I. What are the implications of the key issues raised in the Cornerstone Paper for missile defense, and specifically for space-based missile defense, as we look beyond 2005?Given the missile threats currently facing the United States, the Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) system being de ployed represents only the first step required for a robust,global layered defense, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in each phase of their trajectory. By itself, however, GMD is a limited midcourse defense that will be effective against only a few missiles with simple decoys.
Because GMD cannot adequately discriminate among mid- course threats, it may be prone to failure unless it becomes part of a layered missile defense. The United States must be prepared to deploy a missile defense sufficiently advanced that rogue states will be dissuaded from making the necessary investment in missiles. At the same time, the United States should also deploy a missile defense capable of deterring strategic competitors such as China or Russia.
More than a decade ago, the United States had vig orous space-based sensor and interceptor development programs underway such as Brilliant Pebbles which were terminated because they did not conform with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. These technologies should be revived and incorporated, along with advances made since then, into a high-priority development program that not only draws on the lessons learned from Brilliant Pebbles program but also from other successful weapon development efforts such as those that produced intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Polaris nuclear submarine and missile, and stealth technologies.
The threat environment for missile defense includes the possibility that missiles could be launched against the United States from anywhere on the globe. We are increasingly vulnerable to both short- and long-range missiles from rogue states and non-state actors, as well as from strategic competitors such as Russia and China. Because we cannot know with certainty where or when a missile will be launched against the United States, our missile defense must be capable of handling a broad spectrum of threats. In short, the United States needs to deploy a global,multi-tiered missile defense system against an increasingly worldwide missile threat.
II. What are the implications of the key issues raised in the Cornerstone Paper for overall U.S. national security?
The United States faces a global security setting characterized by accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them. New actors are acquiring technologies ranging from individual components to complete systems resulting in such capabilities. Although Russia does not today pose a missile threat to the United States, despite its continuing possession of large numbers of delivery systems with sufficient range to reach American targets, it possesses technologies, including ballistic missile components and expertise, that are being actively proliferated. Furthermore, we have no assurance that a future Russian leadership will not threaten the United States with its extensive nuclear-armed missile inventory.Indeed,under President Vladimir V. Putin, Russia appears increasingly committed to the reestablishment of a neo-imperialist sphere of influence in the new states to its south and west. Putin has spoken of rebuilding a “Great Russia.” Russia has also demonstrated a sustained and alarming drift toward authoritarianism. A U.S. missile defense must therefore be sufficient to counter a future threat from Russia.
China, meanwhile, is expanding both its ballistic missile capabilities and its space presence. China has benefited considerably from U.S. technology, including missiles, and now has an inventory of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the United States. This capability is being improved by replacing China ’s existing arsenal of CSS-4 “Mod 1 ” ICBMs with the longer-range CSS-4 “Mod 2,” together with the development of mobile and submarine-launched variants of the Dong-feng (DF)-31 ICBM. Estimates suggest that its arsenal could grow to as many as sixty ICBMs by the end of the decade. China seems determined to build a nuclear force designed to inhibit U.S. action in the event of a renewed crisis such as in the Taiwan Strait.At the same time,China is deploying between 650 and 730 short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan,with roughly one hundred such missiles expected to be added each year. These missiles could also be used to conduct strikes against Okinawa and Japan, including U.S. forces stationed there.
China also possesses an active space program designed to make it a military space power.With the launch in October of its first manned spacecraft, China became the third nation, after the United States and Russia, to send a manned vehicle into space. A second successful manned mission was completed in October 2005. China ’s space program is designed to demonstrate Beijing ’s achievements and potential in such areas as computers,space materials, manufacturing technology, and electronics, technologies with dual-use military and civilian space applications, as well as to challenge U.S. dominance in space.
At the same time, the United States faces threats from other states that are either the exporters of WMD technologies or the breeding rounds and training sites for terrorists. One such nation is North Korea, which launched . In addition to missiles, North Korea now is able to export fissile material or even assembled nuclear devices, posing an additional and unacceptable threat to the United States. A nuclear-armed North Korea would also weaken deterrence in and around the Korean peninsula.
Moreover, many states, as well as terrorist groups, could launch short-range missiles from ships off American coasts. We currently have no missile defense capable of destroying such missiles. The devastation caused by short-range missiles such as Scuds armed with a nuclear warhead would be far greater than the 9/11 attacks. A comprehensive approach to homeland security, in which missile defense and efforts to identify, destroy, or change such regimes are priorities, is therefore needed.
