamed the fighting on an angry attitude on the part of the Muslim boys, racism on the part of the local boys or the ‘usual’ relatively trivial events that lead almost all teenage boys into a confrontation at one point or another in their lives.
According to Joy Felber, 62, a retired taxidermist who’s lived in Deposit for 19 years, the cause lay with a group of local boys who picked a fight with the Muslims.
‘We had some young boys in town who were causing trouble — not from the Muslim community — but they were antagonizing the boys in the Muslim community,’ Felber said. ‘It was lack of knowledge. When people don’t know other people, they have a tendency to lash out. And you put two teenage boys together and sparks fly.’
After a further controversy about whether the Islamberg boys should have been going to public school in Deposit or Hancock (the compound lies on the border between the two towns, and even longtime residents differ on whether it’s technically in Deposit, Hancock or nearby Tompkins), the boys were pulled from the schools and the Muslim community drew away from town life.
All Islamberg children are now schooled on the compound in a school that, according to one report, has a total of 62 students.
And then Sept. 11, 2001 happened. Anti-Muslim sentiment soared throughout the United States , and in the case of the Islamberg compound, concern grew among their neighbors.
Sheikh Syed Mubarik Ali Shah Gilani, the Pakistani Sufi cleric whom the Islamberg residents call their spiritual leader, has long been suspected of being one of the founders of a group called Jamaat al-Fuqra, a group that the U.S. and Pakistan say is responsible for a long list of terrorist activities around the world, including murders of rival religious figures in the U.S.
Gilani also was the man American reporter Daniel Pearl was going to see when he was abducted and murdered.
Gilani has denied any connection with either Pearl ‘s death or with Jamaat al-Fuqra.
The possible connection between Islamberg and extremist Islamic terrorism wasn’t lost on authorities.
‘We’ve had files on them for years,’ said Sgt. William Vymislicky of the New York State Police.
FBI Special Agent Richard Kolko said that he could neither confirm nor deny any current investigations, but that the bureau follows up on every reported case of possible terrorist activities.
And, according to some locals, the Islamberg community has given them plenty of reason to be wary. If you visit the compound’s entry gate, you will be stopped at a guard shack by men armed with guns. And some say that you sometimes can hear gunfire or even explosions coming from the area.
‘You’d better be careful if you go up there,’ several locals said. ‘They have guns.’
After Sept. 11, local rumors about the compound ran rampant, from the plausible to the patently ludicrous: The compound trained terrorists for combat; there was a tank buried somewhere on the grounds; Usama bin Laden had gone into hiding in the compound.
A series of articles about Islamberg in newspapers and on the Internet further fueled the flames, and people started to focus more closely on the work the men did on New York City’s bridges and tunnels, and how close the compound was to a major reservoir.
But other local residents say fears about Islamberg are unfounded. The region is a hunter’s paradise, practice shooting is a nearly universal hobby in the area, and the sounds of explosions most likely come from a very nearby quarry.
‘I live up on Columbia Lake and I hear gunshots all the time, and it’s not from the Muslim community,’ Felber said. ‘I always hear people practicing and shooting their guns and stuff.’
Of those locals who expressed fears about Islamberg, almost none of them said they had ever actually had any substantial interaction with anyone from the compound.
And though the community is noticeably less friendly that it once was, some say that it still welcomes those who make an effort to be sympathetic.
The doctor at the local clinic in Deposit, John Giannone, now fasts on Ramadan out of respect for the community’s beliefs and has maintained a relatively close relationship with the group. When his house was devastated by flooding that nearly wiped Deposit off the map in June 2006, volunteers from Islamberg came down and helped him clear out the debris and clean up the rental home his family had moved into. Giannone says they even did the dishes.
That flood was one occasion when Islamberg shone, according to many. According to several accounts, Islamberg men, women, boys and girls pitched in and helped clear debris, clean people’s basements, distribute food and maintain the emergency shelter where residents gathered. On July 4, the Muslims joined the rest of the community for a dinner to commemorate their shared adversity.
‘We were all just overwhelmed, and I remember the thanksgiving prayer that was said to bless everyone, no matter who you are and to bring the community together. And in that moment, we were a community, we were together as one,’ Felber said. ‘I couldn’t see a person that was going to be part of a terrorist group standing in a food line of thanksgiving there serving the community.’
But plenty of questions remain:
How close is Islamberg to Gilani?
How does it accept, reject or interpret the portions of his writings that espouse violence?
Does the community send people overseas or to other camps for training? And, if it does, exacly what kind of training?
How does the group see its relationship to the local community, and does it plan to do anything to improve it?
Islamberg’s elders refused a request to visit with them and tour the compound, citing a recent spate of negative publicity. For now, it remains an enigma in the mountains.
Source: unknown
Iran’s Foray Into Latin America (back)
February 5, 2007
When Iran ‘s firebrand president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, chose to visit three Latin American capitals earlier this month, there’s little doubt he meant his trip to irritate the Great Satan to the north. Sure enough, it had just that effect; ‘ Iran ‘s track record does not suggest it wishes to play a constructive role in the hemisphere,’ said Eric Watnik, a U.S. State Department spokesman. But U.S. officials are worried about more than just Tehran ‘s diplomacy these days. They fear that Iran might one day help its terrorist proxy, Hizbullah, set up shop throughout the United States ‘ backyard. Indeed, Latin America could be emerging as a quiet new front in the war on terror. So far, however, most regional governments remain unmoved by Washington ‘s requests that they clamp down, and the controversy could further damage some already fragile relationships.
The lawless tri-border region, where Argentina , Brazil and Paraguay meet, has long been a suspected locus for Hizbullah fund-raising, although the State Department continues to rate the threat of terror strikes as low in most of these countries. Last month U.S. Treasury officials issued a statement describing in detail how an established Hizbullah network, based in Ciudad del Este in eastern Paraguay , has sent millions of dollars to the terrorist group over the past two years. The report also fingered nine Lebanese men—most of whom hold Paraguayan or Brazilian passports—it claimed were running the operation.
Latin America is home to between 3 million and 6 million Muslims, many of whose forefathers came from Syria and Lebanon in the 19th century. They settled largely in Brazil (which now has more than 1.5 million Muslims), Argentina (which has 700,000), Venezuela and Colombia . The region is no stranger to terror operations allegedly bearing Tehran ‘s stamp.. In November, an Argentine judge issued arrest warrants for Iran ‘s ex-president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and eight of his associates for complicity in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. An Argentine prosecutor has traced the planning for that operation to a 1993 meeting in the Iranian city of Mashhad . But Iran has denied the charges and said it would ignore any extradition requests from the government of President Néstor Kirchner. The case has yet to produce a single conviction and remains a sore point with Kirchner, who two weeks ago abruptly canceled plans to attend the Inauguration of Ecuador’s new president, Rafael Correa, when he learned that Ahmadinejad would be there.
Sources in U.S. military intelligence have also identified Islamic radicals in the Brazilian cities of São Paolo and Curitiba , the Colombian town of Maicao , the Dutch Antilles island of Curaçao and the Chilean free port of Iquique , where one of Hizbullah’s fund-raisers traveled frequently to raise cash. The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, spent some time in Brazil in 1995, and another Qaeda operative named Adnan G. al-Shukrijumah visited Panama in 2001 while traveling on a passport issued by Trinidad and Tobago. Dozens of missionaries belonging to a Pakistani-based Islamic organization called Jamaat al-Tabligh are dispatched to the region each year in search of converts. ‘The bottom line is that there are Islamic radical groups throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and not just in the tri-border area,’ says a U.S. military intelligence official, who asked not to be named for security reasons. ‘ Latin America is still an area where it’s easy for people to move in and out of, and there are communities in which terrorists can hide.’ Now Iran ‘s increased outreach may be making matters worse, say diplomats. Jaime Daremblum, a former Costa Rican ambassador to the United States , called Iran ‘s new activism ‘a very explosive cocktail that’s being mixed.’
The State Department has credited Panama , El Salvador , Trinidad and Tobago , Jamaica and Mexico with stepping up their antiterror activities. Yet to Washington ‘s dismay, other local governments seem less willing to address the threat. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry responded to Washington ‘s charges last month by stating that Brazil , Argentina and Paraguay had found no evidence to corroborate the U.S. allegations about terrorist financing activity in the tri-border area. Brasília went on to complain that ‘unilateral declarations that point arbitrarily to the triple border cause undue damage to the region.’ Some regional governments have adopted a see-no-evil attitude, treating Hizbullah fund-raising, for example, as innocent cases of Arab immigrants’ sending cash remittances back home. ‘It’s difficult sometimes to get these countries to talk about the presence of terrorist organizations within their borders,’ says Patrick O’Brien, assistant Treasury secretary for terrorist financing. ‘But Hizbullah is a global organization, and we certainly think [their Latin operatives] are major figures in [this] activity.’
If some local governments appear reluctant to crack down on Iranian-backed groups or sever ties with Tehran , it may be because Ahmadinejad has worked hard to make himself an attractive friend. On his recent tour of the region, he promised to open an embassy in Managua , build dams and housing, and improve Nicaragua ‘s drinking-water supplies. Meanwhile, Venezuela ‘s President Hugo Chávez has worked closely with Iran inside OPEC to boost oil prices and has defended Ahmadinejad’s nuclear ambitions. During the Iranian president’s latest visit to Caracas , Chávez announced that a $2 billion investment fund previously established by the two countries would be used to ‘liberate’ other nations from what he called ‘the imperialist yoke.’
It’s no surprise, then, that U.S. concerns keep growing. The United States’ porous border with Mexico has long loomed as a tempting entry route for terrorists, and Latin America itself has until recently been what one expert calls a virtual ‘blind spot’ in Washington’s war against terror. ‘Law-enforcement officials are very concerned about [South America’s] becoming a transit point [for terrorists], and [governments in the region] have yet to demonstrate in any serious fashion their counterterrorism capacity,’ says Magnus Ranstorp, a specialist in militant Islamic movements at the Swedish National Defense College . ‘If I were a terrorist today, I’d be hiding out in South America .’ If Washington ‘s claims are right, some Islamic radicals have done just that, and with an expanding Iranian presence in the region, others may soon follow in their footsteps.
Source: unknown
Civil Rights Is A Form of Critizing Islam (back)
June 13, 2007
There exist a concerted attempt to undermine Islam and Muslims, in Malaysia , today. This structured effort is being generated from outside Malaysia and if unchecked, will lead to further instability with regards to the acceptance and sensitivities of Malaysian Muslim majority towards conversion outside Islam.
