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Symposium: From Russia With Death
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 19, 2007

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As the British investigation ensues into the death of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko, fingers of blame point at President Vladimir Putin.
Litvinenko himself accused Putin of killing him before he died. The Russian President, meanwhile, is casting blame on Russian London exiles, including billionaire businessman Boris Berezovsky, for Litvinenko’s murder.

These horrid events were preceded by the murder of Russian journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya. Meanwhile, the doctors who are treating Yegor Gaidar, former Russian prime minister and Putin critic, believe he was poisoned.

While Putin remains the primary suspect behind the Litvinenko murder, there is talk of a larger conspiracy that aims to discredit the Russian President.

How do we make sense out of all these disturbing and mysterious events? Who killed Litvinenko? What danger did he pose to Putin? Who profits most from this former spy’s murder? And how nasty has the Putin government become? How far is it willing to go to resuscitate Stalinist tactics? And if Putin turns out to have murdered Litvinenko, a British citizen, on British soil, what must Britain -- and all Western governments -- do?

To discuss all of these events with us, Frontpage Symposium has assembled a distinguished panel. Our guests are:

Oleg Kalugin, a retired Major General of the Soviet KGB.

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Richard Pipes, a Professor Emeritus at Harvard who is one of the world's leading authorities on Soviet history. He is the author of 19 books, the most recent being his new autobiography Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger.

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Vladimir Bukovsky, a former leading Soviet dissident who spent twelve years in Soviet prisons, labor camps and psychiatric hospitals for his fight for freedom. His works include To Build a Castle and Judgement in Moscow.

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Jim Woolsey, director of the CIA from 1993-95 and a former Navy undersecretary and arms-control negotiator.

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Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa, the former acting chief of Communist Romania’s espionage service. He is the highest ranking official ever to have defected from the Soviet bloc. He is author of Red Horizons, republished in 27 countries. In 1989, Ceausescu and his wife were executed at the end of a trial where most of the accusations had come word-for-word out of Pacepa's book.

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David Satter, a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute and a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is the author of Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State.

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Yuri Yarim-Agaev, a former leading Russian dissident and a member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Upon arriving in the United States after his forced exile from the Soviet Union, he headed the New York-based Center for Democracy in the USSR.

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and

Andrei Piontkovsky, a member of International PEN-club, currently a Hudson Institute Visiting Fellow and author of Another Look into Putin’s Soul (Hudson.2006).

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FP: Oleg Kalugin, Richard Pipes, Vladimir Bukovsky, Jim Woolsey, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa, David Satter, Yuri Yarim-Agaev and Andrei Piontkovsky, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

Before we begin, I would like to dedicate this symposium to Alexander Litvinenko and to his family.

Let’s have a moment of silence for Alexander Litvinenko and his loved ones.

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(moment of silence)

Thank you gentlemen.

Oleg Kalugin, let’s begin with you.

What do you make of Litvinenko’s murder and its fallout?

Kalugin: Alexander Litvinenko was assassinated by the Russian security service, and president Putin bears full responsibility for this crime, irrespective of whether he ordered the execution or simply let his subordinate thugs to do the job.

Ever since Mr. Putin took over as chief of the federal security service in 1998 and later moved to the Kremlin as president of the country, scores of his prominent critics in Russian legislature, business and the media were killed or jailed. The civilized world is facing a growing power of the authoritarian state which, if unchecked, may degenerate into a fascist dictatorship and pose threat to all freedom loving nations and peace on earth.

FP: Thank you Mr. Kalugin. Well, if I ever received an unambiguous answer to one of my questions, this is definitely one of them.

Vladimir Bukovsky, are you on the same page with Mr. Kalugin?

Bukovsky: Yes, I agree with Gen. Kalugin.

I am an analyst, not a policeman, so I don't follow the current lines of Scotland Yard's investigation, and, frankly, I don't believe they will catch any murderer. But the general picture is pretty clear to me.

Consider this: in July of this year, the Russian Duma passed a law authorizing the Russian President to use secret services as "death squads" in order to eliminate "extremists" -- even on the foreign territory (Federal Law of 27 July 2006 N 153-F3).

At the same time, the Duma amended another law, expanding the definition of "extremism" to include anyone "libellously" critical of the current Russian regime (Federal Law of 27 July 2006 N 148-F3).

Thus, as we warned in a letter to the Times on July 11 (together with Oleg Gordievsky):

"a stage is set for any critic of Putin's regime here, especially those campaigning against Russian genocide in Chechnya, to have an appointment with a poison-tipped umbrella. According to the statement by the RF Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, the black list of potential targets is already composed."

Then followed the murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko. The question is: why would the Russian authorities rush through these laws if they had no intention of implementing them? The ball, therefore, is now in the Russian court: they have to prove to us that they did not do it.

FP: Sergei Kirov’s murder, Trotsky’s murder . . .the current events appear to be an eerie rendezvous with history, almost as if the Soviet purges are being resuscitated. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but the ghosts of the Stalinist terror are definitely lurking in the shadows.

Dr. Pipes?

Pipes: The affair is very murky but all indications are that Moscow ordered the murder of Litvinenko as it did that of Politkovskaya. They fit a pattern. If it were true, as Moscow claims, that the murder was committed by its enemies in order to discredit Russia, we would have seen far more activity on Russia's part to discover the culprit or culprits.

In reality, Moscow treats the killing (by its alleged enemies) rather nonchalantly. At this stage all I can say with certainty is that if it turns out that the order for the killing of Litvinenko emanated from the Kremlin, then Russia and the rest of the world face an appalling prospect of this vast country turning once again to gangster methods of dealing with its opposition.

FP: I fear that the Putin regime is searching for the killers like O.J. Simpson has been trying to track down the murderers of his wife.

David Satter, what’s your take on the Litvinenko murder and its significance? And kindly also shed some light for us on who exactly Litvinenko was and to whom he posed a danger. Who profits most from his death? Why? What knowledge did he have, what behaviour was he engaged in that posed a threat to Putin – or to someone else?

Satter: I also am convinced that Litvinenko was murdered by the Russian intelligence service. No one else had both the motive and the means. Litvinenko was not only murdered. He was tortured to death. This is a message to his colleagues in the FSB about the cost of defecting.

Litvinenko was highly unusual because he not only refused to participate in the planned murder of Boris Berezovsky but took the risk of announcing the plot publicly. He represented some danger to the FSB although not a great one because his former colleagues could bring him information.

I think the reason he was killed is either that the regime wanted to get rid of him and now thinks it can ignore the West totally or there is a power struggle going on and the more fascistic faction in the leadership is using these murders as part of its bid for power.

FP: Thank you David Satter.

While I would like the rest of the panel to also offer their perspective on the how and why here, I would also like to expand the discussion into the realm of why these fascistic and Stalinist strains continue to dominate Russian politics even despite the fall of communism. Is it because communism actually never even fell? After all, there was never a de-communization process in the same sense that there was a de-Nazification process in Germany after the Second World War. There were no Nuremberg-style trials in the former Soviet Union. In many ways, the same ideology and the same criminals remain in power, but just under another name.

Or is there also something larger than the continuation of Soviet communism here? Is it Russia’s traditional inability to embrace democracy and individual liberty, and its addiction to firm and brutal despotism? If so, how come the country can’t shake off this dreadful ghost?

And when David Satter raises the possibility that Putin might now be able to “ignore the West totally” what does it mean? Have we become helpless in being able to apply pressure on Russia? Why? Why does Putin feel he can do whatever he wants without a fear of the West -- if this is the case?

I apologize if there are too many loaded questions here. Just provoking a bit of discussion to give the Litvinenko murder some context.

Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa?

Pacepa: Assassinating anyone who stood in their way is indeed a tradition that Russia’s tsars passed on to the Communist rulers--and beyond. The custom goes back to Ivan the Terrible, whose political police, the Oprichnina, killed tens of thousands of boyars who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to his eldest son, an infant at the time.

Under Communism, these arbitrary assassinations became a state policy. During Stalin’s purges alone, some nine million people lost their lives. Nikita Khrushchev condemned Stalin for aiming the cutting edge of his political police against his own people, and he shifted the killing abroad. The “Western bourgeoisie” and “our own traitors” became the Kremlin’s main enemies. Khrushchev ordered the KGB to develop a new generation of weapons that would kill without leaving detectable traces in the victim’s body, and he created units for assassination abroad in all Eastern European foreign intelligence services. I was present when Khrushchev told Romania’s dictator, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, that killings abroad should be approved only by the country’s ruler, that they should be kept forever a secret, and that after each assassination abroad “we” should surreptitiously spread “evidence” accusing the CIA or other convenient “enemies” of having done the deed, thereby killing two birds with one stone.

It seems that Vladimir Putin is continuing Khrushchev’s tradition. Yury Andropov, the other KGB officer who was enthroned in the Kremlin, used to tell me that every society reflected its own past. The Communist party was a foreign organism introduced into the Russian body, and sooner or later it would be rejected. But “our gosbezopasnost”—the Kremlin’s political police—would remain unchanged for as long as the Russian motherland still existed. "Our gosbezopasnost" had kept Russia alive for the past five hundred years, and "our gosbezopasnost" would steer her helm for the next five hundred years. Andropov has proved to be a dependable prophet: Communism is history; but the gosbezopasnost has taken over the Kremlin itself, and a gang of over 6,000 former KGB officers are now running the country. It is as though today’s Germany were being run by Gestapo officers.

The assassination of Litvinenko looks like a modernized version of Khrushchev’s attempt to kill Nikolay Khokhlov, another KGB defector who dared to expose assassinations abroad and display the latest weapon created by the gosbezopasnost for secretly committing them (an electrically operated gun fitted with silencer and concealed inside a cigarette pack, which fired cyanide-tipped bullets).

In the late 1970s, Leonid Brezhnev gave Ceausescu, via the KGB, radioactive thallium that could be inserted in food to silently kill his own political enemies abroad. The substance was described to Ceausescu as a new generation of the radioactive thallium weapon unsuccessfully used against Khokhlov in West Germany in 1957. (Khokhlov lost all his hair but did not die.) Ceausescu baptized it with the codename “Radu” (from radioactive), and he used it to secretly kill his own political enemies. The polonium 210 that killed Litvinenko looks to me just like an upgraded form of “Radu.”

Putin and his KGB/FSB may temporarily be able to hide their involvement in Litvinenko’s vicious murder. But in the long run political crime does not pay, even when it is committed by the leader of a superpower.

Woolsey: I'm afraid I have to make it unanimous. Although if this were an isolated case, given the complex facts, it would be imaginable that it was the result of some feud between people in the Russian government and one or more oligarchs and Putin was not involved -- but that seems most unlikely in the current context.

The murder of Politkovskaya, the attack on Gaidar, the imprisonment of Khordokovsy, the proliferation of former intelligence officers in positions of power, the several other killings -- all point toward a Russian state that has regressed to the days of Nicholas I or worse.

I think the most damning fact is that Litvinenko had taken a position on the apartment bombings that were used to justify the second Chechen War. The FSB was extremely clumsy, as David Satter has very effectively chronicled, and the type of explosive used, the one plot that was uncovered (the FSB said it was for "training") and a number of other facts point toward those attacks having been an FSB provocation. This calls into question much of the rationale for Putin's rule and the basis for most of his suppression of civil liberties. Pursuing that issue could well have been Litvinenko's final death sentence.

It may never be known whether Putin gave a direct order or, like Henry II, just surrounded himself with a certain type of subordinate and then, musing on Litvinenko, mumbled the 21st century Russian equivalent of Henry's question: "Will not someone rid me of this turbulent priest?" It doesn't really matter. The rest of us have to deal with a solidifying Russian dictatorship, engorged on oil money, destroying independent media and political figures, determined to reassert control over as much of the former USSR as it can (in part using energy as an instrument of coercion).