III. What steps need to be taken in light of these issues to achieve space-based missile defense, both immediate and longer-term?
During the Cold War, it was clearly possible to identify the Soviet Union as the source of a potential nuclear attack against the United States and the object of retaliation on which Mutual Assured Destruction was based. The twenty-first century strategic environment differs fundamentally: missile threats to the United States can now be mounted from almost any point on the globe.
Given the nature of this missile threat, only a global missile defense is adequate. Moreover, such a defense cannot be achieved without a space-based interception component. In the near term, kinetic energy space-based intercept technologies developed more than a decade ago in the Brilliant Pebbles program could be revived at minimal cost (approximately $5-7 billion over a five-year period).. A research program in directed-energy weapons based on technologies already developed for applications in space and on aircraft should also be pursued.
While less flexible than space-based defenses, sea-based anti-missile options should be vigorously developed and deployed. This includes upgrades to the U.S. Navy ’s Aegis system and Standard Missile to provide increasingly effective intercept capabilities. Both sea- and space-based missile defenses are essential to a global layered missile defense.
IV. What are the key obstacles to space-based missile de- fense and how can they best be addressed and overcome?
While in effect, the ABM Treaty served as a critical impediment to U.S. deployment of space-based missile defense.
With the Treaty ’s termination in 2002, new opportunities for space-based missile defense have emerged. However, the key obstacles to space defenses remain more political than technological in nature.For example,certain constituencies continue to voice vehement opposition to space-based missile defenses in the mistaken belief that they could result in the weaponization of space. This assumption is the result of the dubious logic that if the United States refrains from the deployment of space-based missile defense, other nations will behave in similar fashion. There is no empirical basis for expecting such international reciprocation, however. Whatever the United States chooses to do (or not to do),China,among other nations,seems determined to pursue space programs and, at least in the case of Beijing, to establish itself as a space superpower.
Another issue is the failure to connect the emerging global missile threat to an adequate understanding of the requirements for an effective defense against such threats. This means that confining a U.S. missile defense to a few fixed land-based interceptors, together with an extremely small sea-based and land-based interceptor force provides extremely limited coverage without any global capability that would result from deployment of a space-based missile defense component.
Other political obstacles exist. Should U.S. public awareness of the threat environment increase the Bush administration could potentially come under criticism for having underestimated (or ignored) the growing threat. That same public will want to know why so little has been accomplished to date.
Closely related are institutional barriers in which departments and agencies responsible for missile defense are understandably reluctant to see their efforts questioned or their roles changed. Furthermore, defense contractors often have strong financial interests in maintaining existing programs.
Last but not least, China and Russia have adopted strategies designed to prevent or discourage the United States from pursuing space-based missile defense options. Both nations seek to undermine the position of the United States as the dominant space power and to keep it from developing space-based missile defense and other space capabilities.
V. Are there opportunities that can be seized to press forward with space-based missile defense?<.u>
Despite the political obstacles,there is a desire within the general American public to maintain space superiority,including the deployment of space-based missile defense. If the United States is perceived as no longer dominant in space, many people will want to know how and why such dominance was lost and what needs to be done to restore it.
By the same token, there is a broad, but mistaken, belief that the United States is already defended by missile defense (which underscores the public ’s support for missile defenses).
Moreover, as noted above, China ’s increasingly prolific space program could offer another catalyst to building an American consensus on missile defense. The fact that other nations are manifestly interested in space and pursuing their own programs provides yet another important consideration for pressing forward with a robust U.S. missile defense program that prominently includes space.
Last but not least, the Bush administration has yet to de- fine clearly its missile defense plans post-GMD deployment.
Therefore, we have an important opportunity to shape the future and in doing so, to set forth the need for a global layered missile defense system that encompasses a space-interdicton component.
VI. What are the implications of key issues raised in Panel I for other panels?
The Cornerstone Paper raises a number of important issues including the global nature of the missile threat, the need for a correspondingly global defense and the role of space in that architecture,and existing obstacles and opportunities to the development and deployment of a layered global missile defense. Creating a robust,flexible,and expandable missile defense will have important implications for the U.S. scientific-technological base, including required investments, lead times, and ensuring that a cadre of trained personnel remain available. Such issues will need to be addressed as the United States moves forward with missile defense. They are discussed in greater detail in subsequent Sections of this report.
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