In a recent landmark case where Lina Joy wished to omit the word “Islam” from her MyKad, no longer depicting her faith in Islam, the Chief Justice of Malaysia ruled that “one cannot embrace or leave religion according to one’s whims and fancies”.
It was seen as people taking advantage of the case for their own narrow quest. Some say it was an attempt to test the system which protected the interests of the predominant Malay Muslim majority. The case attracted a lot of NGOs from abroad, hiding under the veil of universal values such as human rights.
Now, we can’t have that! How dare the world hold Islam to the concept of universal human rights? How dare they! But why stop at government issued identity cards as excuses for establishing human rights. What’s that saying. If you find yourself in hole – stop digging.
However, the structured effort still continue. Some of them tried to re-define and narrowly interpret Islam and/or the covenants and conventions that Islam stood for, for ill intent and skewed reasons. The Ministry of Internal Security recently banned 37 titles of books contained elements that will demean Islam, from the Malaysian perspective.
Another once moderate Muslim nation falls under the control of the Islamists.
Syariah Chief Judge Datuk Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahman said the decision meant that only the syariah court could judge cases involving Islam and apostates. “The decision cements the court as the authority on Islam in the country. If other courts were allowed to interject in Islamic cases, that would make the syariah court’s role redundant,” he said.
Yep. Secular governments are redundant. Don’t need them. But there is some good news coming from that part of the world – and Muslims don’t like it one bit.
The Howard government recently outdid its Western masters in the war on terror, announcing that it would begin banning and restricting materials that it deemed to be promoting ‘terrorism’.
The announcement alarmed activists who are already worried about the way in which Canberra is living up to its status as deputy sheriff for the US . It is common knowledge that the latest book-banning move did not target works bearing titles such as “How To Make A Bomb”. Nor did it mean removing books praising Hizbullah – the kind of book that could not have made it into the Australian bookshelves anyway, thanks to the intensely Islamophobic campaign being championed by a tiny, but vocal and powerful, segment of the country.
It’s called self-defense and cultural protection. Australia gets it and see the danger of anything that smacks of Islamic fundamentalism and won’t be intimidated by Islamist propaganda claiming their rights are being violated.
We can learn a lot from the Aussies.
Source: http://www.bloggernews.net/17677
http://gloria.idc.ac.il/freebooks.html
Free Books
The full length text of the books listed below are available for free in Adobe Acrobat and HTML format. Please note that because of the size of these files, downloading might take time (the better the connection, the faster the download). Copyright for these books is owned by Barry Rubin. Reproduction, except for quotations for academic or journalistic purposes, without the author’s written consent is strictly forbidden.
* Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin (eds.), Loathing America, Global Research in International Affairs Center, 2004. This is a collection of articles based on a project of the GLORIA Center made possible by a grant by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
Click here to download (pdf, 916 kb)
* Barry Rubin, Modern Dictators: Third World Coupmakers, Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants (published by McGraw-Hill, New York, 1987; British edition, WH Allen, 1987; paperback, New American Library/Meridian, 1988, two printings).
Click here to download (pdf, 868 kb) - Click here to read reviews and a summary
* Barry Rubin, Cauldron of Turmoil, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992.
Click here to download (pdf, 664 kb) - Click here to read a summary
http://gloria.idc.ac.il/articles/2007/rubin/06_13.html
Bush Goes Mainstream
Barry Rubin
June 13, 2007
U.S. Middle East policy has been quietly transforming itself into the near-opposite of what it has been under the Bush administration . To understand why, we must define its top-priority issue.
Most people respond, and understandably so, that the White House’s number-one priority is Iraq. How can the United States handle the very difficult question of how to extricate itself from Iraq? But this is not true for two reasons.
First, President George Bush does not want to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. The wisdom of this can be debated—the image comes to mind of the obsessive Captain Ahab being dragged down to the sea bottom by the whale Moby Dick which he has hunted beyond rational calculation—but the fact that it is true cannot. It is very likely that large numbers of U.S. combat troops will remain in Iraq down to President George W. Bush’s last day in office, in January 2009.
Second, U.S. policy has to take into account an increasingly confident, highly ambitious Iran trying to seize control there coupled with the growing power of revolutionary Islamist groups, which include Iraq’s own insurgency. The number-one issue for U.S. policy is thus a revised version of the War on Terror, which has now become the struggle with Middle East radicalism, especially in its radical Islamist form.
After September 11, 2001, the United States committed itself to fight against terrorist forces. At that moment, this meant al-Qaida and its Taliban allies in Afghanistan. Yet battling al-Qaida directly and disrupting terrorist attacks was only a relatively narrow task, and certainly no comprehensive Middle East policy.
So there was the additional idea of promoting democracy as a strategy in the Middle East. It is pretty funny that this idea of spreading human rights, higher living standards, and the rule of law to Middle Eastern societies was so easily transmuted by many in the West and most in the Middle East into ravenous imperialist aggression. But never mind, that’s for another column.
To summarize, U.S. policy has focused on fighting in Iraq, battling terrorism, and trying to spread democracy. And what happened on all three fronts shifted the focus somewhat. Many people forget that Iraq is facing so much bloodshed not because of the United States but due to the fact that terrorists are blowing people up, ready to wreck the country in order to rule it. So Iraq is not working out well due to the efforts of subversion by Iran, Iraq, and the insurgents.
As for the battle against terrorism, al-Qaida is certainly important in Iraq but its efforts are only a portion of the terrorism problem, for much terrorism is also being sponsored by Iran and Syria, carried out by groups like Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, among a number of others. Once again, the focal point of the problem becomes the ambitions of Middle East radicals.
And finally, democracy as a policy has been discredited by the successes of radical Islamists in Egypt, Lebanon, and among the Palestinians, though one might add Iraq and Turkey to some extent.
So this brings us back to the new priority of U.S. policy: the struggle between two groups, with Iran, Syria, and a number of radical Islamist and terrorist groups on the other side.
This is the defining issue of U.S. policy and it is almost with an audible sigh of relief that all these strange and unfamiliar notions of democracy promotion, fighting terrorism, and regime change can be jettisoned for the familiar concept of a struggle between two blocs. It is thus like a conventional war, or the Cold War, or the usual formula of international affairs: Bloc A against Bloc B.
Thanks for bearing with me through this explanation of how things look in 2007. Now, how to deal with it? In general, one sees two major strategies proposed.
One of them, much promoted by a large element of the academic-intellectual-media class, the left posing as liberals, is that this conflict is a mistake, a misunderstanding, which can be talked out of existence. The radicals must either have their own real interests explained to them or receive Western concessions in order to behave themselves.
This camp’s watchwords are: appease, explain, and engage. They see the problem not only as Islamophobia but also Islamismphobia. For them blame always lies with the United States, Israel, or the West in general. The reasons for this stance include: ignorance; a reaction against the Bush administration’s many failures and a frothing hatred of it, fear of facing facts which require risk and conflict; hatred of their own society; and short-range partisanship against the incumbents.
What has happened in the last few months is that the administration has heeded the criticisms of its mainstream and, to a lesser extent, more extreme critics. In the latter case, it has reduced the policy of pressuring Syria and Iran through isolation. High-ranking U.S. officials met with both.
More emphasis, however, is put on helping “good guys,” those not siding with Iran and Syria, against those “bad guys.” Thus, U.S. policy wants to align with the Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi, and just about every other Arab regime. The democracy policy is downgraded or dead. And Fatah, despite its continued terrorism and radicalism, is seen mainly as a bulwark against radical Islamism. So now U.S. aid is to be paid directly into a PLO bank account, along with arms and training for Fatah. In addition, U.S. policy wants to keep European countries happy by not going further than they want on Iran while showing them that it is energetically pursuing Israel-Palestinian negotiations.
The bottom line is that U.S. policy has now become pretty much a historically mainstream one, a new Cold War with the names changed, a traditional alignment with more moderate against more radical Arabs and Muslims. The irony is that this means, except for refusing to withdraw from Iraq, it is close to the views of Bush’s more mainstream domestic enemies.
Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book, The Truth about Syria was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in May 2007. Prof. Rubin’s columns can be read online at: http://gloria.idc.ac.il/articles/index.html.
The Radicals’ Not-So-Secret Winning Strategy
Barry Rubin
March 7, 2007
The world’s radical regimes—especially Iran, Syria, North Korea, and their associated client groups—have come up with a brilliant strategy that breaks every rule in the diplomatic book and yet works brilliantly. The West’s inability to cope with this approach—indeed, failure even to comprehend it—has been one of the biggest problems in Middle Eastern and world politics for the last few decades.
The basic rules of diplomacy go something like this:
- States that act aggressively or systematically subvert neighbors (using tools like terrorism) know they will be punished and so don’t do it;
- Governments seek to resolve conflicts, especially if they are losing them;
- Powerful states can deter less strong adversaries from violating their interests by the threat of force or sanctions;
- Weaker states want to avoid violent confrontations with stronger ones, fearing the cost of defeat;
- Governments must try to address the suffering of their citizens, and if they don’t deliver the goods, they get overthrown.
All the above points make sense. Western politicians, diplomats, academics, and journalists all expect that other countries will follow these rules. When they don’t do so, often they reinterpret the other governments’ behavior—out of ignorance or disbelief—to conform to them.
You might call this system, “moderation insurance” because it tends to discourage regimes from acting in an adventurous manner and knocks out of existence those who disregard these rules. In fact, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, while so highly controversial, could be called a normal application of the rules of international affairs. Another example of the system is the balance of power, which has so often prevented war—the U.S.-Soviet, Greek-Turkish, and India-Pakistan balances usually worked to keep the peace.
Starting in the 1950s, however, radical Arab nationalist, and later Islamist regimes, simply threw away this rule book. Their less extremist neighbors—like Saudi Arabia and Jordan—believed they were making a big mistake by doing so. Watch out, they warned, the West is going to crush you! Do you think it will let you get away with sponsoring terrorism, starting wars, overthrowing the shah of Iran, and disregarding their interests in every way?
But surprise, surprise, the radicals have generally gotten away with their strategy and often they have prospered from it. This inspired revolutionary opposition movements to use similar tactics and even relatively moderate countries to step up their anti-Western propaganda and ignore Western demands or interests.
