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"By the same token, it seems that a warrant may not be needed for a "reasonable" search of Al Queda operatives if they are caught in the act of communicating enemy "signals.""

I'm sure you can find somebody that will argue that it is not reasonable, but I'm not. In cases where communications from abroad are tapped and incoming or outgoing calls to the U.S. and even to U.S. Persons are intercepted, to me that seems reasonable.

I have difficulty imagining a court denying a retroactive warrant in such a case. So why bypass such a system?

"So why bypass such a system?"

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Are you for real?!

This entire thread started out with the article, which pointed out that the FISA court denied the warrants in quite a number of cases.

As the article, excerpt of which I posted in posts 298 & 300, said, the President HAS the authority in the first place, he doesn't need to go through FISA.

In cases where communications from abroad are tapped and incoming or outgoing calls to the U.S. and even to U.S. Persons are intercepted, to me that seems reasonable.

I have difficulty imagining a court denying a retroactive warrant in such a case. So why bypass such a system?

Because it has been politicized.

I have difficulty imagining a court denying a retroactive warrant in such a case. So why bypass such a system?

Easy. You have two competing elements here that aren't designed to work with each other.

Judges, especially FISA judges, are not rubber stamps. They want to see probable cause, and are sticklers for detail. The process to put something before a FISA judge is very strict, time consuming, and will weed out anything that won't get approved.

Intelligence analysts, on the other hand, are in a perpetual race against the clock. Their targets are elusive, and evasive. They rarely leave enough of a footprint to be deemed 'probable cause'. Through pattern analysis a smart analyst can find needles in the haystack, but that requires being allowed to look.

To that end, the analysts don't care about prosecuting these guys, just stopping attacks. They only needs a quick peek. The law enforcement types might want to build a case, get a warrant, do some long term surveillance, and eventually prosecute. They may even determine that the analyst was wrong, and drop the case entirely.

The point is that law enforcement tools are not agile enough to defeat a military opponent. Nor should they be. We shouldn't expect the FISA judges to rubber stamp any request that gets sent their way, since that would allow FAR more than the quick peek the analysts need. On the other hand, letting the intelligence side of the house have some flexibility to screen for potential threats should be seen for what it is: a sensible precaution against a known foreign adversary that has advanced into our territory, and who hides behind laws that weren't designed to protect him.