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Excerpts from the August 2002 press briefing by Richard A. Clarke:

RICHARD CLARKE: There was no plan on al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration ... In January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. [They] decided to ... vigorously pursue the existing policy [and] ... initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years.
In their first meeting [the principles] changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding [for covert action against al Qaeda] five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance. [They] then changed the strategy from one of rollback with al Qaeda ... to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of al Qaeda.
QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against ... the foreign policy?
CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with [the] terrorism issue ... There was never a plan [in the Clinton administration].
QUESTION: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?
CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. In the spring [of 2001], the Bush administration ... began to change Pakistani policy. We began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis ... [to] join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.
QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration ... prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way?
CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points ... to think about it. And they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.
QUESTION: You're saying ... there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?
CLARKE: You got it ...The other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the [policy] from one of rollback to one of elimination.

http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=39612

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Berger blocked 4 plans to get bin Laden
9-11 commission report shows handwritten responses on documents

Posted: July 23, 2004
2:00 p.m. Eastern

© 2004 WorldNetDaily.com

Former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger blocked four separate plans of action against the al-Qaida terrorist network from 1998 to 2000, according to the newly released 9-11 commission report.

The report cites a 1998 meeting in which then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet presented a plan to capture Osama bin Laden, notes the New York Sun.

"In his meeting with Tenet, Berger focused, however, on the question of what was to be done with Bin Ladin if he were actually captured," the report says, citing a May 1, 1998, CIA memo. "He worried that the hard evidence against Bin Ladin was still skimpy and that there was a danger of snatching him and bringing him to the United States only to see him acquitted."

Berger, who served in the Clinton administration, is facing a Justice Department investigation for allegedly smuggling secret files out of the National Archives prior to the 9-11 commission hearings.

After news of the probe broke Monday, Berger stepped down from his informal position as security adviser to Democratic Sen. John Kerry's presidential campaign.

The 9-11 commission report presents three other opportunities given to Berger to take action against bin Laden:

June 1999: The potential target was an al-Qaida terrorist camp in Afghanistan known as Tarnak Farms. But the commission cites Berger's handwritten notes on the meeting paper, which referred to "the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60-65 casualties." The Berger notes said, "if he responds, we're blamed."

Dec. 4, 1999: National Security Council counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke sent Berger a memo suggesting a strike against al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. According to the commission, however, in the "margin next to Clarke's suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, 'no.'"

August 2000: Berger was presented with a plan to attack bin Laden based on aerial surveillance from a "Predator" drone. "In the memo’s margin," the commission said, "Berger wrote that before considering action, 'I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in place.'"
The New York paper, in an editorial asks why Berger made these critical decisions rather than the president. The commission report notes the decisions "were made by the Clinton administration under extremely difficult domestic political circumstances. Opponents were seeking the president's impeachment."

The Sun opines, had Berger "been a little less reluctant to act, a little more open to taking pre-emptive action, maybe the 2,973 killed in the September 11, 2001, attacks would be alive today."

Mr. Berger's "hand-written notes on the meeting paper," the report says, showed that Mr. Berger was worried about injuring or killing civilians located near the camp.

Additionally, "If [bin Laden] responds" to the attack, "we're blamed," Mr. Berger wrote.

The report also says that Richard Clarke, Mr. Berger's expert on counterterrorism, presented that plan to get bin Laden because he was worried about the al Qaeda leader's "ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

These revelations come as Mr. Berger is under investigation by the Justice Department for smuggling several copies of classified documents that dealt with the Clinton administration's anti-terror policies out of the National Archives.

According to the report, the first plan of action against bin Laden presented to Mr. Berger was a briefing by CIA Director George J. Tenet on May 1, 1998. Mr. Berger took no action, the report says, because he was "focused most" on legal questions.

Bill Clinton's red-faced, squinty eyed, finger pointing schtick with Chris Wallace, was another full-frontal example of how Clinton uses indignant rage to deflect questions. Brit Hume was right on the money when he said Clinton came "loaded for bear". Brit knew Clinton wanted a fight, wanted to look tough.

"You don't deserve to be on this platform with my wife", Clinton angrily said to Jerry Brown.

"I did not have sex with that woman...Ms Lewinsky"

"at least I tried, I tried...." Just the latest.

Bill Clinton's bombastic interview, besides being great television, reminded me of..... Socks the cat. (Spare me those pasty white legs!) Yes, Suzanne, you'd think a multi-millionaire jet-setter, so concerned with image, could afford proper socks.

"I tried, I tried!" Clinton kept saying. Just like all Democrats, Clinton believes his legacy should be based on his "good intentions", not on what he accomplished.

And perhaps THE most unexpected thing said today was said by Mira Liasson. She refuted one of the Democrats best attack lines when she openly defended Bush by saying he wasn't alone in thinking Iraq had WMD. She said everyone else did too. BRAVO, Mira!!

But what struck me the most? did you notice? Bill Clinton hates FOX News more than he hates Karl Rove or bin Laden. The panel chose to ignore the multi-insults Clinton hurled at FOX News. Too bad, I thought it was telling.

:^)