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§ 7A‑66. Removal of district attorneys. The following are grounds for suspension of a district attorney or for his removal from office: (1) Mental or physical incapacity interfering with the performance of his duties which is, or is likely to become, permanent; (2) Willful misconduct in office; (3) Willful and persistent failure to perform his duties; (4) Habitual intemperance; (5) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute; or (7) Knowingly authorizing or permitting an assistant district attorney to commit any act constituting grounds for removal, as defined in subdivisions (1) through (6) hereof. A proceeding to suspend or remove a district attorney is commenced by filing with the clerk of superior court of the county where the district attorney resides a sworn affidavit charging the district attorney with one or more grounds for removal. The clerk shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the senior regular resident superior court judge for the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A‑41.1(a) in which the county is located who shall within 30 days either review and act on the charges or refer them for review and action within 30 days to another superior court judge residing in or regularly holding the courts of that district or set of districts. If the superior court judge upon review finds that the charges if true constitute grounds for suspension, and finds probable cause for believing that the charges are true, he may enter an order suspending the district attorney from performing the duties of his office until a final determination of the charges on the merits. During the suspension the salary of the district attorney continues. If the superior court judge finds that the charges if true do not constitute grounds for suspension or finds that no probable cause exists for believing that the charges are true, he shall dismiss the proceeding. If a hearing, with or without suspension, is ordered, the district attorney should receive immediate written notice of the proceedings and a true copy of the charges, and the matter shall be set for hearing not less than 10 days nor more than 30 days thereafter. The matter shall be set for hearing before the judge who originally examined the charges or before another regular superior court judge resident in or regularly holding the courts of that district or set of districts. The hearing shall be open to the public. All testimony shall be recorded. At the hearing the superior court judge shall hear evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law and if he finds that grounds for removal exist, he shall enter an order permanently removing the district attorney from office, and terminating his salary. If he finds that no grounds exist, he shall terminate the suspension, if any. http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_7a/gs_7a-66.html The district attorney may appeal from an order of removal to the Court of Appeals on the basis of error of law by the superior court judge. Pending decision of the case on appeal, the district attorney shall not perform any of the duties of his office. If, upon final determination, he is ordered reinstated either by the appellate division or by the superior court upon remand his salary shall be restored from the date of the original order of removal. (1967, c. 1049, s. 1; 1973, c. 47, s. 2; c. 148, s. 1; 1977, c. 21, ss. 1, 2; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 13.) See Paragraph 7: http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_15a/gs_15a-101.html § 15A‑101. Definitions. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following words have the listed meanings: (1) Appeal. – When used in a general context, the term "appeal" also includes appellate review upon writ of certiorari. (1a) Attorney of Record. – An attorney who, under Article 4 of this Chapter, Entry and Withdrawal of Attorney in Criminal Case, has entered a criminal proceeding and has not withdrawn. (2) Clerk. – Any clerk of superior court, acting clerk, or assistant or deputy clerk. (3) District Court. – The District Court Division of the General Court of Justice. (4) District Attorney. – The person elected and currently serving as district attorney in his prosecutorial district. (4a) Entry of Judgment. – Judgment is entered when sentence is pronounced. Prayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more, does not constitute the entry of judgment. (5) Judicial Official. – A magistrate, clerk, judge, or justice of the General Court of Justice. (6) Officer. – Law‑enforcement officer. (7) Prosecutor. – The district attorney, any assistant district attorney or any other attorney designated by the district attorney to act for the State or on behalf of the district attorney. (8) State. – The State of North Carolina, all land or water in respect to which the State of North Carolina has either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, and the airspace above that land or water. "Other state" means any state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (9) Superior Court. – The Superior Court Division of the General Court of Justice. (10) Superior Court Judge. – A superior court judge who has jurisdiction pursuant to G.S. 7A‑47.1 or G.S. 7A‑48 in the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A‑41.1. (11) Vehicle. – Aircraft, watercraft, or landcraft or other conveyance. (1973, c. 1286, s. 1; 1975, c. 166, s. 2; 1977, c. 711, s. 19; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 52; 1997‑456, s. 27.)

Well it looks to me like Nifong:

(1) clearly guilty of a mental incapacity which is likely to be permanent but is undiagnosed.

(2) guilty of willful misconduct in office as he willfully used this case to win election, willfully refused to look at exculpatory evidence as required, willfully hid exculpatory evidence and as the NC Bar has said willfully broke other cannons of ethics by willfully talking about this case.

(3) guilty of willful and persistent failure to perform his duties by willfully failing to turn over exculpatory evidence.

(6) guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute certainly the NC Bar charges fit here again, not recusing himself ater the NC DAs asked him to and the Nifong refusing to hear exculpatory evidence.

The law seems to indicate if anyone makes a sworn affidavit with the clerk of the superior court of the county where the district attorney resides, ie Durham, charging Nifong with (2), (3) or (6).

For example Brodhead could turn himself into a bit of hero here, if he went down to the clerk of the superior court today and files such a sworn affidavit. It is almost hard to believe someone has not done this yet, particularly the evidence is overwhelming in editorials around the state of NC and the nation that Nifong conduct prejudicial to the administration of justic which brings the office into disrepute.