A key element in this strategy is that it plays to the strengths of the perpetrators and the perceived weaknesses of the West. On their side, the radicals have several advantages: they like conflict; are patient; not bound by morality (that is, they don’t mind murdering people in cold blood); and are willing to suffer (or, rather, let their people suffer since the dictators always eat well). Since they are dictators, they don’t care about public opinion and even mobilize it for themselves through demagoguery. (As dictators, they also control the schools and media.)
In contrast, the West likes peace, is impatient for solutions, and doesn’t like casualties. As democracies, their people are divided and thus vulnerable to the extremists’ propaganda.
So what are the main elements of the radicals’ regulations?
1. Ignore the balance of forces. Who cares if the other side is stronger? What are they going to do, attack us?
2. And if they attack us, let our people suffer to make them feel guilty. Use demagoguery at home to promote the appeal of martyrdom and launch appeals for sympathy abroad.
3. Never end a conflict even if you are losing; never make major concessions because keeping the issue open may mean you will win, and get everything, in the future. Show you are willing to destroy everything and go on fighting forever in order to discourage the other side.
4. Fool the West with propaganda; promise to be good if they only give you what you want. Get concessions and then break your promises about giving anything.
5. Throw in some offers of compromise periodically, even if you don’t stick to them. Western leaders will rush to make a deal in order to avoid confrontation.
Thus, in the 1950s and 1960s, Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser said that, if the West doesn’t like what we do, let them drink the Nile. In the 1970s and 1980s, Iranian dictator Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said, the West cannot do a damn thing. Yasir Arafat committed terrorism for 30 years and made the West fund him and beg for his cooperation. Saddam Hussein in the 1990s said, let them continue sanctions, rather than fulfill his commitments. Today, there is Iran’s nuclear campaign and Syria’s terrorism against its neighbors.
There are some specific countries—especially India, Israel, South Korea and Turkey—whose survival requires them to make an equally tough response with popular support at home. In contrast, crippled by European weakness and its own intellectual fifth column, its priority on high living standards and low levels of bloodshed, the West has a hard time dealing with this problem.
And yet, nevertheless, the West and democratic world will win, for the traditional rules ultimately will apply. For example, the extremists force the West to oppose them by their very aggressiveness; economic and strategic superiority does count. The problem is that this new radical strategic superweapon makes it harder and longer to achieve this result.
Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His co-authored book, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography, (Oxford University Press) is now available in paperback and in Hebrew. His latest book, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, was published by Wiley in November 2005. Prof. Rubin’s columns can be read online at: http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/column.html.
http://gloria.idc.ac.il//articles/2007/rubin/03_07.html
http://gloria.idc.ac.il/articles/2007/rubin/06_06.html
A Guide for the Depressed
Barry Rubin
June 6, 2007
Almost daily nowadays—I’m tempted to write, “almost hourly”—one sees atrocities in deeds and shamefulness in words. Friends, colleagues, and readers often tell me how depressing it is to live in these times.
I could give lots of examples but will let you choose your own. Caught between the big mistakes of one’s own leaders, extremist ideologies and movements in large parts of the world, irresponsiblity of too much of the media, and the abandonment of Enlightenment standards in intellectual discourse, it is easy to feel down.
Wow, I better stop here as I’m depressing myself. And yet, while there is much reason to be disgusted and a good basis for worrying, I tell them that things will turn out all right. Western civilization is not on the road to collapse; the Middle East is not going to be taken over by al-Qaida or the Muslim Brotherhood, and so on.
Agreed, it isn’t enough just to assert a happy ending is inevitable, so let’s look at some key factors as to why this is so:
First, the worse things get, the more people realize that things have gotten worse. Precisely the experience of seeing how intransigent and murderous are the extremists, how efforts at negotiation fail, how past concessions are exploited to bash those who make them, how dangerous Islamism is, among other factors, forces countries to react against them, intellectuals to denounce them, and public opinion to shift against them.
This is the process followed in the crises of dealing with fascism in the 1930s and 1940s, and with communism in the 1940s and 1950s. John F. Kennedy, or at least his ghostwriter, penned a book called Why England Slept on the first of these three ordeals. Bruce Bawyer wrote a good book entitled Why Europe Slept regarding the current one. Foreign terrorists and domestic fools provide the wake-up calls.
Second, the enemy side makes big mistakes. They push too far, demand too much, shoot off their mouths as well as their guns. The ideological extremism, tendency toward endless splits, blatant dishonesty, and inability to build alliances all take their toll. They simply cannot keep up their pretenses at moderation.
The mask falls all too often. Hamas, Hizballah, Ahmadinejad all provide good examples of this phenomenon in the Middle East. On Western campuses, extremist academics and students horrify onlookers. Most people in the West don’t hate their own countries and will be put off with those who all too obviously do.
Third, a lot of the current unpleasantness, at least in the West, is transient. It is the belated tantrum of the 1960s’ generation’s old radicals. This is not to deny that there are many younger imitators but the leadership and impetus is coming from those veterans of so many dubious battles, to use the novelist John Steinbeck’s phrase about the 1930s.
I have found that most undergraduates just don’t accept the propaganda they are being fed, about the Middle East and other things. Yes, it will have a lasting impact but some of that will be a reaction against nonsense.
Another factor here is the hysterical hatred of President George W. Bush or, if you prefer it this way, the impact of that government’s divisive and mistaken policies. On January 20, 2009, Bush will leave office. If his replacement is anywhere near mainstream, that person is going to follow more than 80 percent of the current U.S. foreign policy program, Iraq being the big exception of course. I estimate that about 25 percent of current craziness will fade rather quickly, both in the United States and in Europe. The more hardcore silly people will carry on but at lot of the support will fall away.
Finally, I am tempted to quote the saying that “the dogs bark but the caravan moves on” though that can no doubt be twisted into some politically incorrect slur. Let’s just put it this way: Don’t pay too much attention to op-eds, the rantings of academics (or in Britain, academic unions), and even certain newspapers which seem to resemble campus revolutionary clubs more than great metropolitan dailies.
George Orwell, one of the best guides to the current insanity given his dealings with the last round, once referred to an idea so stupid that only an intellectual would believe it. This hurts me to say but such people all too often lack both responsibility and a sense of the real world. They have set themselves up as a counter-force to those who govern and run the economy.
Angry, jealous, dissatisfied, they believe they could do a better job. William F. Buckley, the American conservative intellectual, once stated that he would rather be governed by people chosen randomly off the street than the faculty of Harvard University. History has absolved him on that concept.
What better way to end than to quote a poem written by Orwell in June 1943:
“I wrote in nineteen-forty that at need
I’d fight to keep the Nazis out of Britain....
How shocked the pinks were! ...
One had the effrontery
To write three pages calling me a ‘traitor,’
So black a crime it is to love one’s country.
Your game is easy, and its rules are plain....
Cry havoc when we bomb a German city,
When Czechs get killed don’t worry in the least....
Don’t mention Jews—in short, pretend the war is
Simply a racket “got up” by the Tories.”
You know, sort of like the War on Terrorism or the struggle with radical Islamism.
Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book, The Truth about Syria was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in May 2007. Prof. Rubin’s columns can be read online at: http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/column.html.
http://gloria.idc.ac.il/articles/2007/spyer/06_11.html
The Long War Strategy?
By Jonathan Spyer
The Guardian, June 11, 2007
The decision by the University and College Union (UCU) to consider a boycott of Israel is the latest manifestation of a broader process which has been steadily gathering speed in the last half-decade: the converging of opinion on the Middle East conflict among members of two camps, who might ordinarily be considered to have little in common.
The two camps are the European radical left and supporters - both in Europe and here, in the region of Islamist states and organisations. The alliance is built around a joint commitment to Israel’s disappearance from the map.
Supporters of these streams sometimes gather together. The “anti-war” conference in Cairo in April of this year, attended by representatives of Hamas, Hizbullah and European extreme-left and Islamist groups, was organised jointly by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Socialist Revolutionary party. Leaders of Respect - that joint venture of far-leftists and Muslim Brothers - were also in attendance.
But the important cross-pollination is taking place in the realm of ideas and strategies, rather than joint political organisation.
Israel’s regional enemies are currently in a state of euphoria. The failures of the second Lebanon war, combined with the possibly imminent eclipse of US strategy in Iraq, and the emergence of Iran as an active sponsor and inspiration for radical Islamist organisations, have combined to produce in the region an atmosphere familiar to students of its history. This mood might aptly be termed “pre-conflict euphoria”. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent contention that the “countdown to Israel’s destruction has begun” perfectly captures it.
A previous manifestation of this phenomenon in the region took place in the period between Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990, and his expulsion from there in Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. The atmosphere in Arab capitals prior to the war of June 1967, and the lionisation of the Palestinian guerrillas in 1968-70 are similar instances. On all these occasions, broad swathes of the intelligentsia and the people of a number of regional states came to believe that after many failures, they had finally found the blueprint for defeating Israel, and undoing the shame inherent in its creation.
Today, among those states, organisations and people in the region who reject Israel’s continued existence, there is a perception that the correct strategy for producing the eventual demise of the Jewish state has been found. The new strategy has been likened to the antique far-left doctrine of “prolonged popular war”.
According to this view, conventional battlefield confrontation is only one of a variety of means to be employed to achieve the desired end. Ongoing, demoralising guerrilla attacks, which sap will and morale, the constant maintenance of conflict - with the intention of preventing successful societal development, and a parallel political strategy of delegitimisation and isolation - are all key ingredients. The perceived combination of sophistication and indefatigability represented by Hizbullah in Lebanon is a key model and source of inspiration in this.
Victory here is not predicated on a Syrian armored column entering Tel Aviv. The intention is to gradually whittle away at the various components of Israel’s strength. The goal is to make of Israel a “failed state”, in which the pursuit of normal life becomes impossible.
This is where the various international delegitimisation initiatives come in. Initiatives such as the UCU boycott are the result of the efforts of a fairly small number of people. The anti-Israel boycott campaign offers a chance for activists of fringe political organisations to “punch above their weight” and for a moment take centre stage. The people behind the latest move in Britain, for example, are members of a small far-left party - the Socialist Workers party.
But such figures have been able to emerge from eccentric obscurity precisely because of the current febrile mood regarding Israel and the Middle East conflict among significant parts of educated British opinion.
Thrilled by the militant challenge offered by the popular war strategy and its supporters, the boycotters wish to cast themselves in the mould of the anti-Vietnam war and anti-apartheid campaigners of the past. They will do their bit by cutting the ties of support linking the enemy entity to its western backers through commerce, trade, and cultural and educational links. Israel, in the analogy, is to play the unflattering role of Thieu’s doomed South Vietnamese republic, or the apartheid regime.
