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This post contains 2 opinions, not mine.
granny.........

"...the more democratic Palestinians and Iraqis become, the less
likely they are to support U.S. strategic and economic interests.
Israel is a strategic interest for the United States; but it is
unlikely that given a choice, most people in the Middle East would
accept Israel's right to exist. In other words, ideal election
outcomes may not result in ideal foreign policy outcomes, from a U.S.
perspective."
"Democracies, even traditional allies, often don't see eye to eye; and
historically they are as likely to start wars as dictatorships."
"Thus, as in Woodrow Wilson's day, exporting democracy is as useful
for gaining domestic political support as it is destructive as foreign
policy."

Especially since in both Iraq and Palestine, as in already in Iran and
possibly soon in Lebanon as well, the "democratically elected"
majority parties are hard-line and/or terrorist Islamists whose
primary aims include expulsion of infidels (especially Jewish
infidels) from Muslim lands. Regardless of whether or not those
infidels lived in an area of Muslim land (Palestine and Jordan) over a
thousand years before Islam existed. Superimposing democratic
processes on peoples with no history of freedom, democracy or
religious diversity results only in the process being taken over by
existing extremists: Islamists.
Thus, U.S. policy of "democratization" has been a wonderful
vote-getting ploy for CICBush43 in his elections. HOWEVER, its
implementation, including CICBush43's invasion of Iraq and pressure on
Syria (about Lebanon where the Shiite majority's Hizballah terrorist
militia would likely win any new election) and on Israel (contrary to
the article author's premise that such pressure on Israel will solve
the Palestinian problem) to withdraw from Gaza is the establishment of
hard-line Islamist regimes highly likely to actively oppose the United
States and join Iran in favoring eradicating Israel by whatever means
possible. The only exceptions might be the Kurd zone of Iraq (if it
survives, against very heavy odds, as an independent entity) and the
Karzai government in Afghanistan. The latter is on very shaky ground
as the Taliban, complete with field level leadership from al-Qaeda and
plentiful modern arms bought from the Tamil Tigers arms network with
narcotics money, is rebounding and using Iraqi tactics (IED's, car
bombs, suicide bombers) and its usual elimination of officials,
teachers and doctors (along with the occasional U.S., NATO or U.N.
soldiers) to cause increasing disarray for the already weak Karzai
government. Nuclear-armed Pakistan only awaits the removal of
Musharraf to join the ranks of our Islamist enemies stretching from
India to Palestine.
Overall, not a successful result for CICBush43's "democratization".

David

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/27/opinion/edtoft.php?rss

When terrorists go mainstream

Monica Duffy Toft The Boston Globe
FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 2006
CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts Perhaps the biggest surprise about this
week's election results, in which the terrorist group Hamas won a
majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament, is that it was so
much of a surprise to America. There are two main reasons why.

First, many in America have fallen victim to the notion that if
today's rogue states are bad neighbors, democratization will make them
good neighbors. A central pillar of the current Bush administration's
foreign policy is that dictators make bad neighbors. In other words,
we can expect authoritarian governments to start wars and support
terrorism more readily than democratic governments.

When President George W. Bush first took office, the security concern
of the day was "rogue states," a euphemism for Afghanistan, North
Korea, Iraq and Iran. After Sept. 11, the threat of rogue states
morphed into the terrorist threat, along with the conviction that
because these states were led by dictators, they would be more
susceptible to terrorism and they would eventually have "to be dealt
with."

But apt as the characterization of these states might have been, and
as troubling as they were to their respective neighbors, the corollary
does not follow. It is not the case that democratic states necessarily
make good neighbors on account of their form of government alone.

Japan is a democracy, but China does not rest easy on that account,
even though Japan has no formal military to speak of, and even though
pacifism is a part of its constitution. Democracies, even traditional
allies, often don't see eye to eye; and historically they are as
likely to start wars as dictatorships.

Second, most Americans buy into the romantic notion that "there are no
bad people, only bad leaders." By extension, giving power to the
people must result in "good" policy. The trouble is, what is "good"
depends on where you sit. If you live among the minority of states
that are rich and getting richer, then war and violence are a bad
idea: There is little to gain and everything to lose. If, however, you
live among the majority of states that are poor and getting poorer,
then war and violence seem a good idea: There is everything to gain
and nothing to lose. Thus, as in Woodrow Wilson's day, exporting
democracy is as useful for gaining domestic political support as it is
destructive as foreign policy.

Logic notwithstanding, we have a real-world example of what happens
when the people of a poor Islamic state are offered democracy. In the
early 1990s, Algeria's government held democratic elections to head
off widespread dissent and riots. The Islamic Salvation Front - the
first legal Islamic political party in North Africa - worked hard to
win. When the Algerian people were given a choice (twice), they chose
the theocracy (twice), and the government of Algeria was toppled by a
military coup that repudiated the election results and imposed martial
law.

What can we learn from this?

First, the United States and its allies have the power to bring their
own foreign policies in line with their professed democratic values.
It may be difficult, but the United States must stop supporting
military dictatorships simply because they are "allies in the war
against terror." The United States must also support Israel by
pressuring it to concede to a genuine Palestinian state, while at the
same time guaranteeing Israel's security.

Second, the more democratic Palestinians and Iraqis become, the less
likely they are to support U.S. strategic and economic interests.
Israel is a strategic interest for the United States; but it is
unlikely that given a choice, most people in the Middle East would
accept Israel's right to exist. In other words, ideal election
outcomes may not result in ideal foreign policy outcomes, from a U.S.
perspective.

Countering the popular appeal of groups such as Hamas requires
controlling habitat, not population. Killing terrorists can't stop the
violence until and unless you destroy the habitat that produces them.
That in turn demands serious effort at providing basic needs, such as
food, shelter, clean water, education and health care.

Hamas has historically done much better at providing for the basic
needs of Palestinian Arabs than the Fatah politicians in the
Palestinian Authority. That's why Hamas won, and that's why, when
seeking to export democracy, the United States and its allies must
remain careful of what they wish for.

(Monica Duffy Toft is an associate professor at the Kennedy School of
Government and assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute of
Strategic Studies at Harvard University.)