[ArtyFO]

Getting bogged down in Iraq with an undermanned force is the problem. The enterprize should never have been undertaken without a draft or an increase in forces and a force sufficient to complete the mission. Shenseki was right. Trying to fight a war on the cheap is the problem. If the resources can't be raised politically or economically, then just don't invade. Meanwhile, he has depleted the reserves and National Guard and put the forces in peril. Economy of force is a wrong headed idea. Overwhelming force is what Schwartzkopf and Powell advocated and demonstrated effectively. Rummy was removed for his failures. We need to learn from that.

[Cheburashka]

Getting bogged down in Iraq with an undermanned force is the problem. The enterprize should never have been undertaken without a draft or an increase in forces and a force sufficient to complete the mission.
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First we were talking about China, then Iran, now Iraq. Ooooookay.

I think I've done enough to demonstrate that your antipathy for Rumsfeld is not based on reason, you wouldn't have to keep abandoning your positions and coming up with new ones if it was. And I accept that I cannot reason you out of a position you did not reason yourself into.

[Just A Nobody]

The enterprize should never have been undertaken without a draft or an increase in forces and a force sufficient to complete the mission. Shenseki was right. Trying to fight a war on the cheap is the problem. If the resources can't be raised politically or economically, then just don't invade.

The "invasion" of Iraq was one of the most stunning military success stories of all time, with the smallest number of troops on the ground, completed in record time. Shinseki, was NOT right.

Period 1: March 20, 2003 through through May 1, 2003: (the end of major combat)
Total US Hostile Casualties = 108

May 2, 2003 through October 31, 2003: (6 months following end of major combat)
Total US Hostile Casualties = 121

See hostile breakdown here
See monthly breakdown here.

Just what the heck were 400,000 additional troops supposed to do? The first real sign of trouble came a year later, in April 2004.

The problem began when another Rumsfeld critic, retired Army General Major General Paul Eaton, failed at his 2003-2004 tour as chief of the U.S. training mission in Iraq... His tenure was characterized by uneven training efforts and some embarassing moments--notably, Iraqi units breaking under fire. Eaton was eventually replaced by Lieutenant General David Paetraeus, who turned the program around, and oversaw the training of more than 80 Iraqi battalions during his tenure. Read more here.

The plan was to quickly train a new Iraqi Army, to join with our foces, as they have now. Eaton blew it then had the unmitigated gall to call for Rummy's head as did Shinseki.

Shinseki, Riggs ... virtually all of these officers were in senior positions in the mid-to-late 1990s, when the Clinton Administration cut four divisions from the active Army. Did any of these generals oppose that move, realizing that it would mean "fewer boots on the ground" in a future conflict? Ironically, some of these generals--including Shinseki and Riggs--seemed willing to trade troops for the next generation of super weapons,