Replies

“Courts begin their review to determine whether a statement is susceptible of a defamatory meaning by looking ‘to the fair and natural meaning which will be given it by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence’ ” Ibid. (citations omitted). “The court must consider all the words used not merely a particular phrase or sentence.” Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., 386 Mass. 303, 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1025, cert. denied,459 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 449, 74 L.Ed.2d 603 (1982). Therefore, our focus must be on the defendant's entire statement, not just “wife-beating.”
Here, Grant's full remark was “sick, no good, pot smoking, wife beating skunk.” We acknowledge that the words “wife-beating,” taken alone, could be defamatory, especially in light of our society's heightened awareness of domestic violence. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. When “wife-beating” is considered in the context with the remaining words, however, we are satisfied that the language is mere name-calling or verbal abuse. “The common law has always differentiated sharply between genuinely defamatory communications as opposed to obscenities, vulgarities, insults, epithets, name calling, and other verbal abuse.” Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 4.03 at 4-12 (1995).
As to verifiability, we agree that whether plaintiff is a “wife-beater” is capable of being verified. Nonetheless, Grant used “wife-beating” as a descriptive adjective for the noun “skunk.” We think it inappropriate, under these circumstances, to separate “wife-beating” from the remaining remarks by Grant. Grant engaged in “non-defamatory name calling.” Ward, supra, 136 *137 N.J. at 530, 643 A.2d 972. “There are some statements that are in form statements of opinion, or even of fact, which cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and seriously and are obviously mere vituperation and abuse.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566 Comment e. (emphasis added). We are satisfied that this is the case here, despite the ability to verify whether plaintiff is a “wife-beater.”
[5] We next consider the context. We examine “the statement in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published.” Cole, supra, 435 N.E.2d at 1025. “[T]he context to be considered is both narrowly linguistic and broadly social.” Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982 (D.C.Cir.1984)(en banc), cert. denied,471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). “The listener's reasonable interpretation, which will be based in part on the context in which the statement appears, is the proper measure for whether the statement is actionable.” Ward, supra, 136 N.J. at 532, 643 A.2d 972.
Here, Grant's remarks were made in the context of a long time “war of words” between plaintiff and Grant. Plaintiff was a radio monitor who commenced a public campaign to vanquish Grant from the airwaves because plaintiff perceived that Grant was dividing “our society along racial lines.” Plaintiff taped Grant's show and provided those tapes to others and wrote letters to **1014 Grant's employer and to the media complaining about Grant and his talk show. Furthermore, a published article about plaintiff dated June 10, 1993, stated that plaintiff had “monitored ‘hate radio programs'··· for over five years.” The article discussed plaintiff's claims that “he has gotten people fired for ‘broadcasting hate’ ” and that “he is currently out to nail Bob Grant.” Plaintiff's efforts to get rid of Grant began in 1988. Grant, in response, had referred to plaintiff as a “stalker” and other unflattering terms.
[6] In addition to the above circumstances, when considering context we also look at the “medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is published.” Cole, supra, 435 N.E.2d at 1025. Grant made his remarks during the *138 broadcast of his controversial talk-radio show. Grant's listeners knew that he would make provocative and caustic remarks during his broadcast.
Indeed “[t]he ordinary reasonable recipient of a communication naturally discounts to some degree statements made in the heat of vitriolic battle, because the recipient understands and anticipates the human tendency to exaggerate positions during the passions and prejudices of the moment.”
[ Ward, supra, 136 N.J. at 532-33, 643 A.2d 972 (quoting Smolla, supra, § 6.08[4][b][ii], at 6-35)(alteration in original).]
Further, Grant's listeners were aware of his verbal feud with plaintiff. They knew about plaintiff's monitoring and his efforts to remove Grant from the airways. Moreover, the listeners were aware of plaintiff's involvement in the David C. Clark incident involving the Neptune School District.
Grant made his remarks during a conversation with a caller about the death of David Clark, who died earlier on the same date. The caller and Grant were discussing the tragedy of Clark's death and a book that Grant intended to write, which would include “the David Clark story,” when Grant, who perceived that plaintiff was responsible for Clark's suspension, made his comment. In this context, we conclude that any listener “must have perceived that the word [s] [were] no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by” Grant who perceived that plaintiff was responsible for the misfortune visited upon David Clark. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g. Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1542, 26 L.Ed.2d 6, 15 (1970). Cf. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980)(holding that a statement accusing a union of “communism” was opinion, and, therefore, not actionable because the audience heard the charge on a radio call-in talk show during a public debate over a labor contract that threatened to add to the tax rate).
[7] We also find it relevant that plaintiff voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy. Plaintiff, as a result of his activities regarding Grant, became a limited public figure. See *139 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 811 (1974).
Those who step into areas of public dispute, who choose the pleasures and distractions of controversy, must be willing to bear criticism, disparagement, and even wounding assessments. Perhaps it would be better if disputation were conducted in measured phrases and calibrated assessments, and with strict avoidance of the ad hominem; better, that is, if the opinion and editorial pages of the public press were modeled on The Federalist Papers. But that is not the world in which we live, ever have lived, or are ever likely to know, and the law of the first amendment must not try to make public dispute safe and comfortable for all the participants. That would only stifle the debate.
[ Ollman, supra, 750 F.2d at 993 (Bork, J. concurring).]
The motion judge properly concluded that the statement was not actionable and appropriately applied the criteria set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).

Wilson v. Grant 297 N.J.Super. 128, *136-139, 687 A.2d 1009,**1013 - 1014 (N.J.Super.A.D.,1996)