Actually, Miller concluded (correctly) that the militia clause provides guidance as to what sort of weapons constitute "arms". (The Supreme Court went astray in its specific finding of fact because the defendant failed to present the evidence that would have supported the conclusion that a sawed-off shotgun is indeed an "arm" of militia utility.)
Note that this neatly disposes of the "argument" that the militia clause must mean what the gun-grabbers want it to mean because, darnit, it has to mean something or it wouldn't be there.
Because the judge in the case implicitly took "judicial notice" that it was an arm, and thus no evidence was needed nor requested. Miller's lawyer just moved for dismissal on grounds that the law was not a law at all, since it violated the second amendment (and that the Government failed to provide any evidence that the 12 guage double barrel had ever been transferred without paying the tax, or at all). The judge said in effect, "Bang!" "Case dismissed".
What the lawyer, Paul E. Gutensohn, actually wrote was:
That the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed;" that the said "National Firearms Act" is in violation and contrary to said Second Amendment and particularly as charging a crime against these said defendants, is unconstitutional and therefore does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime under the statutes of the United States.
4. That the indictment herein charges the violation of Section 1132 (c) and Section 1132 (j) in which it is made unlawful to transfer a firearm which has previously been transferred on or after the 30th day of June, 1934, in addition to complying with subsection (c), transfers therewith the stamp affixed order; that there is no charge in the said indictment that the said defendants made any transfer whatsoever of the double-barrel 12 guage shotgun having less than 18 inches in length, and said indictment, therefore, does not charge facts sufficient to constitute a crime under the statutes of the United States.
5. That the indictment charges the defendants "not having in their possession a stamp affixed written order for said firearms, as provided and required by Section 1132(c) and section 1132(j) Title 26, United States Code, and the regulations issued under the authority of said Act of Congress known as the National Firearms Act, approved June 26, 1934"; that said Section 1132(c) and Section 1132(j) does not make it a violation to merely fail to possess a stamp affixed written order for said firearms, and a failure to charge a transfer of said firearms by or to the said defendants, fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a crime under the statutes of the United States.
What Judge Heartsill Ragon wrote was:
The defendants in due time filed a demurrer challenging the sufficiency of the facts stated in the indictment to constitute a crime and further challenging the sections under which said indictment was returned as being in contravention of the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The indictment is based upon the Act of June 26, 1934, c.757, Section 11, 48 Statute 1239. The court is of the opinion that this section is invalid in that it violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing, "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."
The demurrer is accordingly sustained. (the Bang! part :) )