Issued today by the UN:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (For the period from 21 January 2006 to 18 July 2006)
28. Control of the Blue Line and its vicinity appears to have remained for the most part with Hizbollah. During the reporting period, Hizbollah maintained and reinforced a visible presence in the area, with permanent observation posts, -temporary checkpoints and patrols. I t continued to carry out intensive construction works to strengthen and expand some of its fixed positions, install additional technical equipment, such as cameras, establish new positions close to the Blue Line and build new access roads. These measures resulted in a more strategically laid out and fortified structure of Hizbollah's deploynlent along the Blue Line. Some Hizbollah positions remained in close proximity to United Nations positions, especially in the Hula area, posing a significant security risk to United Nations personnel and equipment, as demonstrated during the heavy exchanges of fire on 28 May. In letters to the Foreign Minister, dated 23 March, 27 June and 5 July 2006, the Force Commander, General Pellegrini, expressed grave concern about the Hizbollah construction works in close proximity to United Nations positions and requested that the Government of Lebanon take necessary actions to rectify the situation. However, the situation remained unchanged despite repeated objections addressed by UNIFIL to the Lebanese authorities. UNIFIL observed the reconstruction of Hizbollah positions that were daniaged or destroyed during the 28 May exchange of fire. [emphasis added]
And,
41. The hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel since 12 July have radically changed the context in which UNIFIL is operating. In the current environment, circumstances conducive to United Nations peacekeeping do not exist. Facing a situation where the Force is restricted from carrying out even basic activities, such as the ability to resupply its positions and to conduct search and rescue operations on behalf of its personnel, how can it fulfil its mandate under Security Council resolution 425 (1 978)? [emphasis added]
In other words, Kofi Annan knew 1) that Hizbollah was fortifying its positions in the shadow of the UNIFIL positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities on July 12, and 2) that the UNIFIL personnel had no hope of fulfilling their mission after July 12. This is the report of the Secretary General. For Annan to even
hint the deaths of the UNIFIL personnel were a deliberate act of the IDF is grossly irresponsible, and it tarnishes what little respect the office of Secretary General still has. Why on earth did Annan fail to evacuate the helpless UNIFIL forces?