The first instalment gives a detailed account of the origins of the documents (or most of them, my note) up to the autumn of 2001 when Nicolò Pollari passed the false SISMI dossier to Rome CIA station chief, Jeff Castelli. In a previous diary I had alluded to the possible role of Castelli in the Nigergate scandal. Castelli wrote a report and forwarded it to the Greg Thielmann's Bureau of Intelligence which eventually dismissed this first report as unfounded.
It is a known fact that a report on the bogus, made-in-Rome dossier ended up at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence—in the Office of Strategic, Military and WMD Proliferation Affairs.
Strategic Affairs is not a big place. At the time, 16 analysts worked there under the direction of Greg Thielmann. Thielmann tells La Repubblica: I received the report in fall of 2001. We thought that Langley had acquired it from their field officer in Italy. The agent in the field reports that Italian intelligence permitted him see some papers documenting the attempt by Iraq to acquire 500 tons of uranium ore from Niger.
I know I saw a better source on this, however, will see what I can find. I don't like sourcing from moonbat sites blaming the Italians, LOL!
Thanks! I think some of that may be alluded to in the Senate report on prewar intelligence, minus the names of the personnel involved, so we might try crossreferencing against that for corroboration.