Ultimately, the followers of the strategy of prolonged popular war and their international cheerleaders are advocates of failed ideologies, backed by states whose achievements in the field of societal and economic development are modest in the extreme. Previous outbreaks of pre-conflict euphoria in 1967, 1970 and 1990-91, ended in defeat and humiliation. In all three of the previous cases cited, however, it is worth noting that the mood eventually faded as a result of a decisive military humiliation suffered by its main protagonists. This time, hopefully, another way will be found in time to deflate the ugly, politicidal alliance now gathering strength.
Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya.
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a6.html
MIDDLE EAST ISLAMISM IN THE EUROPEAN ARENA
By Reuven Paz
http://w-n-n.net/showthread.php?p=28381#post28381
Allahu Akbar
“Honor, Power and Glory belong to Allah, His Messenger and the believers, but the hypocrites know not”
Don’t forget us in your prayers
Your brothers in
Al-Furquan foundation for media production
The Islamic State of Iraq / Information Ministry
Jumada al-Awal 29 , 1428
14/06/2007
[the jihadi video for today, with all the ____ links...granny]
http://www.ict.org.il/apage/printv/11847.php
Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat
Mr. Akiva Lorenz
Read as pdf.
April 15, 2007
I. Introduction
II. Definition of Maritime Terrorism
III. Historical overview
IV. Al Qaeda Background
V. Wake-up calls
VI. Analyzing the USS Cole Incident
A. Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri
B. Planning Cycle – Recruitment
C. Planning Cycle – Preparation
D. Planning Cycle – Procurement
E. Planning Cycle – Conclusion
VII. Post USS Cole Attack Skims
VIII. Global Maritime Trade Links
A. Weaknesses – Vessels
B. Weaknesses – Ports
C. Weaknesses – Containers
IX. Response
X. Conclusion
XI. Bibliography
Read as pdf
ALMT.jpg
I. Introduction
Terrorism is a phenomenon which citizens of most countries have been tragically familiar with long before the infamous 9/11 attacks in the United States. Despite the long history of a successful fight against the plague of traditional forms of political terrorism, security services have underestimated the threat which militant Islam poses to the Western world. Only the tragic death of about three thousand innocent and unsuspecting citizens on 9/11 opened people’s eyes to visualizing the changing threat. It further exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern, increasingly open, and interdependent societies to highly organized terrorist groups.
Incidents such as the attacks on Super Ferry 14 (February 2004), the Madrid train bombing (March 2004), and the London tube bombing (July 2005) demonstrated in the most graphic and chilling way the vulnerability to transportation infrastructures. From this perspective, the question has changed from which country might be the terrorists’ next target, to which mode of transportation would next attract their interest.
As an immediate reaction to these attacks, U.S. officials reviewed shipping and port security, and established security initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, the international community, in form of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), established the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). However, Al Qaeda operatives, acting in a fast learning and maximizing terrorist network, have learned to adapt to this rapidly changing environment. They appear to have stayed at least one step ahead of the security services invoked thus far by modifying their recruitment and the organizational structure.
Examples of their adaptability are the attacks on the USS Cole (October 2000) and MV Limburg (October 2002). Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to analyze Al Qaeda’s maritime capabilities. Its past operations will be reviewed, new developments will be discussed, and projections will be given in order to help security services ensure a safer tomorrow.
II. Definition of Maritime Terrorism
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered an extensive definition for maritime terrorism:
“…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.”
This definition, however, does not define what terrorism is and whether it would only include maritime attacks against civilian (merchant) vessels or also attacks against military crafts. I define maritime terrorism, therefore, as the use or threat of violence against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facility, or if the purpose is solely a platform for political ends. The definition can be expanded to include the use of the maritime transportation system to smuggle terrorists or terrorist materials into the targeted country.
Maritime terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target. Piracy, in contradistinction, according to article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is defined as[1]:
(a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship
or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas[2], against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph (a) or (b).”
Given these definitions, the grey area are cases of kidnap-for-ransom incidents, such as the May 2001 abduction of three American citizens and 17 Filipinos at the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Al Qaeda affiliate[3]. Motivated by the need to finance their political aims, ASG repeatedly perpetrated such acts of piracy. Their actions are an example of the blurring of the distinction between terrorism and piracy.
III. Historical overview
Historically, the world’s oceans have not been a major venue for terrorist activity. According to the RAND Corporation’s terrorism database, maritime terrorist attacks have accounted for only two percent of all incidents since 1969.[4] This relatively small number originates from the fact that security forces have had to deal with traditional terror groups. These groups can be divided into three major categories: (1) the vestiges of political terrorism (November 17, New Red Brigades, etc.), (2) separatist-irredentist terrorist groups (PIRA, ETA, The National Liberation Front of Corsica, etc.) and (3) foreign terrorist groups (Hamas, PKK, LTTE, etc.) - the latter using third (Western) countries as their support base[5]. All these groups are characterized by their hierarchical, pyramidal structure and centralized command system. Almost all groups have a regional or local operational agenda using terrorism to target specific people or places, often giving early warnings that result reduce the damage to small numbers or individual casualties.
The sophistication, expense, and training to carry out maritime terrorism necessitates considerable overhead. It would require terrorist organizations to acquire appropriate vessels, mariner skills and, specialist weapons / explosive capabilities.[6] Many terrorist groups are either not located near to coastal regions or do not possess the necessary means to carry out maritime attacks. Limited by scarce financial and operational resources, most traditional terrorist organizations have decided not to venture into the maritime arena as the ends do not justify their means. Therefore, following more pragmatic methods, many terrorist groups have preferred to stay with proven successful land based terrorism, especially when are not too difficult to target.
Initially, terrorism was primarily a means to attract the attention of the media, not to cause mass casualties. In the words of Brian Jenkins, an advisor to the RAND Corporation, the terrorists wanted “a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” However, with international media networks only being in the fledgling stages of development, strategists in terrorist organizations assumed that maritime attacks in the open sea would fail to generate their desired hysteria. Moreover, pragmatism and a degree of realism often brought the political wing of terrorist organizations to realize that terrorism was not the best means of achieving their aims, but that they had a better chance of achieving their goals by political means.[7] This, as well as the successful implementation of counter-terrorist strategies, led to the decline of traditional terrorism over the past decade.
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is a prime example of a traditional, European terrorist group, satisfying all the elements mentioned above. Between 1970 and 1996, the PIRA was the best-armed and most experienced terrorist group in Western Europe. During the 1980s, the PIRA smuggled more then 100 tons of arms and explosives from Libya to Ireland using container ships registered under flags of convenience.[8] Although the PIRA was responsible for killing more civilians than any other terrorist group in Europe[9], only a small percentage was due to attacks on passenger ferries and private yachts, such as the attack of the private yacht of Lord Mountbatten in 1979.[10] The bomb destroyed the yacht, killing Mountbatten, two of his godchildren and one crewman.
The PIRA focused primarily on its regional, ethno-separatist objectives in Northern Ireland with the overall goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland and uniting the whole of Ireland under a single Republican government. To gather political support, raise money and acquire weapons, the PIRA undertook enormous efforts to establish a Diaspora network outside of Great Britain.
Eventually, the signing of the “Good Friday Agreement,” known also as the “Belfast Agreement,” on April 10, 1998 between most of the parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein (the political arm of the IRA) and the British and Irish governments increased pressure on the PIRA to cease and desist its activities. After several decades of using terrorism as their main instrument to achieve their aims, the PIRA finally agreed in July 2005 to a cease fire, and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.[11]
Among the most experienced traditional terrorist groups that possess maritime capabilities are the Middle Eastern Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Fatah, Hezbollah and the South East Asian Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
IV. Al Qaeda Background
In recent years, many governments have faced an enemy that is best described as a loose cooperative of terrorist networks without the clearly defined, hierarchical structure and centralized control mechanism that characterizes traditional terrorist groups. The largest alliance of Islamic groups is the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. A member of this alliance, the Al Qaeda (trans.: “the base”) movement was founded in 1988 under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden[12] to function ideologically and operationally at local, national, regional and global levels.
The Al Qaeda movement was an offshoot of the Maktab al-Khidamat, MAK, (Services Office), which was founded in 1984 by Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader Dr. Abdallah Yousuf Azzam, together with his protégé, Osama Bin Laden. Inspired by the Iranian Revolution (1979), the MAK recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign Sunni Islamic extremists to fight as mujahadeen (holy warriors) in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. Toward the end of the Afghan war, Osama Bin Laden, as other mujahideen, wanted to expand the struggle beyond Afghanistan. Through its widely disperse cells and affiliates, Al Qaeda maintains a global reach in over 60 countries.[13]
Prior to 9/11, the leadership of Al Qaeda saw their mission as the training of as many operatives as possible and thus successfully staying beneath the radar of most intelligence agencies. However, Al Qaeda had to adapt to the changes brought about by “Operation Enduring Freedom” (October 2001) when allied forces gathered to fight U. S. President George Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” This offensive successfully destroyed Al Qaeda’s training bases, along with command and control headquarters, in what Dr. Rohan Gunaratna described as the “terrorist Disneyland” of Afghanistan.[14]
Al Qaeda’s horizontal network[15] structure assured the continuation of what militant Islam views as defensive jihad. Although some operational capabilities where lost, Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, continued to provide the ideological and religious inspiration, while their followers and affiliate terrorist groups continued to carry out the actual terror attacks. The result is that today there are “many Al Qaedas rather than the single Al Qaeda of the past.”[16] These ad-hoc groups consist of like-minded individuals, often Muslim converts, with no prior involvement in terrorism. Noteworthy is the new trend of extremists with (petty) criminal records being involved in terrorist attacks, as was the case in the train bombings in Madrid.[17] These adversaries are arguably more difficult to detect and to counter.
Al Qaeda’s core ideology is the notion of global jihad against “apostate” Muslim rulers, the Crusaders and Zionists, such as the U.S. and its allies.[18] Their jihad will come to fruition with the formation of a pan-Islamic Caliphate. Bin Laden argued that jihad, as a divine command, is an individual responsibility incumbent upon every Muslim; “It is no secret that warding off the American enemy is the top duty after faith and that nothing should take priority over it.”[19] The willingness to sacrifice one’s life “in the path of Allah”, is also known as Ishjihad. According to Bin Laden, the first phase of the jihad will occur in counties which are entirely Muslim with a foundation of radical Islamic ideas, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Then, counties with large Muslim minorities, such as Singapore, Philippines and certain countries in Europe (e.g., France) would be targeted. Lastly, jihad will be delivered to the rest of the Western world. It is clear, therefore, that Al Qaeda, unlike traditional separatist-irredentist terrorist groups (like the PIRA), does not want to become part of today’s international (political) system, but to replace it entirely.
