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"Considering the NFA didn't come around until 1934, an 1870's case on the issue would be a little out of place."

I did not offer English v Texas as a case negating the NFA. I wrote that it "supports the contention you make" which was that the NFA is unconstitutional because it restricts "private ownership of the very type of arms necessary to formulate a militia unit."

In English v Texas the Texas Supreme Court held that weapons such as "dirks, daggers, slungshots, sword-canes, brass-knuckles and bowie knives, belong to no military vocabulary" and affirmed the right of the State of Texas to control their use, because they did not constitute weapons a militiaman would use, which by inference, means that weapons falling within the "military vocabulary" would be protected. Here is a quote giving substance to this claim by the court, which specifically named the weapons of an infantryman or militia soldier that were covered:

". . . The word "arms" in the connection we find it in the constitution of the United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or soldier, and the word is used in its military sense. The arms of the infantry soldier are the musket and bayonet; of cavalry and dragoons, the sabre, holster pistols and carbine; of the artillery, the field piece, siege gun, and mortar, with side arms. . . ."

So by inference, it can be logically argued that the passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934 overturns a legally-established right, given substance in the English v Texas decision, for a person to possess the weapons of a militiaman as you had stated.

English v. Texas was also wrong. The weapons of a "militiamen" are any weapon, right down to his bare fists, that said militiamen could use in his defense, that of another, or of the Nation in an official capacity. Placing a limit on the definition of "arms" is a slippery slope whereby even todays State CCW laws, and lack of open carry provison, restrict a particularlly useful "militia weapon" re: handguns.

E v. TX is wrong as it restricts a common mans most humble arms and the NFA of '34 is wrong as it unConstitutionally does a similar "infringement" at the Federal level.

So by inference, it can be logically argued that the passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934 overturns a legally-established right, given substance in the English v Texas decision, for a person to possess the weapons of a militiaman as you had stated.

Now you are beginning to "get it". Now look up the US First Circuit court's "Cases" decision, from 1941.

Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the federal government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.

But they recoiled in apparent horror from their own logical conconclusion, and went on to state:

However, we do not feet that the Supreme Court in this case was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases. ... at any rate the rule of the Miller case, if intended to be comprehensive and complete would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it was formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well known fact that in the so called "Commando Units" some sort of military use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon. In view of this, if the rule of the Miller case is general and complete, the result would follow that, under present day conditions, the federal government would be empowered only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus. But to hold that the Second Amendment limits the federal government to regulations concerning only weapons which can be classed as antiques or curiosities, -almost any other might bear some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia unit of the present day,-is in effect to hold that the limitation of the Second Amendment is absolute. Another objection to the rule of the Miller case as a full and general statement is that according to it Congress would be prevented by the Second Amendment from regulating the possession or use by private persons not present or prospective members of any military unit, of distinctly military arms, such as machine guns, trench mortars, anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns, even though under the circumstances surrounding such possession or use it would be inconceivable that a private person could have any legitimate reason for having such a weapon. It seems to us unlikely that the framers of the Amendment intended any such result.

But that is exactly what the founders intended. Rights are not subject to governmental determination of a"legitimate reason" for exercising them.