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Good related article:

At a House Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday, the Defense Intelligence Agency head, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, said that although the Iraqi chemical weapons were in degraded condition, they were still "a danger in Iraq for those who could come in contact with them." Use "outside of Iraq could not be ruled out," he added.

The NGIC commander, Col. John Chiu, testified that "regardless of the purity . . . any remaining agent is toxic, with potential to be lethal."

The ISG's 2004 Duelfer Report documented Saddam's ability and willingness to use chemical weapons again. Among the findings:

• Saddam's government intended to resume all banned weapons programs once sanctions against Iraq were lifted.

• Saddam considered chemical warfare "a proven weapon against an enemy's superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already — during the Iran-Iraq War — and . . . deterred the coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad."

• The U.N.'s oil-for-food program "sparked a flow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied to . . . Iraq's chemical industry."

• "The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge base needed to restart a CW (chemical weapons) program."

• Hardware found by the ISG "suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds."

• The head of the Iraqi paramilitary force tried to obtain chemical weapons for use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

• The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) from 1991 to 2003 maintained "a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations." Those labs could have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue R&D or small CW production.

• Saddam's IIS program used human subjects for testing.

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf

Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta.On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah.The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had “reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.”109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was “probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.” Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the “exact formula used by Iraq.”110This language about al Qaeda’s “understanding” with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.