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Our ability to decode intercepted Japanese messages was well less then 100%. But, even if we had the information, what were we supposed to do with it? Tensions between the US and Japan had been building for some time, and the rest of the world was in the middle of a world war. We were already at a high alert and gearing up war-level production of military equipment and personnel. A state of war did not exist.

- Would it be smart to let the Japanese know that we have broken their code, by publishing the exact content of their coded message?
- Should the administration attack the Japanese fleet in international waters, without a declaration of hostilities, without a declaration of war, and strike the first blow?

We did all that could have been done. We warned our bases and continued to prepare. It was Kimmel who failed to appreciate the risk. It was his fault that we were caught with our pants down at Pearl Harbor. He should have appreciated that we had a large number of assets assigned to his command, and he should have used some of them to establish adequate pickets and responses.

Your ...

" ...He should have appreciated that we had a large number of assets assigned to his command, and he should have used some of them to establish adequate pickets and responses."

neglects some specific facts.

For example, during 1941 fully a third of the Pacific Fleet was transferred to the Atlantic to support the convoying of Lend-Lease war materiels - these included the majority of Fleet's oilers. In this same period, over 200 PBYs also went to the USSR, again under Lead-Lease, while Pearl Harbor got very few and even less spare parts, ..., etc.

For more details on the types/numbers of "assets" and their fighting capacity - see Gannon's "Pearl Harbor Betrayed" from 2001.