Tell me again why this dictatorship is in the G-8?

FP: Thank you Jim Woolsey. Yuri Yarim-Agaev?

Yarim-Agaev: Let us describe what happened. British investigative journalist (not spy) and Putin critic Alexander Litvineko was killed in London by (most probably) Russian terrorists. The case is very similar to the Anna Politkovskaya murder, only now it is a British citizen on British territory. Why do most journalists and politicians prefer to see it differently? The two reasons are psychological and political.

Psychologically, people prefer not to hear for whom the bell tolls. It is much more comfortable to be presented with a cloak and dagger case rather than the murder of a colleague and compatriot.

The political reason is even more compelling. We have here a classic case of terrorism, the same terrorism that Bush and Blair are crusading against. Combine it with the previous murders and the laws quoted by Vladimir Bukovsky, and according to Bush’s definition, Russia is a country that “harbors terrorism.” To fit this definition the president of such a country does not have to authorize or even to know about specific terrorist acts. It was never claimed that Taliban leader Mullah Omar gave direct orders to Osama Bin Laden or even knew about 9/11 beforehand. That, however, was not considered a good excuse.

According to the Bush doctrine, countries that harbor terrorism call for preemptive action and retaliation. Had Bush and Blair demanded the immediate repeal of the laws authorizing the killing of Putin’s critics, Politkovskaya and Litvinenko’s murders could have been avoided. They did not. Instead , without saying a word, they went to St. Petersburg to pay tribute to Putin, who (what a coincidence!) had signed those laws only one week before the summit.

At least our political leaders should demand repealing those laws now. They should also consider other measures, including the possible suspension of Russia’s affiliation with the G-7 club. This is not only a matter of retaliation. This is necessary to guarantee that the lives of their own citizens will be protected, independent of whether those citizens like Putin’s regime or not. Unfortunately, so far we hear only assurances of eternal partnership with Putin, assurance that may invite even more murders.

Communism is dead, but many of its structures remain. The most dangerous of them - the KGB - is currently in power. Without communism, however, this power is limited. They cannot so easily imprison their critics or stop them from leaving the country. Therefore, they revert more to secret murders. And they will continue to do so until they are stopped.

It is not important whether these murders are in Putin’s personal interest or not. He remains merely a representative of the KGB, which put him in power in the first place, and he has to obey the rules of that organization. What should he tell his pals? “Thou shalt not kill’ or “We cannot suppress freedom of speech”? The only viable argument for them would have been that such killing would be very costly. The American and British position, however, does not provide much support for such an argument.

FP: But how can we “demand” that another nation repeal its laws? And what can we really do about it anyway? Can we really suspend Russia’s affiliation with the G-7 club? What else? Would even Putin care? Has the West lost its will and lost its respect?

Andrei Piontkovsky?

Piontkovsky: I think that the West now has the last opportunity to positively affect events in Russia.

Jim Woolsey`s King Henry argument is very appropriate in this situation. It would be pointless for G8 partners to speculate on the extent to which Mr. Putin is personally involved in these crimes. That never comes to light in political assassinations. What is more important is what Mr.Putin will do now.

Within Russia and beyond her frontiers, assassinations and attempted assassinations are taking place of “enemies of the people”, lists of whom are to found on all of our country’s quasi-fascist websites. It is only going to be possible to continue blaming these murders on the CIA, or the oligarchs Boris Berezovsky (in Great Britain) or Leonid Nevzlin (in Israel), for a few more days, until the British, as seems likely, publicly and officially produce compelling evidence showing that the tracks of Alexander Litvinenko’s murderers lead straight back to Moscow. The President of the Russian Federation will then have to take possibly the most momentous decision of his life.

Much the same dilemma faced the one-time President of Poland, Wojciech Jaruszelski, when his intelligence services brutally murdered their own “enemy of the Polish people”, the priest Jerzy Popieluszko. He could have tried to cover up the crime, thereby irrevocably becoming an accomplice (and if he had, he would undoubtedly be in prison today). Instead he chose to hand the murderers over to justice and as a result has remained, even today in post-Communist Poland, a respected political figure.

More important, however, than the fate of the Russian President is the fate of his country. The effective legitimization of these serial political murders will make not only President Putin but all of us hostages of the institutions which are committing them. That is quite apart from the fact that Russia’s international reputation for years to come depends on whether a radiological attack on a G-8 partner was sanctioned by the Head of the Russian State rather than by some rabid FSB oil baron.

To judge by several signals from the Kremlin, Putin is wavering. Some sound advice from his partners in the G-8 to their friend Vladimir could play a crucial role.

Such advice from the White House should be accompanied by a totally unambiguous warning of something that very many in Russian political class, including Putin himself, would find profoundly hurtful. That is, that if the Kremlin shields the murderers of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko, and if its propaganda continues to accuse “Western intelligence agencies” of those crimes, as it does at present, as it accused and continues to accuse the United States of sinking the submarine Kursk and of being behind the massacre of children in Beslan, then relations between the USA and Russia will be totally soured and will remain so until the last day of V. Putin’s occupancy of the Kremlin.

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Symposium: From Russia With Death (Continued)
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | January 19, 2007

Bukovsky: I agree with most of what has been said. Except, perhaps, a largely unnecessary analysis into as deep a history as Ivan the Terrible or even Nicholas I. Both of them were hardly worse than their contemporaries in Europe. Instead, let me provide an update to the general political context of the present-day Russian situation:

The current ruling clique in Kremlin knows very well how much they are hated in the country, all the "polls" notwithstanding. They know that they are perceived as usurpers and impostors. True, in 2000 Putin came to power by winning an election, but so did Hitler in 1932. And, pretty much like Hitler, he immediately proceeded to dismantle all democratic checks and balances.

Now, as the power transition of 2008 is approaching, Putin is paranoid in his suspicion that the West will try to use this opportunity to stage an "orange revolution" Ukrainian style. Hence his government’s clumsy provocation against the British Embassy in Moscow a couple of years ago (the "electronic stone" case) aimed at discrediting non-governmental organizations perceived by them as hostile, cutting their funding from abroad and placing them under the Kremlin's control. Hence is the decision to silence the most persistent critics of the regime -- even by violent means if need be. In a way, this is understandable: they know they all will be in jail if a genuine democrat wins an election, particularly if it happens by means of a popular upheaval.

The question is: what should be done by the West and, first of all, by the British government? As the police investigation of the case is at its end, we expect the British Government to finally make a statement and to announce the measures in connection with it. I am afraid that the preliminary indications are that Blair will try to avoid a firm stand on the matter using one or another excuse. At least a leak to that effect was published by Sunday Times couple of weeks ago alleging that he said to the cabinet: "Our priority is to retain good long-term relations with Russia". If this is to happen, and quite apart from the fact that he will be in dereliction of his prime duties to the security of the UK citizens as well as to the sovereignty of this country, it will send a very wrong signal to the Russian rulers. They already believe that their energy supplies and the world's dependence on them places them above the international law and will allow them to get away even with murder. Further acts of appeasement by the West will make them outright dangerous.

What if they occupy Georgia or Moldova tomorrow? What if they do something equally stupid against one of the Baltic countries which are members of NATO now? What would the West do then? More excuses, more appeasement? No, in my firm belief, they should be stopped now, they should be shown their proper place in the world.

The options are limited and none of them is good. If Britain simply kicks out some 30 odd Russian diplomats from the Russian Embassy in London, there will be tit-for-tat expulsions, and the British government will be left looking rather silly. A suspension of diplomatic relations is even more silly, as we all know they will be quietly resumed in a year or so. In both cases, nothing would be achieved. Russia would not be forced to back off while relations will be spoiled for a couple of years anyway. Therefore, I suggest:

First, it should be made absolutely clear that a murder of a British citizen on British soil by agents of a foreign power constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of British sovereignty, and, as it happened, an act of a radioactive attack on a NATO country. Second, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be invoked demanding a collective response by the NATO countries. Third, NATO should present Russia with an ultimatum demanding an immediate repeal of that offensive law with apologies. Failing that, Russia should be expelled from all international organizations, starting with G8, Council of Europe, WTO, etc. etc. Top Russian officials should not be allowed to step on the territory of NATO countries. Russia should be proclaimed a rogue state.

What would be the likely response? At first, Russia will posture as an injured innocent, it might even flex its "gas muscles" for a while. But, then, in two years time, after that all-important transition of power in 2008, they will quietly drop that law from the books (without saying much to their public at home), and will be eager to mend fences. Of course, for two years relations will be strained, but they will be in any case. At least, Russia will be forced to climb down.

FP: What a wonderful thing it would be if the West could actually act with such resolve, not only against Putin but also against Islamism. But I fear it is too good to be true.

Dr. Pipes, what do you think of the others’ comments so far and Mr. Bukovsky’s recommendations, and the realism of them?

Pipes: I agree with the various analyses and recommendations, with one exception: Vladimir Bukovsky's astonishing statement that "all the polls notwithstanding" the rulers in the Kremlin know that they are "hated" in Russia. The polls conducted by such highly regarded pollsters as the late Iurii Levada cannot be dismissed so easily: they are professionally done and honestly reported.

This is the problem: the Russian people with a sizable majority approve of the authoritarian policies of the Putin regime because they respect "groznyi" (severe) rulers who (in their eyes) offer them protection from foreign and domestic enemies lurking around every corner. They are prepared to regard the Politkovskayas and Litvinenkos as traitors and the Putins as true patriots. This is the real tragedy of Russia.

It behooves the West to make it unmistakably clear to the Russian government and its citizens that such behavior will not be tolerated, that it disqualifies Russia from membership in the ranks of civilized nations, and, whenever possible, to give this opinion a practical demonstration. Appeasing evildoers will fail, as it always does.

Satter: I agree with Richard Pipes that the Levada polls need to be taken seriously but we need to consider the reasons why Putin's popularity rating is so high. During the Yeltsin period, the Russian people were subjected to a frontal attack on their values and material well being. If we take the latter first, in some months under Yeltsin, wage arrears exceeded 50 per cent of the total wage bill due.

By January 1, 1998, wage arrears reached 13 per cent of the total money mass (M2) or $8 billion at the official rate of exchange. Official statistics even introduced a heading "wage arrears" and by December, 1998, 26 million people lived in dire poverty. At the same time, an ideological vacuum was created. Of course, it was a good thing that communist ideology was discredited but no new system of values took its place. The "reformers" spoke a great deal about establishing the authority of "universal values" but universal values are reflected in the rule of law. What was introduced instead was unrestrained criminality.

Putin was Yeltsin's hand picked successor. He came to power to preserve the oligarchic regime. He immediately benefited, however, from the spectacular rise in oil prices (from $9 a barrel in 1998 to $78 a barrel recently.) By claiming to restore Russia as a great power, he also helped to fill the spiritual vacuum that resulted from the Soviet Union's fall. He did nothing to bring about the energy windfall and his efforts to "reassert Russia's greatness" consisted mainly of bullying small powers. Nonetheless, he won the support of the demoralized Russian population, which, at the very least, began to be paid on time. Therefore, Putin's popularity should not be underestimated. At the same time, it is one of the reasons that the murder of Alexander Litvinenko demands a strong Western response.

Unfortunately, Russian society cannot subject the regime to moral restraint on its own. Individuals in Russia have an almost impossible time defending their sense of right and wrong against the pressure of the regime even when they are so inclined. If we accede to absurd official Russian explanations for the death of Litvinenko, we will show that we too cannot defend our sense of right and wrong. This will encourage the view in Russia that the authorities can act with total impunity. The torture death of Litvinenko will then not mark the end of the present leadership's assault on civilized standards but only the beginning.

