Port Security is being handled by a US company (period). Two of the twelve highjackers were originally from the UAE. By discounting the entire UAE as being untrustworthy is bad diplomacy. This deal was announded in November and not a peep from either side. This is politics pure and simple, a way for politicians from both sides to scream their outrage.
Oh honestly. In addition to ignoring Dubai's direct ties to terrorist funding, transit, and facilitation, you trot out this nonsense.
The notion that terminal operators are some kind of isolated (and apparently excess) middle-men without responsibility for port security, cargo tracking and verification, and the vetting of personnel is so patently false that I'm truly surprised at its constant repetition as a talking point.
Operator cooperation is integral to effective port security. The Canadian PIP program, the US Customs CIS program, the Container Seal Verification Regime (CSVR), and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), are just a few of the security regimes that require operator initiative, cooperation, and reporting.
As a small example, TWIC, a uniform personnel credentialing procedure, will vet the identity and background of individuals with access to cargo and to secure areas of a marine cargo handling facility. It is implemented by the operator pursuant to explicit operator duties under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The duties under the 2002 Act include requirements that marine cargo handling facility operators submit facility security plans designating "secure" areas of the facility for control of access by vessels, vehicles and individuals.
These procedures (PIP, CIS, CSVR, TWIC) are designed with the intention of operator participation, and include essential site security procedures and mandates directly imposed on the operator. Properly vetted personnel at domestic facilities, secure rail and land connections with terminals, container content verifications, etc. are nothing to be sneered at or lightly dismissed.
Heck, even DP World stated explicitly that "We intend to maintain and, where appropriate, enhance current security arrangements," making this claim that DP World will have no responsibility for security a truly bizarre little piece of spin.
The UAE has been unable (or, more likely, unwilling) to police its domestic companies and financial institutions, which have an ignoble history of providing terrorism funding, transit, and logistics. There is no good reason to believe that a state owned company of the UAE will be somehow free from the same manipulations.
The more difficult it is to smuggle or deliver devices, materials, or fungibles to an end destination, including a port itself (which is, after all, a perfect target in many instances due to immediate proximity to chemical and petroleum storage and refining), the better off we are. That's the whole point of efforts to assure container, site, personnel, and land transfer security, and the whole point behind integrating domestic, trustworthy operators into these security procedures.