To reach its followers and affiliate cells, Al Qaeda uses the technological blessings of today’s globalized world. This is especially true regarding the internet, which is used as a multimedia medium, not only allowing its top ideologues to conduct psychological warfare illustrating their propaganda in myriad of written statements and audio or videos recordings that are posted either on web pages or blogs, but also to raise necessary funds for a continuous struggle.
Al Qaeda sees this struggle not as one of weeks or months, or even years, but of decades. Therefore, its ideology is absolutist and non-negotiable. This reduces the possibility of finding a political solution to nearly zero. Al Qaeda’s fatawa (trans.: religious opinions) call for total war, permitting the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents against their enemies.[20] Their tactics typically make use of coordinated, near-simultaneous suicide attacks, using traditional means such as car bombs, to cause mass casualties. At the same time, it is an organization whose strategists often think outside the box, as seen in its transformation of hijacked airplanes into missiles in the 9/11 attacks. Since the assassination of Theo Van Gogh (November 2004) by a seemingly well integrated Dutch and Moroccan citizen, Mohammed Bouyeri, who was radicalized by the propaganda of radical Islam, it has become clear that Al Qaeda tries to exploit the sense of alienation, humiliation and frustration experienced by Muslim immigrants in order to convince them to return to the values of Islam and rise up against their society. All of this points towards a change in the traditional strategies; now terrorists want not only “a lot of people watching,” but also “a lot of people dead.”
V. Wake-up call
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, was attacked by a small craft loaded with 270 kg of C-4 explosives while making a routine refill stop in the port of Aden, Yemen. Steered by two Saudi suicide terrorists, Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al-Thawar, the small craft exploded alongside the USS Cole 47 minutes after the refueling was initiated, killing 17 U. S. servicemen and injuring 37 more.[21] The attack caused $250 million in damage to the warship taking 14 months to repair.[22]
VI. Analyzing the USS Cole Incident
As noted above, Al Qaeda has demonstrated its capabilities to successfully operate and attack maritime vessels. Similar to Al Qaeda’s carefully planned plot over several year to use airplanes to attack strategic targets that cumulated in the tragedy of 9/11, the planning to attack maritime targets which resulted in the USS Cole bombing was put in motion as early as 1998.[23]
A. Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri
The mastermind of maritime terrorist operations for Al Qaeda (until his capture in Aden in November 2002) was Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri, otherwise known as the Prince of the Sea. Born in Mecca on January 5, 1965, al-Nashiri left formal education after intermediate school to follow the footsteps of his cousin and uncles in pursuit of jihad in Tajikistan (1996).[24] In 1996, he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he encountered Osama Bin Laden, who attempted to convince al-Nashiri to join Al-Qaeda’s jihad against the Americans. Al-Nashiri, at this point, refused because he found the idea of swearing a loyalty oath to Bin Laden to be distasteful.
Leaving Afghanistan, Nashiri returned to his native Saudi Arabia. He subsequently visited his home in Yemen. According to transcripts of his interrogation[25], it was there that al-Nashiri, eyeing the stream of U.S and foreign ships plying the waters along the coast of Yemen, conceptualized and developed the idea of using maritime terrorism. Returning to Afghanistan in 1997, al-Nashiri was still not willing to join bin Laden. Instead, he pursued a conventional jihad mission in fighting alongside Taliban forces against the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Massoud. During this time, al-Nashiri was also involved in the smuggling of four Russian-made Sagger anti-tank missiles from Yemen into Saudi Arabia which characterizes his metamorphosis towards Al Qaeda.
Having witnessed the martyrdom of his cousin Mohammad Ali al Makki (Azzam) in the Nairobi embassy bombing, al-Nashiri finally joined Al Qaeda in 1998. Shortly thereafter, al-Nashiri was tasked by Bin Laden to attack U.S. or Western oil tankers off the cost of Yemen.[26] Having difficulties finding appropriate targets along the western coast of Yemen, Bin Laden reportedly instructed him to shift his operational arena to the port of Aden and towards U.S. navy vessels.[27] Realizing that the average refueling stop of a U.S military vessel in the port of Aden was just less than four hours (the window of opportunity) al-Nashiri highlighted the importance of a good intelligence system based on informers. These sources were working for the Aden harbor or were posted along the Read Sea. The result of his intelligence capabilities were the attempted attack on the USS Sullivan (January 2000) and the successful attack on the USS Cole (October 2000) that brought al-Nashiri an elevated status within Al Qaeda.
Later, al-Nashiri became chief of operations for Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula consulting with Bin Laden while keeping operational security in selecting operatives and the formulation of new attacks. According to Michael Richardson, a visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, al-Nashiri based his operation on four pillars:[28]
· using a zodiak speed boat packed with explosive to ram warships or other ships;
· using medium sized boats as bombs to be blown up near slips or ports;
· using airplanes to ram boats; and
· having underwater demolition teams.
Until his capture in Aden on November 2002, al-Nashiri developed plans to attack U.S. warships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gibraltar, to bomb the fifth fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and to crash a small aircraft into the bridge of an allied navy vessel docked in the U.A.E.’s port Rashid. Due to his involvement in the USS Cole bombing, al-Nashiri, he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by a Yemeni court. Al-Nashiri is currently detained by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[29]
B. Planning Cycle – Recruitment[30]
Soon after al-Nashiri became the operational commander for Al Qaeda’s maritime terrorism plot in Yemen (Spring 1999), Tawfiq Muhammed Salah Bin Roshayd Bin Attash (Khallad) wrote a recommendation letter to help al-Nashiri enlist local Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi (facilitator), and Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, to command logistics. Furthermore, al-Nashiri enlisted Saudis with Yemini background, Hassan Awadh al-Khamri (Hassan) and Ibrahim al-Thawar (Nibras), as potential future suicide bombers.
C. Planning Cycle - Preparation[31]
In early Summer of 1999, Badawi leased, on behalf of al-Nashiri, a safe house for six months in a quiet neighborhood of Aden. To ensure privacy, the group installed a gate and increased the height of the fence surrounding the residence. Furthermore, on request of al-Nashiri, Badawi traveled to Saudi Arabia to purchase a boat large enough to carry explosives, and a trailer and truck to tow the boat from the safe house to the harbor. Then, the boat was filled with C-4 explosives and readied for transport.
On January 3, 2000, al-Nashiri and his team brought the boat to the harbor after receiving word of the arrival of the USS Sullivan. Shortly after the launch, the boat steered by Hassan and Nibras sank in shallow water due to the large amount of explosives on board. On January 4, 2000 the group returned in order to salvage the boat and its precious cargo. The accident, thought to be al-Nashiri’s most important lesson, was that a rehearsal is an essential part of the successful outcome of an operation. Rehearsal reveals logical problems (such as a boat being too heavy from too many explosives) and improves the speed, stealth, and the surprise factor in an attack.
After the failed attack on the USS Sullivan, Quso and Nibras traveled to Bangkok, Thailand to meet with Khallad. Because Bangkog was chosen (in Pakistan) in order not to arise the suspicion of intelligence services, Quso was directed to shave and wear western-style clothing. The men reportedly received approximately $36,000 from Khallad.
D. Planning Cycle - Procurement[32]
In the Summer of 2000, Hassan leased a new safe house in Aden. As before, a fence was built to ensure privacy. Moreover, Hassan also leased an apartment overlooking the harbor to serve as an observation point. Al-Nashiri and Khallad traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Bin Laden and test explosives.
Over the summer, al-Nashiri and others refitted the boat and replaced the old explosives. In September 2000, Badawi trained Quso to operate a camera in order to film the attack. Khallad returned to Afghanistan while Bin Laden, in an interview with an Arabic language television station, called for jihad for the release of the “brothers in jail ‘everywhere’.”
On October 12, 2002, after receiving news about the USS Cole, the group transports the ship to the launch site. Slowly approaching the USS Cole, Hassan and Nibras waved their hands in a friendly gesture. Shortly afterwards their explosion left a 40 foot hole on the side of the USS Cole and killed 17 U. S. servicemen. Quso overslept and did not make it in time to film the attack. This was a loss to Bin Laden because the film was meant to be distributed for propaganda purposes. In January 2001, Bin Laden celebrated the bombing of the USS Cole with a poem at his son’s wedding:[33]
A destroyer: even the brave fear its might.
It inspires horror in the harbor and in the open sea.
She sails into the waves
Flanked by arrogance, haughtiness and false power.
To her doom she moves slowly
A dinghy awaits her, riding the waves.
E. Planning Cycle – Conclusion
By analyzing these time lines, it becomes evident that al-Nashiri was able to keep his activities below the radar screen of the Western and Yemeni security and intelligence agencies, but nevertheless emitted ominous indicators of the looming attack:
· Strategic Indicators, such as Bin Laden’s speech (September 2000) and the recruitment of activists indicated the motivation and capability of a terrorist organization.
· Operational Indicators, such as increased communication between cell members, influx of foreign elements, travel and increased fund raising.
· Tactical Indicators, such as the leasing of safe houses and the raising of fences around the residencies, and other suspicious behavior such as rehearsals, individual panic, or nervousness.
All of these indicators should raise the red flag of the security services analysts.
Thus, Al Qaeda was able to exploit the vulnerabilities of its adversaries (a stationary ship with a lax crew) while learning from its mistakes (USS Sullivan). The example with the USS Cole has shown that terrorist organization can, with even relatively miniscule funding of $40,000, create damages costing in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Moreover, the attacks showed that maritime attacks could take place from land to sea, in the port area, or near it.