Pacepa: Let’s face the facts. On May 28, 2002, NATO welcomed President Putin as a partner in the alliance. A month later, his chief military prosecutor charged Litvinenko in absentia with high treason for providing old KGB secrets to the government of a NATO country. [1] No body blinked in Moscow. Quite a few Russians still love Byzantine deception—generations of them have kidded themselves about the glorious state of their country. The Russians also love Putin. They call him the “Gray Cardinal” for his secrecy and Vatican-like mastery of backroom intrigue, and they admire his icy blue eyes as indicative of the strong, silent type, a real man, who chooses his few words with great care.

So, what can we do? First, we should tear off the veil of secrecy surrounding Putin. When you get right down to it, his magic derives from his following the tradition of Soviet rulers who cloaked themselves in secrecy and began being known only after they were gone. It is true, we may get a glimpse of Putin’s wife and hear about his love of karate through occasional self-controlled appearances, but on the whole Putin looks less three-dimensional than his Soviet predecessors.

Next, we should admit that Putin is a dictator brought to power by a KGB putsch. Every Soviet bloc intelligence service had a “survival plan” in case Communism would collapse. Romania’s, which I wrote out by hand (typewriters were considered insecure), was christened with the pedestrian name “Plan M” and stated that a couple of hundred undercover Securitate officers (named in an attachment) should take over the government. Their task was to abolish the Communist Party, remove “Socialist Republic” from the name of the country, restore the old Romanian national flag, re-baptize the Securitate with a Western-sounding name, simulate privatization by secretly transferring state enterprises into their own hands, and introduce Romania to the world as a democratic country. The plan of East Germany’s Stasi was called OibE (Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz, “officers on special assignment”), and was registered as Top Secret Document 0008-6/86 of March 17, 1986. Plan OibE, published on June 27, 1990 by the German newspaper Der Morgen under the title “The Most Secret of the Secret,” was identical to my Plan M but provided for a much larger number of intelligence officers (2,587) assigned to take over the government. The speed of Eastern Europe’s collapse did not allow for plans M and OibE to become operational, although quite a few politicians who rose to prominence in those countries after Communism collapsed had been secretly affiliated with the Securitate and the Stasi in the past.

Russia’s “democratization” looks like an operation staged by my Plan M. The Communist Party was abolished, the Soviet Union re-became Russia, the Red Flag was replaced by the old tsarist one, the KGB got a Westernized name, and a small clique of predatory intelligence insiders plundered Russia’s most valuable assets. The looting penetrated to every corner of the country, and it eventually created a Mafia-style economic system that threatened the stability of the whole Russia. By July 1998 the ruble had lost 75% of its past year’s value, short-term interest rates had climbed from 21% to 60%, and the stock market had slumped by more than 60% since the last year.

By that time the Kremlin was reporting that Yeltsin was suffering from a “cold.” When the Russian media recalled that in the past “colds” had proved lethal for the rulers (former presidents Konstantin Chernenko and Yury Andropov were dead in weeks after catching colds), the Kremlin acknowledged that in fact Yeltsin had the “flu,” which later proved to be a euphemism for a heart problem that necessitated a multiple by-pass operation. Soon Yeltsin came down with one more “cold,” which metamorphosed into a two-month bout of pneumonia [2] To top it all off, an influential newspaper in Moscow was already reporting that a KGB putsch against the ailing Yeltsin was in the making.[3]

On December 31, 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation. “I shouldn’t be in the way of the natural course of history,” he explained.[4] For his part, the newly appointed president, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree pardoning Yeltsin, who was allegedly connected to massive bribery scandals, “for any possible misdeeds” and granted him “total immunity” from being prosecuted (or even searched and questioned) for “any and all” actions committed while in office. Putin also gave Yeltsin a lifetime pension and a state dacha.[5] Now over 6,000 positions in Russia’s federal and regional governments are held by former KGB officers.

Finally, we should help the Russians realize that there might be more to their world than just Soviet traditions.

FP: Thank you Mike Pacepa. You definitely don’t lack a punch.

Jim Woolsey?

Woolsey: My colleagues have all made extraordinary contributions. I find nothing really to disagree with. Even the split between Messrs. Pipes and Bukovsky about Russian attitudes toward Putin seems to me to present the two sides of a recognizable historical phenomenon: authoritarian rulers being simultaneously popular (especially if they come to power after a period of chaos and rule simultaneously with a factor-of-seven increase in the price of their country's principal export) and also hated. The brave will in one way or another express their hatred of tyranny and love of liberty even in the face of government-sponsored terror: some, such as the remarkable Mr. Bukovsky, will take a public stand and be persecuted for it; others, such as Count von Stauffenberg and Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer will take up arms. But most citizens of an economically successful tyranny will feel simultaneously fear, hatred, and physical satisfaction. Most of us are capable of a fair amount of cognitive dissonance.

I am inclined to think that these assassinations and the new Russian statute do present the West with an opportunity that should be seized in order to increase the pressure on Mr. Putin. It would probably be difficult to marshal support for a whole range of retaliatory steps, but refusing Russian membership in the G7 as its 8th member seems to me to present an ideal focus for getting Mr. Putin's attention. These seven democratic nations should simply refuse to have as a member a dictatorship that assassinates its enemies, whether on its own soil or the soil of a fellow member state, and proudly claims by statute its intention to do so. Taking such a step of expulsion, especially if it is combined by serious efforts to move away from dependence on oil (via alternative fuels, including electricity via the coming plug-in hybrid technology) and gas (via conservation, renewables, Russia-skirting pipelines to Central Asia) should get Russian attention.

With current demographic trends (ethnic Russians are having children at the incredibly low rate of about half what is needed to replace their population and Russian men's life expectancy is below that of Bangladeshi men) Russian rulers should be hearing some footsteps behind them: by the middle of the century Russian population, under these assumptions, will be under a hundred million, below that of Yemen, and nearly one-third will be Muslim. Mr. Putin and his thuggish compatriots may care about nothing beyond their own generation and its creature comforts, but some Russians in political authority before too many years will take a longer view. If they see a resolute West, their energy leverage declining, and their population declining even faster they will begin to re-think things. In the meantime we should begin our help for present and future Russian reformers by refusing to permit those who currently rule Russia to participate in the G7.

Yarim-Agaev: For any opinion poll to be meaningful, it has to have two components: a good pollster and people with opinions. I do not question the integrity of the late Yuri Levada, whom I knew when he was still a young nonconformist sociologist. The problem is with the second component. I am afraid that most Russians still do not have personal opinions on political matters. And, I mean real opinions, of conviction and consequence, opinions according to which a person acts.

We often under-appreciate the fact that to have such opinions is the privilege of a sovereign person living an independent life. Most people gain such independence not through metaphysical meditations, or even from liberties granted from above, but rather by possessing private property and running their own business. Most Russians do not have property and still work for the government, upon which they feel very dependent.

For almost a century, they were actively taught not to have opinions; they were in fact punished for having them. They remember this part of their education, and they still do not see much use in having their own opinions. Hence, however accurately you conduct a poll, you cannot reveal what does not exist. You can skim superficial sentiments and momentary emotions. Those are too volatile, though, and should not be given too much credence.

Similar considerations may be applied to a phenomenon even more important than opinion polls: elections. A democratic election also must have two components: first, a political and legal framework, and secondly, voters. Again, most Russians are not real voters--yet. For many of them, voting is merely a required ceremony or a way to express their emotions rather than a political act with consequences. Many Russians do not believe that their vote can influence the outcome of an election, or that it can somehow influence their future life. Most elections in post-soviet territories are merely a rubberstamping of the rule of the existing leader or a successor chosen by him. The rare exceptions, which start to approximate democratic elections, are called revolutions--such as in Ukraine, Georgia, or Kyrgyzstan.

The paradox of Putin’s first term election may serve as a good example that both opinion polls and voting in Russia carry very little weight. The totally unknown Putin was elected only because he was appointed by Yeltsin and ran on a platform of continuity, whereas at the same time the approval rating of Yeltsin himself and his policies dropped to 12%.

We ignore all these factors and concentrate only on the technical aspects of elections in these countries. We send hundreds of observers to make sure that all formal rules are adhered to, and if they are, we declare that the country has had a democratic election. As a result, we overrate the elected officials, who at this stage of political development in Russia and other former Soviet countries should be considered merely transitional, provisional authorities.

This one-sided approach is responsible for the America’s main policy mistake toward post-totalitarian countries: equating their majority vote with democracy. As soon as the first elections were completed in Russia, Afghanistan, or Iraq, we rushed to proclaim them democracies. This mistake has had dire consequences both for these countries and the U.S.

People in Russia and similar countries do not take it seriously when their leaders tell them that they are living in a democracy and free market. They take it differently when the ultimate authority on democracy and capitalism, the United States of America, reaffirms the declarations of their leaders. And America reaffirms it not only through numerous statements by its presidents, but in the case of Russia, by issuing it an official “diploma” as a democratic and capitalist country by admitting it to the G-7 club. Russian people looked around and said: “If America says that we live in a democracy and free market, it must be a democracy and free market, but we do not like it. If this is the American lifestyle, we do not like America.” Inadvertently, our impatience has helped both to create a new wave of anti-Americanism in Russia and to discredit not only democracy and the free market, but also freedom itself.

Faced with the eternal dilemma of freedom vs. security, Russia once again turned to the latter. With the primacy of security, it is only natural to have the KGB as a ruler.

If we want Russia to be a democratic country, we have the very difficult task of helping to rehabilitate democracy and capitalism in Russia. So far, we are doing a poor job. We endorse the rule of the KGB, we overlook the suppression of voices of freedom, and we pander to Russian chauvinism and xenophobia.

Until freedom and reason are rehabilitated in Russia, its people and leaders will persist in a quagmire of prejudice and absurdities. The recent campaign concerning Litvinenko’s and Politkovskaya’s murders is a good example of that. Russia’s officials and its controlled media are spreading the idea that behind those murders were forces that tried to discredit Russia and to spoil its relations with the West. It doesn’t occur to them that this is a self-incriminating proposition, since we know that such forces do not exist in the West. I know only of one place where these forces exist. It is Russia. And these forces are heavily concentrated around the Kremlin.

Piontkovsky: It's significant that most of us used the word "opportunity" in our discussion. The tragedy we are dealing with does present an opportunity, maybe the last one, to prevent Russia from sliding into the camp of authoritarian anti-Western dictatorships. Whether this opportunity will be smartly used depends on political will and the integrity of Western leaders, such as George W. Bush and T. Blair personally.

There is an additional human tragedy aspect in this macabre affair:

Given all the emerging evidence it is quite clear that Kovtun and Lugovoy brought Polonium 210 to London. Now they are hidden from the world behind the walls of a highly secret medical establishment. The fate of these people are being now decided in the Kremlin consumed with panic as to what to do next in the face of the growing heap of hard evidence. I see the Kremlin really facing two options here:

Option #1: Lugovoy and Kovtun quietly pass away behind the clinic walls and we will forever be left speculating about the reasons and motives of the Litvinenko assassination.

Option #2: Lugovoy and Kovtun testify against Boris Berezovsky or Leonid Nevzlin as the alleged mastermind behind the crime at a Moscow trial staged by the Kremlin (a-la Zinoviev and Kamenev trials in Stalin's Russia in 1930-s).

Knowing that Putin is famous for his indecision when it comes to serious political action, I would say that the first more inertial and less dramatic variant of events is the likeliest. In any case the fate of Kovtun and Lugovoy is not the subject of envy now. A dramatic factor is the fate of Lugovoy's family. His wife and children traveled with him to London on October 31 and also are in hospital now. What will happen to them now?

Anyway these two young gentlemen sent by the Russian King to England with an important mission look more and more now like the characters of William Shakespeare's "Hamlet" or rather Tom Stoppard 's "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead" play.

If George Bush and Tony Blair let Vladimir Putin get away with this scandal they will become another pair of Rosencrants and Guildenstern. They will become morally dead as proponents of Western principles and values.

