In the event of invasion, he planned to go to ground and direct an insurgency -- and had prepared the ground to do exactly that. Evidently, we were totally unprepared for this tactic.
After what we have learned about CIA opposition to this war, is it any wonder our intel on the Saddam Fedayeen and the Mukhabarat was weak?
See Camp Saddam.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted] sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism.
How do you prepare for an insurgency?
Do you kill everyone that looks suspicious?
Do you incarcerate everyone that looks suspicious? When do you release them? How can you prove that that person will not revert to an insurgent?
A stable gov't with popular support can undermine an insurgency. Therefore, the best course was to move forward, setup the gov't, kill insurgents as they arise and hope the people come together.
It looks like our plan is working. Given the fact that we only lost 2500 men over 3 years is a testiment to success, not failure.