Since the time spent out on sea during the duration of a maritime terror attack is only a few minutes, it makes it nearly impossible for maritime security services to successfully prevent an attack. Thus, the logical starting point in preventing future maritime attacks, as Dr. Rohan Gunaratna stated, is to disrupt the terrorist infrastructure on land where an identified terrorist can be much more effectively targeted by security services. The failure to detect the planning and preparations of a maritime terrorism attack will lead to an attack attempt by that terrorist organization.[34]
VII. Post USS Cole Attack Skims
Following the successful bombing of the USS Cole, al-Nashiri planed to use the acquired and tested knowledge on maritime terrorism to expand his operations. Due to the highlighted force protection protocols of the U.S. and other foreign navies, he focused on the Strait of Hormuz. According to his interrogation, al-Nashiri, planned to attack U.S. navy ships with several speedboats launched from a mother vessel traveling on one of two one nautical mile wide channels. The plan was to detonate the mother vessel once it passed any possible target. After a final intelligence review, al-Nashiri deemed the success of such a mission was unlikely and aborted its operation. This opportunity was not al-Nashiri’s only shot, as he subsequently sent three Saudi nationals to Morocco to implement other maritime terrorist attacks. Moroccan security services arrested the three Saudi terrorists in June 2002. They were planning to attack U.S. and British navel forces with explosive loaded speed boats in the Strait of Gibraltar. The slow and careful planning, starting with the marriage of the terrorists to local women in order to blend into society, had the characteristics of an al-Nashiri operation similar to the USS Cole. Moreover, with the hardening and establishing of new security protocols for navy vessels against small boat attacks, al-Nashiri, shortly before his capture in November 2002, intended to use divers and swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) to attack Al Qaeda’s adversaries.[35] Al Qaeda operatives would either plant explosives on the hull of a ship, try to sneak on board in order to hijack the ship for ransom or to be steered as a floating bomb, or use the SDV loaded with sealed explosives to function as an “underwater suicide bomber” against ships or offshore installations.
A further use of SDVs is to combine them with divers and to position sea mines in narrow chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca or the Suez channel. However, according to Oded Yoffe,[36] CEO of an Israeli maritime security firm, the rate of success of such events is unlikely due to the difficult situations under water, such as currents, low visibility, etc. An operation in such a hostile environment requires years of operational experience. Al Qaeda has increased its operational capabilities in recent years by acquiring sophisticated diving equipment as well as training their operatives in commercial diving techniques.
As a possible example, consider the allegations against Tunisian national Wahid Gomri, a diving instructor in the Safe Dive club in Eindhoven, Netherlands, He has come under scrutiny by the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD after three of his students were suspected of Al Qaeda links in 2003. Gomri and his students attended the Al Fourkhan mosque in Eindhoven, which Dutch police have identified as a centre for Muslim extremists. Labeled as the “Al Qaeda diving team”, and with many questions unanswered (such as who was behind the money transfers from India), Dutch investigators could not collect enough evidence to convict any of the accused.[37] However, according to Dutch authorities, the investigation against Gomi, who today lives in England, are still open.
Another example of Al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire the necessary skills to operate underwater is the arrest of 35-year-old Abu Sayyaf operative Angelo Gamal Baharan in 2005. According to Baharan, he underwent scuba training in the Philippines’ southwestern province of Palwan in preparation for an unspecified operation outside the Philippines.[38] In response to the perceived threat of underwater terrorism, the Professional Association of Diving Instructors (PADI) provided the FBI, in May 2002, with the information of about two million divers who had learned to scuba dive during the previous three years. The prosecution of Baharan’s alleged acts to support terrorism is on-going.
While Al Qaeda, under al-Nashiri, constantly adapted to the changing tactical environment, Al Qaeda shifted its focus towards attacking the global economy and the merchant fleet as its facilitator. On October 6, 2002, a small fiberglass boat loaded with 100 - 200 kg of TNT explosives guided by two Yemenite suicide terrorists rammed the French VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) MV Limburg, killing one and injuring 25 crew members. The attack occurred 400 nautical miles outside the port of Aden while the Limburg prepared to take on a pilot-assisted approach to the Ash Shihir terminal to load 1.5 million barrels of crude oil. Being leased to the Malaysian state petroleum company Petronas, the MV Limburg carried, at the time of attack, 400,000 barrels of crude of which an estimated 90,000[39] of which spilled into the Gulf of Aden. As a direct result of the bombing, oil prices rose by $0.48 / barrel due to increasing insurance fees for ships calling Aden. This premium fee, in turn, caused most ships to call neighboring ports resulting in an additional loss of $ 3.8 million in monthly port revenue and the loss of employment of as many as three thousand employees.[40] Al Qaeda’s communiqués issued after the bombing of the MV Limburg in 2002 read:
· “We congratulate our Islamic nation for heroic and brave jihadi operations that were undertaken by its justified mujahideen sons in Yemen against the crusader oil tanker and in Kuwait against the invading forces and the American occupation. By hitting the oil tanker in Yemen, the mujahideen hit the secret line, the provision line and the feeding to the artery of the life of the crusader’s nation. They reminded the enemies of the heaviness of the blood bill and the enormity of losses, that they will pay a high price for the continuation of their aggression on our nation and their plunder of our good and our wealth”.[41]
· “If a boat which didn’t cost US $1,000 managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude, imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West’s commercial lifeline, which is petroleum.”[42]
VIII. Global Maritime Trade Links
Decreasing trading barriers and reduced tariffs created an increasingly open and interdependent globalized economy. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an estimated 85% of the world’s trade volume (7.1 billion tons of goods) was shipped by sea in 2006. Carried by at least 46,000 ships calling at over 4,000 ports worldwide, the maritime sector employs more then 1.3 million people (seafarers and port workers). The majority of consumer goods are shipped by as many as 15 million containers making over 230 million journeys per year.[43] Catchphrases as “Just enough – Just in Time” have left lasting effects on the way trade is conducted in the 21st Century. As Michael Richardson explains:
“The global economy is built on integrated supply chains that feed components and other materials to users just before they are required and just in the right amounts. That way, inventory costs are kept low. If the supply chains are disrupted, it will have repercussions around the world, profoundly affecting business confidence.”[44]
Carried by a heterogeneous fleet of vessels, the maritime transport sector is one of the most vulnerable points in today’s interdependent societies.
A. Weaknesses – Vessels
Merchant vessels, as with pleasure vessels, can serve, in principal, in four ways to facilitate a maritime terrorist attack:
· The vessel can be used as a weapon against port, offshore facilities and other maritime vessels. Previous maritime terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda, such as the USS Cole and MV Limburg, tended to use small explosive loaded boats to attack their target. Although it seems likely that Al Qaeda will continue on this path due to a positive cost / benefit analysis, maritime security experts tend to view a growing threat in the possible use of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tanker to attack port cities. Experts such as former National Security Advisor Richard A. Clarke and the 2004 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) study[45] found that LNG is an easily explosive material: “a similar attack to the USS Cole in 2000 could cause at least half a cargo hold’s worth of LNG to seep out of the ship and ignite… in just over three minutes, the fire could spread two-thirds of a mile from the ship.”[46] Nevertheless, the Federal Energy Regulation Authority (FERC) stated that LNG in its liquid (transport) state is not explosive. According to FERC, when LNG becomes a gas it is not explosive if it is unconfined (which would be the case of a terrorist attack on a vessel in transit).[47] Moreover, due to the dangerous nature of its cargo, today’s LNG tankers have a robust cargo security system in place. During the Iran-Iraq war in October 1984, an LNG cargo vessel took a direct hit by an Exocet anti-ship missile. According to a Distrigas spokeswoman, the ship did not explode and the crew was able to contain the fire.[48]
In addition to the perceived danger through LNG and LPG carriers, maritime security experts also focus on certain extremely hazardous bulk shipments, such as atomic waste or ammonium nitrate. The latter is used worldwide as an agricultural fertilizer. However, mixed with fuel oil, ammonium nitrate becomes a powerful explosive treasured both by commercial demolition teams as well as terrorists. Being easy to handle and widely available, ammonium nitrate has seen its use in terrorist attacks across the globe, from the first World Trade Center truck bombing (1993) to those in Oklahoma City (1995), Nairobi (1998), Bali (2002) and Istanbul (2003). One of the worst disasters involving two ships carrying ammonium nitrate occurred in Texas City on April 16-17, 1947. The incident occurred after loading 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate into the French bulk carrier Grandchamp. The explosion created a 5 meter tidal wave while the blast wave destroyed most of the town of 15,000 residents. Five hundred and sixty-eight people were counted dead, and the economic damages ranged into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
With the hardening of military vessels and the strategic shift towards mass transportation systems, cruse ships have increasingly attracted the attention of terrorists. Besides being highly iconic, Al Qaeda favors the possibility to find up to 5,000 (Queen Mary II) targets in a small, confined space.[49] The preferred method of an attack would either be by poisoning the food or using explosive loaded speed boats to ram the cruise ship. Moreover, an important consideration is the increased probability that the victims will be of Judeo-Christian (the primary target off the jihad agenda), without risking wider Muslim interests.[50] An example of this directive toward cruise ships occurred in August 2005. Al Qaeda operative and Syrian national Lu’ai Sakra was arrested for planning to attack Israeli cruise ships while visiting Turkey with explosive laden speedboats.
· A “mother ship” can be used to launch an attack using either small explosive loaded boats or a different weapons system. Al-Nashiri planned to use a mother ship in order to attack targets in the Strait of Hormuz. Previously, this tactic was used by several other groups, such as the LTTE and the different Palestinian groups. The majority of such attacks that took place in Israel happened in the 1970s. An example of an attack launched from a mother ship was on the Tel Aviv Savoy Hotel by Fatah on March 5, 1975. Taking the hotel guests hostages, the eight terrorists demanded the release of 11 terrorists, including the terrorist leader Hilaryon Qapuzhi. Storming the building, the IDF (Israel Defense Force) succeeded in freeing three of the hostages while eight were killed by the terrorists. Following the Savoy attack, Israel security officials had to rethink their maritime defense strategy to counter the increasing threat of maritime terrorism, such as launching rockets from ships outside the national waters (less than 12 nautical miles) against a major Israeli city.
· The vessel can be sunk in a narrow chokepoint in order to disrupt infrastructure. Global and interdependent trade follows the shortest sea way often passing narrow and shallow waterways called chokepoints in order to get their merchandise from “point A” to “point B”. Six of the nine chokepoints in the world are located in geographical areas where local terrorist groups with ties to Al Qaeda possess maritime capabilities. A successful closure of the Strait of Hormuz by attacking and sinking of a VLCC tanker thereby disrupting the sea-lane could stop all traffic through this specific chokepoint. As a result, the world economy would experience a sudden shortfall of 90% of Saudi crude oil and all of Kuwaiti and Iraqi crude oil, which is typically shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Although some of the Saudi crude oil could be sent through a pipeline to the Yanub export terminal on the Read Sea,[51] the massive cut to the oil supply would increase the oil price to unknown heights.