Bukovsky: The last thing I intended to do was to question Mr. Levada's integrity. But, as Yuri has explained, opinion polls mean very little in Russia. Suffice it to recall that in 1996, before his second elections, Yeltsin's rating was in single digits. Yet, in a couple of months, he won a landslide victory. Russian polls (and elections) are like a guessing game or a bet on who is more likely to win. They are no a real measurement of public sentiments. And, what else would one expect, bearing in mind that the people are never given a genuine, honest choice? It reminds me a popular joke circulating before Putin's first election victory in 2000 (based on the famous Aesop's fable about Mr. Crow with a piece of cheese, and a hungry Mr. Fox): So, Mr. Fox asks Mr. Crow: "Are you going to vote for Putin?" Mr. Crow keeps his beak closed, mindful of cheese. "Well, tell us, tell us, would you? Just say `yes’ or `no’. Very simple - `yes’ or `no’?" "Yes", finally says Mr. Crow and a happy Mr. Fox scurries away with cheese. Now, a very sad Mr. Crow sits on a tree top and muses: "Suppose I would have said `no.’ Would it change anything?"

Anyway, much more to the point is what the West will do to counteract Russian aggressiveness. Judging by what has been said in this discussion, my suggestions are perceived as too optimistic. Yet, nothing less will do the trick. So, are we at a dead-end? Perhaps we are, in some sense. On the other hand, perhaps this is a new beginning. Indeed, there is little doubt that Frau Merkel, Monsieur Chirac and Signor Prodi will do their best to undermine NATO unity and to water-down any serious measures. Equally, there is little doubt that the new NATO members, former Warsaw Bloc countries and the Baltic states, would vote for the toughest proposals on the table.

So, if a NATO member refuses to accept its responsibility under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, its membership should be terminated, should it not? In other words, this might be a great moment to do what is long overdue (and what we have been discussing on Frontpagemag.com for a very long time): to re-configure NATO. There are quite rough times ahead of us, and it sure pays to be well-prepared.

Satter: Andrei Piontkovsky raises an important point. We need to ask ourselves: what are the consequences if the West fails to respond forcefully to the murder of Litvinenko? The problem with contemporary Russia (and with Russia historically) is that it tries to redefine morality. We see this in the Litvinenko case. It is said that Britain is refusing to extradite persons wanted by Russia so Russia is under no obligation to extradite those wanted by Britain. The underlying assumption is that Russian justice is as impartial as British justice.

When the Soviet Union fell, it was suggested that Russia would become an authoritarian state on the Latin American model, corrupt but not totalitarian. Russia is certainly corrupt and authoritarian. But it is an authoritarian regime with pretensions. To a degree largely unanticipated in 1992, a new Russia has emerged with great power ambitions and a renewed insistence on its “special way.” What this amounts to is that the Russian regime refuses to be bound by higher moral values. Acts like the murder of Litvinenko, which it conceives as being in its interest, are treated as wholly legitimate.

Other enemies of the Russian regime have been murdered inside Russia. Litvinenko, however, was murdered, as were several victims of the Soviet regime, in the West. Are we to accept this as normal and lend our implicit support to the deluded Russian view of reality? If we fail to act, can we expect the Russian authorities to be more restrained in the future? And having made such a moral compromise will we be in a position to fight against the Islamic fanatics who are also trying to redefine morality?

We aren’t going to declare war on Russia. We have no intention of disrupting economic relations. We can’t refuse to give them credits because they don’t need our credits. But we can exert moral pressure. This may seem inconsequential but its effect is greater than often imagined, in part because there is no effective moral opposition inside the country. The alternative to attempts to hold the Russian leadership responsible for crimes in which they are implicated – at least in the West - is greater acts of Russian aggression -- as the leadership falls increasingly under the illusion that there is some substance to their talk about Russia’s “special way” after all.

Pacepa: I agree that refusing Russian membership in the G7 as its 8th member may get the Kremlin’s attention. But we must act now. Otherwise, we may see a repeat of what happened during the Cold War, when the Kremlin moved from killing émigrés to assassinating international leaders (Laszlo Rajk and Imre Nagy of Hungary; Lucretiu Pãtrãscanu in Romania; Rudolf Slansky and Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia; the shah of Iran; Palmiro Togliatti in Italy). The U.S. kept quiet, and eventually the Kremlin killed America’s own president. (At the time, the leaders of Moscow’s satellite intelligence services unanimously agreed that the KGB had been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy; as a Communist general, I was involved for the next 15 years in Moscow’s cover-up “Dragon” operation aimed at throwing the blame on the U.S. itself for JFK’s death). Again the U.S. kept quiet, and the Kremlin was emboldened to attempt the murder of Pope John Paul II, who had started a crusade against Soviet Communism.

Appeasement and closing an eye to evil do not work. Appeasement was instrumental in spawning the current wave of international terrorism. In December 1979 the Kremlin assassinated the American-educated prime minister of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, replaced him with a Soviet puppet, and invaded the country. The U.S. merely protested by boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow. That indulgent attitude generated the Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden’s terrorism. In the 1990s, the U.S. government virtually ignored bin Laden’s first assault on the World Trade Center, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, and the attack on the USS Cole. Subsequently, we had barely set foot in the 21st century when bin Laden’s terrorists directly attacked our country and unleashed a relentless general war against us.

For the long run, we should help the Russians learn about our Western democracy. They have never before experienced a free society, have never really owned property or been allowed to make decisions for themselves. They have never had a real political party, and few in post-Soviet Russia seem to see a particular need for one. But they are the only ones who can rid Russia of Putin-style leaders. Turning that huge country westward may be a lengthy, sinuous and expensive process, but we can help. I suggest publishing this Symposium in Russian as well. And maybe later, we could have a weekly Russian edition of the FrontPagemag.com. Let us remember that the missiles that destroyed European Communism were originally launched from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Woolsey: I especially like David Satter's formulation that we have now a Russia "with pretensions" that seeks to "redefine morality". This is indeed far more totalitarian than what most of us had hoped for from a post-Yeltsin Russia. Many were prepared to understand some degree of corruption and authoritarianism in the aftermath of the chaotic nineties. But these pretensions and this indignity when assassinations and provocations are exposed are quite remarkable. At least the Communists had a bizarre ideology as a cover story for their trashing of things like truth and elementary human rights. Putin and the siloviki have nothing but the indignant pretensions of raw power.

Were it not for fossil fuels those pretensions would get the derision they deserve. But as one Russian neighbor after another is exposed to natural gas blackmail, as one international energy corporation after another is subjected to godfather-like offers they can't refuse and their investments, well, stolen, the character and extent of Russian extortion get clearer. As Tom Friedman puts it, the path of freedom and the price of oil run in opposite directions.

But last Sunday something happened in Detroit that bears watching, especially in Moscow, Caracas, Riyadh, and Tehran -- wherever the price of oil fuels repression. The General Motors that many thought moribund dramatically unveiled a concept car and joined Toyota in a race to be first into the market with a plug-in hybrid passenger vehicle. The plug-in aspect is crucial - both companies are headed toward having on the market soon cars that get on the order of 500 miles per gallon of petroleum products. This is because they can run on cheap off-peak electricity by being plugged in at night, but then just become an ordinary hybrid after some 40 miles of all-electric driving. And what liquid fuel they use after their all-electric run need not be petroleum-based -- it can easily be ethanol or bio-or renewable-diesel.

Can the new battery technology that makes 500 mpg (of gasoline) cars possible undermine the roots of Russian pretensions? Stay tuned. Consumers who will enjoy seeing their driving costs cut to a fraction of today's, the automobile companies that have woken up, and electric utilities (who smile at the prospect of being able to sell otherwise-wasted off-peak power) are joining the environmentalists and those who are seriously concerned about depending on dictatorships and autocratic kingdoms for our transportation fuel. These folks don't see everything alike, but they are united in having had it with oil. The need for natural gas for electricity generation and heating is another story -- but even there we are seeing important progress both in the efficiency of renewables and in the ability to utilize coal in a way that sequesters the carbon produced by its use. One can now begin to see a future where sitting on oil and gas reserves doesn't give dictators and autocrats anything like the leverage they have today. The progress of energy technology, Mr. Putin, does not bode well for your pretensions.

Yarim-Agaev: The KGB is not capable of inventing new morality, and does not need to do so. This new “revolutionary morality” was created by Lenin a century ago. According to this morality, specific rules of operations were developed for Soviet structures, such as the KGB, which has been operating under those rules for generations.

Now, without the communist system, the KGB is left with those rules like a severed limb with knee reflexes. The reflexes are simple. The enemy is neither good nor bad; it is only strong or weak. The US is enemy number one. If America comes up with any conciliatory step, it is a sign of weakness and invites attack. If attack does not encounter retaliation, it must be escalated.

These are typical rules for such structures. Look at Syria. Just as Washington started to mention it as a possible partner in Iraq’s situation, Syria immediately killed the most pro-democratic Lebanese minister. It was a knee-jerk reflex. One cannot exert moral pressure on a knee. Political or financial retaliation, yes. Even a knee can learn restraint, if with every jerk a leg painfully hits something hard.

Having said that, I do not deny the importance of providing a political and moral standard to people in Russia. For that purpose, however, we need first to stick to our own principles without compromising them and adapting to other countries’ rules, as we do now. Here are a couple of examples.

We know that a necessary condition for democracy to take root in Russia is to have a lustration, i.e., to prohibit former communists and KGB officers from holding positions of power. This condition is even more important for a democratic election than a proper vote count. We cannot force Russia to adopt a law to that effect, yet nobody can force us to recognize Russia as a democracy until such a law is passed. And we should not pretend that there exists some alternative form of democracy—Putin’s so-called “sovereign” democracy—which does not require such a condition.

The second example is the broadcasting done by Radio Liberty and the BBC, which were major vehicles for providing moral and political support to Russian democrats. As we have written recently, the work of these radio stations was greatly compromised by modifying their programs to the taste of the Russian audience and government.

These compromises are based on two premises: that we have to appease the Russian government, since we depend on it, and that we have to gain instant popularity with the Russian people, since that would help world peace and stability. Both premises are wrong and counterproductive.

We do not depend on the Russian government either strategically or economically. Our alleged strategic dependence is based on the fact that Russia has leverage over our enemies, such as Iran and North Korea. But Russia has this leverage only because it is their ally, not ours, and always acts in their interests.

There is no more validity to our alleged economic dependence on Russian oil. This is mutual interdependence, whose degree is determined by the percentage of oil in the corresponding GNP. Since oil constitutes a much smaller part of our GNP than Russia’s, we depend on Russia much less, than Russia depends on us. We can easily eliminate any dependence on oil by building nuclear power plants—the cleanest source of energy from the environmental standpoint. I welcome any new scientific developments, but I do not think that they will change our attitude. The existing economy and technology are sufficient for our independence. This dependence is not of a material, but rather of a psychological nature, and we can change this perception at any moment.

Our government is trying to gain popularity in Russia by supporting the KGB and by pandering to Russian chauvinism. This is a great disservice to the Russian people and an awkward way to improve relations between our countries. Such a policy helps to enhance the worst of the Russian nation and to suppress the best. It is demoralizing for true Russian democrats, people who deserve our real support. There may not be many of them, but they are the only hope for Russia to develop into a free, democratic and peace-loving country.

Piontkovsky: For Western governments to stand up to the Putin's regime is not just an issue of morality or concern for Russian democracy. It's an issue of self-interest and security.

Emboldened by US failure in Iraq, Putin's regime is challenging Western strategic interests more openly and aggressively all over the world. There is no brutal dictator or murderer in the world (from the Burma junta to Sudan’s genocidal rulers) which wouldn't be supported and covered both politically and militarily by Moscow.

