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For the gold, see my book, "Banking in the American South, from the Age of Jackson to Reconstruction." It's interesting that Lincoln destroyed the southern economy largely by yanking the financial basis out from under it with the Emancipation Proc. Most southern banks had only two forms of collateral on the books: land and slaves. But the land was worthless without the slaves. When Lincoln announced that slavery was over in the south---whether it was in reality or not---the uncertainty associated with the possibility finished off what the Confederate government started with its confiscation of all gold in early 1861 (which was the only other form of reserve any banks had). So, ironically, the two presidents utterly destroyed the once-strong southern banking system.

In fact, the southern banks were stronger/more stable than the northern banks going into the war (though not nearly as large) because of branch banking in the south; but typically Davis destroyed their note-issuing function by taking their gold and printing Confederate notes, whereas in the north, Lincoln utilized an inferior system of "unit" banks by allowing them to retain their note-issue function, thus the number of "greenbacks" peaked at only $450m, and never constituted any major source of money in the north. More to the point, northern currencty held its value (supported by gold) while Confederate notes plummeted. (See "Graybacks and Gold," by James Morgan).

I would take what Jeff Davis said with a grain of salt. He had his own agenda. All one needs to know about the unpopularity of the war from the get-go in the south was that more southerners fought for the Union than northerners fought for the south---a lot more. In addition to the more than 80,000 black troops from seceded states who fought in blue, 100,000 white southerners (40,000 from Tenn.) fought for the Union, including the 4th Ark. Infantry, the 1st Mississippi Mounted Rifles, the 2nd Florida Cavalry, and the 1st Alabama Infantry.

Stanley Legergott, a well-known economic historian, has written an article in the Journal of Am. History in which he traced the quiet rebellion of the merchant and business classes against the Confed. government over the cotton embargo and high taxation, and found that by 1863, the blockade runners---who were operating under the financial support of these groups---were only bringing in jewelry, fancy clothes, combs, etc., which the merchants could sell at high premiums, NOT guns or ammo that were needed by the army.

For the gold, see my book, "Banking in the American South, from the Age of Jackson to Reconstruction."

Ah, thank you again for an excellent reference. I will put this one on my Amazon wishlist, as I prefer to own books written by you to borrowing them!

It's interesting that Lincoln destroyed the southern economy largely by yanking the financial basis out from under it...but typically Davis destroyed their note-issuing function by taking their gold and printing Confederate notes...northern currencty held its value (supported by gold) while Confederate notes plummeted. (See "Graybacks and Gold," by James Morgan).

Forgive me for abbreviating your quote, but I didn't want to sandwich a brief reply between overly large paragraphs. I've noted the reference, and will add it to my library list.

Didn't the Confederate currency plummet largely as a result of quasi-official counterfeiting rings, which printed large quantities of fake Confederate notes in New York City and supplied these notes to Sherman's Army, who spread them all over the south? That's one of the claims made by Mr. Davis, though I can see it as being a potential usage of war (I believe the British did something similar in the War of 1812) between Christian belligerents.

...whereas in the north, Lincoln utilized an inferior system of "unit" banks by allowing them to retain their note-issue function, thus the number of "greenbacks" peaked at only $450m, and never constituted any major source of money in the north. More to the point...

The Federal debt in the war was an order of magnitude larger than the Confederate debt. Could that be a consequence of the Northern (more centralized) banking policy? Or merely a result of having an immensely larger army and war policy?

I would take what Jeff Davis said with a grain of salt. He had his own agenda.

I actually enjoy "Rise and Fall" to a great degree. I understand that he had his own agenda in writing what he did, but I'd argue that, as humans, we all have our own agendas. In its final form (and I'm not saying I accept everything in it at face value, merely commenting on its form), it comes across to me, the reader, as a very beautiful argument for the sovereignty of the people, versus the military might of a conquerer.

All one needs to know about the unpopularity of the war from the get-go in the south was that more southerners fought for the Union than northerners fought for the south---a lot more. In addition to the more than 80,000 black troops from seceded states who fought in blue, 100,000 white southerners (40,000 from Tenn.) fought for the Union, including the 4th Ark. Infantry, the 1st Mississippi Mounted Rifles, the 2nd Florida Cavalry, and the 1st Alabama Infantry.

Are all of these soldiers counted here voluntary? Or were they conscripted by the invading Northern army? (I'm not very intimately familiar with the military side of the Civil War at this point, I admittedly have quite a bit of work left to do to bring my understanding of those affairs up to par. Please forgive me for asking these questions out of such supreme ignorance, but they're the first questions that come to mind in reading the prior statement.)

Stanley Legergott, a well-known economic historian, has written an article in the Journal of Am. History in which he traced the quiet rebellion of the merchant and business classes against the Confed. government over the cotton embargo and high taxation, and found that by 1863, the blockade runners---who were operating under the financial support of these groups---were only bringing in jewelry, fancy clothes, combs, etc., which the merchants could sell at high premiums, NOT guns or ammo that were needed by the army.

I will see if I can find that article - It sounds rather interesting. I was under the impression that blockade running was fairly subdued after 1862, as most of the nations which would have been there to trade with the Confederacy were blocking military orders from being sent to any Southern destination, as a result of a "neutral policy." Is that a correct reading of the historical record?

In light of that, what do you think about the fact that these same nations, who were refusing trade with the CSA [which, in my opinion, was too interested in behaving honorably to be able to succeed in this type of affair], were on the other hand openly dealing in arms and soldiers to the United States. Was this considered fair treatment, in light of the usages of Christian war up until 1860?

(I tend to compare the Civil War with the War of 1812, wherein the British and the Northern armies were merely interested in conquest and domination of the Americans and Southerners; respectively. Do you think that's a fair allegory to use?)

As always, I am humbled and honored to hold you in the highest regard,

Most respectfully,
~dt~

For some the Civil War is a conflict between oppressive central governments and liberty or the people. That takes on mythical proportions. I don't think they get just how much the Confederacy was driven by ambitious politicians and how strong its central government really was during the war.

A lot of the discussion of secession assumes that somehow these were harmless or laudable rebels. People would come to different conclusions about the Constitution if it were another group with a different philosophy that tried to break away.