A successful closure of the Malacca Strait by attacking and sinking of a VLCC tanker thereby disrupting the sea-lane could stop all traffic through this specific chokepoint. Using the Lombok strait, the average travel time would increase by four days; it would increase by seven days would it be necessary to sail around Indonesia altogether. Taking into account that an average day of a larger container ship cost up to $ 125,000 the economic burden of the closure of the Malacca Strait would be between $500,000 – $875,000 per ship.[52]
· Ships can be used to either smuggle weapons / terrorist operatives into another county or to launder illicit funds for the terrorist organization. The ability to freely transport personnel and/or weapons around the world is one of the most important factors for international terrorist. According to a Norwegian Intelligence source, Al Qaeda possesses a “phantom fleet” of 23 ships.[53] The ships were used to smuggle explosives to Kenya and Bali in preparation for the attacks in 1998 and 2002. It was also used to smuggle terrorist operatives into foreign countries (Europe). An example was the case of the Twillinger, a Nova freighter that transported eight Pakistanis, traveling with false identifications and large sums of money, in February 2001. Ostensively, the purpose was to provide a steady flow of funds by transporting either legal goods or engaging in criminal activities, such as drug smuggling and human trafficking. Flags of convenience were originally created to avoid heavy taxes and stringent inspections which might not allow the vessel to operate. Today the flag has become the best friend of terrorist organizations as it allows them / the boat owner to hide behind a wall of secrecy.
B. Weaknesses – Ports
Ports are one of the major security weaknesses in the maritime transport arena. They were constructed to be widely accessible by land and sea in order to facilitate an increasing amount of materials moving through them. Their infrastructures are often interlined with that of the neighboring cities. Their hazardous storage facilities were built according to the cost benefit analysis, not according to security considerations. The extensive size of current mega-ports precludes a closed, secure environment. Moreover, thousands of workers and seamen stream daily into them. It is alleged that a sizable portion of these individuals do not possess authentic identification and/or workers licenses and permits.
For example, the Ashdod port screens all incoming containers, and hence, it is viewed by many as the world’s safest harbor. Nevertheless, the on March 16, 2002, two 18-year-old Palestinians hid behind a false wall in a 15 meter container and succeeded in infiltrating the Israeli Port of Ashdod.[54] The subsequent terror attack killed 10 port workers.
Indeed, the U.S., at present, is only able to inspect about five percent of all incoming containers. However, as the incident from March 16, 2002 pointed out, the fact is that the human eye behind the technology can sometimes miss an important detail. Moreover, attacks on ports can be launched against a ship or port facility from either the sea, underwater, from land and from the air. As ports are essential links in the supply chain, the disruption of one port could lead additional economic costs as shippers have to make alternative arrangements.
C. Weaknesses - Containers
Another weakness in the maritime trade is the containers in which goods are transported. Today, 15 million containers are making 230 million journeys.[55] With an average of a five percent inspection rate worldwide, containers can be easily be used to smuggle illegal goods, human beings or weapons. The problem is port workers can’t see the contents of a container, or make a proper assessment that when the container seal is intact. Furthermore, a sealed container is no guarantee of a safe inspection, because seal mechanisms are vulnerable to manipulation. Therefore, containers are often viewed as the most vulnerable link in the maritime trade transport system.
The fear that terrorists could exploit the container system first came to fruition on October 18, 2001 when port authorities in the Italian port of Gioia Tauro[56] discovered a stowaway within a shipping container. The container was complete with a bed, heater, toilet facilities and water.
In resent years, however, the focus shifted towards the use of a container as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. The fear was fuelled by Al Qaeda’s fatwa (2003) to use WMD against the enemies of Islam, and plans that surfaced to acquire CBRN weapons. The latest attempt was that of Al Qaeda of the Two Rivers trying to use CBRN in order to strike the Jordanian royal family and the Jordanian intelligence headquarters in 2004. According to Jordanian intelligence, the attack could have caused as many as 80,000 dead[57] and as many as 150,000 injured. As Al Qaeda’s plan for 2004 provided for two vehicle borne suicide attacks, it is imaginable that Al Qaeda could use the container, loaded on a merchant ship, as a delivery system to attack port or costal cities.
IX. Response
In response to the 9/11 attacks, the IMO and the U.S. developed several programs to counter the threat of maritime terrorism. A brief summery of their objectives follow.
The Conference on Maritime Security adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) in 2002 but was implemented in July 1, 2004. The ISPS Code was an amendment to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. The ISPS outlines the minimum security procedures that all ships and ports must meet to improve overall maritime security. In case a certain ship does not fulfill the requirements as stated in the ISPS Code, it can be turned away by the relevant authorities in the destination county. The ISPS Code in general binds all vessels of the “SOLAS” class (ships above 500 tones and passengers) vessels employed on international voyages to:
· install an automatic identification system (AIS) that will provide authorities with the ship’s identity, position, course and speed. It also will provide the last harbor visited by the ship;
· display the unique ship identification number (SIN) on either the ship’s hull or superstructure;
· install a ship security alert system; and
· creation of a ship security plan and having a security officer on board.
The downside is that these requirements are only for “SOLAS” class ships. Therefore, it doesn’t apply to warships, government vessels, fishing vessels and ships less than 500 tons. Moreover, a high percentage of these ships are found in maritime terror plagued areas, such as South East Asia and the Persian Gulf.
The ISPS code by the IMO imposes significant additional costs to ship owners. This high cost penalty is particular acute for small vessels. Ship owners in developing countries cannot comply and compete in the global market. In addition, the ISPS code is seen as a U.S. code responsible for national port and ship security, presenting difficulties to other nations involved. Officials of many developing countries consider the ISPS code as a measure to counter maritime terrorism and provide security to the West. Their fiducial priority, however, is with their own economic development.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI), introduced in 2002, is a U.S. initiative involving a series of bilateral accords that allow for the forward deployment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. Their duty is to identify and inspect suspicious containers before they are placed on vessels destined for the United Sates in order to extend the zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first.[58] Moreover, with the establishment of the C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism) CBP recognizes that it only through close cooperation with the ultimate owners of the international supply chain, such as importers and carriers, can increase the cargo security. International importers can expedite processing of their cargo while complying with the rules of the CBP.
Countries that do not implement CSI procedures will be at a disadvantage, because their cargo will be subjected to extensive examination. To date, more than 45,000 companies have agreed to participate in C-TPAT.[59] Nevertheless, several countries’ governments remain skeptical. They consider the underlying purpose of “extending of the zone of security outward” as a method to shift the terrorist threat away from the U.S.
Lastly, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced by President Bush in May 31, 2003. It aims to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by sanctioning the right to stop, board, and, if necessary, seize a vessel on the high seas if it is suspected of smuggling CBRN materials.[60] Currently, 15 countries have joined the PSI, with major region gaps in membership. For example, Singapore is the only member country from Southeast Asia. Another major weakness of the PSI is its limited authority under international law. Thus, at present, warships can only halt ships in international waters when they have the consent of the flag’s state.
X. Conclusion
Al Qaeda is a network that has so far understood how to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. It was able to rise from its ashes and find vulnerable spots in an open society. Maritime transportation, with its many weaknesses, is one of those weak spots waiting to exploited by Al Qaeda. International counter-measures such as the ISPS code and U.S. initiatives like the Container Security Initiatives (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) can only be regarded as the first step in order to close this Achilles’ heel.
Based on the evidence presented above, I believe that in the near future we will witness more maritime attempts to disrupt the oil flow in the Persian Gulf and against cruise ships. It is only the matter of time until Al Qaeda once more will succeed in attacking the West. Maritime terrorism is positioned to be their method of choice.
XI. Bibliography
1. Bruce Hoffman, The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism, Routledge, Volume 27, November-December 2004
2. Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, Macmillan 2003
3. U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Report on Al Qaeda”, August 2005 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/56106.pdf
4. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Prophet‘s Banner”, London 2001
5. Rohan Gunaratna, “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror”, Hurst & Co., 2002
6. BBC News Service, “The New Al-Qaeda: the Madrid attack”, 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/4697707.stm
7. “September 11 Report”, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/
8. Bruce Hoffman, “In the Calculus of Fear, Terrorists Have an Edge”, November 2, 2003
9. Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response”, Chaillot Paper N. 84, Oct. 2005
10. Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 2004
11. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Biographies of High Value Terrorist Detainees Transferred to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay” http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf
12. United Sates of America versus Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cole/usalbadawi051503ind.pdf
13. Yemen Gateway, Attack on the USS Cole at:
http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm
14. Guardian, Tanker blast was work of terrorists at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,813404,00.html
15. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, “The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Real Is the Terrorist Threat?”, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Papers, found at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/Rugerpapers.htm
16. Maritime Transport Committee, “Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact”, OECD 2003, p. 3
17. RAND Institute “Beyond Al Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement” , 2006
18. RAND Institute “Beyond Al Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe” 2006
19. Study: LNG - Not in my backyard, http://www.iags.org/n0121041.htm
20. Who’s Afraid of LNG? http://www.greenfutures.org/projects/LNG/LNG1-4-04.html
21. Rand Institute “Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, 2006
22. Statement of Mr. Jayson P. Ahern found at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=856&wit_id=2514
23. C-TPAT found at: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_faq.xml
24. State found at: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/
[1] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
[2] High Seas describes waters outside the common 12 nautical mile territorial (State) zone
[3] ICT Profile of ASG at http://fighel.com/organizations/org_frame.cfm?orgid=3
[4] Rand Databases http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase
[5] Akiva Lorenz, “The European Union’s Response to Terrorism”, http://www.ict.org.il/apage/5176.php
[6] This is due to the fact that many regular weapons / explosives do not operate efficiency in the hash maritime environments, eg. Salt water etc.