Americans somehow talked themselves into the double stupidity. They still believe that they need Putin for dealing with Iran, North Korea, Syria and other rogue states and that they also need to reward him politically for his services.

But Putin has already been playing on the side of enemies of the West for a long time. Paradoxically he is also playing on the side of Russia’s enemies because enemies of the West (i.e. Islamofascists) regard Russia as part of the "satanic" West. Putin hates the West more than he loves Russia.

For the sake of Western, Russian and World security this disruptive and suicidal course of Moscow foreign policy should be stopped. And Western governments have sufficient leverages to do it.

Putin`s KGB cleptocracy wants to enjoy two pleasures simultaneously: to hate the West and to harm it and at the same time to enjoy a wealthy Western lifestyle. (Nothing new about it - the same is the behaviour of Saudi royals. All of their billions of dollars are held in Western banks and their real estate is at Cote d'Asure, Florida and Canary Islands.

The day after Crown Prosecutor office names the suspects in Litvinenko murder, Putin and his "brigade" should be demanded to expose the superiors of Lugovoy and Covtun, those KGB generals who were sent on their murder mission to London. Putin should be told very clearly that there will be no business as usual with him any more. If he gets away with this murder, he will not only hate the West but also despise it.

FP: Oleg Kalugin, Richard Pipes, Vladimir Bukovsky, Jim Woolsey, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa, David Satter, Yuri Yarim-Agaev and Andrei Piontkovsky, thank you for joining to Frontpage Symposium.

[To go back to the first part of this symposium, click here.]

Notes:

[1] Steven Lee Myers, “Treason trial evokes ghosts of Soviet past,” International Herald Tribune, June 12, 2002, Internet edition, www.iht.com/articles/61081.html.

[2] “The Perils of Catching Cold,” The Time Inc., Magazine Company, December 1997, p. 38, Internet Edition, geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/9802/yelt1.

[3] “Can the crisis end in a coup?” Moscow, the Nezavisimaya Gazyeta, July 7, 1998, p. 1.

[4] Barry Renfrew, “Boris Yeltsin Resigns,” The Washington Post, December 31, 1999, 6:48 a.m.

[5] Ariel Cohen, “End of the Yeltsin Era,” The Washington Times, January 3, 2000, Internet Edition, cohen-20000103.

http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2006/09/lets-remember-on-this-somber-day.html

Monday, September 11, 2006
Let's Remember on this Somber Day

Five years ago today, a squad of crazed Islamic terrorists attacked the innocent people in the World Trade Towers, killing women and children as well as many Muslims. Heroic Americans responded by downing one of the terrorist jets and risking their lives rushing to the scenes of the attacks to peform valiant rescue work. We owe it to their memory that such a thing not be repeated, and for the past five years America has been 100% free of terror incidents on its home soil. We all must pause this day and honor the heroes of 9/11. As Lincoln said, no words we can utter are meaningful on such an occasion, only our deeds can matter.

On this somber day, as the fork-tongued serpent named Putin tries to propagandize by reminding the world that he was the first to call President Bush to offer 9/11 condolences, let's not forget that Russia is complicit in this outrageous act, and more importantly in future similar acts which may befall America despite her best efforts to defend herself. Here's why:

* Russia has long supported Islamic terror, especially that aimed at the U.S., through its secret police. It's quite possible that KGB know-how was passed to the 9/11 terrorists through Russia's contacts in the Islamic world and used by the terrorist to acquire the level of sophistication needed to carry out the attacks.

* Russia passed U.S. military secrets to Iraq during the U.S. attack on Sadaam Hussein; it also did everything it could to obstruct the invasion on the dipolmatic front.

* Russia is now supplying both assault weapons and attack jets to U.S.-hating Venezuela, from where they may be exported to Bolivia and other South American nations.

* Russia is now supplying sophisticated nuclear technology to Iran, another ardent U.S. foe, which is seeking atomic weapons.

* Russia is supplyling both dipomatic cover and financial support to both Hamas and Hezbollah (neither of which it will recognize as terrorist organizations) as they struggle to destroy U.S. interests in the Middle East.

* By doing all these things (and more) Russia has created a climate of ambivalence which indicates to the terrorists that American responses to their outrageous actions will be tempered by Russian resistance, making them bolder and bolder.

How many Russians publicly rejoiced with the Twin Towers were attacked, and how many more secretely? How many Russians came forward to publicly scold those who rejoiced? Even as we speak, drunk with oil revenues, Russia is willfully provoking the U.S. into a second cold war. Many believe the Russian secret police capable of having planted the bombs that exploded in Moscow apartment buildings just before Russia launched its second military campaign in Chechnya. The Kremlin's callous disregard of Russian lives during the Beslan and Dubrovka crises is well known. Would the Kremlin really hesitate, then, to take actions that would jeopardize American lives?

In short, signs of genuine Russian friendship towards America are difficult indeed to identify, while signs of enmnity abound.

Labels: russia Thanks for reading La Russophobe

Operation: Stand Your Ground!
Minutemen Civil Defense Corps sent me this news tip. Please read. We must do all we can to secure our borders, and right now the California-Mexico border is doing the job the federal government refuses to do.

Read on….

MCDC April 2007 Events

Operation: Stand Your Ground!

Starting March 31 thru April 29 the California chapter of the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps will be providing coverage of our California-Mexico border, doing the job the federal government refuses to do.

During this time we will be standing watch looking for people crossing into California along the southern border where there is a high amount of illegal immigrant and drug traffic during the day and nights. Our teams will be reporting all activity to the local Border Patrol offices so that law enforcement officials can apprehend these people.

We will also be working on several improvement projects around camp “Vigilance”, our new campsite in Boulevard, CA. that resides on almost 8 acres of land that is just 2 miles north of the Mexican border and right in the middle of one of the heaviest trafficked areas in California for illegals to cross into America.

We are planning a special “Open House” event for members to bring their friends and family down to see the camp, and to take a tour of what the federal government actually calls the “Border Fence”. This event will be the weekend of April 20-22 (after Tax time). Light snacks, hot dogs, chips, desert and drinks will be provided, please invite those family and friends that you think would be interested in attending this event. We would also like to know how many in your party are going to be attending so we can plan accordingly for refreshments and transportation to the border fence. (Please no children under 18, no shorts or open toe shoes)

If you have not come down to the border in the last year, we miss you and need your help, we know everyone needs some of your time, but in the “Big Picture” so do we! We need help from those other 1450 members who are sitting at home watching American Idol, golf or cutting the lawn on Saturday, please make time to come down in April for this event. Bring your cameras and binoculars with you!

We will be sending out press releases to all of the media stations, print, radio & TV local and nationwide to get coverage of the progress that we have made on protecting our southern border.

For those of you who have not been down to camp, we have a full tent area, complete RV hookups for 8+, and our own “Mountain retreat” 1 bedroom apartment with private bath and kitchen.

Also if you are interested in assisting the
“April Event Planning Team” please contact us at: reservations@campvigilance.com or call us at: 619-567-4110

http://thehillchronicles.com/?p=792

http://www.globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=2149&cid=11&sid=64

Russia's Spetsnaz and Islamic Terrorism
Ryan Mauro - 9/11/2006
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union played a tremendous role in the expansion and evolution of Islamic terrorism. Many of the people responsible for the policy of promoting fundamentalist miliancy still hold key positions in Russia. People can accept the fact that there are "anti-Bush" cliques inside the CIA and State Department, and the fact that there are "pro-Bin Laden" cliques in the Pakistani military ISI. Yet, for some strange reason, they cannot accept the fact that there are still "pro-Marxist" cliques inside Russia. I believe that the Russian Mafia operates in unison with these "rogue" elements, almost as a separate intelligence directorate.

To help our readers understand how this clique works, and what it means today, I am posting a series of important quotes from the book, "Spetsnaz" by the defector, Viktor Suvorov. I believe that readers will have a better understanding of the role Russia's Spetsnaz (elite special unit of the GRU) played in terrorism and how it continues to support terrorism by operating through the mafia or in the security services themselves.

Quotes From "Spetsnaz" by Viktor Suvorov

"…Soviet secret police, the KGB, carries out different functions (than the Spetsnaz) and has other priorities. It has its own terrorist apparatus, which includes an organization very similar to spetsnaz, known as osnaz. The KGB uses osnaz for carrying out a range of tasks not dissimilar to those performed by the GRU's spetsnaz. But the Soviet leaders consider that it is best not to have any monopolies in the field of secret warfare. Competition, they feel, gives far better results than ration."

"…Osnaz apparently came into being practically at the same time as the Communist dictatorship. In the very first moments of the existence of the Soviet regime, we find references to detachments osobogo nazhacheniya-special purpose detachments. Osnaz means military-terrorist units, which came into being as shock troops of the Communist Party whose job was to defend the party. Osnaz was later handed over to the secret police, which changed its own name from time to time as easily as a snake changes its skins: Cheka-Vcheka-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. Once a snake, however, always a snake."

"It is the fact that Spetsnaz belongs to the army, and Osnaz to the secret police, that accounts for all the differences between them. Spetsnaz operates mainly against external enemies; Osnaz does the same but mainly in its own territory and against its own citizens. Even if both Spetsnaz and Osnaz are faced with carrying out one and the same operation, the Soviet leadership is not inclined to rely so much on co-operation between the army and the secret police as on the strong competitive instincts between them."

"…Thus if it is relatively easy to recruit a man to act as a 'sleeper', what about recruiting a foreigner to act as a real terrorist, prepared to commit murder, use explosives and fire buildings? Surely that is much more difficult? The answer is that, surprisingly, it is not."

"A Spetsnaz officer out to recruit agents for direct terrorist action has a wonderful base for his work in the West. There are a tremendous number of people who are discontented and ready to protest against absolutely anything. And while millions protest peacefully, some individuals will resort to any means to make their protest. The spetsnaz officer has only to find the malcontent who is ready to go to extremes."

"On another occasion a group of animal rights activists in the UK injected bars of chocolate with poison. If spetsnaz were able to contact that group, and there is every chance it might, it would be extremely keen (without, of course, mentioning its name) to suggest to them a number of even more effective ways of protesting. Activists, radicals, peace campaigners, green party members: as far as the leaders of the GRU are concerned, these are like ripe water-melons, green on the outside, but red on the inside-and mouth-watering. So there is a good base for recruiting."

"The spetsnaz network of agents has much in common with international terrorism, a common center, for example-yet they are different things and must not be confused. It would be foolhardy to claim that international terrorism came into being on orders from Moscow. But to claim that, without Moscow's support, international terrorism would never have assumed the scale it has would not be rash. Terrorism has been born in a variety of situations, in various circumstances and in different kinds of soil. Local nationalism has always been a potent source, and the Soviet Union supports it in any form, just as it offers concrete support to extremist groups operating within nationalist movements. Exceptions are made, of course, of the nationalist groups within the Soviet Union and the countries under its influence."

"If groups of extremists emerge in areas where there is no sure Soviet influence, you may be sure that the Soviet Union will very shortly be their best friend. In the GRU alone there are two independent and very powerful bodies dealing with questions relating to extremists and terrorists."

"…The GRU's tactics toward terrorists are simple: never give them any orders, never tell them what to do. They are destroying Western civilization: they know how to do it, the argument goes, so let them get on with it unfettered by petty supervision. Among them there are idealists ready to die for their own ideas. So let them die for them. The most important thing is to preserve their illusion that they are completely free and independent."

"Although the vast majority of spetsnaz is made up of Slavonic personnel, there are some exceptions…And spetsnaz contains Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Koreans, Mongolians, Finns and people of other nationalities."

"The Soviet Union condemns the civil war in Lebanon. But there is no need for it to condemn the war. All it has to do is hold back the next transportation of ammunition and war will cease."

"Apart from military and financial support, the Soviet Union also provides the terrorists aid in the form of training. Training centers have been set up in the Soviet Union for training terrorists from a number of different countries."

"Every terrorist is studied carefully during his training, and among them will be noted the potential leaders and the born rebels who will not submit to any authority…Of equal importance are the students' weaknesses and ambitions, and their relationships with one another. Some time, many years ahead, one of them may become an important leader, but not one approved by Moscow, so it is vital to know in advance who his likely friends and enemies will be."

"The reward for the GRU is that a terrorist doing work for spetsnaz does not, in the great majority of cases, suspect he is being used. He is utterly convinced that he is acting independently, of his own will and by his own choice. The GRU does not leave its signature or his fingerprints around."

"Even in cases where it is not a question of individual terrorists but of experienced leaders of terrorist organizations, the GRU takes extraordinary steps to ensure that not only all outsiders but even the terrorist leader himself should not realize the extent of his subordination to spetsnaz and consequently to the GRU."

"The overture is a series of large and small operations the purpose of which is, before actual military operations begin, to weaken the enemy's morale, create an atmosphere of general suspicion, fear and uncertainty, and divert the attention of the enemy's armies and police forces to a huge number of different targets, each of which may be the object of the next attack."

"The overture is carried by agents of the secret services of the Soviet satellite countries and by mercenaries recruited by intermediaries. The principal method employed at this stage is "gray terror", that is, a kind of terror which is not conducted in the name of the Soviet Union. The Soviet secret services do not at this stage leave their visiting cards, or leave other people's cards. The terror is carried out in the name of already existing extremist groups not connected in any way with the Soviet Union, or in the name of the fictitious organizations. The GRU reckons that in this period its operations should be regarded as natural disasters, actions by forces beyond human control, mistakes by people, or as terrorist acts by organizations not connected with the Soviet Union."

"The terrorist acts carried out in the course of the 'overture' require very few people, very few weapons and little equipment. In some cases all that may be needed is one man who has a weapon nothing more than a screwdriver, a box of marches or a glass ampoule. Some of the operations can have catastrophic consequences. For example, an epidemic of an infectious disease at seven of the most important naval bases in the West could have the effect of halving the combined naval might of the Soviet Union's enemies."

"There is a marked increase in the strength of the peace movement. In many countries there are continual demand to make the country neutral and not to support American foreign policy, which has been discredited. At this point the 'gray terror' gathers scope and strength and in the last days of peace reaches its peak."
Ryan Mauro is a geopolitical analyst. He began working for Tactical Defense Concepts (www.tdconcepts.com), a maritime-associated security company in 2002. In 2003, Mr. Mauro joined the Northeast Intelligence Network (www.homelandsecurityus.com), which specializes in tracking and assessing terrorist threats. He has appeared on over 20 radio shows and had articles published in over a dozen publications. His book "Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq" is scheduled to be published in the coming months. In addition to writing for the Global Politician, he publishes his own web site called World Threats. He may be reached at tdcanalyst@aol.com
tdcanalyst@optonline.net

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http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2007/03/on-trail-of-politkovskayas-killers.html

[From Anna P. Diary/book]

Tuesday, March 20, 2007
On the Trail of Politkovskaya's Killers

The Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets has published what it claims are photographs of Anna Politkovskaya's killers. LR's translator tells her that a forum entry on the website of another Russian newspaper, Yezhedevny Journal, says this:

Forum: How they killed Litvinenko
Posted by: "Korchagin"
Date: 18 Mar 2007
Post Number: 3630

Photographs of the murderers of Anna Politkovskaya, taken from Moskovskiy Komsomolets. [at above link]

If you know these faces, please contact the police, or better, Novaya Gazeta, which is conducting its own investigation. Gentlemen from the KGB, you can make an anonymous call and receive 25 MILLION RUBLES for full name of just one of the murderers. Payment of the reward is guaranteed by Aleksandr Lebedev, Duma Deputy and part-owner of Novaya Gazeta. Contact: rassled@novayagazeta.ru (address for letters to the Investigations Department, everything concerning compromising information, corruption and criminals). Editor's telephone: (495) 623-68-88.

Meanwhile, on Saturday the Guardian published extracts from Anna's final book, with more yesterday dealing with Beslan. Here's the first installment:

The day of the elections to the Duma, the [same] day Putin began his campaign for re-election as president. In the morning he manifested himself at a polling station. He was cheerful, elated even, and a little nervous. This was unusual: as a rule he is sullen. With a broad smile, he informed those assembled that his beloved labrador, Connie, had had puppies during the night. "Vladimir Vladimirovich was so very worried,' Mme Putina intoned behind her husband. "We are in a hurry to get home," she added, anxious to return to the bitch whose impeccable timing had presented this gift to the United Russia party.

That morning in Yessentuki, a small resort in the North Caucasus, the first 13 victims of a terrorist train attack were being buried. It had been the morning train, known as the student train, and young people were on their way to college. When, after voting, Putin went over to the journalists, it seemed he would express his condolences. Perhaps even apologise for the fact the government had again failed to protect its citizens. Instead he told them how pleased he was about his labrador's puppies.

My friends phoned me. "He's really put his foot in it this time. Russian people are never going to vote for United Russia now." Around midnight, when the results started coming in, many people were in a state of shock. Russia had mutely surrendered herself to Putin.

Reports we received from the regions show how this was done. Outside one of the polling stations in Saratov, a lady was dispensing free vodka at a table with a banner reading "Vote for Tretiak", the United Russia candidate. Tretiak won. One opposition candidate twice had plastic bags containing body parts thrown through his window: somebody's ears and a human heart.

December 8

Were we seeing a crisis of Russian parliamentary democracy in the Putin era? No, we were witnessing its death. In the first place, the legislative and executive branches of government had merged and this had meant the rebirth of the Soviet system. The Duma was purely decorative, a forum for rubber-stamping Putin's decisions.

In the second place the Russian people gave its consent. There were no demonstrations. The electorate agreed to be treated like an idiot. The electorate said let's go back to the USSR - slightly retouched and slicked up, modernised, but the good old Soviet Union, now with bureaucratic capitalism where the state official is the main oligarch, vastly richer than any capitalist. The corollary was that, if we were going back to the USSR, Putin was going to win in March 2004. It was a foregone conclusion.

December 23

Ritual murders are taking place in Moscow. A second severed head has been found in the past 24 hours, this time in the eastern district of Golianovo. It was in a rubbish container. Yesterday evening, a head in a plastic bag was found on a table in the courtyard on Krasnoyarskaya Street.

Both men had been dead for 24 hours. The circumstances are almost identical: the victims are from the Caucasus, aged 30-40 and have dark hair. Their identities are unknown. Such are the results of racist propaganda in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. Our people are very susceptible and react promptly.

December 26

Putin does not simply lack competitors. The whole background is an intellectual desert. The affair has no logic, no reason, no sparkle of genuine, serious thinking. Candidate No 1 knows best and requires no advice. There is nobody to moderate his arrogance. Russia has been humiliated.

December 28

Ivan Rybkin has announced he will stand [against Putin]. He is the creature of Putin's main opponent, Boris Berezovsky, now in exile abroad. Rybkin used to be the speaker of the Duma and chairman of the National Security Council. Who is he today? Time will tell.

January 6 2004

Those at the top and bottom of our society might as well be living on different planets. I set off to see the most underprivileged of all: Psycho-Neurological Orphanage No. 25 on the outskirts of Moscow. The surroundings here are warm and clean. The patient carers are kind, very tired, overworked women. Everything here is good, except that the children don't cry. They are silent or they howl. There is no laughter.

When he is not grinding his teeth, 15-month-old Danila is silent, peering attentively at the strangers. He does not look at you as you would expect of a 15-month-old baby; he peers straight into your eyes, like an FSB interrogator. He has catastrophically limited experience of human tenderness.

The wave of charitable giving in Russia stopped in 2002 when the Putin administration revoked tax privileges for charities. Until 2002, children our orphanages were showered with gifts and new year presents. Now the rich no longer give them presents. Pensioners bring them their old, tattered shawls.

Meanwhile, our nouveau riche are skiing this Christmas in Courchevel. More than 2,000 Russians, each earning over half a million roubles [£10,000] a month, congregate for the "Saison russe". The menu offers eight kinds of oysters, the wine list includes bottles at £1,500, and in the retinue of every nouveau riche you can be sure of finding the government officials, our true oligarchs, who deliver these vast incomes to the favoured 2,000. The talk is of success, of the firebird of happiness caught by its tail feathers, of being trusted by the state authorities. The "charity" of officialdom, otherwise known as corruption, is the quickest route to Courchevel.

January 16

The body of Aslam Davletukaev, abducted from his home on January 10, has been found showing signs of torture. He has been shot in the back of the head. Aslan was a well-known Chechen human rights campaigner. Our democracy continues its decline. Nothing in Russia depends on the people; Putin is resuscitating our stereotype: "Let us wait until our feudal lord comes back. He will tell us how everything should be." It has to be admitted that this is how the Russian people likes it, which means that soon Putin will throw away the mask of a defender of human rights. He won't need it anymore.

February 6

8.32am: there has been an explosion in the Moscow metro. The train was heading into the city centre during the rush hour when a bomb exploded beside the first door of the second carriage. Thirty people died at the scene, and another nine died later from their burns. There are 140 injured. There are dozens of tiny, unidentifiable fragments of bodies. More than 700 people emerged from the tunnel, having evacuated themselves without any assistance. In the streets there is chaos and fear, the wailing sirens of the emergency services, millions of people terrorised.

At 10.44 the Volcano-5 Contingency Plan for capturing the culprits was implemented, more than two hours after the explosion. Who do they think they are going to catch? If there were any accomplices they will have fled long ago. At 12.12 the police started searching for a man aged 30-35, "of Caucasian appearance". Very helpful.

February 7

Ivan Rybkin has disappeared. A bit of excitement in the election at last. His wife is going crazy. On February 2, Rybkin harshly criticised Putin and his wife believes that did for him.

February 9

No details have yet been established of the type of bomb used in the metro. Putin keeps repeating, as he did after Nord-Ost [the attack by Chechen militants on a Moscow theatre in 2002, which ended with 130 hostages killed when special forces gassed and stormed the building], that nobody inside Russia was responsible. Everything was planned abroad. A day of mourning has been declared but the television stations barely observe it. Loud pop music and cheerful TV advertisements make you feel ashamed.

Two of those who died are being buried today. One is Alexander Ishunkin, a 25-year-old lieutenant in the armed forces. His Uncle Mikhail identified his body in the mortuary. Seven years ago Alexander's father was killed, and since then Alexander had been the very dependable head of the family. Even in issuing his death certificate the state can't refrain from dishonesty: the box for "Cause of death" has been crossed through. Not a word about terrorism.

February 10

Rybkin has been found. A very strange episode. At midday he announced he was in Kiev. He said he had just been on holiday there with friends and that, after all, a human being has a right to a private life! Kseniya Ponomaryova promptly resigned as leader of his election team. His wife is refusing to talk to him. In late evening he flew into Moscow from Kiev, looking half-dead and not at all like someone who has been having a good time on holiday. He was wearing women's sunglasses and was escorted by an enormous bodyguard. "Who was detaining you?" he was asked, but gave no reply. He also refused to talk to the investigators from the Procurator's Office who had been searching for him. It was later announced he might withdraw his candidacy. In St Petersburg, skinheads have stabbed to death nine-year-old Khursheda Sultanova in the courtyard of the flats where her family lived. Her father, 35-year-old Yusuf Sultanov, a Tadjik, has been working in St Petersburg for many years. That evening he was bringing the children back from the Yusupov Park ice slope when some aggressive youths started following them.