[7] Akiva Lorenz, “The European Union’s Response to Terrorism”, http://www.ict.org.il/apage/5176.php
[8] Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 42, and “Arming the IRA: The Libyan Connection,” The Economist, March 31, 1990
[9] Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response”, Chaillot Paper N. 84, Oct. 2005
[10] BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/5/newsid_2499000/2499279.stm
[11] MI5, Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page388.html
& PIRA at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ira.htm
[12] Rohan Gunaratna, “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror”, Hurst & Co., 2002 and “The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda”, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_gunaratna.htm
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15]Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda and the terrorist threat today
[16] Bruce Hoffman, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism”
[17] BBC, The New Al-Qaeda: the Madrid attack
[18] Rohan Gunaratna, “Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror”, Hurst & Co., 2002 and “The Rise and Decline of Al Qaeda”, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_gunaratna.htm
[19] Zawahiri “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner” 2001
[20] Ibid
[21] Yemen Gateway, Attack on the USS Cole http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm
[22] USS Cole Bombing, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/uss_cole_bombing.htm
[23] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Biographies of High Value Terrorist Detainees
Transferred to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay” September 6, 2006 at
http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf
[24] Ibid
[25] Interview
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid
[28] Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 2004
[29] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Biographies of High Value Terrorist Detainees Transferred to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay” September 6, 2006 at http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf
[30] United Sates of America versus Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/cole/usalbadawi051503ind.pdf
[31] Ibid
[32] Ibid
[33] Yemen Gateway, Attack on the USS Cole http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole8.htm
[34] Dr. Rohan Gunaratna “The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Real Is the Terrorist Threat?” at
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/Rugerpapers.htm
[35] Terror’s New Frontier: Underwater , CBS News
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/18/terror/main681524.shtm l
[36] Interview with Oded Yoffe, December 2006
[37] Fears Persist of Al Qaeda Terrorist Link to PADI Dive Center
http://www.cdnn.info/news/article/a030802.html
[38] Terror’s New Frontier: Underwater , CBS News
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/18/terror/main681524.shtml
[39] Guardian, Tanker blast was work of terrorists
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,813404,00.html
[40] Maritime Transport Committee, “Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact”,
OECD 2003, p. 3
[41] Statement from Al Qaeda’s political bureau regarding the explosion of the Christian oil tanker in Yemen,
dated 13 October 2002, released in wide circulation on 15 October; translated by Aimee Ibrahim
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_29/ai_112129347/pg_2
[42] Ibid at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_29/ai_112129347/pg_3
[43] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//rmt2006_en.pdf
[44] Michael Richardson, “A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of
Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Singapore 2004, p. 7.
[45] Study: LNG - Not in my backyard, http://www.iags.org/n0121041.htm
[46] Ibid
[47] Natural gas is only flammable within a narrow range of concentrations in the air (5% to 15%). Less air
does not contain enough oxygen to sustain a flame, while more air dilutes the gas too much for it to
ignite. Source FERC http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/lng.asp
[48] Who’s Afraid of LNG? http://www.greenfutures.org/projects/LNG/LNG1-4-04.html
[49] Rand, “ Maritime Terrorism – Risk and Liability”, 2006
[50] Rand, “ Maritime Terrorism – Risk and Liability”, 2006
[51] EIA http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html
[52] Ellis, Eric “Singapore’s New Straits: Piracy on the High Seas in on the Rise in South-East Asia.” Fortune Magazine
[53] U.S., International Authorities Track Terrorist Shipping Assets, Activities
http://www.amo-union.org/newspaper/Morgue///1-2002/Sections/News/terrorist.htm
[54] Suicide bombing in Ashdod Port, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/3/Suicide%20bombing%20at%20Ashdod%20Port%2014-Mar-2004
[55] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//rmt2006_en.pdf
[56] Sue M. Cobb, at http://kingston.usembassy.gov/062904.htm l
[57] Global Defense Review http://www.global-defence.com/2006/Weapons/article.php?id=581
[58] Statement of Mr. Jayson P. Ahern, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=856&wit_id=2514
CSI in Brief at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml
[59] C-TPAT http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_faq.xml
[60] State, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/
An amazing collection of texts, speeches and knowledge of the terrorism and its leaders.............
Check all the links for important articles:
http://gloria.idc.ac.il/freebooks.html
Jihadi videos:
http://www.globalterroralert.com/
News and articles on terror:
al-qaeda navy:
http://www.ict.org.il/apage/11847.php
Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh: Militant Islamist Terror
[snipped]
An increase in membership to radical Islamist organizations is proving that Bangladesh is becoming a nexus of militant Islam in South Asia, as many Bangladeshi militant Islamist organizations have been linked to al-Qa’ida.[2] Furthermore, the secular and democratically elected BNP has built a coalition with politically oriented Islamist groups such as the Jamaat e-Islami (JI),
http://ict.org.il/apage/12227.php
Books some free:
http://www.ict.org.il/aecommerce/c1410.php
June 14, 2007 PM Anti-Terrorism News
(Iraq) Al Qaeda in Iraq kills 14 hostages - executed 14 soldiers and
police in a video posted on the Internet
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/June/middleeast_June263.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
(Iraq) Al-Qaeda military emir of Mosul killed - Kamal Jalil Bakr
‘Uthman, aka Sa’id Hamza
http://media-newswire.com/release_1052355.html
(Iraq) U.S. Forces Detain 6 in Raids Targeting Al Qaeda in Iraq
(updated) - 25 arrested over past 2 days - members of a car bomb network
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,282197,00.html
(Afghanistan) Update: 34 Taliban said killed in Afghanistan
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070614/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunrest_070614164234;_ylt=Ak0RoyBAo6yYbHC89RAQWojOVooA
(Pakistan) Gunmen kill 9 soldiers and police in southwestern Pakistani
city, police say - in Quetta
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/14/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Shooting.php
Palestinian President Abbas to Dissolve Palestinian Authority
Government in Wake of Hamas-Fatah War - to declare state of emergency
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,282195,00.html
Hamas rejects decision to fire Hamas Prime Minister Haniyeh - rejects
Abbas decrees
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21909630-1702,00.html
Hamas liberation hails victory, “liberation” of Gaza Strip
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?rpc=401&storyId=B924908
Hamas Bringing Islamic Rule to Gaza Strip - “The era of justice and
Islamic rule have arrived”
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200706/INT20070614c.html
US: ‘Hamas terrorizing the people’
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813036451&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Rice Calls Abbas After Palestinian Leader Declares State of Emergency
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,282572,00.html
Hamas attacks, torches Fatah-linked radio in Gaza, Palestinian TV
reports
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/14/africa/ME-GEN-Palestinians-Gaza-Broadcasting.php
Hamas says prominent Fatah gunman killed in clashes
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/14/africa/ME-GEN-Palestinians-Gunman-Killed.php
Hamas Executing Men In Front Of Families
http://www.10news.com/news/13501140/detail.html
‘The Gaza Strip has fallen’ - 2 years after Israeli retreat, Hamas
creating ‘Islamic caliphate’ in territory
http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=56169
Bomb strikes Palestinian radio - studio of the official Voice of
Palestine radio overnight in an attack blamed on Hamas
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21909622-1702,00.html
EU suspends Gaza aid due to “suicidal” fighting
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L14287044.htm
Report: Hamas: Documents from GSS HQ prove Fatah links to CIA
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181570271436&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Gaza) Terrorists claim CIA files seized - Documents said to provide
details of U.S. intel networks in Mideast
http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=56174
West Bank: Fatah nabs 36 Hamas activists
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813032455&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Syria’s Export of Terrorism to Lebanon: Threat and Response
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2618
(USA) Judge clears way for wounded soldier to collect judgment against
terrorist - Federal judge approves damages owed by Ahmad Said al-Khadr
http://www.sltrib.com/ci_6140530?source=rss
Draft FBI rules to curb privacy abuse
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070614/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/national_security_letters_11;_ylt=Aisxpp_gSmOvQNee1E7OFngTv5UB
US Court Ruling: How Will it Impact Coverage of Terrorism?
http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/homeland.php?id=1059400
Interpol calls for funds to battle nuclear terror
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813035820&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
NEIN Report: JFK bomb plot links to murder, Iran & top al Qaeda
terrorist-at-large
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/JFK061407
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/hagmann061407.htm
(Iran) Terror ‘Cell’ Sweeps Tehran — Increased use of cell phones to
spread political dissent creates new problem for Iran’s hardline Islamic
regime
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,282456,00.html
Spain braces for rebel attacks
http://www.suntimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=492043
(Spain) ETA developing new bombing techniques in France
http://www.typicallyspanish.com/news/publish/article_10972.shtml
Colombian Terrorist Victims’ Families File Suit in South Florida
http://orange.advfn.com/news_Colombian-Terrorist-Victims-Families-File-Suit-in-South-Florida_21039975.html
(Columbia) French family pleads over Colombia rebel hostage - Ingrid
Betancourt held by FARC for over 5 years
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N14458388.htm
North Korean funds transferred
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2007/06/14/north_korean_funds_transferred/7817/
Other News:
Video: 9/11 Quiz in NYC - respondents don’t know when 9/11 happened,
unaware of attacks anywhere other than NYC, think Hindus responsible
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnP0snh_1cU
(CAIR) Who Are CAIR’s Paymasters?
http://www.investors.com/editorial/editorialcontent.asp?secid=1501&status=article&id=266541652591574
(Russia) Prominent Islamic researcher warns against Wahhabism replacing
traditional Islam throughout Russia
http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=3188
JihadWatch.org Report: YouTube hosts genocidal antisemitic videos
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/016929.php
JihadWatch.org Report: Montreal Muslim who killed his ex-Muslim
brother: “All those who are not Muslims are Satan”
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/016931.php
Iran denying US-Iranian scholar representation
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813034118&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Iran censorship ‘getting worse’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6751819.stm
Iran moves to execute porn stars
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/06/13/iran.porn.ap/index.html
New Jersey mulls banning Iran investments
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813036172&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Shipping group warns of rising pirate attacks
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20070613-113141-2841r.htm
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20070613-113141-2841r.htm
Shipping
group warns of rising pirate attacks
By Sean Yoong
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published June 14, 2007
_____
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia Global shipping officials warned yesterday that
pirate attacks off Somalia´s coast have spiraled to terrifying levels,
with
U.S. and international navies failing to protect seafarers from being
kidnapped.
Somali pirates have abducted more than 100 crew members of various
nationalities, often seizing them in international waters and spiriting
them
away to Somalian territory, said Capt. Pottengal Mukundan, director of
the
British-based International Maritime Bureau, a shipping security
watchdog.
The attacks have increased despite the permanent presence of an
international task force in the northern Indian Ocean that patrols the
Somali coast in an effort to intercept terrorists. U.S. destroyers are
normally assigned to the task force and patrol in pairs.
“The figures are frightening and unacceptable because the pirates
operate with impunity,” Capt. Mukundan said at a maritime security
conference. “If the navies fail to intervene, we fear the situation
will get
a lot worse before it ever gets better.”
Somalia lies close to crucial shipping routes connecting the Red
Sea
with the Indian Ocean, where valuable cargo and carriers pass.
Officials say
Somalia´s 1,880-mile coastline makes it difficult to prevent pirate
attacks.
continued....
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