In a dark connecting courtyard leading to their home the youths attacked them. Khursheda suffered 11 stab wounds and died immediately. Yusuf's 11-year-old nephew, Alabir, escaped in the darkness by hiding under a parked car. Alabir says the skinheads kept stabbing Khursheda until they were certain she was dead. They were shouting, "Russia for the Russians!" The Sultanovs are not illegal immigrants. They are officially registered as citizens of St Petersburg, but fascists are not interested in ID cards. When Russia's leaders indulge in soundbites about cracking down on immigrants and guest labourers, they incur the responsibility for tragedies such as this.

Fifteen people were detained shortly afterwards, but released. Many turned out to be the offspring of people employed by the law-enforcement agencies of St Petersburg. Today, 20,000 St Petersburg youths belong to unofficial fascist or racist organisations. The St Petersburg skinheads are among the most active in the country and are constantly attacking Azerbaijanis, Chinese and Africans. Nobody is ever punished, because the law-enforcement agencies are themselves infected with racism. You have only to switch off your audio recorder for the militia to start telling you they understand the skinheads, and as for those blacks ... etc, etc. Fascism is in fashion.

February 11

The Candidate Rybkin soap opera continues. Before this, Rybkin had the reputation of being a meticulous person, not a heavy drinker and even slightly dull. "Two days in Kiev" are very much out of character. Rybkin reports that after he disappeared he spent a certain amount of time in Moscow Province at Woodland Retreat, the guest-house of the Presidential Administration. He was taken from there and found himself in Kiev. He says further that those controlling him compelled him to call Moscow from Kiev and talk lightheartedly about having a right to a private life.

February 12

Alexander Litvinenko in London and Oleg Kalugin in Washington, former FSB/KGB officers who have been granted political asylum in the west, have suggested that a psychotropic substance called SP117 may have been used on Rybkin. [Litvinenko died in London last November after being poisoned.] This compound was used in the FSB's counter-intelligence sections and in units combating terrorism, but only in exceptional cases on "important targets". SP117 is a truth drug that prevents an individual from having full possession of his mind. He will tell everything he knows. These statements will not save Rybkin. Putin has won this round against Berezovsky, now his sworn enemy, but his pal in the late 1990s.

February 13

Ivan Rybkin has announced that he will not be returning from London. A defecting presidential candidate is a first in our history. Nobody now has any doubt that the regime drugged him.

February 15

The Sultanovs, the family of the little girl Khursheda who was murdered by skinheads in St Petersburg, have abandoned Russia and gone to live in Tajikistan. They took a small coffin containing the child's remains.

March 5

Everything is being reduced to absurdity. The appointment of [Mikhail] Fradkov as prime minister by the Duma deserves an entry in the Guinness Book of Records. 352 votes in favour of a man who, when asked what his plans for the future were, could only blurt: "I have just come out of the shadow into the light." Fradkov is a man of the shadows because he is a spy. We have a truly third-rate prime minister. The country is sinking into a state of collective unconsciousness, into unreason.

March 12-13

Silence and apathy. Nobody can be bothered to listen to the drivel coming from the television. Let's just get it over with.

March 14

Well, so he's been elected. By and large, the concept of ruling the country by the same methods used in conducting the "anti-terrorist operation" has been vindicated: L'Etat, c'est Putin.

· In G2 on Monday: Politkovskaya's devastating report on the Beslan school hostage disaster; and on Tuesday, her interview with Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen warlord suspected of involvement in her murder. Extracted from A Russian Diary, copyright © Anna Politkovskaya 2007. English translation copyright © Arch Tait 2007. Published by Harvill Secker next month at £17.99. To order a copy for £16.99 with free UK p&p go to guardian.co.uk/bookshop or call 0870 836 0875

[Bout turns up in the oddest places]

http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2007/03/what-about-safronov-and-what-about-all.html

Wednesday, March 14, 2007
What about Safronov? And, what about ALL THE OTHERS!

The bilingual zaxi blog has the following fascinating commentary on the demise of Kommersant reporter Ivan Safronov (pictured):

As The Economist reasonably points out: “Buying a bag of oranges is an odd thing to do before jumping out of the fifth-floor window of an apartment block.”

So is falling out of that particular stairwell window – leaving the oranges scattered on the ground – when your apartment is down on the third floor. So is the emergency number operator telling the kids who heard (!) the fall to call back later. And so is the police labeling Kommersant reporter Ivanov Safronov’s death a “forcible suicide.”

How odd? That particular phrase appears only eight times on Google – once Safronov is eliminated from the search.

Which is of course precisely what the Kommersant staff believes happened. Safronov was reportedly hounded by either the FSB or some other unnamed officials before his last story was due to have gone to press.

Safronov was remarkable among Russian journalists for being a hardnosed and apolitical reporter who covered stories pretty much the way they are in the West. He had a career in the military and retained many of those ties while writing about the armed forces’ debacles.

His revelation that the Bulava sea-based ballistic missile – hailed by President Vladimir Putin as Russia’s crafty response to the US missile defense shield – had failed in its third successive test ruffled a few army feathers. Putin personally witnessed the first launch fizzle while posing with binoculars in hand before state television cameras on an accompanying craft. The second attempt went largely unmentioned. The third one in October was simply hushed up until Kommersant hit the stands. It was particularly awkward because Russia has a pricey new submarine waiting for the missile called the Dmitry Donskoi – it now sits toothless in its dock.

Kommersant says Safronov’s ill-fated report was due to have been about illicit Russian arms sales to Syria and Iran. A story about past and present quasi-secret sales to those two Russian allies is not particularly enlightening. Shells from heat-seeking Russian missiles have wound up in Israeli tanks taking direct hits from the Hezbollah. The defense ministry is repeatedly forced do deny and then confirm elements of new arms shipments to Iran.

Safronov’s story had two somewhat novel aspects as reported by the Kommersant staff. The first was that Iran would get the mighty S-300V surface-to-air missile and Syria would finally secure the Iskander that it first tried to snatch back in 2002 before Israel made that impending sale public.

The S-300V is a supped up US Patriot that can strike down numerous incoming missiles and planes within a range of just over 100 miles. Its sale to Iran would pretty much make Russia into Tehran’s Lone Ranger in a potential military standoff with Washington. The Iskander on the other hand would give Syria a free hand to deliver a precise strike on any target in Israel – whereas now its missiles would be lucky to hit anything there at all.

The second slightly more interesting reported aspect to the story was that Russia was supposed to have been planning to cover up its tracks by peddling the weapons through Belarus – which pretty much has nothing to lose as it is.

Such a report would have been obviously picked up by the Western media. All the required parties would have refuted it within the week and Belarus would have accused Kommersant of slander (which it did even without the story being published).

So it is not entirely clear why the FSB would threaten Safronov about this publication when he had broken stories like the Bulava that cut much closer to Putin’s heart and which could not simply be dismissed as speculation. Kommersant has written about just such possible arms sales in the past.

zaxi by pure chance has uncovered a far more interesting and unreported piece of what Safronov was actually after. It is known that he went to an arms fair in the United Arab Emirates – at which obviously the Russians were out in full force – to confirm elements for his story. What had remained unknown was that Safronov also went there to track down one Viktor Bout.

The name Bout is most familiar to the people who compose Interpol lists and run US anti-terror squads. His father was believed to have been a heavy hitter within Yury Andropov’s KGB clan. Bout launched his own foreign intelligence career in the late 1980s by keeping an eye out for Jews fleeing to the West through Finland. He took the cover of a UN peacekeeper in Angola in the early 1990s and went into African business from there.

Bout unfurled his own air cargo companies and was soon shipping Russian arms to fuel massacres across the continent – from Zaire, Angola and Sierra Leone to Rwanda. He is thought to have supplied both Serbia and Iraq before those regimes fell. Bout was smuggling the Russian arms inside shipments of fish belonging to the companies Air Cess and the Flying Dolphin – which oddly were based not far from NATO headquarters in Belgium.

Bout is also believed to have been peddling “blood diamonds.” But his biggest claim to fame came in supplying what is thought to have been several hundred million dollars worth of arms to the Taliban and Al Qaeda between 1995 and 2001. His deliveries were reportedly marked “fish from Tanzania.” (Interestingly the 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya was plotted by a man known as “Muhammad the Fisherman.”) Bout was forced by that stage to move at least a part of his operation under the auspices of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi. But business soured: US authorities traced him with the help of Pakistan once the Afghan campaign began.

The link between Bout and the FSB was beyond anything even the Kremlin could deny to a fairly irate United States following September 11. Moscow gave up his two Ukrainian partners – Vadim Rabinovich and Leonid Minin – in 2002 while Bout lay low. The fact that both men were Ukrainian Jews was enough to deflect attention away from the FSB in the Russian press.

Which countries required Bout’s services over the past five years is murky. His mode of operation however remained unchanged. The Russian arms mostly went through Belarus. Besides his two Ukrainian merchants Bout also used the muddle of Transdniestr to help his cause.

It is unknown whether Safronov actually got a hold of Bout at the UAE arms fair. Yet Safronov clearly believed that Bout was again operating the Russian arms trade and already suspected the link to Belarus before his trip. And somewhere in the UAE – in the mix between the world’s most wanted arms dealer and the other more official Russian peddlers – his story of an imminent sale through Bout’s favorite conduit Belarus was confirmed.

So the potential embarrassment from Safronov’s report was not that Russia was scheming another naughty arms shipment to Syria and Iran. It was that the FSB was still providing cover – that favorite word of the Russian underworld “krysha” – for Bout.

And a story like this would indeed upset the FSB and Putin. A Russian arms shipment has that much more zing to it when conducted through a smuggler more wanted in Washington than few other people on earth.

All of which makes it vital to learn who exactly was hounding Safronov before his death – was it the FSB itself or these other unidentified figures who could simply have been Bout’s Moscow henchmen with less formal Kremlin ties.

For if it was the FSB plain and simple then it becomes a case of the Kremlin killing a reporter who was about to expose its continued reliance on Bout to merchandize its wares abroad.

zaxi is not sure if the case looks much better for the Kremlin if Bout's long hand pushed Safronov instead.

Here's the Independent's wonderful article detailing the shocking legacy of murders under the Putin regime:

Ivan Safronov did not die immediately, despite falling four floors from a window in his Moscow apartment block. Witnesses say he tried to get to his feet after hitting the ground, but then collapsed for the final time.

The police say the death of the well-respected journalist, who worked for the daily Kommersant newspaper, has all the hallmarks of suicide - though they are willing to consider the possibility that he was "driven" to kill himself. But his friends insist he was not the sort to take his own life. Why should he?

They say he was happily married with children, loved his work and was awash in job offers. On his way home he had bought a bag of tangerines, which lay scattered in the stairwell from which he jumped - or was pushed.

Far from being an individual tragedy, the death of Ivan Safronov will be seen by many as part of a grim trend. The Kommersant reporter is at least the 20th Russian journalist to die in suspicious circumstances since 2000, when Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency. Shot, stabbed or poisoned, the journalists have two things in common: no one has been convicted, or in most cases even arrested, after their deaths. And all of them had angered powerful vested interests which appear to suffer little restraint in dealing with their enemies.

"In Russia," said Oleg Panfilov, president of the Moscow-based Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations (CJES), "whenever you are investigating something that could destroy someone else's business, it always generates a reaction - often it is murder."

A specialist in military matters, Ivan Safronov revealed embarrassing failings in the Russian defence programme. Shortly before his death, he was reported to be working on an exposé of Moscow's secret arms deals with Iran and Syria, something that, if true, would have caused further scandal. "He covered themes that could provoke a reaction," said Mr Panfilov.

Political opponents of the Kremlin can end up in jail, such as the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or in exile, such as the equally rich Boris Berezovsky, or simply vilified and ignored by a media industry whose independence is being squeezed. But if you offend the less scrupulous elements in Russian society, you could be risking your life. You may not be safe even if you flee abroad, as Britain discovered when the renegade security agent Alexander Litvinenko died from Polonium-210 poisoning in a London hospital.

Journalists, however, are particularly at risk. According to a new report from the International News Safety Institute, only Iraq has claimed more journalists' lives than Russia in the past decade. Though nobody is suggesting that Mr Putin had anything to do with the deaths, media organisations around the world have expressed concern at what they call "a climate of impunity". At the very least, he is accused of presiding over a country where it appears that the murder of journalists goes unpunished.

Few of the killings are as overtly political as the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, who was gunned down last October at the entrance to her apartment block. In that case it seemed clear that her death was sanctioned by someone powerful, who wanted her silenced. Most cases are much murkier, however; they can be seen as a brutal form of punishment for reporters who delve too deeply into Russia's sinister intersection of business, organised crime and the state's legal and security apparatus.

Working for a nationally known outlet such as Kommersant might be seen as some protection, though that did not save Ms Politkovskaya or two other journalists who worked for Novaya Gazeta, a fortnightly newspaper. She wrote that it received "visitors every day ... who have nowhere else to bring their troubles, because the Kremlin finds their stories off-message, so that the only place they can be aired is in our newspaper".

Pursuing corruption in the provinces, however, can be lonelier and even more dangerous. Two editors of a local newspaper in Togliatti, a city on the Volga east of Moscow, were murdered in succession. So was the director of the local TV station.

Death is not the only occupational hazard for reporters who show too much investigative zeal. Around 50 court cases are pursued against journalists every year in an attempt to muzzle them, while some 150 are seriously assaulted each year.

Mr Panfilov makes a direct link between such intimidation and the presidency. "The problem is with Putin himself," he said. "He showed his true colours with Politkovskaya's death." In the eyes of many, he appeared dismissive and slow to react. "Putin takes pleasure in launching verbal attacks on journalists," Mr Panfilov went on. "It is he who defines the atmosphere in which we work."

And after a journalist is killed, the truth is rarely if ever exposed. The investigation into how and why Ivan Safronov died, like those that have gone before, is likely to be quietly closed and an open verdict declared.

Ivan Safronov

Military affairs specialist for daily national newspaper 'Kommersant'. Was investigating a Kremlin arms deal with the Middle East. Found dead on 2 March after 'falling' from a window in his Moscow home in suspicious circumstances.

Anna Politkovskaya

Crusading investigative reporter specialising in Chechnya, attached to fortnightly national newspaper 'Novaya Gazeta'. Shot dead in a contract killing outside her apartment block in Moscow on 7 October 2006.

Vyacheslav Plotnikov

Reporter for a local TV channel in Voronezh. His body was found in a forest on 15 September 2006, dressed in someone else's clothes. No signs of a violent death, but his colleagues are convinced that he was murdered.

Yevgeny Gerasimenko

Investigative reporter on regional newspaper 'Saratovsky Rasklad' who had been looking into shady local business dealings. Found dead on 25 July 2006 in his flat, where he had been tortured and suffocated with a plastic bag.

Alexander Pitersky

Presenter on the St Petersburg radio station Baltika, who sometimes covered criminal investigations. His body was found in his flat, where he had been stabbed to death, on 30 August 2005.

Magomedzagid Varisov

A press commentator in his native Dagestan, where he also ran a think-tank, Varisov had criticised local politicians. Killed in a machine gun attack in Mahachkala, the capital of Dagestan, on 28 June 2005.

Pavel Makeev

Cameraman for Puls, a local TV station in southern Russia. Died on 21 May 2005 while covering illegal street racing in the town of Azov. His car was rammed by an unknown vehicle and his camera and tapes taken.

Paul Klebnikov

US citizen of Russian extraction. As editor of the Russian edition of 'Forbes' magazine, he put together the country's first rich list and specialised in corruption investigations. Shot dead in a contract killing in Moscow on 9 July 2004.

Aleksei Sidorov

The second editor of local newspaper 'The Togliatti Overview' to be murdered in as many years. He was stabbed in the chest with an ice pick or similar sharp object outside his apartment block on 9 October 2003.

Yuri Shchekochikhin

Investigative journalist, liberal MP and deputy editor of 'Novaya Gazeta'. Specialised in investigating corruption in the general prosecutor's office. Died on 3 July 2003 after an unexplained allergic reaction. His colleagues believe he was poisoned.

Dmitry Shvets

A senior executive at a local Murmansk TV station, TV-21 Northwestern Broadcasting. Had been highly critical of local officialdom. Shot dead outside the station's offices on 18 April 2003.

Valery Ivanov

Editor of 'The Togliatti Overview' and managing editor of the independent channel Lada-TV, specialising in crime and corruption in the local car industry. Shot dead in his car on 29 April 2002.

Natalya Skryl

Business reporter on 'Our Time', a local newspaper based in Rostov-on-Don, investigating controversial dealings in a local metals plant. Died on her way home after being beaten with a heavy object on 8 March 2002.

Eduard Markevich

Editor of 'Novy Reft', a local newspaper in the town of Reftinsky, Sverdlovsk region, who was critical of regional authorities. After a series of threatening phone calls, he was shot dead in the back on 19 September 2001.

Adam Tepsurgayev

TV cameraman for Reuters who filmed exclusive footage of the conflict in Chechnya. Shot dead in the village of Alkhan-Kala on 23 November 2000 by masked gunmen who burst into his home.

Sergey Ivanov

Director of the Lada-TV station in Togliatti. Showed an interest in the area's notoriously corrupt car manufacturing business. Shot five times outside his apartment building on 3 October 2000.

Iskandar Khatloni

Journalist investigating human rights abuses in Chechnya for the Tajik- language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Killed by an axe-wielding attacker in Moscow on 21 September 2000.

Sergey Novikov

Senior executive at the Vesna radio station in Smolensk. Claimed to be able to prove corruption among high-ranking local officials. Shot dead on 26 July 2000, in the lobby of his apartment building.

Igor Domnikov

Investigative reporter on 'Novaya Gazeta'. Died on 16 July 2000 after being attacked with a hammer in the lobby of his Moscow apartment block. His newspaper believes his murder was a case of mistaken identity.

Artyom Borovik

Senior executive at investigative magazine 'Completely Secret' that exposed the misdeeds of the rich and powerful. Died on 3 March 2000 in a plane crash that the authorities believe may not have been accidental.

http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2007/03/yet-another-journalist-in-kremlins.html

Friday, March 30, 2007
Yet Another Journalist in the Kremlin's Crosshairs

The Moscow News reports:

The Committee to Protect Journalists is alarmed by the criminal prosecution of Viktor Shmakov (pictured, left), editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Provintsialnye Vesti (Provincial News) in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, the watchdog said in a web release.

Prosecutors in the regional capital Ufa, 680 miles (1100 kilometers) east of Moscow, have charged Shmakov with “public calls for the realization of extremist activity using mass media” and “calls for insubordination to legal authorities,” according to local press reports. If convicted in the trial that began March 21, Shmakov faces up to five years in prison.

The charges against Shmakov stem from two articles published in an April 2006 edition of Provintsialnye Vesti that criticized corruption and human rights abuses in Bashkortostan. The articles also called for the resignation of the republic’s president, Murtaza Rakhimov, who has ruled the oil-rich and mostly Muslim republic since 1993, according to local press reports. Shmakov did not write the articles. Authorities have filed the same charges against the author, local opposition leader Airat Dilmukhametov. “The prosecution of our colleague Viktor Shmakov is another disturbing example of Russian authorities’ use of the full force of criminal law to stifle critical reporting and opinion,” said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon. “Political criticism is not a crime. All charges against Viktor Shmakov must be dropped immediately.”

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006. Bashkortostan prosecutors had initially added the charge of “organizing mass unrest” to Shmakov’s indictments, a count that provides for up to 10 years in prison, but later reduced to the lesser charge of “calling for insubordination to legal authorities” in August 2006.

The CPJ press release states:

The persecution of Shmakov started on April 28, 2006, when Federal Security Service (FSB) agents arrested him for his paper’s critical reporting. He was sentenced to two months in jail, while the FSB and Interior Ministry said they were conducting a joint investigation into his alleged extremist activities. On May 16, 2006, the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan ruled that authorities did not have enough evidence to hold Shmakov, and ordered his release. However, authorities delayed implementing the court’s decision for 48 hours before releasing the journalist on May 19, 2006.

http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2007/03/annals-of-cold-war-ii-send-in-spies.html

Saturday, March 31, 2007
Annals of Cold War II: Send in the Spies

The Moscow Times reports on yet another convincing demonstration by Russia that it is a friendly, reliable country that means the USA no harm:

A senior U.S. counterintelligence official said Thursday that Russia had fully restored its espionage capabilities against the United States after a period of decline following the Cold War.

Joel Brenner, the head of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, said the United States was concerned that Russia was continuing to ramp up its operations.

"The Russians are now back at Cold War levels in their efforts against the United States," he said at an event held by the American Bar Association, a lawyers' group. "They are sending over an increasing and troubling number of intelligence agents."

The comments come at time of greater tension between the two countries. President Vladimir Putin has sharply criticized the United States in recent months, and he told Arab leaders in a letter Thursday that Washington should set a time limit for its military presence in Iraq. Also Thursday, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized the United States for conducting naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf.

Brenner, whose job is to oversee counterintelligence strategy and policy for U.S. intelligence chief Mike McConnell, did not provide details about suspected Russian intelligence operations in the United States. Sensitive counterintelligence activities are classified.

But he said Moscow appeared less interested in U.S. commercial and military technology than other countries, including China, which U.S. officials including China, which U.S. officials have described as the greatest counterintelligence threat facing the United States.

McConnell also warned the U.S. Senate last month that Russia was taking a step backward in its democratic progress and could be heading for a controlled succession to Putin. Moscow responded by describing his remarks as "outdated assumptions."

The U.S. government has suffered several embarrassing security breaches at the hands of Russian and Soviet intelligence moles, including former CIA case officer Aldrich Ames and former FBI agent Robert Hanssen.

Brenner said Ames provided the Soviets with enough information about U.S. officials to "decapitate" America's leadership in the event of war.

But Moscow intelligence does not now appear interested in posing a physical threat to U.S. leaders. "It's not a strike threat they're after. I don't want to give that impression," Brenner said.

Russian officials have expressed frustration at what they see as U.S. foreign policy unrestrained by consultation with other world powers, including Russia. They have criticized the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence and U.S. plans to install radar and interceptors in Eastern Europe as part of a missile defense program.

In turn, U.S. officials have warned that Russia's increased assertiveness in challenging U.S. policy is complicating cooperation on important foreign policy goals, including counterterrorism, nonproliferation and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East.

Both sides have denied that the tension means a return to the Cold War.

The Kremlin said Thursday that Putin had sent a letter to a summit of Arab leaders calling for a time limit on the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

Putin said in the letter to the summit, which opened Wednesday in the Saudi capital, that Russia highly valued "the Arab world's contribution to building a just, multipolar world order and political and diplomatic settlement of crises."

In what sounded like a veiled criticism of the United States, Putin complained in the letter against a "policy of unilateral use of force and a desire to monopolize conflict settlement." He also criticized those seeking to "provoke a confrontation between civilizations and faiths."

Lavrov, meanwhile, criticized the United States for conducting naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf.

Lavrov said: "The Persian Gulf is in such a troubled state today that any actions in the region, especially those with the use of the navy and other military forces, should, of course, take into account the need to prevent the exacerbation of the situation even further. It has already been heightened to the limit."

The U.S. exercise, which ended Wednesday, was the largest show of force in the Gulf since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with 15 ships, 125 aircraft and 13,000 sailors taking part in maneuvers a few dozen kilometers off Iran's coast.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/03/30/002.html

Friday, March 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Spying at Cold War Levels, U.S. Says
Combined Reports